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ABSTRACT
WEAK LINKS IN A DANGEROUSLY FRACTURED REGION: FRAGILE STATE AS GLOBAL
THREATS
Tasawar ul-Rahim Baig
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty

In the post-9/11 period a common belief em erged th a t fragile states are
launching pads for unprecedented and unconventional transnational threats. The rise o f
state fragility or state failure as a paradigm surfaced a fte r th e end of th e Cold W ar, but
their high risk factor was noticed only later. This is because increased
interconnectedness allows inform ation to spread faster and intensifies th re a t
perceptions.
This study recognizes th at the idea o f w eak states, small states, and political
decay existed before, and that the notion o f state fragility has been w idely used in
recent years. The conventional wisdom about political decay refers to the
ineffectiveness of institutions and corrupt governance structures which enfeeble th e
state, and which is similar to the current literature focused on dom estic factors. To
understand the fragility of statehood, th e study answers the following research
question: "Under w h at conditions do w eak and fragile states continue to fail?"
The analysis explores tw o core factors: endogenous and exogenous. The
academic literature primarily focuses on endogenous factors, m ainly political, security,
economic, and social perform ance of states, to determ ine state capacity and
capabilities. However, this study adds geography, or geopolitics, as an exogenous factor

causing state fragility in many cases. Therefore, the study suggests a new category,
"weak pivot states" in which fragility is not only the outcom e o f domestic factors but is
also due to its geography and position as a "pivot." The evidence suggests th a t the
im pact factor of "weak pivot states" is higher than o th er w eak and fragile states, as they
are m ore susceptible to great pow er struggles.
As "w eak pivot states" sit at th e crossroads o f major and regional powers'
interests, one of the findings of this dissertation dem onstrates that m ajor powers have
often supported undemocratic forces, w ith centralized authoritarian regimes benefiting
the interests of a hegemon. The reduction of the th re a t level requires the provision of
stability and the im plem entation of an effective political order. The findings suggest th a t
fragile states need to reorient their constitutions and laws so as to create opportu nity of
equality and inclusiveness to its populations. In addition, th e dissertation recom m ends
the creation of "spheres o f socialization" at intra-state and inter-state level th a t will
allow education for democracy towards state building and establishing accountable
political systems instead of interventions in w eak and fragile states; and also facilitate
an integration process at sub-regional, regional and then global level to tackle the
burden of geography respectively.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The weak states are cracks in the very foundation of our international
system. Left untended, they can and they will threaten the entire edifice of
political and economic stability ... The threats to our security fro m weak and
failed states are very different from the threats we are used to, and very different
from the threats we are prepared fo r ...Those states can destabilize their
neighbors and whole regions, creating humanitarian crises as severe as any
natural disaster... We have both a humanitarian obligation and a national
security mandate to pay attention.
Senator Joseph R. Biden1

The post 9 /1 1 period changed the security dynamics of the entire w orld. W ith
th e emergence o f new spheres of influence on a global scale, 9 /1 1 has raised num erous
questions about the complexities o f our tim e and th e ways to govern new insecurities.
Fragile states, trans-national m ovem ents, and geopolitical recasting breed
unprecedented threats to traditional norms of political life. Among these threats, state
fragility and failure are portrayed as bogeymen. Dealing w ith state failure resembles a
swinging pendulum betw een an agenda of necessity and an agenda of choice for policy
makers and states themselves. The decision to choose th e best available option is
always linked to its cost, w h eth er political or econom ic.2
If we delve back into the past, the history of international relations is witness to
the rise and fall of political systems, w hether traced in city-states, em pires, or in

1 "Nations on th e Brink," (Center for Global Developm ent, 2004).
2 Simon Serfaty, A World R ecast: An American M o m en t in a Post-Western O rder (Lanham, M d .: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 73.

contem porary nation-states whose constant rise and fall are causes and consequences
of various intra-state and inter-state factors.
It is im portant to understand the conventional wisdom that political decay is a
substantive process th a t emerges because of a lack of political order, mainly
characterized as ineffective institutional capacities in a nascent or m alfunctioning aging
state. The institutions of m alfunctioning aging states are to o deeply fractured to
develop a m ature and viable political system. This means th e m alfunctioning aging
process, festered w ith prolonged chronic political ailm ent, causes th e decay of a political
system and potential breakout of the state. Both strong and at-risk societies are always
sensitive to essential ingredients th at can provide good health to function sm oothly.
Political order is a core ingredient th a t is needed to sustain the system to w ork
efficiently. For any political system, the absence o f order in a state means a higher level
of fracturedness and patent w eak bounds w ithin the state's political institutions. As a
m atter of truth, every state is susceptible to political decay. Surely the typology of a
state, meaning its nature, type, and category determ ines the level o f susceptibility.
Yet the w eak states are troubled w ith a wide range of domestic and external
security issues that are mainly driven by fragile nationhood, a lack of governability,
higher levels of political corruption, the rise of sub-level ethno-nationalism , sectarian
and inter-religious clashes, w eak economic grow th, the absence o f accountability in the
system, lawless borders, geopolitical challenges, and o th e r forms of socio-economic and
political fears. Consequently, for the citizen of fragile states, the meanings of the social
contract gradually diminish, and the w eak governm ent holds an increasingly ineffective

control over its territory.
Every state and its political system experiences a constant input (n e w demands
and support for dem and) and output (decisions or policies) processes; th e dom estic
state's structure tries to synchronize dem ands and realities.3 A successful
synchronization betw een input and outp u t processes reflects m aturity and th e viability
of th e system and its resiliency to cope w ith th e persistent change processes, w hile a
desynchronized process in the system tends to lead tow ards alteration, failure, or
decay.4
In recent times, political discourse refers to the notion of failure or decay in
connection to nation-states and their domestic systems. The political systems in
Afghanistan, Congo, Haiti, M yanm ar, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and m any m ore states in
Africa, Asia and Latin America, abound w ith vivid examples of political decay and state
failure. Interestingly, in recent tim es th e issues of state fragility and failure em an ate
from the weakness of states in the developing regions of th e world, w hile most of the
developing states em barked on the journey of nation building and d evelo p m en t as a
result of a massive wave of decolonization process following the Second W orld W ar.
Subsequently, most of the political leadership in newly independent societies has faced
troubling issues of effective authority and governability in "how to exercise pow er over
th e ir (newly shaped) territories given th e incom plete and highly invariable

3 David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis o f Political System," W orld Politics 9, no. 3 (1957): 384.
4 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O r d e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 1st ed.
(N ew York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 7.

4
administrative system" from colonial legacy.5
This study aims to discuss issues related to fractured statehood in w eak, but
geographically pivot states. It helps to draw a new category calling "W eak Pivot States."
This study first presents a theoretical fram ew o rk designed to develop a basic
understanding and explanation about th e causes and consequences of fracturedness in
w eak states. Next, the case studies apply theoretical explanations and seek solutions to
fix the gaps through dealing w ith contagious intra-state and geographical troubles in
w eak states. The core arguments validate the colonial legacies, domestic factors, and
state policies as reasons for continued state fragility. Therefore, the discussion involves
the historical and political developm ent of w eak and fragile states, which suggests
establishing a viable and effective political order th a t may resolve dom estic challenges.
The study questions the notion th a t dom estic factors are the only reasons for
state fragility. In this context, the w ork also re-visits the notion of political geography
along historical lines, which re-affirm s th a t geography still matters in a tim e of complex
interdependence. A careful observation reflects th a t the historical geopolitical mapping
and contem porary process of virtual re-m apping o f the world puts a burden on a w eak
state. Some studies inform th a t the burden o f geography can cause "state death," due
to external intervention.6 Specifically, the sensitivities and vulnerabilities o f virtual
geopolitical propositions of a globalized world creates higher political risks for fragile
states, because it has already "spurred the rebirth of localisms, built in many cases on

5 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa : Comparative Lessons in Authority an d Control, Princeton
Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 97.
6 Tanisha M . Fazal, State Death : The Politics and Geography o f Conquest, Occupation, an d Annexation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 17.

5
ethnic and religious consciousness," which fu rth e r widens th e exiting institutional gaps
of a fractured statehood.7 The rise o f ethnic consciousness gradually awakens the
ethno-nationalistic fervor th a t becomes a cauldron o f deprived and repressed anger,
waiting for the right tem peratu re to boil over.

ROOTS OF FRACTURED-NESS: PAST, PRESENT, AND W HAT NEXT?
The historiography of pre-colonial status of fissures in weak and fragile states
shows the very existence o f fragm ented identities, w eak institutions and incom patible
structures for state form ation; it is fo r these reasons th a t many of these fractured
statehoods are referred to as fragile, w eak, failed, or quasi-states th a t could not manage
to evolve towards m atured political entities.8
In the early years o f the post-colonial phase, the idea of self-determ ination
gathered more attention and higher preference than giving a serious e ffo rt to
developing a political system fo r a long-term survivability through political developm ent.
Subsequently, in later years gradual anarchic conditions become favorable fo r "civil
strife, governm ent breakdown, and economic privation."9 Observing the state form ation
during the post-colonial period depicts th a t many developing states perceived
modernization as a political will to attain the socio-economic and political goals,
believing it as the reason and modus operandi fo r the pattern of higher-level political
and economic developm ent practiced in the developed countries.
7 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge o f G eo g rap h y: W h at the M ap Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the
Battle against Fate, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2012), 35.
8 Seth D. Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States : A N ew Paradigm fo r Development (W estport, Conn.: Praeger
Security International, 2008), 36-37.
9Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89(1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 ): 3-4.

According to Karl Deutsch (1963), the processes of m odernization helped
accelerate the rate of social mobility, w hile social m obilization offers m ultiple positive
outcomes th at som ehow link to political developm ent and a higher level o f participation
as w ell. M odernization is also explained as economic developm ent; for instance, in th e
developed w orld, the higher level o f economic grow th provided benign conditions for
political participation and democracy to flourish.10 In contrast, the recent history of
developing states tells us how th e colonial legacies, corrupt polity, and ill-planned
policies towards m odernization deeply affected the process o f political developm ent,
resulting in the establishm ent of quasi-democracy, arm ored democracy, or th e absence
of civil society in democratic transitions. Hence, the effects are "directly responsible for
the deterioration of political institutions" in developing states.11
Forever, it seems, many developing states ignored the nation-building process as
well as eschewed strengthening political institutions, which is why all w eak and fragile
states do not now have benign conditions to establish favorable values fo r "dem ocratic
state, rule of law, and system o f accountability".12 In this connection, Samuel
Huntington (1965) observed th a t in most developing societies "the rates of social
mobilization and participation are high, (but) the rates of organization and
institutionalization are low ."13 As an outcom e, a m ajority o f developing countries took
the path of m odernization assuming it would provide a w ay to the political developm ent

10 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and D evelo pm ent: Political Institutions and W ell-Being in the World,
1950-1990, Cambridge Studies in th e Theory o f Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2000 ), 88 .
11 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political D evelopm ent and Political Decay," W orld Politics 17, no. 3 (1965): 405.
12 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 16.
13 Huntington, "Political Developm ent and Political Decay," 386.

7
of these states, contrarily it "produce[d] not political developm ent, but political
decay".14
A broader scale consensus undertakes th at th e political decay o f th e system is
primarily driven from w ithin, and the decay process gradually widens the gaps w ithin
th e boundaries of a nation-state. M oreover, an inquiry beyond the nation building
process suggests th a t the "path dependency" set by th e culture of colonial legacies
inherited to certain state institutions, i.e. feudal lords, tribal lords, fam ily dynastic
politics, civil-military bureaucracies, led to corruption from dictatorial democracies or
authoritarian regimes and witnessed some fre q u e n t recurrences of m ilitary coup
d'etats.15 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2 0 12 ) forw ard a differen t perspective
and believe th at prosperity and poverty conditions o f a nation are not due to their
geography, cultures, or leadership; rather, it is the nature o f institutions they possess
th a t matters most. These institutions can be inclusive economic and political institutions
or extractive economic and political institutions.16 In addition, we could see radical
approaches from the dependency school of thought, which "believes th a t th e role of
external factors (is responsible) in the creation and maintenance o f w eak states".17

14 Ibid.
15 Douglass North explains th a t in many cases th e survival o f societies is dependent on efficient
institutions. These institutions survive even in low perform ing societies because th ey are com paratively
and actively efficient. Based on Charles Darwin's theory o f evolution, North elaborates th e "path
dependency" through Darwin's idea on institutions and w rites that, "over tim e inefficient institutions are
weed[ed] out, efficient ones survive, and thus th e re is a gradual evolution of m ore economic, political and
social organization." See, Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, an d Economic Perform ance,
The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (C am bridge; N ew York: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 92.
16 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, W hy Nations F a il: The Origins o f Power, Prosperity and
Poverty (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 79-83.
17 Barry Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An Agenda fo r In ternatio n al Security Studies in the Post-Cold
W ar Era, 2nd ed. (Colchester, UK ECPR Press, 2007), 94.

Specifically, over the years, most developing states witnessed th e influence and
strength of a system set on praetorian oligarchy or praetorianism . The praetorian
oligarchy em pow ered the civil-military bureaucracy to shape the state institutions vis-avis the political culture of state and created a "praetorian society".18 Amos P erlm utter
(1974) believes th a t "praetorian governm ents develop when civilian institutions lack
legitimacy", w hile "praetorianism has existed in all historical periods."19 In m odern
times, praetorianism is considered one o f th e fundam ental factors of political decay of
democratic institutions. In order to reduce the powers of th e military in th e political
arena, Samuel Huntington suggested the m axim ization of civilian pow er and
maximization of m ilitary professionalism, which w ould becom e a firew all betw een th e
m ilitary and society, so the professional m ilitary would stay out of "institutional, class,
and constitutional politics."20 Professional soldiers do not have any inclination or
ambitions for intervening in politics; mainly, the institutional constraints and norms limit
any tendency o f intervention.21 Otherwise, the decrease in civilian pow er lets the
praetorian structures gain a deeper role in politics and obviously "m ilitary interventions
frequently outweigh ... the electoral process as a means o f regime change."22 Looking at
M yanm ar's m ilitary th a t benefited out o f the weakness o f political institutions and
absence of norms restraining the m ilitary elites; as a result, M yanm ar becam e a garrison

18 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),
195.
19 Amos Perlm utter, Egypt, the Praetorian State (N ew Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), 5.
20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f C ivil-M ilitary Relations (New
York: Vintage Books, 1957), 80-83.
21 Amos Perlm utter and Valerie Plave Bennett, The Political Influence o f the M ilita r y : A C om parative
Reader (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 3.
22 The Political Influence o f the M ilita ry : A Com parative Reader (N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1980),

state and since 1962 continued to influence politics. Similar patterns can be observed in
many other pivot states like Egypt, Pakistan, while in the recent past a vivid exam ple can
be Turkey. Therefore, it would not be w rong to blam e praetorianistic regimes for
weakening the political capacity of dem ocratic institutions and further creating
fractured systems as an inherited colonial legacy in Third W orld societies.
In sum, at the domestic level, tw o prone societal behaviors can be witnessed
during the post-colonial period along w ith institutional legacies of colonialism in new ly
independent states or today's developing, yet w eak and fragile states: a) searching fo r a
political system, be it dem ocratic or authoritarian b) modernization or economic
developm ent. A m isinterpretation betw een the political system (lack o f developing a
political order) and economic developm ent via the modernization process w eaken ed
the foundations o f statehood.
Consequently, providing a socio-political vacuum in weak societies, social
m ovements got some space to re-em erge and tried to fill the vacuum. For exam ple,
from the Pakistan case study: In 1994 th e decision to abolish colonial legal laws in
M alakand, w ith o u t im m ediate replacem ent or the introduction of state's legal system,
created a vacuum which allowed local cleric Sufi M uham m ad to launch Tehrik-e-N ifaz-eS hariat-e-M uham m adi (TNSM) dem anding Sharia law and courts for M alakand. His
m ovem ent gradually engulfed the entire region including Swat and resulted in tw o
m ilitary operations in 2007 and 2009 in Swat to curtail rising influence o f radicals in the
region. Hence, it is visible to account th a t searching for a political system and social
m ovements go hand in hand in post-colonial societies. It provided a venue for
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contentious politics, w here "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on
someone else's interest, lead to coordinate efforts on behalf o f shared interests or
programs, in which governments appear e ith er as targets, initiators o f claims, or third
parties."23 Interestingly, the other instances, com pared to traditional social m ovem ents,
are gradually being replaced w ith new form s of social movements under th e leaderlessleadership of the digitized world of blogs and social media to vent-out frustration and
achieve demands. These trends w ere w idely witnessed during the Arab Spring in late
2010 and the following year's vis-a-vis the other socio-economic and politically oriented
uprisings across the world gave a new tw ist to the social m ovements w ith transnational
effects.
The traditional dynamics of intra-state affairs with sovereign autonom y w ithin its
territorial scope has changed dram atically too, which infers a higher level of
transnational influence upon a state's domestic political affairs. Particularly, the postCold W a r period is a crucial and unique m om ent fo r the state system. It is crucial not
only because of the fall of the Berlin W all on Novem ber 9 ,1 9 8 9 , the dem ise of the
Soviet Union on December 31, 1991, and the emergence o f a unique unipolar
international system, but also because of the rise of a highly globalized w orld. The new
globalization sketches a different picture of the international system, which is in
contrast to w h a t was established a fte r the Peace Treaty o f W estphalia (1648) and
confirmed with the Concert of Europe (1815) period.
It is w orth noticing th at a globalized world passes through a constant "process of

23 Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 4.
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shifts, surges and feeds on the dynamic relationships" w ithin and betw een state
structures.24 During this period, the phenom enon of state fragility gathered a w ider
range of attention than ever before and had any higher levels of serious deliberations
about its linkages to emerging security threats. Primarily th e nature and th re a t of in te r
state conflict shifted to intra-state conflicts, so th a t the threats posed to others are
driven from w ithin state groups. M o reo ver, the consideration of dom estic threats are
also gradually transitioning from hum anitarian threats to national security threats and
then expanding to trans-national threats driven by non-state actors.25
The transition scenarios vindicate th a t international politics turned to be residing
in a complex period of a highly interdep endent world, w h ere time and space is
compressed in a world w ithin a super-connected epoch. On the one hand, th e epoch
facilitates the individuals and ideas to flo w actively and freely in "both geographic
locales and scalar spaces that have been socially constructed," and on th e other hand, it
becomes an "era of pervasive contradictions th a t give rise to polarities subject to
diverse norm ative judgm ents."26 The outcom e w e see w ith the dawn o f an em ergent
epoch has transform ed the world w ith "uncertainties, perplexing, ambiguities, and
unending contradictions fostered by a w ide range of dynamics, not the least being
newly em pow ered individuals and expanded roles for non-governm ental agents of

24 Ersel Aydinli, "Seeking Conceptual Links for Changing Paradigms," in Globalization, Security, and the
Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition, ed. Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2005), 231.
25 Stewart Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6.
26 James N. Rosenau, D istant Proximities : Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2003), 7-8.
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change".27
The transform ations furth er help us to witness the creation of new social
geography and a spatial netw ork th at has entered in a new epoch, w here th e traditional
Hobbesian notion about the state as the m onopoly o f the legitim ate use of violence is
shifting tow ards abiding w ith legal international norms, which proves a gradual
transition of authority from state to international regim es.28 These patterns of
transitions portray a great deal o f changes at the intra-state and inter-state level,
especially for th e newly em pow ered individuals w hom are more politically aw akened
than ever.29 Therefore, the compression o f tim e and space set both new challenges and
opportunities. The political fates of w eak and fragile states are among some serious
challenges, and state fragility anticipates some urgency to deal with "the dynamics of
nation-state failure (that) have become central to critical policy debates".30
As highlighted earlier, this study also evaluates th e geopolitical dynamics of state
fragility. As far as domestic political order is concern, it is tru e that political order helps
in sustaining the viability and efficiency o f political institutions, maintains the
im plem entation of rule of law at the dom estic level, and also manages to control the
effects of trans-national activities. Equally, geopolitics is another im portant factor th at
should be taken into consideration, first by understanding that geopolitics "is the

27 Distant Proximities : Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003),
3.
28 Serfaty, A W orld R ecast: An American M o m e n t in a Post-W estern Order, 2.
29 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision : Am erica and the Crisis o f Global Power (N ew York: Basic Books,
2012), 26.
30 Robert I. Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time o f Terror (Cambridge, Mass.;
Washington, D.C.: W orld Peace Foundation ; Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1.
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relation of international political pow er to the geographical setting."31 Secondly, the
spatial or geographic connection to international pow er relations traces th e effects of
geopolitics on state fragility. Therefore, the role of geography and its im pact on w eak
states is significant in many ways, particularly if the geographic location of th e state is in
the "central location of a system or subsystem and this location of strategic im portance
to th e powers" lends to conflict for fragile states.32
Arguably, at the tangible (physical) level the significance of geopolitics reflects
tw o dimensions: a) resource rich geography and b) geo-strategic significance of state.
The intangible (mind) level of a surge of "geopolitics of emotions" and the "m apping of
emotions" may solace the existing domestic and external frustrations of societies.33
Throughout history the cultures of em otions have faced various tides of gains and loss;
therefore, at this particular junction em otional satisfaction remains p re m atu re.34
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) highlighted the significance of "geopolitical pivots" as
o th er political geographers and political thinkers did in early stages of th e ir conceptual
fram ew ork. These pivot states have an im portance and influence on m ajor events which
"is derived not from their pow er and m otivation but rather from th e ir sensitive location
and from the consequences o f th e ir potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of

31 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a W orld Divided, 2d ed. (N ew York,: Random House,
1963), 24.
32 Michael I. Handel, W eak States in the International System (London ; New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1981),
76.
33 Dominique Moisi, The Geopolitics o f Emotion : H ow Cultures o f Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are
Reshaping the World, 1st ed. (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 5-16.
34 Simon Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," Policy Review no. 174 (2012): 44.
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geostrategic players."35 Many w eak pivot states are fragile, not because they are located
at an im portant geostrategic location or possess resource richness, but because the
region itself is situated on a significant, though highly-shattered, geostrategic region.
Political geographer Saul Bernard Cohen explained these shattered zones as "shattered
belts" which are highly fragm ented w ithin and trapped in great power struggle.36 During
th e Cold W ar era th e M iddle East and East Asia, tw o im portant Asian regions, w ere
considered shatter belts or crush zones due to both a higher scale o f fragm entation and
a greater pow er com petition over these regions.
The geographic significance of a state's locality gives an edge to th a t state over
others and valorizes it as a geographically im portant pivot. These pivot states can be
significant for access to im portant regions for their resources, and in some cases they
can become a defense shield (offshore balancing, buffered regions or bandw agon(ed)
ally) against potential hostile states. These pivot states m ay also have significant
influence on states th a t may result significant "political and cultural consequences fo r a
m ore active neighboring geostrategic player."37 For exam ple, the Eurasian pivot states
have remained significant throughout history.
Finally, looking back to the recent past, the contem porary political map no
longer shows Austro-Hungary or the Soviet Union: the phenomenon of decay can not
only end a domestic political system, but also leads to the collapse o f the w hole state as
a unit. Interestingly, the decay or collapse observed over th e past decades follow ed the
35 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Im peratives (New
York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 40.
36 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics : The Geography o f International Relations, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 44.
37 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: Am erican Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 40.
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birth of a num ber of new states. This means a fte r every decay, there can be a possible
birth or reincarnation of some new and old political entities. The birth process of states
can be both natural (indigenous political struggle) and surgical (external engineering to
create a buffer region) too. If th at is the case, then w h a t are the criteria for th e political
decay of a state? W h a t are the domestic conditions th a t m ake a state becom e w eak,
failed, or collapsed? In contrast to domestic reasons of failure, one cannot eschew the
possible consideration of external interference or foreign occupation as a facto r fo r a
state weakening or collapsing, as referenced earlier. Has any political entity ceased so
far, due to any occupation?38 There are a num ber o f gray areas that need appropriate
inquiry, explanation, and prescription through the use of an integrated approach.

WHAT'S THE RATIONALE?
W e are standing at the historic crossroads of interregnum . This junction is characterized
as a complex period in human history w ith acute levels of unpredictability. In particular,
th e gloomy pictures of institutional fracturedness in w eak and fragile states are
experiencing a trem endous am ount of challenges along w ith contagious force. Gramsci's
words aptly portray the situation of the interregnum th a t "the old is dying and the new
cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms."
M orbid symptoms in a fractured statehood show a lack of political order and no definite
political system, resulting in administrative and coercive incapacities o f state. Failing
political entities become "incapable of fully projecting pow er within th e ir national

38 Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An Agenda fo r In ternatio n al Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era,
65.
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boundaries."39 That is why w eak and fragile states are more institutionally fractured
within and prone to instability w ith a long history of autocratic regimes, (dom inantly
praetorian-oligarchy) chronic and endem ic corruption, the th re a t of nuclear
proliferation, the barbaric nature of terrorism , m eager im plem entation o f rule of law, a
lack of accountability, lawless ungoverned spaces, unbridled dem ographic m om entum ,
and the rise of ethnic and religious tensions.
The rationale for this study is to find th e reasons w hy weak states fail to
establish a viable political order and how fractured statehood can be transform ed into
sustainable states with higher social cohesiveness. To w hat extent has political order
rem ained im portant for a w eak state in the past, but also in th e present and future?
How does the political economy of a w eak and fragile state work? This research fu rth er
seeks to develop an integrated approach through conceptualizing, rather than
contextualizing, the phenom ena of fractured statehood in w eak pivot states. In some
ways the notion o f fracture points towards existing gaps in the structure of a w eak state.
These fissures can also be characterized w ith "gaps in the social, cultural, economic,
psychological, and political spheres," as in th e 1960s and 1970s w hen these gaps w ere
referred to as underdeveloped societies.40 Hence, both at th e theoretical and practical
scale, there is a need to fram e an integrated w ork th a t can bridge the conventional
wisdom and contem porary changing dynamics w ith new realities. It will help to develop
a consensus betw een disciplines, so a b e tte r understanding and prescription can be put

39 James A. Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?,"
International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 470.
40 Leonard Binder, "Crises of Political Developm ent," in Crises and Sequences in Political Developm ent, ed.
Leonard Binder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 29.
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forw ard. Possible atte m p t through borrowing varieties of notion from "differen t
disciplines can be applied a n d /o r be cross-fertilized in order to create new hybrid ideas,
hypotheses, theories, and approaches' to deal w ith research problems and prioritize the
factors involved in cause and e ffect."41
In the post-Cold w ar period the notion o f state fragility has caught attention and
is being discussed under various them es, including fragile states, w eak states, quasi
states, failed states, or collapsed states. In real term s, w e see a great level of fra c tu red 
ness appear w ithin state structure or w ithin political institutions th a t m ake them
considered fragile. However, th e post 9 /1 1 era set a different draft tow ards state failure
due to the changing nature of intervention in w eak states fo r reasons ranging from
hum anitarianism to security goals driven by global and regional interests. Believing in
th e transitory nature of global interest, this study discussed the classification or
typology of the failed state and historiography of w eak states rooted in pre-colonial and
postcolonial tim efram e. Following an integrated approach th at includes com parative
politics, transnationalism, and geopolitics, this discussion structures a basic
understanding of the root causes and consequences of state fragility. A prognostic
atte m p t built upon discussion and analysis will be a useful a tte m p t to avoid fu rth er
cracking of th e w eak and fragile state.
The aforem entioned introduction provides grounds to understand th a t there are
a num ber of cases available all over the developing world to discuss state fragility.
However, this study has chosen tw o case studies, namely M yanm ar and Pakistan, to

41 Steve Yetiv, "History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches: Thinking About G reater
Interdisciplinarity," International Studies Perspectives 12, no. 2 (2011): 96.
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understand from th e ir experiences o f nation-m aking to state-m aking processes and vice
versa from state-m aking to nation-building processes. M ore significantly, understanding
the nature o f institutional fracturedness, its origin, challenges, and implications of
selected case studies and th e ir relevance to debates about state fragility is also
considered. The study intends to incorporate theoretical explanations, which tell th a t
both endogenous and exogenous factors can cause decay. Revisiting th e theories of
geopolitical pivots brings additional perspective to th e study.
The core objective of any doctoral research is to contribute to th e existing
literature pertinent to the subject m atter. Similarly, this project is also m ean t to
contribute to the literature discussing state fragility and seeks to bridge the gaps
betw een the existing literatures. The existing literature mainly discusses the causes and
consequences of the state fragility and failure w ithin the confines of one discipline,
w hile ignoring the explanations em anating from o th er disciplines o f th e social sciences
and humanities. Jean-Germain Gros (1996) highlights th at "it is neither m oral, practical
nor politically feasible to ignore the problems in failed states, there is a serious lack of
knowledge of how best to help solve these problem s"42 o f state fragility. In addition, this
project furth er tries expanding the knowledge w ith new inputs, in order to fix or
manage the fracturedness in w eak states. The theoretical fram ew ork, analysis, and
results can be helpful to understand other similar cases all around. It is also im portant to
notice th at generalization is one o f the great challenges to answering the variety of each
unique case pertinent to state fragility.

42 Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy o f Failed States in the N ew World Order: Decaying Somalia,
Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," Third W orld Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Sep. 1996): 466.
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Generally, th e problem lies w ith our m onolithic a ttitu d e of thinking of failed
states. Therefore, tim e and space m atters w hile com paring th e cases. In addition, each
selected case study has a great diverse structural setting, barely achieving m e rit as being
considered a state. Every case study requires an in-depth area-based approach to study
domestic dynamics and understand failure phenom ena accordingly. A fter all, "failure is a
fluid,"43 a term th at means states can go forw ard and backward to failure and w eak
conditions. Thus, it is a graduating process depending on how the socio-political
cohesion of fragile states structure and m e e t the basic needs of security and the
m aterial well-being o f th e ir peoples.

RESEARCH QUESTION
The above discussion helped to fram e a basic research question follow ed by
num ber of supporting questions to find o u t a b e tte r explanation from literatu re and real
life political developm ents from selected case studies. This research w ork is prim arily
trying to answer these questions: Under w hat conditions do weak and fragile states
continue to fail, and how might the fractures of statehood be fixed? To answer the
questions, the discussion will stay around the concept o f state polity based on
traditional and m odern approaches of explanations. Following traditional prescriptions
to develop an effective political and social order, fixation means reinvigorating or

43 Robert I. Rotberg explains that "Failure is a fluid halting place, w ith movement fo rw ard to weakness
and backward into collapse always possible. Certainly, to o , because failure and collapse are undesirable
results for states, they are neither inevitable nor unavoidable. W hereas weak states fail much m ore easily
than strong ones, th a t failure is not preordained. Failure is preventable, particularly since human agency
rather than structural flaws or institutional insufficiencies are alm ost invariably at th e root". See, Robert I.
Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004),

10 .
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making a Leviathan stronger as a "symbol of law, order, pow er, the state, dom ination,
and social control" against the Behem oth as a "symbol of lawlessness, chaos, disorder,
anarchy, heterodoxy, and deviance," traceable in w eak and fragile states.44 If th a t is the
case, then in a period of high globalization, a strong Leviathan becomes th e issue of
"state repression and human rights violation."45 Visibly, authoritarian regimes enjoy
more controlled and highly militarized systems to use the monopoly o f violence as a tool
of repression against legitimate voices seeking basic rights o f citizenship.
Furtherm ore, it is m entioned earlier th a t if failure or collapse is a real and final
destination for a w eak state, then w hy do these w eak states not collapse instantly? To
unfold the question further, the following subsidiary questions help to go into an indepth understanding: 'w hat factors keep the states surviving and slow progress tow ards
failure? W h a t are the challenges to manage continued failure? How should states cope
w ith these challenges? M ore im portantly, do these challenge m atter to th e global
community? If yes, then how has the global com m unity discussed fixing them ? The issue
is equivocal and imprecise for the m ajority, despite a silent acceptance and realization
about the th re a t and spillover effects of the issue area.
The aforem entioned questions diam etrically look a t broader vis-a-vis specific
aspects of the issue area. Two hypotheses of research are framed to discuss issues of
governability, capacities, and challenges of state fragility: 1) The absence of an effective
political order (institutional ineffectiveness and bad governance) causes a gradual decay

44 M ark I. Lichbach, "Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and th e Structure-Action Problem of
Social Order," Annual Review o f Political Science 1(1998): 402.
45 Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," ibid.10(2007): 1.
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of state structure. 2) The burden of geography and geopolitics is more likely to affect
state fragility.
The first hypothesis mainly looked into dom estic factors causing fragility, and
prim ary variables w ere picked and discussed w ithin th e political, security, economic,
and social domains. These domains helped to answer the research questions about state
fragility pointing at variables such as colonial legacies, praetorian-oligarchy, fam ily
dynastic politics, ethno-nationalism , and religious violence to see th e ir effects on state
fragility. The second hypothesis helped to know th e external factors affecting the
capability of the state, and the geography or geopolitics (overlapping at various
instances) is taken as a core independent variable. The structure and proposition of th e
literature review on understanding statehood, state fragility, the factual discussion on
the case studies, and the com parative analysis is systematically outlined to determ ine
the causal effects.

METHODOLOGY
The research is discussing the issue of historical lines digging into colonial
legacies, as explanations of com parative political and area studies suggest adopting a
qualitative research approach fu rth er based on case studies. First o f all, th e qualitative
research provides leverage m axim ization, meaning "we w ant to explain as much as
possible w ith as little as possible."46 To do so, th e qualitative research m ethodology also
allows to select descriptive analysis to understand and explain th e research problem ,

46 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social In q u iry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29.
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because "description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before w e
know something about the world and w hat needs to be explained on th e basis of w hat
characteristics."47
Notably, the "case studies are essential for description ... [and they] provide an
insightful description of complex events."48 The case studies provide a testing ground
w ith practical examples to justify the causal relation and explanation o f research. This
project has follow ed a systematic study to discuss th e issues related to challenges of
statehood in w eak states. Discussing typology, the historical explanation o f fragile or
w eak states, and changing dynamics o f security and the globalized w orld anticipates and
revisits, as traditional explanations face lim itations to the current realities o f w orld
politics. Therefore, research disputes with one-dim ensional explanation most of the
w ork done so far focused on the domestic state o f affairs. This dissertation project has
incorporated m ultiple approaches to seek m ending the gap betw een disciplines vis-a-vis
providing a prognostic solution for cases selected or similar issues in o th e r parts of th e
w orld. The m ultiple approaches include a) bridging contending theoretical discourses of
comparative politics b) incorporating transnational dimension into discussion c)
providing geographical pivots as a base.
Before embarking on the theoretical discussion on w eak states, this dissertation
has revisited the literature on the nation-state, in order to develop an in-depth
understanding about the notion of state, its roles, and duties. It also helps to

47 Designing Social In q u iry : Scientific Inference in Q ualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1994), 34.
48 Designing Social In q u iry : Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 44.

understand th e process from nation-m aking to state-m aking on one hand. On the o th er
hand, different forms o f political systems and identities show the social m obility,
conflict, and com m itm ents tow ards th e ir political identities. This procedure included
various theoretical explanations about small powers and small states to construct a
consensus to define the phenom ena of w eak states in the context o f today's fragile
state. In addition, by doing so it provides an understanding about the differences and
categories of nation-states. The analytical part also discusses garrison states, predatory
states, hybrid states and their structural linkage w ithin w eak states. It also makes th e
case easier to differentiate betw een various categories of states and fu rth e r
classification of w eak states. The lessons try to discuss w hy some states are w eak and
fragile w ith tendencies of becoming parasites on others, w hile by contrast, some states
are strong and function normal w ith a higher level of social cohesion and effective
political institutions.
Sovereignty and territory are some of the core ingredients in the making of a
modern nation-state; sovereignty m atters most fo r all states, but transnational
networks, porous state frontiers, and frequent interventions affect th e sovereignty of
fragile ones. First, it is easy to penetrate a fragile state and subdue its sovereignty for
greater interest as a "prim ary responsibility for m aintenance of international peace and
security."49 Second, it is observed th a t fragility always becomes a justified intervention
to fix the domestic problems o f w eak state, while ruling elites of w eak states also
anticipate foreign intervention to root out elem ents th a t may th re a te n th e ir rule and

49Age Eknes, "The United Nations and Intra-State Conflicts," in Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the
Right to Intervene, ed. M ariannne Heiberg (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 97.
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others' interests to o by lending or com promising sovereignty.50 Therefore, Jeffrey
Herbst called the sovereignty of fragile states nothing "more than legal fiction."51
Despite the earlier identified specifications, in general the changing nature of
territorial settings from hard boundaries to soft boundaries are becoming ubiquitous
and pose issues to rethink w ith increasing clarity ab o u t sovereignty, self-determ ination,
nationalism, and citizenship rights. Yet, th e re is still "resistance to re-conceptualize the
static units of the inter-state system of W estphalian sovereignty, (as) th e re is significant
nostalgia for the notion of national identity."52 Above all, over the period o f history, w e
observe th a t up to this point states have achieved a great variety o f structural changes
w ith inner and outer shells of th e ir form ats. These various kinds and types of states
interact in the real world and continue to construct norms and cultures of th e
international state system.
There are some benchmarks th a t w ere follow ed to pick the case studies.
Generally speaking, case studies are im portant because th e literature review and
theoretical discussion can be em ployed and tested on the selected cases. The above
section under the them e "what's the rationale?" m entioned two selected case studies
for this research project: M yanm ar (East Asia) and Pakistan (South Asia).
The criteria to select th e cases w e re based on the consideration of several
im portant factors. Primarily, it is im portant to m ention th a t there are m any w eak and

50 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1999), 127.
51 Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21, no. 3 (W in te r 19961997): 122.

52 Julie Mostov, "Soft Borders and Thin Bonds: Citizenship and Transnational Democracy," Global Studies
Review 2, no. 2 (2006).
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fragile states located in Africa and Latin America other than Asia. M oreover, by and
large, African states are suffering with ultra-poverty conditions. So, the question is, w hy
choose cases from Asia? Despite the harsh realities of Africa and Latin Am erica, it should
be acknowledged th a t Asia is not only th e largest continent, but most im portantly, it
hosts about 60 percent of the world's population. Asia is th e fastest growing region in
the w orld, but a t the same tim e, is a highly volatile continent ranging from th e M iddle
East to Far East, and from South Asia to Central Asia. Waves of violence, global acts o f
terrorism , and desperate poor people seeking safety and security all coexist in th e Asian
hemisphere.
The second factor is the growing im portance of Asia in the current century, both
for economic and geo-strategic reasons. It is w idely discussed how the tw enty-first
century is the Asian Century, and in 2011 then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
advocated in her think piece published in Foreign Policy th a t "the future of geopolitics
will be decided in Asia ...[and] harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to
American economic and strategic interests."53 Following the rising im portance of Asia in
global politics, U.S. and W estern countries gradually became keen on region, and
occasions like easing sanctions on M yanm ar and restoring diplomatic ties speaks for
themselves. President Obama, during his historic visit to M yanm ar in N ovem ber 19,
2012, stressed the geostrategic, economic, and cultural im portance o f M yanm ar in the
region. His speech at University of Yangon emphasized the im portance of the country
because of its location "at the crossroads of East and South Asia, [which] border the

53 H illary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, no. 189 (November 11, 2011): 56-57.

most populated nations on the planet... and the ability to help determ ine the destiny of
the fastest growing region of the world... [And] M y an m ar is famous fo r its natural
resources, and they must be protected against exploitation."54
According to the Asian Developm ent Bank's edited volume report, th e Asian
economy will share the global gross domestic product (GDP) to 52 percent and regain its
economic position globally, as it had during eig hteenth century before th e industrial
revolution.55 It provides the fundam ental justification th at state fragility in th e Asian
continent will have a severe global impact, due to Asian pivot-ness in global geopolitics.
The growing m arket economy in Asia and its large population will becom e th e largest
consumers as w ell, setting an ideal place fo r economic activities. In addition, lately th e
debates around the "rise o f China," and the "new influential" like India attracted foreign
policy shifts tow ards Asia too. The Obama adm inistration has shown its com m itm ent
towards "pivot to Asia" policy, which intends to "rebalance" the pow er dynamics in the
Asia. In O ctober 2013, speaking at the Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
Secretary o f State John Kerry guaranteed th a t "there is nothing that will shake the
com m itm ent of the United States to the rebalance to A s ia ,... which w e are all a part of,
[it] is by far the largest, the fastest-growing, and th e most dynamic economic region in
the w orld."56
Although Asia has become a "factory Asia ... [and] global hub fo r m anufacturing
and inform ation technology services," the fact is th a t the "world's fastest growing
54 "Remarks by President Obama at the University o f Yangon," h ttp://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/11/19/rem arks-president-obam a-university-yangon.
55 Harinder S. Kohli, Ashok Sharma, and Anil Sood, Asia 2 0 5 0 : Realizing the Asian Century (Los Angeles:
SAGE, 2011), 2.
56 "Remarks at the Apec Ceo Summit," h ttp ://w w w .s ta te .g o v /s e c re ta ry /re m a rk s /2 0 1 3 /1 0 /2 1 5 1 7 6 .h tm .
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region remains hom e to m ajority o f w orld's extrem e poor" w ho face com plexities of
traps.57 Be it poverty traps, geographical traps, traps of bad governance, conflict traps,
and so on.
On strategic grounds, China is trying to revive its historical m aritim e pow er and
gradually wishes to gain a leadership role in its Near Seas and possibly in Indian Ocean,
which includes th e coastal w aters o f the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea,
and growing presence in and around Indian Ocean vis-a-vis Arabian Ocean. China's slow
and steady projection through putting strings of pearls in th e Near Seas and Indian
Ocean via developing seaports in the region alarms the U.S., India, and U.S. allies in th e
region. On the o th er hand, China considers the tw elve-nation regional trade pact called
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a U.S. strategy o f containm ent, w hile the U.S and its
allies in th e region are seeking to fram e som e m aritim e codes of conduct under
International Law to become applicable on the N ear Seas to tam e growing China's
assertiveness in th e w aters.58
Keeping in mind th e growing influence of China, a num ber of accounts believe
th at "the new era of m ilitary com petition in the Pacific w ill become th e defining
geopolitical contest of the 21st century."59 The U.S. policy o f rebalancing Asia will need
careful consideration and, the investm ent of extra tim e and energy, though not at th e
cost of other regions like Europe. As the allies in th e region consider the U.S. as a
security guarantor, any imbalance of pow er structure in th e region m ay possibly prom pt

57 Asia 2 050 : Realizing the Asian Century, xxiii.
58 Simon Denyer, "Kerry W orried About Asia's Sea Disputes, Citing Moves by China," W ashington Post
February 17, 2014.
59 Geoff Dyer, "Us V China: Is This th e N ew Cold W ar?," Financial Times February 20, 2014.
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th e Japanese and South Koreans to pursue th e ir ow n nuclear program, making th em less
dependent on external support. Therefore, th e Asian case is serious in this nature to
retain checks and balances.
The final criterion o f selecting the case studies of M yanm ar and Pakistan is based
on the countries' high ranking in fragility status, and most im portantly, th e ir geopolitical
roles in th e developing scenario relevant to th e Asia pivot. The geopolitical and geo
strategic significance of the tw o cases qualifies them to m e et the criteria o f "w eak pivot
states." Both M yanm ar and Pakistan are located directly or indirectly at the crossroads
o f interests of m ajor and regional powers. For instance, M yanm ar's geopolitical and
economic role betw een the United States, China, Japan, India, and others is significant
to consider. Similarly, the case of Pakistan portrays an im portant position fo r future
economic and geopolitical scenarios. Pakistan has been considered an extended
w ing/arm of the United States in th e M iddle East; shifting U.S. policy tow ards East Asia
fu rther signifies Pakistan's role. China's eye on the deep-sea port at Gw adar, Baluchistan
for its future trade activities and possible use for security purposes will have a significant
impact on rebalancing the Asian continent. India's high-energy dem and for its economic
viability w ill also rely on benign relations w ith Pakistan to g e t access to Central Asian
and M iddle Eastern oil and gas energy facilities.
A part from the policy of the United States to "rebalance in th e Asia pivot," the
Asian countries dream of making th e tw enty-first century an Asian century will only
remain a dream if the hostile relations betw een Asian countries are not resolved.
Alarmingly, three nuclear powers, China, India, and Pakistan, sit next to each o th er with
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hostile mem ories to date. The o th er factors, in addition to geography, the colonial
legacy, praetorian society, state capacity, governance, political economy, security, and
social issues are carefully and thoroughly discussed in the research project. It is w o rth
m entioning here th a t th e conclusions o f th e case studies and discussion can be
observed and applicable to other w eak pivot states located in African and Latin
American context.

ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH
The dissertation is fram ed into five chapters including the introductory chapter.
The first chapter holistically outlines state fragility and the birth of its paradigm during
the post-Cold W a r period. The section briefly sketches th e issues related to state
fragility and its regional as well as global impacts on peace and stability. In view of
conventional wisdom, the research agrees w ith general understanding about the poor
perform ance of states due to th e ir lack of political capacity and capabilities, but at the
same tim e includes other explanations like "state death" due to geographical factors.
Therefore, a significant part of th e w ork is trying to introduce the concept or category of
w eak and fragile states called "w eak pivot states." To be clear, the research has already
clarified th a t the discussion on state fragility in this w ork is actually referred to as "weak
pivot states."
The idea of the "weak pivot state" is not fam iliar in or referred to in the debates
of international relations. Recent literature talks about fragile, weak, failing, quasi-state,
failed and collapse states for poor perform ing states and there is also currently enriched
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w ith contributions on pivot states, rising in flu e n tia l, and so forth for those states w ith
promising capabilities. The contribution of this project is th e attem pt to blend tw o
categories, i.e. w eak states w ith th e ir geographical pivot. Based on th e categorization,
th e research question tries to seek an answer to the question 'under w h a t conditions do
fragile (w eak pivot) states continue to fail?' The chapter draws a road map through th e
qualitative m ethod, picking case studies in th e next chapters to find th e answ er both
from endogenous and exogenous factors involved in "decapitating" th e state.
Following the road map, chapter II provides a conceptual base to understand
statehood and state fragility. In addition, it thoroughly tracks the literature discussing
th e endogenous and exogenous factors causing the fragility. Revisiting the rich historical
and current literature on intellectual genesis, the nature and duties o f th e state provides
an intellectual depth to understand the role and responsibilities of the state. W ith
reference to conventional argum ent, the traditional state was referred to as a
"Leviathan" retaining a "m onopoly of [the] use of violence" to project a symbol of law
and m aintain order in society against the "Behem oth," a symbol of lawlessness and
disorder. In fact, in many ways, today's fragile states show symptoms of being a
"Behem oth."
The theoretical prism of chapter II highlighted the adm inistrative and
institutional limitations and origins, due to colonial legacies, poor governance,
kleptocracies, inability to accom m odate political participation, prolonged m ilitary rule,
ethno-religious violence, and geographic factors. The political, security, economic, and
social indicators of state fragility shows th at states are w eak due to various traps, i.e.
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"the conflict trap, th e poverty trap, th e natural resources trap, the tra p o f being
landlocked w ith bad neighbors, and the trap o f bad governance." Some of these traps
are situational and some inherent. Situational traps can be overcome w ith im provem ent
through socio-political and economic transitions, but inherent ones are almost
perm anent and challenging to handle. S tew art Patrick (2011) and Jean-Germ ain Gros
(1996) have vividly drawn th e trajectories and taxonom y of state fragility, which makes
it easier to test and apply various situations in categories.
Chapter III and chapter IV are the case studies presented on M y a n m a r and
Pakistan. Tw o cases have been done w ith m ajor discussion following the roadm ap
drawn earlier and analysis of the indicators o f fragility. The discussion looked through
factual and chronological ways to analyze political developm ent since th e colonization
period to th e most recent tim e period, validating th e argum ent of "path dependency."
The tw o cases are unique fo r many similarities as both enjoyed a colonial tim e period
under British rule and inherited much of the British m ilitary and bureaucratic structures.
Both M yanm ar and Pakistan witnessed prolonged m ilitary rule underm ining civilian rule.
The praetorian oligarchy becam e pow erful in the tw o states, which have
gradually shifted their interests into the business sector to own much o f the land,
resources, and industrial units, other than higher annual defense budget. Though the
patterns and mechanism of m ilitary interventions and policies in both countries are
similar on larger scale, the m ilitary orientation is differen t because M yanm ar's m ilitary
(Tatm adaw ) was established to liberated M yan m ar from foreign occupation, which later
suppressed other ethnic minorities. By contrast, Pakistan's military was raised as a
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British Colonial force, which was later inherited by India and Pakistan a fte r their
creation. The creation of th e British colonial force was on racial grounds, as in M yanm ar
it ignored th e m ajority of Burmans and recruited m inorities into the force. On the IndoPak sub-continent, the phenom ena o f m artial race picked Punjabi and Pashtun Muslims
from today's Pakistani side and Punjab's Sikh from India side. In both cases th e racial
oriented militaries left the scars of a social divide in the post-colonial period still
affecting the states today.
In addition, the bad governance and high level of corruption affected th e states'
political capabilities. In Pakistan's case, fam ily dynastic politics rule has been one factor
th a t caused bad governance and m ade political compromises with undem ocratic forces.
The argum ent suggests th a t with these undem ocratic processes underm ining the
political developm ent over a period of tim e, the result in M yanm ar is an "arm ored
democracy," while Pakistan is a "compromised democracy" betw een civil-military
oligarchies.
The case studies also elaborate in detail the geopolitical and geo-strategic
im portance of both states and identify the nature o f regional and global interests in the
region. China and India are the main contending regional players seeking th e ir best bids
and bets over M yanm ar and Pakistan, w hile Japan is a secondary regional player. The
U.S. and its allies brings a global dimension to the study.
Finally, chapter V is based on a com parative analysis and conclusion discussing
th e tw o assumptions based on endogenous (lack o f state capacity) and exogenous
(geopolitics) factors, recalling the discussions on the conceptual fram ew o rk and
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evidence displayed in case studies. First, th e study objects to the idea which believes
state fragility or related explanations are a recent origin. The research has already
undertaken various historical studies or explanations about weak societies, small states,
and small pow er th a t show th at fragility always rem ained in international relations.
However, the research endorses th e fear th a t regional and global insecurities are much
higher due to higher levels of interconnectedness, which was not th e case in earlier
epochs.
Second, the study also observed th a t various studies suggested d iffe re n t ways to
tackle the problem of fragility through m ilitary, economic or dem ocratic interventions,
while interventions always suffered mostly due to issues o f sovereignty. Setting aside
the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures o f interventions, the study makes a
claim th at the economic aid to support these fragile societies did not w ork properly, as it
had been thought. Why? The political elites in w eak societies m anipulate the traditional
duty of state, which is the "extraction of resources" through taxation, and in return of
taxation, state should guarantee the safeguarding o f basic rights and the w ellbeing of
citizens on equal grounds. However, in w eak and fragile societies, w h ere political
corruption is ram pant, political elites know exactly how to extract local resources
through taxation, but at the same tim e and follow ing domestic patterns of extractions,
political elites "extract foreign resources and aids" which in most cases goes directly to
their personal benefits.
The other crucial conclusion is the state enforced or indirectly constructed
narrative th at threatens th e equal rights and protection o f minorities. In M yanm ar,
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religious minorities fear th e revival of Buddhist nationalism , and in Pakistan the
deliberate usage of blasphemy law to seek political victimization of th e m inorities or
political oppositions, which undermines th e prospects of dem ocratic transitions
happening in both countries. Therefore th e indoctrination o f religious and ethnic based
narratives later is causing insecurity in the form o f terrorism and ethno-nationalistic
hostilities. Interestingly, most of th e security challenges in th e tw o case studies resides
in areas w here minorities are larger in num ber, and they hold more resourceful
geographic locations w ithin their respective countries. Geopolitically, w ith th e rapidly
gripping notion of the Asia pivot and rising regional in flu e n tia l with geopolitical
interests now know th a t the best bid to safeguard th e interests of powers is to extend
their support to "praetorian-guards," w ho are ruling these countries and will eventually
set back the prospect of future dem ocratization processes. Therefore, future stability
and peace is certainly linked w ith tam ing fragile conditions through facilitating a vibrant
civil society to establish a political culture based on inclusive and pluralistic dem ocratic
norms. In addition, on the regional and global scale, creating "spheres o f socialization"
can engage these weak and fragile societies to interact at a higher frequency, make
them learn the evolving global norms, and help th em to assimilate, accom m odate, and
integrate into the global system. This will ensure th e best pay off for all players, w ith ou t
risking the interests of others.
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CHAPTER II
UNDERSTANDING STATEHOOD AND STATE FRAGILITY

A fter h a lf a century o f im perial rollback and exaggerated warnings o f
neoimperialist resurgence, postcolonial sovereignty ceases to be a historical
entitlem ent: it m ust be earned again - and again by quasi o r contingent states
th a t the fo rm e r im perial powers created in error fo r their own gains and
convenience, and around a religion, a clan, a tribe, a dynasty, or even fo r an
army. Lacking legitim acy a t birth, these fra c tu red countries are a t the m ercy o f
centrifugal forces th a t pull them a p a rt and which the state cannot m an ag e or
fix.
Simon Serfaty 1
In the decades to come, the m ost leth al threats to the U nited States'
safety and s ec u rity -a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist a tta c k are likely to em anate fro m states th a t cannot adequately govern themselves or
secure their own territory. Dealing with such fra c tu red or fa ilin g states is, in
m any ways, the main security challenge o f our time.
Robert M . Gates, Former Secretary o f Defense 2

The strength o f statehood is dependent on the political capacity o f a state. The
effective political capacity of a state helps to m aintain a viable and effective
relationship betw een intra- and inter-state levels. However, the stability and smooth
political functioning o f a state relies prim arily on its domestic perform ance. Thus, the
higher the synchronized nature of the relationship at an intra-state (state and society)
level, the higher the probability of keeping state subjects in control, obeying th e rule of
law, and norming the accountable governance system performing under a legitim ate
political order or authority. Eventually, this process advances towards a durable

1 Serfaty, A W orld R ecast: An American M o m e n t in a Post-Western Order, 73.
2 Robert M . Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future o f U.S. Security Assistance," Foreign
Affairs 89, no. 3 (May/Jun 2010).
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political developm ent of society, which plays a significant role in strengthening a state's
political capacity vis-a-vis establishing an effective political system. The differences
betw een the perform ance o f political institutions and the political capacity of strong
democracies and authoritarian regimes are clear.3 For instance, many w eak states are
characterized by "aliberal (illiberal forms of governability) and authoritarian" (despotic)
rule, which become predatory of th e ir own masses."4

STATE: A LEGITIMATE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE
Understanding the state or statehood in a highly interconnected w orld is not
the same as it was during the W estphalian era. The early shape of states was portrayed
through the writings of Thomas Hobbes' in his w ork Leviathan, which referred to th e
state, the most powerful political entity, as sovereign and holding a centralized
administrative control of a given te rrito ry .5 This earlier notion set rules for political
thinkers to define the state and seek the "duties o f state," its role, and its relation w ith
society.6 Over a period of tim e, the state evolved through its dual responsibility of
domestic "pacification and external w arfare," and lately, th e nature of state-society
relations has been further transform ed.7 The transform ative episodes proclaim th a t the

3 M arina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, Colo.:
W estview Press, 1997), 11.
4 Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, Governing the Global P o lity : Practice, M entality, Rationality
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 177.
5 Thomas Hobbes and E. M . Curley, Leviathan : W ith Selected Variants fro m the Latin Edition o f 1668
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994), 3-5.
6 See, "Montevideo Convention on th e Rights and Duties of States," Council on Foreign Relations,
h ttp ://w w w .cfr.org/sovereignty/m ontevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/pl5897.
7 Louise Andersen, Bjprn Mpller, and Finn Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure P eople?: Violence,
Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century (N ew York: Palgrave M acM illan, 2007), 7.
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states are gradually transform ed into m odern or post-m odern states w ith new
obligations. N ew obligations mean the state has become significantly accountable,
both at domestic and global levels, to politically inform ed (aw akened) citizens' vis-a-vis
to institutions as contrasted to traditional functions o f the state. Aligning w ith new
realities, the m odern or post-m odern states becom e flexible, and notably th e nature of
state capacities shifts to cope w ith changing patterns and complex political dynamics.
In a period of complex interdependence, historicizing and conceptualizing the
state is a complicated task to undertake. Yet, the exercise helps to develop a b e tte r
understanding about the fragility o f states when looking at th e form ation,
sustainability, or political decay of institutions in m odern states. In this regard, th e
notion of nation-state is perceived through various perspectives as an abstract,
ideational form , and its objectives are explained depending on various form s of states.
In the early years of the conceptual developm ent o f state discourse, the state is view ed
as bound betw een its authority and subjects or "image and practices."8 Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1 7 12 -1 7 78 ), and John Locke (1 6 32 -1 7 04 )
referred to this bond as "social contract/ social com pact."9

8 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society : Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One
Another (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16. Migdal explains th a t th e '(1)
image and (2) practices' shape the state, while holistically portraying th e state form ation. Migdal puts it
as "(1) the image o f a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation o f the
people bounded by th at territory, and (2) the actual practices of its m ultiple parts."
In addition, According to Buzan, the "Conception o f state in term s of territory/p op u latio n
(body) and socio-political character (mind)" th at helps to understand th e nature and behavior o f state.
Buzan further insists th at the "States must have a physical base of pollution and territory; they must
have institutions of some sort which govern the physical base; and th e re must be some idea of state
which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of its people", see, Buzan, People, States, and F e a r : An
Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era, 68 -7 1 .
9 The concept of social contract provided some early stage intellectual explanation to understand th e
ideational essence of state. A Hobbesian understanding of social contract refers to a hum an's natural
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As a reality, "the state as norm ative order" persistently engages in a
"pathological hom ogenization" or "ethnification" o f its "imagined com m unities," in
order to retain a "symbiotic" relationship w ith society to assert its legitimacy and seek
"obedience" from its subjects.10 Barrington M o o re (1966), Theda Skocpol (1979), Atul
Kohli (1986), Charles Tilly (1992), Michael M ann (1993), and Joel M igdal (1988, 2001)
have contributed extensive explanation of the dynamics of state structure, state
pow er, and its relationship w ith society. As a broader consensus, an understanding can
be traced to Charles Tilly's (1970) definition o f state, as it:
"... controls population occupying a defined territory is a state in so fa r as 1) it is
differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; 2) it is
autonomous; 3) it is centralized; and 4) its divisions are form ally coordinated
with one another."11
Hence, statehood can be depicted through "collectivities o f officials" th a t

tendency of seeking personal interest, which provides a base for a contract with th e state, which seeks
to fulfill those interests. In contrast, Rousseau agrees th a t th e state is to provide basic common goods to
the citizen in return for social contracts, which legitimizes th e state's authority. In addition, Locke fu rther
supports the state's duty to protect the natural rights o f the citizen’s p art of the contract. Thomas Franck
explains the social contract through the Hobbesian understanding th a t it is an "im agine[d] contract
betw een person in the state of nature intends to provide the parties w ith such benefits as security of
person and property," so th e contract safeguards th e allegiance betw een state and society, see Thomas
M . Franck, The Power o f Legitimacy among Nations (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 8.
10 Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,"
Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (Jan 1984): 224; H eather Rae, State Identities and the Hom ogenisation o f
Peoples, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14;
Philip Roeder writes th a t th e nation-states try to "ethnify th e nation, th a t to, propagate a myth of
common origin", which actually justifies a legitim ate popular plebiscite in favor of th e existence of
nation. See, Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From : Institutional Change in the Age o f
Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 31; Benedict Anderson, Im agined
Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, Rev. and extended ed. (London ; New
York: Verso, 1991), 6.Anderson refers imagined communities to nation because, th e "m em bers o f even
th e smallest nation will never know most of their fellow -m em bers, m eet them, or even hear o f th em , yet
in th e minds o f each lives the image of their communion; Crispin Sartwell, Against the State : An
Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory (Albany: State University of N ew York Press, 2008), 24;
Obedience means, state seek allegiance from th e citizens and state can get it through coercive and
voluntary ways. For more explanation, see in Harold Joseph Laski, Authority in the M odern State
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 32-42.
11 Charles Tilly, The Formation o f N ational States in Western Europe, Studies in Political Developm ent
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70.
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enable the "capacities o f state" to achieve its goals, specifically from the "actual or
potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face o f recalcitrant
socioeconomic circumstances."12 This practice justifies the idea th a t "states are
founded on forces," w hile it establishes statehood in a defined territo ry through
"compulsory political association with continuous organization ... and its adm inistrative
staff successfully upholds a claim to the m onopoly of the legitim ate force in
enforcem ent of its orders."13 In successful conditions, the state first becomes efficient
in "the authoritative allocation o f social values" and then enjoys th e "enforcem ent of
order through institutionalizing" the social and political p o w e r.14 The reason th a t the
state establishes an "institutionalize^] political power" is because it helps the
"governm ental institutions of coercion to m aintain a stratified social o rd e r."15
Gianfranco Poggi (2001) w rites th a t "if th e political power is to act as guardian
of th e social order" then it has to institutionalize th a t pow er.16 It fu rth er provides a
legitim ate base to hold the m onopoly of violence as well as to enforce "the
effectiveness o f the political arrangem ents."17 According to Gianfranco Poggi, three
processes are involved in the "institutionalization o f political power," namely,

12 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge
Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.
13 M ax W eb er and John Dreijmanis, M a x Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations
(N ew York: Algora Pub., 2008), 156; M ax W eber, A. M . Henderson, and Talcott Parsons, The Theory o f
Social and Economic Organization, 1st American ed. (N ew York: The Free Press; Oxford University Press,
1947), 154.
14 David Easton, The Political System, an Inquiry into the State o f Political Science, 1st ed. (New York,:
Knopf, 1953), 129; Gianfranco Poggi, Forms o f Power (Cambridge; M alden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell
Publishers, 2001), 4-18.
15 Forms o f Power, 29; R. Brian Ferguson, The State, identity and Violence : Political Disintegration in the
Post-Cold W ar World (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 9.
16 Poggi, Forms o f Power, 42.
17 Ibid.
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"depersonalization (pow er no longer stays w ith one person as decisive force),
form alization ("the exercise o f pow er becomes m ore oriented to rules, procedural
arrangements, rituals"), and finally the integrated (codified norms and rules becom e
"increasingly integrated into broader, encompassing order") power relationships."18
Eventually robust codified procedural arrangem ents can deliver b e tte r political goods
to citizens, strengthen statehood, and enhance th e political capacity o f the state itself
to protect its subjects.
In contem porary world politics, the dem ocratic and stable states have
successfully institutionalized political capacity, w hile w eaker ones struggle w ith
formalizing the process. In a broader sense, George Sorenson (2005) has identified
some features o f states, such as functions o f governm ent, nationhood, and econom y of
stable or successful (post-m odern states) and w eak states, presented in table 1.
Empirical evidence shows th a t successful states have achieved higher levels of
transparency in governance, nationhoods w ith collective loyalty in mind, and vibrant
economies to sustain the smooth functioning of th e state. W eak states are ham pered
by inefficient and corrupt institutional orders th at are fu rth er weakened by the
dom ination of diverse ethnic or religious com m unities, resulting in diverse groups
extending their support and loyalty to their own ethnicities or religious affinities.
The fragile nationhood scenarios develop favorable conditions for dom inant
ethnic or religious groups to attain sway over state power. Ethnic and religious divides
draw power struggles on th e basis o f m ajority and minority; unfortunately, in w eak

18 Ibid.
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states, minorities are always the target of "discrim ination and victim ization."19 it is
im portant to take into account th a t the politics o f ethnic and religious divisions also
occur in stable and highly dem ocratic states; how ever, w eak and undem ocratic states
experience the "deadly outcom e" of these divides.20 For instance, during th e 1990s, the
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups engaged in mass scale genocide in Rwanda, Burmese
nationalists persecuted non-Burmese ethnicities, and Pashtun and non-Pashtun civil
w ar erupted in post-Soviet Afghanistan. These are considerable examples which echo
th at ethno-nationalism significantly weakens statehood on the one hand, w hile on the
other side the "m inority or suffering ethnicities feel their right to spark ethnonationalistic fervors to protect their rights" dwelling in a fragile but "im perial state."21
The challenge o f fragile statehood is missing phenom ena o f unified nationhood, which
means w eak and fragile states are continuously in search and making o f a unified
nationhood.22 As a m atter of fact, creating a com m on identity as a nation is becoming
more complicated in recent years than it would have been perceived in an earlier preand post-decolonization period. This is because, m ulti-ethnic nation states in the
developing world are failing to accom m odate and assimilate minority groups through
developing inclusive political culture, and are, rather, adopting exclusive policies

19 Rita Manchanda, States in Conflict with Their Minorities : Challenges to M inority Rights in South Asia
(New Delhi, India ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2010), 15.
20 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 144-45.
21 Nil S. Satana, M olly Inman, and Johanna Kristin Birnir, "Religion, Government Coalitions, and
Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 1 (2013): 32; Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An
Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era, 78.
22 Paul James, Nation Formation : Towards a Theory o f Abstract Community (London ; Thousand Oaks,
Calif.: Sage, 1996), 14-15.
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undermining the rights of m inorities.23 Despite the com plexity of political situations in
w eak states, a sincere political e ffo rt can help w eak states to mend th e ir problems. At
an initial stage, hum anitarian-based interventions involving international regimes (such
as the UN) could coerce and help in resolving the "state-m inority conflicts and
strengthen ethno-cultural pluralism."24 At a later stage, th e y could m otivate ruling
elites in w eak states to show th e ir viable com m itm ent tow ards dem ocratizing the
system o f governance, which possibly requires "guardianship" by th e international
com m unity in extrem e cases e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan.25 The nature of
guardianship may also act as a "surrogate sovereign," if a w eak state is on the verge of
a com plete breakdown, so the zones o f weakness in a state can be fixed.26

23 Harris Mylonas, The Politics o f Nation-Building : M aking Co-Nationals, Refugees, and M inorities (N ew
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21-22.
24 Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel T. Froats, "M inority Rights and the W estphalian M odel," in The
International Spread o f Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald
Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 250.
25 Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal o f
Politics 26, no. 2 (M ay 1964): 296.
26 peter Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival o f International Trusteeship," The Journal o f
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (M arch 1993): 106.
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W hile making a comparison betw een strong and w e a k states, it is im portant to
note 'institutionalized' state capacities and legitimacies o f political order th a t enforce
and retain the bond betw een the state's image and practices. In addition, the
geographic location and resources of the state will provide a valued addition to
determ ine the pivot-ness o f the state.27 It consolidates a balanced view point to
understand endogenous and exogenous factors causing state fragility.
As m entioned earlier, states, w h eth er strong or w eak, still hold the position as
prim ary unit among other potential components o f the international system.28
However, it is necessary to rem em ber th a t in the post-Second W orld W a r period, a
gradual shift shows th at "pow er is decentralized, th e once homogenous system is
broken down into a num ber of subsystems, the num ber o f actors is large, and the
factors determ ining their policies are innum erable."29 Therefore, the recurrence of
transform ative global political episodes, th e ir sequences, and significantly, their
relationships, has changed the nature o f states as w ell. Specifically, during the late
tw e n tie th century, most of the debate has been focused around the role and fu tu re of
th e state. The political debates paid less attention to issues of weak and fragile states
or issues of post-conflict developm ent in w arring societies centered in the Third W orld.
In the w ake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, democracies rejoiced and
announced the end of history; however, some scholars proposed new security agendas,

27 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 51.
28 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962), 4-24; Gabriel A Almond, "The Return to the State," The American Political Science Review
82, no. 3 (Sep. 1988): 856.
29 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles; or, the Setting o f American Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (N ew York:
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by M cGraw-Hill, 1968), 57.
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such as Samuel Huntington's (1992) 'Clash o f Civilizations/ believing future problem s
would emerge from cultural differences. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1 9 92 -1 9 93 )
suggested th a t failed states would becom e a high priority on the security agenda, and
Robert Kaplan's (1994) alarmist w ork 'The Coming Anarchy' suggested an outlook
tow ards the environm ent, stating th a t resources and over-population w ould potentially
trigger security dilemmas.
The post-Cold W a r era is considered an "age of optimism;" how ever, th e tragic
events of Septem ber 11th 2001 shook th e confidence of optimism w ith new waves o f
security threats.30 Also following w ere "political anxieties," particularly w ith the
"erosion of rule o f law" in many w eak states.31 Gideon Rachman (2011) em phasized
four new forces th a t determ ine future security agendas. First, global political problems
em anate from a variety of common issue areas; these are th e environm ental issues o f
climate change, terrorism , economic recession, or stagnation. Second, th e w eak and
controversial global governance system hampers resolving global political problems.
Third, the gaining m om entum and renew ed confidence of authoritarian powers is
another challenge, specifically backed by Russia and China. Finally, th e re are an
increasing num ber of failed states w ith non-traditional threats rooted in failed
societies.32 Failed societies are more susceptible to adopting authoritarian form s of
governance, becoming ideal places fo r terrorists to reside, proliferate chemical and

30 Gideon Rachman, Zero-Sum F u tu re : American Power in an Age o f Anxiety, 1st Simon & Schuster
hardcover ed. (N ew York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 174.
31 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 4.
32 Rachman, Zero-Sum F u tu re : American Pow er in an Age o f Anxiety, 174.
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nuclear weapons, and present poor economic activity th a t all together lead to
hum anitarian crises and human rights violations.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, policy makers and academics started to
seriously investigate the proposed alarm ing and complex issue areas highlighted above.
Initially, the notion of state failure did not gather m om entum ; nevertheless, w hen the
traum atic events o f 9 /1 1 shocked the global com m unity, th e realization th a t policy
makers and the international com m unity now faced an unprecedented type o f th re a t
from non-conventional structures o f transnational elem ents elicited renew ed interest
in the subject.33 Therefore, the psychological and em otional fear was obvious, because
no one knew the severity o f transnational threats of stateless forces and th e effects of
a state failure. Even if one asked a layperson to list th e countries "most geopolitically
irrelevant to our interests because of th e ir being so rem ote, poor, and w eak, th e list
would surely have begun with Afghanistan and Somalia ... [BUT] today th e w orld no
longer faces just the circumscribed risk o f an Easter Island society or M aya hom eland
collapsing in isolation, w ithout affecting the rest o f the w o rld ."34 The effects have
m ultiple dimensions and political, economic, and social implications. At political scale,
afte r the horrific events of 9 /1 1 , transnational threats stemming from w eak and fragile
states gripped many parts of the world w ith new modes o f violence, specifically linked
to terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. The economic cost of transnational threats
after 9 /1 1 has soared. In 2012, th e cost of dealing w ith violent insecurities across the

33 Andersen, M ille r , and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 16.
34 Jared M . Diamond, Collapse : How Societies Choose to Fail o r Succeed (New York: Penguin Books,
2006), 519.
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world reached to $9.45 trillion, which is 11% of global GDP. Subsequently, th e notion of
fragile states reached a crescendo and it quickly came under the radar of the global
com m unity to deal w ith the issue of state fragility w ith urgency.
This research section develops an understanding ab o u t the challenges to
statehood prevalent in the fragility of states through a theoretical prism, which paves
the w ay to identify and assess the existing gaps in the adm inistrative and institutional
structures o f w eak and fragile states. M any of these gaps are linked to colonial legacies,
w hile many of the problems are linked to domestic governance issues; highly
corrupted, centralized political structures are especially troubling factors in w eak
states. It fu rth er seeks to explain how the widening structural gaps turn w eak and
fragile states into decapitated states w ith higher institutional ineffectiveness and
incompetency in governance. In addition, the im pact of institutional fracturedness
within weak states answer the question 'why does it m atter?' In this regard, the core
theoretical fram ew ork and explanations are developed and derived from theories on
w eak and fragile states, political order w ith reference to governability, political
capacity, political capability w ith reference to political economy of w eak states, and
geopolitical approaches with reference to the concept of th e resource curse and geo
strategy.
The theoretical fram ew ork is categorized into tw o parts. The first part prim arily
builds on the literature on weak and fragile states, which provides a base to understand
under w hat conditions w eak or fragile states continue to fail or becom e fractured
w ithin. The second part of the theoretical literature provides a ladder or tool tow ards
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fixing the state fragility to tackle issues such as economic stagnation, endem ic
corruption, political instability, w eak institutions, and social conflicts (due to a polarized
socially structured society). The entire exercise helps in understanding, explaining, and
extrapolating the research agenda, significantly contributing to the field o f study.

ORIGIN AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE FRAGILITY
In this study fragility is actually referred to as the 'w eak pivot states;' like
others, w eak pivot states also potentially face the challenges of state fragility or quasi
states in contrast to com pletely failed or collapsed ones. They are w eak and fragile
because their political institutions are fractured or ineffective to deliver political goods,
and th e ir societies are highly polarized by deep fragm entation within the nationh oo d.35
Significantly, they are 'pivot' due to th e geo-strategic and geopolitical im portance of
th e ir location or resources, which are lacking in many other weak and fragile states. In
general, while the outcom e of state failure is the same, w h eth er a w eak state is a pivot
or not, but the impact factor is significantly different in both cases.
If w eak states w ere placed in a continuum and facing challenges of state
fragility, they could be dem oted to a "Fourth W orld" category from th e ir current
placem ent in the Third W orld grouping.36 The origin of fragile states is not new.
Throughout history states have faced domestic challenges, regional issues, and
international pressures th at eventually posed political deadlocks. In a fe w accounts,

35 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 180.
36 Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in th e New W orld Order: Decaying Somalia,
Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 455.
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nature driven factors, such as floods, earthquake, hurricanes, etc. beyond human
control, have also raised existential threats to various societies. Hence, societies have
suffered w ith both "m an-m ade" factors as w ell as "nature made" factors like ecocide
(polluting th e environm ent).37 History dem onstrates the diverse experiences "of a
society's birth, grow th, peak, senescence, and death" th a t continues on a constant
basis.38
A w eak state dem onstrates an inability to tackle th e duties and challenges of
statehood. Such a lack of ability causes cracks w ithin its political institutions and
subsequently weakens the state's political capacity to retain its authority. A num ber of
political historians, scholars, and analysts like Paul Kennedy (1987), Jared Diam ond
(2006), and Peter Turchin (2003) explain the rise and failure o f societies, governm ents,
and even stronger empires th at have m et a similar fate. In recent tim es, specifically
during the post-Cold W ar, the global com m unity has been exposed to non-traditional
and unpredictable challenges and security threats.
In a way, these non-traditional security threats e ith er stem from non-state or
'stateless'39 actors (m ore likely residing in fragile states) or from the contagious effects
of state fragility itself that pose threats to the rest by creating "bad neighborhoods"40
th a t end up becoming "ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned"41 spaces. Alarming
situations em erge once territorial integrity becomes "politically disordered," gradually

37 Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time o f Terror, 22; Diamond, Collapse : H ow Societies
Choose to Fail or Succeed, 7-8.
38 Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, 6.
39 Jakub Grygiel, "The Power of Statelessness," Policy Review, no. 154 (A pr/M ay 2009): 35.
40 Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," Dissent 49, no. 1 (W inter 2002): 117.
41 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 5.
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shattering the bounding features o f statehood.42 Ungoverned social spaces are "social,
political, and economic arenas w here states do not exercise effective sovereignty or
w h ere state control is absent, w eak, or contested."43 Hence, the fragile statehood of
w eak states provides fertile ground for non-state or stateless actors to use
geographical spaces to thrive, reside, and act against host states vis-a-vis foreign
territories, because of the w eak states' "deficit in th e efficacious display o f state
pow er."44
Furtherm ore, the vulnerability and sensitivity of fragile statehood potentially
triggers regional and domestic conflicts. Some of these conflicts are witnessed in Africa
stemming from ethno-nationalistic fervor, which led to mass genocides and human
rights violations during the 1990s. The ethnic conflicts in M yanm ar, Rwanda, Bosnia,
and Afghanistan raised the num ber of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee
issues which led to m ounting political and socio-economic burdens on neighboring
countries.
The origin o f the concept and the acute nature of th e political problem of a
state's fragility in today's w orld can be linked to original w ork of Gerald B. Helm an and
Steven R. Ratner. Gerald Helm an and Steven Ratner coined for the first tim e the
term inology "failed states" in their article "Saving Failed States," published in late 1992.
The article emphasized th a t many of the newly independent states which colonization
had left w ith "no tradition of statehood or practice in self-governm ent" ... showed a
42 Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces : Alternatives to State A uthority in an Era
o f Softened Sovereignty (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 17.
43 Ibid.
44 Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in th e New W orld Order: Decaying Somalia,
Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 458.
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"lack of experience in governm ent, w eak civic institutions, limited economic prospects,
and ethnic strife," making them fragile and possibly failed societies.45 Over the years, in
most cases th e ir com m itm ent to govern them selves gradually decayed, and they
became 'client states'46 to look for th e ir day-to-day survivability and to resist any move
tow ards de-recognition of statehood. Interestingly, in some cases like M yanm ar, if a
w eak state holds a pivotal geostrategic location, and retains client state status, then
geography becomes a burden. In contrast, if a w eak state gradually improves its status
then the state can enjoy the "pow er of the weak" as leverage over other influential
states.47 For exam ple, the Cold W ar, the Vietnam W a r, and th e Afghan W a r
dem onstrated th a t the "pow er of th e w eak" developed a harsh, but negotiated order
betw een w eak states and superpowers.48
Early works by Arnold W olfers (1962), Robert Rothstein (1968, 1977), Thomas
Franck (1968), Marshall Singer (1972), M ichael Handel (1981), Robert H. Jackson and
Carl G. Rosberg (1986), and Joel M igdal (1988) help conceptualize the phenom ena of
fragility and fracturedness within th e fram ew ork o f w eak and fragile states. These early
academic contributions fu rth er noted the domestic problems of w eak states and also
th e weak diplomatic positioning o f these states in th e international system. M oreover,
in later years, the significant contributions by Robert Jackson (1987, 1990), I. W illiam

45 Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States," 5.
46 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 4 1 ,1 3 2 -3 3 .
47 Arnold Wolfers emphasized th a t most likely the weak but geo-strategically im portant countries enjoy
some political leverage in world politics, e.g. during Cold W a r period, Cuba and Albania retained an
advantage over great powers; therefore, th e "pow er of the w eak stems from th e relationships among
th e great powers themselves". See, W olfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on In ternatio n al Politics,

111.
48 Serfaty, A World R ecast: An American M o m e n t in a Post-Western Order, 21.
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Zartm an (1995), Jean-Germain Gros (1996), Jeffrey Ira Herbst (2000), Antony G.
Hopkins (2000), Robert I. Rotberg (2003, 2004), and Seth D. Kaplan (2008) significantly
provided an intellectual base th a t has outlined the basic indicators required for
effectively perform ing states. The literature helps to categorize and develop taxonom y
o f troubling states and puts forw ard lessons learned from these w eak societies to seek
viable solutions.
From the outset, it has rem ained a daunting challenge to define, categorize, and
draw a clear distinction betw een various categories o f w eak states. Similarly, in
retrospect and broadly speaking, the m ajor and small powers phenomena or
categorization rem ain in usage instead o f strong and w eak states. Small powers w ere
considered relatively w eaker compared to m ajor powers due to insufficient capabilities
in retaining social cohesion and in deterring m ajor external threats. Robert L. Rothstein
(1968) developed an acceptable definition for small powers that in many ways can be
applicable to today's w eak or fragile states too. The author defines small pow er as:
"... a state which recognizes th at it cannot obtain security prim arily by use o f its
own capabilities, and th a t it must rely fundam entally on the aid of o th er states,
institutions, processes, or developm ents to do so; th e small pow er's belief in its
inability to rely on its own must be recognized by th e other states involved in
international politics."49
Similarly, the literature shows th a t the small states also share some
commonalities w ith small powers. Primary among them is being insufficient in pow er
capabilities, which frequently encounters a small state w ith a sense of inferiority at the
systemic level. Am ry Vandenbosch (1964) portrays small states with follow ing quote:

49 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29.
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"A small state is a vacuum in a high pressure area. It does not live because o f its
strength but because nobody w ants its territory, or because its preservation as
a buffer state or as a w eight in th e balance o f pow er is of interest to a stronger
nation. W hen the balance disappears, th e small state usually disappears with
it."50
In these circumstances, w eak positioned small powers or states ideally look for
"neutrality" or "non-aligned m ovem ent," as they are arguably incapable o f resisting
any coercive a tte m p t by much pow erful states.51 As an instance, before W orld W a r II,
Belgium ensured its neutrality from then great powers. W hile, India during its early
years of independence preferred to join the non-aligned m ovem ent as a m ore
attractive policy to secure its survivability. Those w eak states, which realized neutrality
is an inexpedient option in Realpolitik and "wish to survive," dare to com e out of
neutrality because the w eak states "are m ore preoccupied w ith survival."52 In most
cases, the decision to say farew ell to neutrality forced small states or powers to
bandwagon w ith great powers in order to accrue th e ir relative power capabilities
against their archrivals. M any w eak states enjoyed the support of m ajor powers w hile
balancing th e ir archrivals, and it is a w in-w in situation for both w eaker and stronger
states. Note, th e dynamics of w eak and strong states in global political systems
revolves around balancing, buffering and bandwagoning.
The established relationship betw een w eak or fragile states and strong states is
usually an asymmetrical power relationship. The general understanding about w eak
and fragile states is th at they opt to bandwagon, because th e anarchic nature of
50 Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," 294-95.
51 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 243.
52 Kenneth W altz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54;
M iriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies o f Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own
Backyard," British Journal o f Political Science 25, no. 2 (1995): 175.
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systemic pressure prompts them to do so. In contrast, w ea k er states are rational actors
too; despite fragile and w eak conditions, w eaker states rationally calculate the
available options to maximize th e gains. In this regard, w eaker states also try best to
exploit the interests of great powers and develop bargaining options. These
bandwagoning bargains become "bandwagoning fo r profits," as the stronger states,
driven by the desire to avoid losses, are m ore interested in balancing, w hile the w eaker
states are com fortable w ith bandwagoning, which provides maximum opportu nity for
gain.53
It is witnessed during the Cold W a r period th a t Pakistan allied w ith th e United
States, which helped Pakistan to balance India through acquiring m ilitary and economic
support. In a way, Pakistan's status as a w eak state during its time o f birth maximized
its gains w hile offering to protect U.S interests to contain communism in th e region.
Observing these historical guidelines, w ith o u t external support and alliances for
security arrangements, a w eak state trying to exert pow er is like "the mouse th at
roared" in real world scenarios.54 Finally, there are few states advocating fo r liberalinstitutionalism to safeguard th e ir interests under systemic pressures. These
institutionalists heavily rely on th e support of a "super-leviathan" or take shelter under
th e umbrella of international organizations, e.g. UN, NATO, Warsaw Pact, EU, AU,

53 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing th e Revisionist State Back In," International
Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 74.
54 Marshall R. Singer, W eak States in a W orld o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships
(N ew York,: Free Press, 1972), 368.
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ASEAN, etc., for legal protections provided through a "negotiated order, bargaining
order, or imposed order" of "international regim es."55
Recent studies have led to overlaps w hen analyzing the weak states category
because the notion of w eak states itself is discussed under a number of titles, such as
small states, fragile states, quasi-states, failing states, failed states, and so forth. In
some cases, malfunctioning and human rights-abusing w eak states are considered
rogue states, praetorian states, garrison states, or predatory states as w ell. Therefore,
th ere is a blurred distinction betw een vaguely used phenom ena in the literature. In
addition, each study undertakes differen t param eters to judge the strength and
capacity of a state. On the one hand, th e procedure provides multiple criteria to
understand and evaluate diverse cases o f contem porary w eak states, but on th e o ther
hand, it fails to develop an agreeable path to tackle the problems of w eak states or
generalize the issue area. Similarly, it is hard to suggest any generalized description for
all fragile states, because there are m any factors th a t contribute to determ ining
fragility, and each case study has its ow n uniqueness. However, this study inculcates
various distinctive explanations into one comprehensive study for an in-depth
understanding and prescribes some fundam ental guidelines to improve the fragile
conditions o f w eak states.

55 Hoffmann explains th at there is no super pow er above states due to the absence o f a super-leviathan,
which means th e absence o f form alized international norms and values, which may retain anarchic
realities of world politics. See, Stanley Hoffm ann, Chaos and Violence : W hat Globalization, Failed States,
and Terrorism M ean fo r U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, M d.: Rowman & Littlefield 2006), 43; Oran R.
Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall o f International Regimes," in International Regimes, ed.
Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 99-101; Stephen D. Krasner, International
Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 36-39.
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Despite the variation in titling the subject m atter, it is understandable th at
w eak states can be distinct from strong or successful states on the basis of
psychological and m aterial grounds. On th a t note, most of th e explanations on the
subject affirm th a t the weakness of states means a substantial lack o f effectiveness in
mobilizing its tangible and intangible factors of pow er in contrast to stable ones. This
means the "m ajor components (tangible) of pow er w ere considered to be w ealth,
organization, and status," w hile w eak states considerably lack them or are not fully
capable of harnessing th e m .56 According to Kenneth W altz, th e differentiations
betw een strong and weak are based on "pow er capabilities," which require every state
to behave under anarchic conditions to follow "self-help or decline and perish."57
Subsequently, a state's lack of economic, m ilitary and diplom atic pow er also weakens
its international posture among global m em bers as an effective unit to enforce its
persuasive diplomatic agenda.58
Similarly, at the domestic level, the "scope" of state em powers state institutions
to enforce the rule of law in order to retain a legitim ate monopoly of p ow er.59 The
rationale of the state's legitimacy is linked to "the state's unique ability to provide a
territorially-centralised form of organization."60 Therefore it becomes possible through

56 Singer, W eak States in a W orld o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships, 368.
57 John M . Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge England; N ew York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 23.
58 Singer, W eak States in a W orld o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships, 73;
Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," 302.
59 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance an d W orld Order in th e 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2004), 6.
60 Michael M ann, "The Autonomous Power of th e State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," European
Journal o f Sociology 25, no. 2 (Novem ber 1984): 185.

th e "strength of state pow er, or th e ability o f states."61 Historically, in many societies,
th e m onopoly o f violence was achieved through "despotic powers" which m eant "the
range of actions w ith which the elite is em pow ered to undertake w ith o u t routine,
institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups."62 W ith o u t much surprise, the
com parable type of despotic pow er mechanism is also practiced and w ielded in many
o f the authoritarian systems in contem porary political settings. In fact, in the case of
w eak and fragile states, it rather holds "an inability to m aintain a m onopoly of the
internal means o f violence," proving to be a more fractured political system .63 In
contrast, in m odern democracies, the legitimacy of pow er is retained through
"infrastructural power" o f state institutions.64

DESCRIBING THE ESSENCE OF FRAGILITY
Seeking th e essence and describing the fragile conditions o f a state prim arily
rely on literature explaining w eak states, failed states, and collapsed states.
Additionally, to understand the fragility, it is especially im portant to understand the
norm ative ontology o f state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The perform ance of
both the state and the nation offers some common characteristics and indicators of
fragile statehood th at are equally traceable in weak, failed, and collapsed states. In
contrast to stable and strong states, others faced w ith fragile conditions are considered

61 Fukuyama, S tate-Building: Governance and W orld Order in the 2 1st Century, 7.
62 M ann, "The Autonomous Power of th e State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," 188.
63 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 117.
64 The infrastructural power, according to Michael Mann: "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate
civil society, and to im plem ent logistically political decisions throughout the realm." See, M ann, "The
Autonomous Power o f the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," 189.
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as weak states w ith unpromising coercive and non-coercive state capacity. The extrem e
condition of weak states is th at of a failed or collapsed state. There is a transition th a t
can move a state from strong to w eak, w ea k to failed, and failed to collapsed.
Political scientist W illiam Zartm an (1995) argues th a t the fragility o f states
should be referred "to a situation w here th e structure, authority (legitim ate pow er),
law, and political order have fallen ap art."65 It is p ertinen t to note th a t every collapsed
state reached its status of breakdown a fte r experiencing th e transition of failed and
early fragile statehood. But it is not m andatory th a t every w eak state m eet a similar
fate; a w eak state can be resilient and im prove its fragile conditions. The later part of
th e discussion on political developm ent in w eak states, establishing political order for
an effective political capacity, elaborates on how w eak states can undertake efforts to
improve th e ir status of w eak statehood.
Senior Fellow and Director of the International Institutions and Global
Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, Stewart Patrick, defines a
w eak state as "one that struggles to fulfill th e fundam ental security, political,
economic, and social functions th a t have come to be associated w ith sovereign
statehood."66 M ost w eak states face trem endous challenges and gaps in fo u r areas; i.e.
security, political, economic and social arenas identified in an earlier definition. Once a
state struggles w ith performing its basic functions, it shows the symptoms o f weakness
and state fragility. According to Zartm an, w hen fragile statehood reaches its apex, then
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"the basic functions o f the state are no longer p erfo rm ed ."67
Once a state becomes incapable o f perform ing its basic functions, then the
bond betw een citizens and the state becomes an unfulfilled social contract. Stephen
Baranyi and Kristiana Powell's w ork based on Robert Rotberg and W illiam Zartm an's
literature suggests th a t th e notion of state fragility, weakness, or failure is based on
tw o ideas: first, the "states' inability a n d /o r unwillingness to provide essential public
goods like protection from external threats, rule o f law and basic social services to
most of their citizens;" and second, fragility is a m a tte r of degree -- ranging fro m states
th a t have ceased to exist in all but name and cannot provide protection or w elfare to
anyone, to certain states that can deliver most public goods to most o f th e ir citizens."68
The wide-ranging body o f literature on fragile statehood agrees th a t w hen
states fail to ensure the provision of political goods to th e ir citizens, th e concept of
statehood shatters. Failure to m eet these basic requirem ents causes a gradual loss o f a
state's credibility, at which point the idea of "being a citizen becomes meaningless" for
th e political com m unity of a state. 69 Subsequently, the breach of the social contract
betw een citizens and the state also leads to a "loss of control over political and
economic space."70
Analyzing the nature and hierarchy of political (public) goods, Robert Rotberg
has explained th a t political goods:
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68 Stephen Baranyi and Kristiana Powell, "Fragile States, Gender Equality and Aid Effectiveness: A Review
of Donor Perspectives," (Ottaw a: The North-South Institute, 2005), 1.
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"... are those intangible and hard to quantify claims th a t citizens once made on
sovereigns and now m ake on states. They encompass expectations, conceivably
obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the
social contract betw een ruler and ruled th a t is at th e core of
regim e/governm ent and citizenry interactions ...therefore...political good
enables citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the
political process. This good encompasses the essential freedoms: th e right to
com pete for office; respect and support for national and regional political
institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance o f dissent and difference; and
fundam ental civil and hum an rights."71

IS FRAGILITY A COLONIAL BAGGAGE?
The lack of provision o f political (public) goods due to weak state capacity is
rooted in post-colonial state structures in Third W orld societies. M ost of th e w eak and
fragile states gathered anti-colonial m om entum to establish new nation-states through
nationalistic fervors.72 However, they paid less attention towards nation building and
establishing an effective statehood. In other words, enjoying the spirit of selfdeterm ination through the UN charter did not assure any viable political support to the
challenges o f 'sovereignty' and adopting new models of a state system. Gerald Helman
and Steven Ratner narrate the situation th a t th e "UN made the self-determ ination of
peoples -a right enshrined in th e U.N. Charter-a prim ary goal. Self-determ ination in

71 According to the author, the provision of security is th e most critical hierarchy of political goods,
because, it "prevents cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to elim inate
domestic threats to or attacks upon th e national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any
related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve th e ir differences with the
state and with their fellow inhabitants w ith o u t recourse to arms or o th e r forms o f physical coercion."
See, Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences, 2-3.
72 Yale H. Ferguson, "The State Concept and a W orld o f Polities under Perpetual Siege," in The State,
Identity and Violence: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold W ar W orld, ed. R. Brian Ferguson (London
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fact, was given m ore attention than long-term survivability."73 The new models
adopted by the newly independent states in th e Third W orld w ere in process of
replacing traditional structures of political societies or colonial experiences, as they
w ere explicitly a "repudiation of the old" system.74 W a lte r Opello and Stephen Rosow
portray the final movem ents of Colonial dynamics:
"The colonial encounters com plem ented and clashed with local conditions,
generating certain spaces in which sovereignty was contested ... Ethnicity
provided an alternative identity around which political life could be organized in
and against the new territorial state. Ethnicity should not be thoug ht o f as a
given attribute of people; it is an identity th a t people come to adopt under the
conditions set by the struggles for independence, and just as w ith nationalism ,
its specific features, such as language, racial characteristics, shared histories,
and religion, are constructed under m odern circumstances."75
Newly independent w eak states in Asia, Africa and Latin America grappled w ith
new forms of challenges. Relying on outside support to ensure state sovereignty and
th e provision of basic security and political goods to its population developed a notion
o f dependency on external help.76 Jeffrey Herbst emphasized that granting sovereignty
to many of decolonizing states was unexpectedly got quicker due to decline of colonial
powers and sovereignty became "little m ore than a legal fiction," because soon after
independence they got entangled w ith g reater scale of socio-economic and political
hardships.77 The early foundation of statehood was already shattered w ith non
preparedness to project effectiveness in governance structure. The non-preparedness
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can be reflected through "postcolonial forms o f authority [that] w ere from the outset
partial, fragm ented, and unsettled ... [and, the] structure o f governance was deeply
bifurcated betw een rural and urban form s of governance."78
The political elites not only m anipulated th e fragile conditions of statehood, but
also collaborated with m ilitary institutions to form a new pow er alliance. This alliance
justified the m ilitary rule to stabilize the security threats posed both on a dom estic and
external scale. It can be agreed th a t most w eak states received domestic support in the
conduct of foreign policy, w hile society rem ained fragm ented over dom estic issues.
Robert Rothstein writes th a t during the post-independence period, "unity on foreign
policy seems much easier to achieve than unity on dom estic policy. Dom estic conflicts
may be sharp and pervasive, but contending groups can usually agree on the elem ents
of an external policy: economic nationalism, anti-colonialism, nonalignment, and so
fo rth ."79
As a result, political leadership exploited th e notion o f fear from foreign
interventions w ith the use of b itter examples of th e ir colonial past. These political
manipulations helped the political elites to retain th e ir despotic pow er through
"redistributing w ealth to themselves and their cronies [rather] than creating growth
and wealth for [the] nation, and used [the] state apparatus to stay in p ow er."80 Right at
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the beginning, the political culture and institutions o f state building w ere corrupted.81
Over the years, the legitimacy of political pow er under m ilitary rule was mostly
retained through the justification of providing dom estic stability and protection from
existential threats posed by neighbors. These justifications to stabilize the country
witnessed frequent m ilitary interventions in Third W orld politics and becam e a routine
fashion of the day.82
M ilitary interference in political life im pacted political developm ent as m ilitary
coups proved to be m ore politically repressive o f popular discontent. The expression of
political and socio-economic repercussion can be seen in th e form o f "low governance
effecting provision of goods needed for economic grow th causing economic
stagnation."83 Ultim ately, it will not long last as the world awakens politically, and w eak
states with a long history of m ilitary interventions will be prom pted to think "beyond
sticks, stones, and severing limbs"84 against mass discontent.
In these circumstances, when m ilitary interventions become regular, the
establishment of democratic norms of political developm ent and political participations
gradually w ith er away and crises of political developm ent evolve. Frequent and
continuous crises of political developm ent in w eak states w iden the "gaps in th e social,
cultural, economic, psychological, and political spheres," whereas in strong states these
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gaps are generally absent.85 W hilst authoritarianism paved the ways fo r Praetorians to
establish th e ir own forms of political order, a praetorian-fram ed political order
gradually underm ines the political participation in post-colonial societies, so a process
o f decay affects political institutions and the effectiveness of statehood. The late
Samuel Huntington emphasized th e historical roots of oligarchic praetorianism and its
evolution tow ards radical praetorianism , which underm ines political institutions
resulting in decapitation o f the state. He fu rth er elaborates that a "praetorian society
lack[s] com m unity and effective political institutions" because the authoritarian
regimes and m ilitary dictators do not allow political communities to flourish and
participate. If political institutions are allowed to flourish in society, then in an
"institutionalized society the participation" becomes an im portant fe a tu re in a political
system to establish an efficacious political order. 86
The inefficacy of political orders in w eak and fragile states is also due to the
direct or indirect control of authoritarian regimes. These regimes have self-justified
legitimacy to intervene in a political system as saviors of sovereignty and internal
security. It is significant to mention th a t the role o f m ilitary is equally im portant in
every society, but the nature of civil-m ilitary relations more im portantly determ ines the
nature of the political system of the state. In strong states, the civil-military relations
are com paratively different than in the w eak and fragile ones. To put an o th er way, in
strong states, the civilian control o f institutions, including th e military, is effective.
Samuel Huntington has answered the question of civilian control in tw o ways: 1)

85 Binder, "Crises of Political Developm ent," 29.
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Subjective civilian control through maximizing civilian pow er means em p o w erm e n t of
governm ental institutions, social classes, and constitutions th at can restrain any
possible m ilitary influence in politics.87 2) Objective civilian power through maximizing
m ilitary professionalism means "the distribution o f political power betw een m ilitary
and civilian groups which is most conducive to the em ergence of professional attitudes
and behavior" o f officers in corps.88 Hence, the end result o f subjective civilian control
is "civilianizing th e military (making th em m irror o f state),"while objective civilian
control tries for "militarizing the m ilitary (making th em as tool of th e state)."89
Huntington fu rth er clarified th a t in objective civilian control, the core essence is "the
recognition of autonom ous m ilitary professionalism," and for the subjective civilian
control, the core essence is "the denial o f an independent military sphere."90 W h at
happens in w eak states is th at th e less fear there is of any constitutional or institutional
restraint, the m ilitary actively involves in political spheres. In modern times, freq u en t
m ilitary interventions are observable in various regions of world, specifically in the
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and have always underm ined the electoral processes.91
To understand the role o f the m ilitary in strong and weak states, the typology of
civil-military relations helps to portray the significant involvement o f the m ilitary in the
political system as a partner; dom inant or hegemonic determines th e m aturity and
viability of political process.
Ayesha Siddiqa's work M ilita ry Inc. explains six topologies o f civil-m ilitary
87 The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations, 80-81.
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relations, which are im portant to understand the differences betw een strong and w eak
states. They are: 1) civil-military partnership, in which the military is subservient to
civilian rule, and th e m ilitary gains advantages from this partnership. 2) Authoritarian
political party-m ilitary partnership: in this type the m ilitary is still depen dent on civilian
rule, w hile enjoying the benefits from the dom inant political party. The difference
betw een the first tw o types is the assertive/participatory and controlled civil society,
because a dom inant political party mostly controls th e society. 3) Ruler-m ilitary, which
believes itself to be a guarantor of th e state's security and has the right to control th e
state. 4) A rbitrator-m ilitary, this type provides a justification that th e m ilitary's
legitim ate monopoly as a political and social arb itrato r is to fix the governance issues
created by political leadership. 5) Parent-guardian m ilitary, in which th e m ilitary
employs constitutional and legal rules to strengthen its roots as a perm anent political
actor in domestic and external politics. 6) W arlord, the final type, is the extrem e
condition of an anarchic situation o f state, in which m ilitary partners w ith dom inant
political/civilian ruling elites loot and plunders the society.92 The evolution o f m ilitary
interventions started soon a fte r decolonization; how ever, th e cases and justification of
each case varies from region to region. The com m onality among all the cases is th a t
these interventions are legitimized as saviors of new ly born states from internal and
external threats.
Since decolonization, the entire effort of creating new nation-states looks only
like a political struggle to join a consortium o f the international state system, while
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there is no serious effort m ade to fill the domestic political vacuum in the actual
political transitions. It projects a dichotom y betw een traditional and m odern form ats,
which w ere "m odified and reconstituted" political cultures fo r newly born nation
states.93 Louise Anderson emphasized th a t even earlier attem pts o f creating new states
after decolonization was actually a "failed universalization o f the im ported state w ithin
the postcolonial w orld."94 Anderson fu rth er explains th at th e re is a dire need to find
ways th a t can show "how to deal w ith degrees o f statehood and zones of statelessness
not insisting on helping by (re) constructing states th a t w e re never truly states in th e
modern sense o f [the] w ord anyhow ."95
The journeys of the creation of new states did not halt after the decolonization
period. Recent reports show th a t there are more than "300 developed or em erging
national groups w ithout th e ir own state w orldw ide, known as stateless nations,"96 and
some other studies have also pointed to almost "8 00 0 potential ethnically pure states"
th at can struggle for sovereign territorial units.97 M any of them have launched non
violent political struggles for th e ir independence, w hile m any rely on arm ed struggles.
For instance, th e Kurdistan issue could involve Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in a regional
conflict. Interestingly, the m ajority of all national groups are weak and fragile and
surrounded by hostile neighbors.
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W h a t should have been done? The literature suggests for tw o options. The UN
could have mandated th a t then super powers stop th e creation of new w eak states,
whose weakness and fragility could create m ore "anarchy and disorder."98 Or,
alternatively, agreem ent might have been reached to create a com patible, effective
and self-reliant political order in fragile states. Instead, new independent states
em erged on a fragile foundation of statehood and w ere troubled w ith difficulties of
self-governance.
Actually, many newborn w eak states end up im m ediately experiencing issues of
"dispersed dom ination" (in which the state lacks capabilities in achieving country w ide
dom ination) rather than "integrated dom ination" (in which state establish broad pow er
and acts in a coherent fashion).99 It would not be w rong to adm it th a t fragile and w eak
links in state structure and incapable political institutions leave the idea o f sovereignty
in doubt. The question is w h e th e r w eak states can continue to survive for long, w hen
the fragility is a constant feature o f th e ir existence and may pose an existential th re a t
to them at any stage.
Political scientist Robert Jackson's earlier w ork te rm ed the fragile statehood
w ith "negative sovereignty" and called them "quasi-states."100 Robert Jackson w rites
th a t quasi-states "lack the institutional features of sovereign states."101 He fu rth er
emphasized that, due to negative sovereignty and lim itations of statehood, the fragile
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state's "populations do not enjoy many of th e advantages traditionally associated w ith
independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in political will,
institutional authority, and organized pow er to protect hum an rights or provide socio
economic w elfare ."102 The reason is th a t th e populations o f weak states do not enjoy
political, social, and economic advantages because th e state institutions are highly
exclusive in its nature. American economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
stressed th e need to strengthen the capacity of the state through developm ent of
inclusive political institutions for effectiveness of state capabilities.103 The phenom ena
of inclusiveness will harness greater support from th e population and vice versa, the
population will in turn be able to gain political, social and economic benefits.

BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS: A CRITICAL FACTOR OF STATE FRAGILITY
Above explanations about state fragility explained th a t the ill-preparedness and
w eak capabilities o f state pow er feature its fragility, which possibly becomes or is
considered an endogenous or domestic factor of failure, i.e. insufficient provision of
security, prevailing political corruption, structural weakness, controlled and
malfunctioning economy, m isadm inistration, and so forth. However, its exogenous or
external forces, such as macroeconomic and political policies, diplomatic ties, and
foreign interventions due to geopolitical reasons, cause fragility to o .104 S tew art Patrick
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calls it the "external environm ent" th a t can possibly "m itigate or exacerbate the state's
vulnerability."105
Describing the distinction betw een three concepts i.e. geography, geopolitics,
and geostrategy, Jakub Grygiel w rites th a t th e "geography is the physical reality" and
geological features of earth, i.e. includes m ountains, rivers, and so fo rth . W hile the
geopolitics and geostrategy engages at systemic and state level respectively.106
Geopolitics engages w ith th e "human factor w ithin geography, [means] it is geographic
distribution of centers of resources and lines of com m unication, assigning value to
locations according to th e ir strategic im portance."107 And, finally, the geostrategy is
linked w ith "geographic direction of a state's foreign policy" that shows the pow er of
concentration (both, the hard pow er (m ilitary) and the soft power (diplom atic)) of a
state towards a geographic location.108 The change patterns vary am ong all th re e
concepts. The geopolitical changes takes tim es to shift, even it can take centuries,
because it depends on the "rise and decline of centers of resources and shifts in routes,
placem ent at inter-section, ideological affiliation; in contrast, geography is m ore
constant or perm anent unless a natural calam ity hits and changes, w hile geostrategy
can be expected to shift rapidly.109
Among all the possible exogenous factors, it is particularly im portant to
understand the systemic image of world politics and geopolitical maneuverings th at
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substantially w eaken a state. It is not only w eaker states th a t have suffered due to
geopolitics. In a num ber o f cases great powers have suffered too, as shown fo r exam ple
w ith Paul Kennedy's thesis on "im perial over-stretch."110 W eaker powers suffered
worse, how ever, because pow er struggles com pletely disfigured th e state institutions
and social order. For instance, during the nineteenth century, the core aim of great
pow er involvem ent was th e strategic m anagem ent of regions like Central Asia, the
M iddle East, South-East Asia, and South Asia. These regions were im portant
geostrategic zones th at w ere central to th e great gam e rivalry "on th e chessboard o f
Im perial diplomacy" betw een Russia and Britain.111 Even during the Cold W a r the tw o
super-powers supported their client states to keep their influence in various regions of
the w orld, which resulted in underm ining dem ocratic transitions, as authoritarian
forces w ere allowed to suppress dissidents.
M oreover, historians share the notion th a t the great powers engaged in surgical
partitions w hile carving out the geopolitical map o f the w orld, e.g. th e decolonization
period offers many instances of surgical partitions. Hans J. M organthau has called these
pow er struggles "pow er politics into the periphery of the earth."112 In o th er contexts it
was considered to be a contest fo r the "heartland-dom inated land pow er" (Halford
Mackinder), or even the contest for the "m aritim e-oriented Rimland" (Nicholas John
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Spykm an).113 W h eth er it is a land or m aritim e contest, such great pow er struggle
affected the future stability o f w eak states. Though in recent years, contrary to the
past, territorial expansion through colonizing a peripheral region has changed, the
"private logic of the global econom y' still relies on "territorial expansion [as] a route to
control over new productive assets."114
The geopolitical or geographical factor provides a distinction betw een a "w eak
pivot state" and other w eak or fragile states. It has already been m entioned th a t in
both categories they share some indicators of fragility, but in addition, th e "w eak pivot
states" face fragility due to geographical reasons th a t may not be th e case fo r oth er
w eak or fragile states. The recent debates on geopolitics or geographical contest have
been given less attention due to the erosion o f tim e and space phenom ena in a highly
inter-connected globalized w orld. Still, the return o f geopolitics at this particular tim e
can be traced to "a certain serendipity in the convergence o f political semantics and
international relations."115 Although th e significance of geography remains constant,
and "human society is still related to the facts of geography," each phase o f history has
had its own perspective on geographical explanation, w hile w e witness crises and
sequences of political developm ent, the "view of the geographical realities is colored
for practical purposes by our preconceptions from the past."116
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115 Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics : Past, Present and Future (London ; Washington: Pinter, 1998), 1-2.
116 Halford John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and R e a lity : A Study in the Politics o f Reconstruction, NDU
Press defense classic ed. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 21-23.
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Even during th e recent past, like in th e Cold W a r period, the bipolar pow er
struggle com peted over regional gains. The bipolar p o w er com petition around
shatterbelts left severe impacts of state fragility on countries located in or around
these zones. For instance, in the late 1970s Soviet invasion over Afghanistan, the US
containm ent of Soviets in Afghanistan affected the peace and stability of the entire
region. The concept of "Shatterbelts" help us to understand the dangerously fractured
regions or zones, in which fragile states have very w ea k links to sustain th e regional
peace and sustainability of its own risky society. According to Saul Bernard Cohen,
shatterbelts are also referred as "Crush Zone" or "S hatter Zone," these zones are
"strategically oriented regions th a t are both deeply divided internally and caught up in
the com petition betw een G reat Powers of the geostrategic realm s."117 The M iddle East
and East Asia remained the suitable examples of shatterbelts during the Cold W a r
bipolar rivalry betw een U.S. and fo rm er USSR. In th e post-Cold W ar period, how ever,
the political remapping of regions and sub-regions dem arcated new zones of
insecurities i.e. M iddle East transform ed into the greater M iddle East. On similar lines,
th e notion of "new Global Balkans" also expands th e traditional boundaries o f Balkan.
According to Former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, th e new Global
Balkans are:
"... Extending from Egypt's Suez Canal to China's Xinjiang region, from
northern Kazakhstan to the Arabian Sea, th e Global Balkans o f today m irror th e
traditional Balkans of the nineteenth and tw e n tie th centuries in th a t they are
internally unstable and their geopolitical im portance causes foreign rivalries.
The contemporary "N ew Global Balkans" inhibited by about 500 million people,
are burdened by internal instability derived from ethnic and religious tensions,

117 Cohen, Geopolitics : The Geography o f International Relations, 44.
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poverty, and authoritarian governm ents. Ethnic conflict within th e Global
Balkans involves 5.5 million Jewish Israel and 5 million Arab Palestinians; 25
million Kurds and th e ir partitioning states o f Turkey, Iraq, and Syria; and
betw een India and Pakistan in the dispute over Kashmir, as w ell as numerous
potentially severe ethnic and m inority conflicts in Iran and Pakistan. Religious
conflicts involve th e Muslims and th e Hindus, Muslim Shiites versus, and a
variety of others. In 2005, unem ploym ent was as high as 50 percent in the Gaza
Strip, 40 percent in Afghanistan, 25 percent in Iraq, and 20 percent in the W est
Bank, and 18 percent in Kyrgyzstan."118
In this regard, the geographic factor is critical to fram e a rationale, as Michael
Handel (1981) highlights th e critical role of geographical location o f w ea k states in the
international system. Handel notes th a t it is a disadvantage for w eak states to be
located near a "large num ber of bordering countries, more powerful and w ith
conflicting goals th a t build high border pressure."119 For example, M y a n m ar suffered
both during the colonial and post-colonial tim e period due to frequent external
interference in its domestic politics. Despite th e fact that, in recent years, the direct
th reat from a neighbor coming over to capture territory has largely dim inished, the
th reat cannot be ignored. In th at sense, many w eak pivot states are fragile, and they
face high amounts of indirect interferences.120 M yanm ar's neighbors India and China,
to return to the example, have sponsored th e arm ed ethno-nationalist m ovem ents
against the state itself
If they cannot handle the geostrategic threats, w eak states face "state death"
due to the burden of geography and geopolitics. Tanisha Fazal's research has focused
on the politics of geography, suggesting th a t in earlier times conquest and occupation
118 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance : Three Presidents and the Crisis o f American Superpower (N ew
York: Basic Books, 2007), 154.
119 Handel, W eak States in the International System, 76.
120 David Reilly, "Shatterbelts and Conflict Behavior: The Effect of Globalization on High Risk States,"
Geopolitics 5, no. 3 (2000): 49.
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has caused the decay of states. Fazal defines state death as "internal state collapse or
failure, regime change, conquest, or division" m eaning "loss of sovereignty."121 Fazal
emphasizes th at it is foreign intervention th a t causes the loss of sovereignty, and as a
result, the state fu rth er loses its domestic capabilities, which means a state form ally
loses its "foreign policy making powers" as w e ll.122
In addition, many w eaker states present an abundance of natural resources like
oil, gas, gold, and diamonds, which can be considered either a blessing or a curse.123
The post-colonial history of Africa shows th a t fo rm e r colonial powers re-engaged in the
region to exploit its natural resources. In order to extract these, fo rm e r colonial powers
constructed new relationships w ith non-dem ocratic forces. These relationships gave a
fair am ount of legitimacy to intervene w ith the approval o f the local leadership, and in
return, m ajor powers endorsed th e despotic authoritarian leadership. W eak states
were already experiencing frequent clashes betw een rival ethnic groups fragm enting
th e nation w ith increased turm oil. W ith th e prim ary interest in extracting resources,
such internal turm oil became an opening for direct involvem ent by m ajor powers in the
name of stability.124
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123 Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences, 20.
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Table 2: Salient Features o f W eak Pivot States

instabiiity^nd Mplenee due to lack
I groups;
; statesthu^gles^o establish

Security

il^ l^ fre ^ ie i^ iiii^ o v e m e d
Political (Governamentality)

Excessive Burdens on Governing Capacity of
institutions; Political malfunctioning and Flabbiness
degenerating legitimacy o f authority;
Institutionalized Political Corruption underm ine the
integrity of basic state institutions; ineffective rule
of law; absence of transparent judiciary; and if state
is authoritarian and w eak th en state becomes
repressive and predatory violating hum an rights.

Nationhood

Predominated by ethnic divides; lack o f .cohesive
national identity, minority versus m ajoritypow er

a uthority through seekinghelp from transnational
advocacy networks (TAfcl)or through armed
struggles, e.g. irredentist movements.
Economy

Extractive political capacity relying on heavy
taxation; ruling elites establish a corrupt political
economy to exploit state fragility to extract foreign
aid, donations and loans fo r personal w ealth
accumulation; Based of traditional agricultural
sector, fledgling industrial and urban sector w ith
acute shortage of pow er supply effects production.

Social

Weak social cohesion; deeply fractured society;
Compromised dignity o f humans through human
rights violation; T>atrimomattzati0 n ;facktifaccess to
health and education; improper infrastructure;
human trafficking; poor w ater & sanitation;
malnutrition; high rnortality.

Pivot of Geography or
Resources

Geo-Politics; Geography becoming burden w ith the
direct or indirect external involvem ent, eith er due
to geo-strategic location or resource curse or could
be of tw o.
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The decay of societies is part of world politics; we have witnessed numerous
decays throughout the political history of world w ith the rise and fall of city-states and
empires. Now, possibly, some dysfunctional nation-states w ill face the same fate.
Krasner writes th a t "conflict prevention must becom e a routine elem ent of
policymaking ... [because] State death as a result o f external invasion, com m on before
W orld W ar II, has almost disappeared since 1945. The lack of good governance in w eak
states means they often do not have th e ability to deal w ith disaffected or criminal
groups within th e ir own borders."125 Among many scenarios, countries like
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and M y an m ar are victims of external and
internal troubles, which certainly dem and fu rth er inquiry into endogenous and
exogenous reasons of fragility w ith reference to geopolitics. The consequences o f the
endogenous and exogenous factors, w eak states encounter a num ber o f dire
challenges; in his work People, States and Fear, Barry Buzan (2007) has identified the
following conditions th at prevail in w eak states. According to Buzan, first, th e intensity
of political violence is relatively higher in w eak states. Second, the freedom and liberty
of citizens is always at stake, since there is a conspicuous role of political police in th e
everyday lives of citizens. Third, in w eak states th e core political conflict is over which
ideology will be used to organize the state; this is visible in Pakistan betw een
secular/liberal and non-secular forces. Fourth, th e re is an identity vacuum th a t is th e
reason for a lack of a coherent national identity, or the presence o f contending national
identities within the state. Fifth, the chaotic struggle for domestic political hegem ony

125 Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual," Addressing State Failure," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005):
155.
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shatters the legitimacy; as a result, state structure feels a lack of a clear and observed
hierarchy of political authority. Finally, freedom of expression is subject to censorship
in failing states. W ith various intervals, failing states feel a protective or legitim ate right
to have a light degree of state control over th e m ed ia.126
Both the endogenous and exogenous factors help to develop a balanced
understanding th a t describes state fragility. A fter reviewing the above literature and
looking at the effects of state fragility and the political decay of state institutions, it can
be understood th a t w eak states are grappling w ith issues o f governam entality. These
issues arise w hen a state is incapable of enforcing its political order, and such
enforcem ent depends on political capacity or state's capacity. In o th er words, political
order, political capacity, and governam entality are interdependent. The above
explanation concludes th a t w eak states are required to establish an effective order, so
it can tackle domestic challenges, which ultim ately help to use pivot o f geography, not
as a burden but rather an opportunity.

GLIMPSE ON THE INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY
Drawing some broader lines from the literature discussed above, w e can
identify four domains w here a w eak state suffers from fragility or fracturedness. These
are critical for stability and improving the conditions of any state, nam ely security,
political, economic, and social arenas. M oreover, these four domains are basic
functions as well as indicators that measure the perform ance of a state. Norm alcy in

126 Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W ar
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these four areas is a prerequisite for any stable country to ensure th a t its citizens are
enjoying basic rights anticipated out of the fo u r spheres.
As previously m entioned, security is a top priority on the hierarchy of political
goods th at every citizen of a state seeks. A state's prim ary purpose is to "ensure basic
social order and protect inhabitants from the th re a t of violence from internal and
external forces."127 Due to a lack of effective security arrangements in w eak states,
citizens feel insecure from criminals and terrorists and fear for the safety o f th e ir
private belongings. As a state also fails to impose its m onopoly of the use of force, it
can feel insecure on its frontiers due to a mirage of existential threats from neighbors
and seem less interested in imposing an effective political order. Highlighting the
im portance o f the security dimension, the fo rm e r Resident Representative o f UNDP in
Ghana and Nigeria, Alfred Fawundu, feared th a t fragile and violent societies produce a
negative outlook fo r their own people and neighbors too. He stressed th a t, w hile the
"security o f states worsens, the proliferation of small arms flourishes, and as the arms
proliferation flourishes, the conflicts expand across boundaries."128
On political grounds, a state is responsible for providing "legitim ate,
representative, and accountable governance under the rule of law ."129 As a result, a
transparent system helps citizens to enjoy a g reater deal o f freedom , and their
fundam ental rights are protected. In contrast, the fragile statehood of w eak and

127 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 24.
128 Debbie Hillier and Brian W ood, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control,"
(Eynsham 2003), 78.
129 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 25.
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"decapitated" states fails to create proper institutional checks and balances.130
Eventually political corruption em pow ers chronic and despotic leadership, and these
corrupt political elites then enjoy political freedom w ith o u t any fear o f accountability.
The higher the position these elites occupy, th e higher the desire to stay longer
in power. The desire for reaching higher and staying longer in power encourages
corrupt political elites to prepare fo r "grabbing and retaining power at all costs,
form ing alliances, and taking decisions w ith longer personal objectives in m ind."131
States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America witnessed a prolonged perm anence o f despotic
and corrupt elites, as they legitimized th e ir corrupt rule through constitutional
am endm ents. Michael Comer and Tim othy Stephens, whom have done extensive w ork
on corruption focusing both on least developed and developed countries, quote John
M ukum Mbaku while describing th e ramifications o f poverty and corruption on African
polities, explaining that th e "internal causes of poverty in th e African continent, which
significantly outweigh external ones, includes excessive control of econom y, massive
and pervasive corruption, merciless exploitation o f the peasantry and ethical violence
verging on genocide."132 W ith the passage of tim e, corruption becomes
institutionalized exacerbating the coercive corruption, which undermines th e "integrity

130 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198.
131 Michael J. Comer and Timothy E. Stephens, Bribery and Corruption : How to Be an Impeccable and
Profitable Corporate Citizen (Burlington, VT: Gow er Pub., 2013), 12.
132 Bribery and Corruption : How to Be an Impeccable and Profitable Corporate Citizen (Burlington, VT:
Gow er Pub., 2013), 14.
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of basic state institutions."133 So the entire society becomes a victim to th e com pletely
unjust and no speedy justice system.
The economic sphere is the third im portant dom ain o f a state's responsibility,
that is, to "create a legal and regulatory fram ew o rk conducive to econom ic grow th and
developm ent."134 The economic fram ew o rk process enables a m arket to grow, a ttra ct
foreign investm ent, create favorable conditions for entrepreneurs, and enrich human
capital. The state defines a set of rules and regulations so private entities and investors
feel attracted to m arket friendly policies. The political economic conditions o f fragile
and weak states are always fluctuating and rem ain doubtful to domestic and foreign
investors.
The developm ent economist and fo rm e r director of the Shell Foundation, Kurt
Hoffman, explicitly refers to the problems of corruption th a t cripples domestic
economic conditions and discourages entrepreneurs support initiatives th a t would
counter poverty and help fragile economies. Hoffm an writes that the "entrepreneurs
and businesspeople can help governm ents and the m ajor donors map out the value
chain of activities and stages w here corruption or lack of governm ent capacities
impinges on enterprise creation."135 As comm on features in weak states, such as

133 Louise I. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in The Illicit Global
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investment... See, Bertram I. Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries: Identifying
Causes/Strategies fo r Action, 1st ed. (Sterling, V a.: Kumarian Press, 2012), 26-27; Charles Funderburk,
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frequent capital flights, bankruptcy, and seeking bribes from foreign investors becom e
customized traditions, unem ploym ent and poverty increase.
To sustain the state's costs, a state becomes involved in "extraction of
resources" through taxation and imposition of duties.136 However, political elites and
decision makers can also engage in additional "extraction o f foreign resources" i.e.
foreign aid and loans. In the case of w eak states, most of th e foreign extracted
resources "may be sought to pay off supporters," o r used fo r personal w ealth
accumulation through justified m eans.137 In o th er words, th e chronic political econom y
of w eak states establishes various ways of legitim ate corruption, w h ere dom estic
taxpayers fund as well as "aid funds are m isappropriated through patronage-sw ollen"
(meaning, the misappropriation of resources under the legitim ate protection of corrupt
political elites).138 The notion of legitim ate corruption and tactics used at international
forums to extract foreign resources can be understood in th e following words, as th e
author writes that;
"Domestic instability, or the fear thereof, tem pts insecure leaders to use foreign
policy as a supplem entary resource in th e ir political [and economic] struggles. A
rising defense budget, or efforts to secure high levels of m ilitary assistance, may
be a w ay to keep the army happy.... Foreign aid may be sought to pay off
supporters, not to raise domestic investm ent rates ... use m eetings and
speeches at the UN may be designed to alleviate psychic insecurities, not to
deal w ith substantive problem s."139
Corruption can be controlled if political and legal institutions becom e stronger
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and economic entities enjoy m ore open and orderly access to the political decision
making process.140 Due to the absence o f effective judicial structures, the
accountability system could not succeed to curb the menace of corruption.
Interestingly, in most w eak states, a judiciary exists, but it is either under the control
governm ent or there is too much of a gap betw een im plem entation and enforcem ent.
The social sector is the final arena w here w eak states fail to provide social
services to society. Society expects th at a state provide "basic social w elfare" to its
inhabitants, which is considered one of its prim ary functions.141 That includes access to
proper health care and education, w a te r and sanitation, environm ental protection,
access to the Internet, means of com m unication, infrastructure, etc. In retrospect,
history proves that social issues o f m alnutrition, starvation, ultra-poverty, diseases, and
societal violence are deeply rooted in poor and decapitated societies.142 Overall, the
fragile conditions of weak states do not allow them to provide basic goods and perform
their functions in all four arenas. Some w eak states present strength in one sector or
another, but lack symmetrical strength, which ultim ately translates into an overall poor
performance.
M any crimes and transnational security threats also stem from issues of u ltra
poverty. W hen a person sees the degradation of human dignity and w hen his/her
fam ily and friends suffer with illness, hunger, and m aterial deprivation, the individual
becomes frustrated and feels pushed to rebel against the system. Ted Gurr refers the
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societies with high scale deprivation accumulates aggregate frustration, and eventually,
it can be observe that the greater the intensity of deprivation, the g reater the
m agnitude of violence can be anticipated.143 Around one-sixth of th e w orld population
(1 billion) lives in extrem e poverty and destitute conditions, called th e "poorest of th e
poor," and roughly 1.5 billion m ore face difficulties in attaining basic social rights. By
and large, the greater portions of this 2.5 billion population live in w eak states, whose
populations are "caught in a poverty trap, unable on their ow n to escape from extrem e
m aterial deprivation."144 On moral grounds, it is u n fortunate to see th e "bottom
billion" suffering on "large islands o f chaos," when the rest o f the w orld is enjoying the
benefits of an interdependent globalized economy which generates zones of com fort
and establishes islands of peace.145 These zones o f chaos actually becom e "zones of
silence" proving the geopolitical (and economic) unevenness of globality ignored the
root causes of Third W orld societies.146 The growing feelings of transnational
insecurities, stemming from the zones of chaos, are finally seeking attention to resolve
the fundam ental socio-political and economic problems.
According to statistical data, around "17 million of th e world's youth are
refugees or IDPs, 130 million are illiterate, as many as 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 fight as child soldiers,
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and collectively, young people make up alm ost 60 percent o f the w orld's poor."147
Alarmingly, the age groups most involved in criminal activities are youths, a m ajority of
which belongs to these strata of global poor. Expressing the acute im portance of
tackling poverty, Former Secretary o f State Colin Powell stressed th a t "the United
States cannot win the w ar on terrorism unless we confront the social and political roots
o f poverty."148
The UN M illennium Developm ent Goals (MDGs) acknowledge th e notion th at
poverty contributes to many criminal and violent activities across the w orld and desire
to tackle the issue of poverty. Tackling the issue o f poverty before a state exterm inates
the root cause may be only a cosmetic fixation not endured for long. Bertram Spector
develops a correlation betw een corruption, bad governance, and poverty in a society.
Spector writes th a t "corruption has direct consequences on economic and governance
factors, interm ediaries th a t in turn produce poverty."149 Similarly, Jaffrey Sachs' w ork
also illustrates th a t most of the "poverty trap" is due to bad governance and corrupt
leadership of w eak and poor societies. Consequently, "the poor face structural
challenges th at keep them from getting even their first foot on the ladder of
developm ent."150 In most of African countries, corruption is one of the basic factors
th a t contribute to causing poverty and negatively affecting socio-economic conditions
o f the continent, and the similar conditions prevail in Asian and Latin Am erican context
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to o .151 Paul Collier defines th e leaders of these poor societies as "psychopaths w ho
have shot their way to power, sometim es crooks w ho have bought it, and som etim es
brave people who, against th e odds, are trying to build a b e tte r fu tu re ."152
There are numerous external efforts made through various agencies to bring
some structural reforms to poor perform ing states. How ever, most socio-economic
reforms prom oted by external donors develop a vertical hierarchy in which domestic
agencies are m ore accountable to donors, which again fail to achieve a horizontal
output, or the impact factor is not know n.153 Since 1991 $ 8 billion have been invested
in Somalia in an attem p t to give life to its society and strengthen its fragile
statehood.154 Yet the world com m unity has had troubles w ith Somali pirates, and
militants have used Somalia as a safe heaven. In Septem ber 2013, Al-Shabab, a Somali
m ilitant terrorist group, crossed into neighboring Kenya and terrorized locals and
foreigners by taking them hostage in one of Nairobi's busiest shopping malls. The
militants brutally killed m ore than 60 innocent people, injuring more than 200 civilians,
w ith dozens remaining missing. A country which has been th e focal point of the
international community's atte m p t in improving its security situation becam e one of
worse cases of failed states.
The above-m entioned exam ple dram atically vindicates the real th re a t scenario
th a t em anates from failed states w ith its transnational affects. The entire e ffo rt to fix
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Somalia's failure seems in vain. A possible reason could be th a t an externally
engineered process to im plem ent and test new form ats on a traditional society is not
viable. The models of im provem ent could be incom patible fo r such a society, or society
itself could not be socio-politically m ature enough to synchronize w ith m odern norms.
A num ber of African countries have tried to establish a "hybrid state" th a t may
tem porarily help to tackle domestic security challenges and territorial integrity.155
However, w ith o u t engaging local stakeholders, and w ith o u t devolving responsibility
back to the state itself, the task to fix the state fragility is not a viable option.
Evaluation of the security, political, economic, and social aspects of w eak and
fragile states portrays a frightening image of increased inequality, unem ploym ent, and
poverty th at worsens the situation in w eak states, and ultim ately breeds favorable
grounds for transnational crimes through "new authoritarianism " and violence.156 One
lim itation of w eak states can be predicted through its dealing with crim e and violence
in society. Noticeably, w eak states rem ain oblivious to th e fact that "unpunished
violence by organized crime groups is perhaps the most visible sign of state
im potence."157 It is highly possible th a t most criminal groups emerge due to higher
rates of poverty, and these groups are likely to em brace crim e and becom e
perpetrators of violence activities.158 The UNDP Human Developm ent Index has vividly
highlighted the worsening conditions in Third W orld societies, which host most o f the
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internal conflicts and human rights violations due to the absence o f effective
governance systems and high frequency of social fragm entation.

CLASSIFYING STATE FRAGILTY
Facing a problem of legitimacy and centralized order exists in all fragile states,
w hether they are weak, failing, failed, or on the verge of break down. The difference
can be measured through hard and loose form s of centralized authority over the
physical features of a state, i.e. te rrito ry and population. Jonathan Hill argues th at
there are three forms of state categories: successful states, which are effective in
providing political goods to its citizens; w eak or quasi states, which face some serious
levels of difficulties in the provision of political goods to th e ir subjects; and failed or
collapsed states, which are com pletely unable to perform th e ir basic function as states,
with their subjects hardly receiving any political goods.159
Similarly, it is hard to view all w eak and fragile states with the same standard; in
fact, each fragile state has its unique characteristics and features of fragility. A com m on
problem among all is legitim ate forms of governance and authority. Stew art Patrick
(2011) and Jean-Germain Gros (1996) have outlined the taxonom y or typology of fragile
states into various form ats, specifically on th e basis of pessimistic and optimistic
scenarios of state performances (see table 3 & table 4).
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Table 3: W eak State Trajectories
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Brittle Dictatorship

states ruled by m ilitary
dictators or experience
authoritarian regimes, e.g.
North Korea, M y an m ar

a. Prolonged Political
Crisis

Dwindling performance of
political institutions,
economic stagnation,
increasing violence, e.g.
Pakistan

b.

Center losing much control o f

2. Deteriorating Situations
Conflict-ridden

Countries

its territory to fighting
groups, e.g. Tamils in Sri
Lanka, Kurds in Syria, Sudan,
Yemen

a. Post-Conflict
Recovery

Negotiated settlem ent or
decisive victory after political
deadlock or prolong conflict,
e.g. Mozambique

b.

Governm ents progressive

Democratic

Transitions

reforms; overcoming
authoritarian system, m ilitary
coups, and controlling bad
economic policies, e.g.
Georgia a fte r Rose Revolution

Source: Stew art Patrick, “W e a k Links: Fragile States, Global Threats a n d Internation al
S e c u r i t y . " ___________________________________
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Those states have a long history o f weakness and th e "chronic situation" of th e
worst among th em generates m ore "anarchic" conditions, as in Afghanistan, Haiti,
Somalia, Rwanda, and Congo. The next group of w ea k states face a deteriorating
situation w ith long, internal arm ed struggles and stagnant economic conditions which
cause th e "deteriorating situation" of state fragility. These are "anaemic states."
M any global insurgency m ovem ents are taking root in anaemic states, fu rth er
creating chaos for these host states. M ilitancy in Pakistan has sharply d eteriorated its
security conditions, w hile law and order are at high risk. Stew art Patrick singles out a
category of states whose conditions are significantly improving due to dem ocratization,
economic reforms, and conflict control. H ow ever, Jean-Germain Gros has discussed a
new category called "m ediate states" for those states making serious efforts to
improve their fragile conditions. Gros also identified the "aborted state," a scenario in
which a state experiences failure before its form al creation, as with Bosnia.160

160 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 36-37; Gros, "Towards
a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New W orld Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 4 5861.
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Table 4: Taxonom y o f Failed States

The Anarchic

;|Wartords dominates the
ace, most likely leads deafh-squads o f teenagers and
^^tdacmally immaturejycwng'fightersio gain control of
sto & ^lc buildings/cities o r regions, e;g.Som alia, Liberia,
Afghan Warlords during civil w ar in 1990s.

The Phantom

The Phantom states are also referred as mirage state, similar to
anarchic state. The central governm ent retains some sort of
authority over lim ited areas, fo r instant protecting head of
state or core political leadership, e.g. Zaire.

its political capacity
ifloendingcou nte r-insurgency
1ways o f pow er or authority. 2 nd,
ssedand never
jsgrcw^h assert
demandson archaicjstwctures/ e,g. H aiti, Cambodia has
experienced theanaem ic Situations.
The Captured

Holds a strong centralized authority, b u t political pow er is
captured by rival groups and engages in ethnic cleansing or
executing most of political rival group affiliates, e.g. one million
killed during Rwandan genocide.

The Aborted

i, e.g. Traumatic
events in Bosnia, form er Soviet Georgia experienced a quasi
federation status to independence.

Source: Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy o f Failed States in the N ew W orld
Order."
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PUTTING THE WEAK STATE IN ORDER
The narratives o f state weakness include th e episodes from pre-colonial to post
colonial epochs, which prim arily try to evaluate th e capabilities of the state and
performances of the nation. During these periods, w eak and fragile states have
experienced a variety o f political transitions, experim ented with various forces of
economic structures, and m odified societal customs m ultiple times. Every changing
m om ent form s a new political identity, how ever, cultural and institutional
transform ations took a w hile to change, based on path dependence. The path
dependence is a significant consideration because it helps th e evolution o f institutions
th a t occurs on constant interaction betw een political and social groups, interests, and
exchange o f ideas. These interactions rely on historical contexts as a path to define th e
nature of institution.161 These frequent external and internal inputs in the system
weaken social cohesion w ith deeply fractured societies and provide th e basis for
malfunctioning political systems. This means "political institutions develop, often
slowly and painfully, overtim e, as human societies strive to organize them selves to
m aster their environm ents ... political decay occurs when political system fail to adjust
to changing circumstances."162
Putting the w eak and fragile states in order germ inates a fe w questions, such
as, w hat does order mean? W hy establish an order? And how are orders established?
In rapidly changing times, one cannot rely on a single factor to solve the problem of

161 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 92-93.
162 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 7.
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fixing the "political system ."163 In fact, th e earlier discussions and indicators show th a t
there are m ultiple ingredients th a t cause statehood weakness and fragility. Political will
as a first step to strengthen nationhood and dem ocratic decision-making processes
through establishing inclusive and pluralistic political culture can play a key and
pragmatic role in building a society, its infrastructure, and future grow th. The process
will fu rth er ensure fortifying the viability of social cohesiveness because political will
instigates a determ ination to deal w ith "traps" in order to leave behind the baggage of
weakness and fragility. Paul Collier presents fo u r traps th a t keep society backward and
poor in all aspects of developm ent and are core factors of fragility: "the conflict trap,
the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked w ith bad neighbors, and the
trap of bad governance."164 Some traps are tem porary or situational, w hile others like
"the trap of being landlocked w ith bad neighbors" are inherent. Both of them need to
be tackled in subtle ways. According to Robert Rotberg, weakness is inherent because
of "geographical, physical or fundam ental economic constraints." Conversely, states
are tem porarily or situationally w eak or fragile (situational ones seems m ore strong,
which should not) due to the "internal antagonisms m anagem ent flaws, greed,
despotism, or external attacks."165 M ost dom estic antagonism and tensions are
generated by flaring up the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-com m unal rifts.

163 The political system th at includes the state as a "legally em pow ered and legitim ately coercive
institutions-but it also included these new extralegal and paralegal institutions of political parties,
interest groups, media of communication, as well as social institutions such as fam ily, school, church, and
the like, in so far as they affected political processes." See, Almond, "The Return to th e State," 855.
164 Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing an d W hat Can Be Done A bout It, 5.
165 Rotberg, When States F a il: Causes and Consequences, 4.
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Overcoming the problems of w eak states requires establishing an effectual
order in domestic politics. In this study order is referred to as "political order" at the
state level that helps to retain the domestic political, social and economic life in order.
And th e domestic stability can create equilibrium w ith external pressures or
geographical burdens. Therefore, the concept of order is crucial in political, economic,
and social life at the micro and macro level. It means the notion of o rder is applicable
both at intra- state and inter-state levels, called political order and w orld order
respectively.
Hedley Bull's w ork "the Anarchical Society" prim arily discusses w orld order, and
his w ork relies on the social life or social order as a basic principle to explain his main
thesis. However, Bull's explanation of social order is pertin en t to understanding
"political order" as this study also seeks to trace or establish order in w eak societies.
Bull emphasizes that, in Hobbesian accounts of the state of nature, individuals live in a
condition of "fear and insecurity;" in response to the fear, insecurity, and uncertain
social conditions, societies set some goals to preserve social safety and personal goals.
Bull identified three elem entary or prim ary goals which by and large societies have
recognized: "a) Societies seek certain measures to secure their selves against violence
b) Societies seek to maintain and undertake the promises made under various
agreem ents with each other c) Possession of property will remain stable to some
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extent and will not be subject to challenges, which in a w ay constant and w ith o u t
lim it."166
Keeping the nature of social life in m ind, Hedley Bull tracks the linkage
(relationship) betw een social life and order. He defines the relationship,
"... to rules, or general im perative principles of conduct. Social order is
sometimes defined in term s o f obedience to rules o f conduct; som etim es it is
defined, m ore specifically, as obedience to rules o f law. In fact, order in social
life is very closely connected w ith th e conform ity of human behavior to rules of
conduct, if not necessarily to rules o f law ."167
Francis Fukuyama's recent w ork The Origins o f Political Order argues th a t th re e
sets of institutions "the state, the rule of law, and an accountable governm ent"
together sustain an enforcing political o rd er.168 Fukuyama bases his argum ents on
Samuel Huntington's earlier work "The Political O rder and Political D evelopm ent" and
notes that:
"Political order emerges as a result of the achievem ent of some equilibrium
among the contending forces w ithin a society ... change occurs internally and
externally: the actors established th e original equilibrium them selves evolve or
disappear; new actors appear; economic and social conditions shift; th e society
is invaded from outside or faces new term s of trade or im ported ideas ...
preceding equilibrium no longer holds, and political decay results until the
existing actors come up with a new set of rules and institutions to restore
order."169
It infers that the rule of law is a core ingredient th a t retains th e order in a viable
state. The establishment of rule of law itself is a long process that engages "extensive
construction not just of laws but also of courts, judges, a bar, and enforcem ent

166 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in W orld Politics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2002), 3-4.
167 The Anarchical Society : A Study o f Order in W orld Politics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 6.
168 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 16.
169 The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to th e French Revolution, 139.
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mechanisms across the entire country."170 Emphasizing th e importance o f th e rule of
law, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart note th a t th e "rule o f law is a glue th a t binds all
aspects of the state, the economy, and society" through establishing "governance
arrangem ents decision rights, processes, accountabilities, freedom s, and duties."171
The troubling factor is th a t neither the conform ity o f human behavior to rules of
conduct, nor the rule of law are properly executed in w eak states. Primarily it is
because most w eak states are in postcolonial settings w here they "are still struggling to
define and identify their statehood vis-a-vis other social institutions and actors."172
M oreover, the ethnic, religious, and inter-com m unal violent incidents are gradually
"eating away society from within, which subsequently te a r the system of state o rd e r.173
In successful states, the established order provides a political capacity to the
state and its organs th at ensures the rule o f law, provides security to it citizens, and
ensures protection of their property. In order to strengthen state capacity, "states
fundam entally extract resources (mainly taxation and duties) from society and deploy
these resources to create and support coercive and adm inistrative organizations."174
Hence, the state extracts, regulates, reaches, distributes, and seeks responses tow ards
w hole processes, which show legitim ate authority and political capacity by the state.
Therefore, once a state establishes a legitim ate order, society can notice th e state's

170State-Building : Governance and W orld Order in the 21st Century, 59.
171 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States : A Fram ew ork fo r Rebuilding a Fractured W orld
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125.
172 Andersen, Mpller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure P eop le? : Violence, Security, and
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 7.
173 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 117.
174 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions : A Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia, and China
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29.
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capabilities, which effectively "penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract
resources, and appropriate or use resources in determ ined ways."175
Already known political problems like corruption, w eak governance, unjust
systems, and so many other socio-economic troubles, are daunting challenges of w eak
states. M o re likely, as the daunting challenges becom e m ore acute, w eak states fu rth er
rely on "extractive economic and political institutions," w hile successful states succeed
w ith flourishing dem ocratic norms and facilitate th e ir subjects through "inclusive
economic and political institutions."176 A political order w ith an inclusive institutional
system em pow ers institutional capacity, in Francis Fukuyama's words, this capacity is
to "form ulate and carryout policies and enact laws; to administrate efficiently and w ith
a m inim um of bureaucracy; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to m aintain high
level of transparency; and accountability in governm ent institutions; and most
im portant, enforce of laws."177
Once a state has the capacity to regulate and execute policies effectively, it
shows a higher level of social cohesiveness. In contrast, if a state faces problem s of
execution and "failures of im plem entation," this means a state is lacking th e capacity to
enforce.178 Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tam m en's edited volum e The Perform ance o f
Nations agrees th a t the political capacity of a state revolves around extraction, reaches
(governm ent influences and penetrates into society), and then allocates resources.

175 Migdal, Strong Societies and W eak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World, 4.
176 Acemoglu and Robinson, W hy Nations F a il: The Origins o f Power, Prosperity and Poverty, 79-83.
177 Fukuyama, State-Building : Governance and W orld Order in the 21st Century, 8-9.
178 Joel S. Migdal, "Strong States, W eak States: Power Accomodation," in Understanding Political
Development, ed. Myron W einer and Samuel P. Huntington (Illinois: Waveland Press, 1994), 394.
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Measuring th e processes involved in extraction, reach, and allocation can help evaluate
the political perform ance of a state. Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tam m en note th a t an
"effective governm ent will achieve desired policy outcomes; a weak one will not,"
(because), "political perform ance em ulates in the political and institutional arena," and
w eak states encompass w eak political structures and poor performing institutions.179
W hy is it th a t the political capacity of w eak states seems lacking in resilience or
show no signs of im provem ent, yet these states still survive against all odds? Samuel
Huntington's early works on political developm ent noticed th at in the w ake o f
decolonization, most of the newly independent states in Africa, Asia, and Latin Am erica
adopted the path of m odernization as the only w ay out to achieve political stability and
economic viability. As a result, m odernization processes supported m obility in society,
and urbanization and some efforts tow ards industrialization become visible in w eak
societies. Samuel Huntington argues th a t "economic developm ent and political stability
are tw o independent goals and progress tow ards one has no necessary connection w ith
progress tow ard the other," it rather created an illusion among w eak states.180
i

To create an order, there is need of sincere efforts by weak states them selves
(meaning all stake holders, including civil society) to take serious responsibility, and
th ere is also a need of "close collaboration" by the international com m unity in fixing
zones of fragility th at lies with governability.181 A transparent governance system th a t
maintains order, rule of law and legitim ate m onopoly, in addition to strengthening
179 Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen, The Performance o f Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 9.
180 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 6.
181 Priscilla M agrath, "Beyond Governmentality: Building Theory for W eak and Fragile States,"
Anthropology M atters Journal 12, no. 2 (2010): 3.
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governance system, is im portant fo r o th er functional sectors of state, i.e. developm ent,
defense, diplomacy.
There are some serious but ad hoc efforts made indigenously in Africa. Such as,
w hen Somalia faced collapse, w ith death squads and militias threatening its population,
th e local population used cultural or tribal codes to establish "an alternative system" of
order (w ith deterrence mechanisms against possible threats by rival clans/ tribes)
called a hybrid "m ediate state."182 The ad hoc but hybrid political order in a scenario of
collapse shows a promising step through th e establishment o f an indirect governm ent
structure, w hile the center fails to form a form al order, stabilize political conditions,
enforce rule of law, and establish its legitim ate monopoly into peripheral areas.183
The role of indigenous associations in diffusing the social space is significantly
im portant in improving the conditions of w eak statehood. These associations, which
reside in civil society, can become a resilient force in creating a viable order by laying
the foundations for dem ocratic norms. Subsequently, these norms provide a healthy
base for "ethno-cultural pluralism," so the fruits of the entire process can bring
different ethnic, tribal, and religious groups tog eth er to think on collective and
congenial grounds to strengthen nationhood. Strengthening the nationhood will
support the shaping of a political identity because both nation-building and nationmaking are a very im portant dimension of a nation-state. They help to define the
state's future course of action and w h a t objectives and ambitions it has for potential

182 Menkhaus, "Local Security System in Somali East Africa," 68-70.
183 Andersen, M pller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 6.

grow th as a unified nation.
Though it seems quite an idealistic narrative, the above exam ple of hybrid
political order makes a rational case th a t w eak states could utilize the "symbiotic
relationship betw een state and civil society,"184 as it proves that, even in the cases of
"com plete collapse of order" in a state, th e "reem ergence of interm ediate social
g ro u p s ,... have come together w ith the definition and reassertion of state capacities,
highlighting the close connection betw een civil society and stateness."185 In fact, the
age of com munication can facilitate to speed up th e process, which ultim ately
produces a political system th at respects accountability as a part o f renew ed social
contract.
The role of the international com m unity is significant as well in establishing a
close collaborative effort to support and m onitor the im provem ent o f w eak states. As
discussed earlier, international support in w eak or fragile states has not achieved w h a t
was expected at the tim e of conception fo r developm ental projects, even though
support is witnessed through security and hum anitarian interventions. The security
interventions in the Bosnia w ar, Iraq w ar, and Afghan w ar are examples of this recent
history. Similarly, humanitarian interventions w ere carried out in response to a num ber
of natural catastrophes and violent conflicts w ithin the states, for exam ple, the num ber
of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa to protect local populations w ho are a t constant
risk of ethnic/ tribal fights. The other substantive examples of humanitarian
184 Naomi Chazan, "Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa," in State Power and
Social Forces : Domination and Transformation in the Third World, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and
Vivienne Shue (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 258.
185 Herbst, States and Power in Africa : Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 255; Chazan,
"Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa," 278.
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interventions made w ere after natural calamities, such as th e one th a t hit Pakistan in
2005, w ith 7.6 magnitude earthquake and 1 00,000 deaths, and Haiti in 2010, w h ere a
7.0 m agnitude earthquake caused 100,000 to 3 1 6 ,0 0 0 deaths.
W hen considering interventions in conflict, it is a m a tte r of fact th a t w a r is a
constant phenom enon in international politics. As Charles Tilly noted "w ar m ade th e
state, and the state made w a r."186 How ever, th e tendency o f m ajor wars has reduced in
the post-Cold w ar period, w hile intra-state level conflicts, rooted in ethnic or religious
differences, have increased and pose greater threats to regions. The shift in the nature
of w ar or conflict also changed th e state's national interest priorities, which ensures
futu re "trade expectations" and economic activities should not be disrupted.187 A fter
all, states fundam entally extract resources and run state machinery depending on th e
smooth functioning of economic activities. Com m enting on Charles Tilly's famous
quote, Michael M andelbaum explains the contem porary nature of intra-state conflicts
and notes that:
"... institution w ith which w ar historically has been connected is the state", and
it's the "sovereign states remain a central presence in human affairs at the end
of the tw entieth century. But in the societies th at waged the m odern e ra ’s
m ajor wars, the state has found a differen t purpose. It has becom e an economic
institution. To spur production and manage redistribution has becom e its tw in
missions.”188
Interventions to support states are not always successful, but they have
significance in controlling the spillover effects. Criticizing international organizations

186 Tilly, The Formation o f N ational States in W estern Europe, 42.
187 Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and W ar: A Theory of Trade Expectations,"
International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 6-7.
188 Michael M andelbaum , "Is M ajor W a r Obsolete?," Survival 4, no. 4 (w inter 1998-99): 25.
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and their lack of effectiveness and issues o f powers, Peter Lyon argues that:
"...problems of trusteeship w ere th e problem s of pow er, o f the responsibilities
of the strong tow ards the w eak. The unequal distribution o f political and
economic pow er in the w orld, which was th e fundam ental basis o f colonialism,
has not been suddenly abolished by the accession o f most colonies to political
independence.... But the rich and pow erful countries of the w orld are not
thereby absolved from fu rth er responsibility tow ards those countries."189
In general, interventions are helpful and considered as "moral justification" to
assist a w eak or a state in extrem e need o f help.190 These interventions provide legal
protection to insecure populations, and most of these "protected jurisdictions are
characteristic of post-colonial international society and also to a lesser exten t o f postSoviet Union international society."191 Interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq
(2003) w ere justified to change the repressive and tyrant regimes.192 W hen it comes to
hum anitarian interventions, they "are selectivity on the basis of the 'national interests'
of the interveners."193 M any interventions face huge resistance with issues o f violation
of sovereignty, and in some cases, the interventions are referred to as steps tow ards
"securitization of developm ent," when external support should help in "Regulation of
sovereignty."194
Despite the limitations of interventions, w h e th e r it is a warring situation or

189 Kenneth Robinson quoted as, Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival o f International
Trusteeship," 106.
190 Alex J. Bellamy, "Ethics and Intervention: The Hum anitarian Exception and th e Problems o f Abuse in
th e Case of Iraq," Journal o f Peace Research 41, no. 2 (M ar. 2004): 139.
191 Robert H. Jackson, The Global C oven an t: Hum an Conduct in a W orld o f States (Oxford ; N ew York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 205.
192 Bellamy, "Ethics and Intervention: The Hum anitarian Exception and th e Problems of Abuse in the
Case of Iraq," 141.
193 "Ethics and Intervention: The Hum anitarian Exception and the Problems of Abuse in th e Case o f Iraq,"
145.
194 Andersen, "Dilemmas of Engagement in Fragile States," 37; Opello and Rosow, The N ation-S tate an d
Global O rd e r: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, 205.
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hum anitarian need, supporting international interventions through the UN and
creating surrogate sovereignty in collapsing or failing states, Peter Lyon writes:
"It is in the desperate situations of state collapse or near-collapse th a t the
United Nations, or some other international body, is invoked to act as a
surrogate sovereign and support system in th e face o f anarchy and human
misery - and the signs are th at such situations are currently on th e increase ...
UN trusteeship would almost certainly be an im provem ent on the anarchical
conditions of th e several quasi-states the w orld has now ."195
The point o f departure here is to stress th a t dom estic efforts are needed to be
made by w eak and fragile states through engaging its civil society or using a "state-insociety" approach to build viable support. In th e m eantim e, dem ocratic societies can
assist in political developm ent o f institutions and dem ocratic norms. It is im portant to
note that "democratizing societies" are always at risk of getting hijacked or losing th e
dem ocratization tem po under the influence of traditional "praetorian guards," "nondemocratic forces," or potentially "quasi-dem ocratic," but cronies of corrupt political
elites. Thus proper nurturing and m onitoring is needed to sensitize the population.
Today, most w eak states are enthusiastically adopting democratic principles as
part of their constitutions, but they need to get rid of historical institutions of
domination specifically inherited from colonial tim es. If given support or a chance to
develop parliam entary institutions, democracy is m ore likely to endure and fragile
states can be "rescued by democratic" norms.196 Establishing a dem ocratic order
requires patience and gradual devolution of pow er to state institutions. The order will
eventually create checks and balances betw een state pillars.

195 Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship," 106.
196 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and V otes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, 1st ed. (N ew York: Harper,
2009), 48.
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SUM UP: DILEMMAS OF FRAGILITY
The literature explains serious statehood deficiencies in the domains of services
th a t are shaped through the provision of political goods primarily linked w ith security,
political (governability), economy, and social w elfare. The capacity, autonom y,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of states determ ine th e ir ability or willingness to provide
basic public goods. Unwillingness to perform the basic functions o f state certainly rings
the alarm bells th a t something is wrong w ith state capability.
The dilemmas of w eak pivot states are tw o pronged. The first, endogenous
dilemm as are strong and enduring domestic troubles along the lines of the burdens of
colonial traditions. The second, exogenous dilem mas, are inherent to th e geographical
pivot and becom e an inescapable factor; a "geo" phenom enon invites freq u en t
external interferences and makes geography a burden on th e state. The dilem m as of
th e w eak state's fragility are influenced by m ultiple elem ents within the endogenous
and exogenous realms, such as "political system, m ilitary and police, bureaucracy, pre
colonial, colonial, and post-colonial histories, economic structure, cultural traditions,
and relative position in the regional and international systems [which] shape[s] the
extent of state control over social groups and the extent th a t social forces reshape,
reinforce, or underm ine state strength."197
The reviewed literature thoroughly identified prom inent indicators such as
corrupt incum bent political elites (w ealthy and feudal) or praetorian guards (m ilitary
dictators) manipulating state authority w ithout being checked and frequently using

197 Peter Dauvergne, W eak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies (Canberra, ACT: Allen & Unwin,

1998), 2.

105
violence to deter opposition and shun voices speaking for freedom and rights.
Unfortunately, suppression was a means used by colonial rulers; once colonial rulers
left, the pow er shifted to political elites or a praetorian system. Colonial powers
retained their b e tte r relations w ith the new ruling elites, so the status quo was
sustained. The tragic factor of w eak statehood is a divided population w ith m any w eak
states' nationhood shattered from the early days o f independence w hen ethnic,
religious, sectarian or inter-com m unal clashes erupted into violence and spread, which
shows a divided society has w eakened the nationhood due to regular violent clashes.
Despite all the transnational security fears em anating from w eak and fragile
states, the review shows that, first, fragility affects within th e boundary of th e w eak
state, because, even failed states are safer today from form al takeover by neighbor or
regional force.198 This means "the crippled Leviathan, whose life-support system might
give way at any tim e. But reports o f its near-death seem decidedly prem ature - state
weakness has not m eant state collapse."199 It implies th at state weakness is essentially
bad for the state itself, first, due to its own vulnerabilities, and then fo r others.
As a m a tte r of fact, the globalized w orld gets credit for helping nations to
become more politically inform ed, aw akened, and connected to o th er political
communities or associations across the w orld. In tim es of awakening, states and
incum bent political elites are well inform ed that th e traditional policies o f state based
on exclusive authority will not get popular support. This is suggested by the recent

198 Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice," in When States F a il: Causes and
Consequences ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 308.
199 Migdal, State in S ociety: Studying H ow States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another,
137.
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turm oil in th e M iddle East, particularly, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yem en, w h ere th e
authoritarian regimes lost th e ir pow er to mass m obilization.200 Mass m obilizations and
constant political changes facilitate the establishm ent of new political orders. These
recent trends of political participation show the growing dem ocratic trends; how ever,
the trends need careful tre a tm e n t to establish an effective state order respecting the
rule of law and supporting a transparent system.
To m eet the exigencies o f a complex w orld, w eak states will be favored if
adopting the culture o f global norms practiced w idely by the global com m unity, i.e.
institutionalized m arket economy, dem ocratic rule, and human rights norm s.201 It will
support the w eak states to create an effective order prone to ethno-cultural pluralistic
and dem ocratic norms (pluralistic political culture). The reason to support the
argum ent th at most w eak and fragile states also face challenges is due to th e ir m ultiple
nation or heterogeneous societies; such diversity should in fact be view ed as a
strength, not a fragm enting and centrifugal factor. The fragm enting and centrifugal
forces emerge due to weakness in the state's capacity and political vacuums in certain
regional settings w ithin the state. Therefore a thriving, pluralistic political culture is
strongly advocated, which involves participatory and inclusive forms of governance. In
this regard, international cooperation is crucial to nourish a viable dem ocratic political
culture. Therefore, international support and cooperation will facilitate "global
awakening to the b etter things available" to needy states, so that they can adopt some

200 Serfaty, "The Folly o f Forgetting the W est," 39.
201 Neum ann and Sending, Governing the Global P o lity : Practice, M entality, Rationality, 178.
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useful norms and lessons from enriched dem ocracies.202 The process ends up not only
enhancing the capability o f a w eak state, but also supporting the building global
capacity.

202 Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the W est," 36.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY - MYANMAR: IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL IDENTITY, OBSOLETING PARIAH AND
GARRISON STATE TO RECAST DEMOCRATIC NORMS

"If the arm y shoots, it has no tradition o f shooting in to the air. It shoots straight
to kill."
General Ne W in 1
"I would like every country in the world to recognize the fact th a t th e people of
Burma are being shot dow n for no reason a t all."
Aung San Suu Kyi2
“ We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist. And over the last
year and a half, a dram atic transition has begun, as a dictatorship o f fiv e decades
has loosened its grip. Under President Thein Sein, the desire f o r change has been
m e t by an agenda f o r reform . A civilian n o w leads th e government, and a
parliam ent is asserting itself. The once-outlaw ed N ational League fo r Democracy
stood in an election, and Aung San Suu Kyi is a M e m b e r o f Parliam ent. Hundreds
o f prisoners o f conscience have been released, and forced labor has been
banned. Preliminary cease-fires have been reached with ethnic armies, and new
laws allow fo r a m ore open economy.
President Barack O bam a3

INTRODUCTION
On February 1 2 ,1 9 4 7 , the Panglong Agreem ent established the Union o f Burma,
now known as th e Republic of the Union o f M yanm ar. At Panglong, the representatives
of the Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic states agreed with th e governm ent of Burma to
unite the fragm ented or autonom ous principalities into a union with no expectation that

1 During the valedictory address, on 23 July 1988 in, Shelby Tucker, B u rm a : The Curse o f Independence
(London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2001), 228.
2 Burma : The Curse o f Independence (London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2001), 229.
3 "Remarks by President Obama at the University o f Yangon".

109
th e naive com m itm ent to Panglong would later becom e a curse. The agreem ent assured
g reater autonom y vested to frontier areas of these representing states. The unification
o f principalities is another exam ple o f continuous disintegration and re-integration th a t
M yanm ar has experienced in various historical cycles over th e past centuries. A quick
overview of the past century shows th a t the last M y a n m ar dynasty disintegrated during
1824-1886, and m eanw hile, re-integrated as a British colonized Burma until 1842.
Burma again fragm ented during the horrific w ar betw een British-lndia and Japanese
rule, and despite the Panglong Agreem ent and the internal ethnic disputes w ith the
center, M yanm ar rem ained fragm ented until 1962. The m ilitary takeover in 1962 and its
decades long rule ostensibly projected to re-unite a socially divided M yanm ar. However,
th e recent history of m ilitary rule itself left scars o f traum atic memories in the hearts
and minds of the people o f M yanm ar.
Since 2010 M yanm ar has shown some flexibility to reform its praetorian
structure of political system. Soon after gaining independence and establishing the
union of states, the union became entangled with ethno-nationalist conflicts. To clarify,
th e notion of union remains differing to various socio-political groups and antagonistic
interpretations "from quasi-centralized civilian rule, to authoritarian unitary m ilitary
control, to m inority proposed but rejected federal structures, to b latan t secessionist
attem pts, to ambiguous relationships."4 The ambiguities are a result o f th e brief
honeymoon phase of independence follow ed by ethno-nationalist feuds and political
deadlocks, which provided justification for the m ilitary regim e to take over pow er.

4 David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan, Modern C hina-M yanm or Relations : Dilemmas o f M u tu a l
Dependence (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2012), 3.
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Democratic institutions experienced decay at their nascent stage. Throughout th e Cold
W ar period until today, most of M yanm ar's history has been dom inated by the
centralized rule of the military establishm ent. The m ilitary establishm ent has succeeded
in enforcing rigid centralized power th a t engaged in a brutal war w ith its ow n people
isolating itself from the rest of the w orld com m unity, and becoming a pariah state.
The world com m unity witnessed w idespread repressive state policies, which
caused human rights violations, political revenges, and endemic corruptions w ith in the
governance structure. M yanm ar has an abundance of natural resources and is located in
a geostrategic location betw een tw o of the world's largest populous and growing
economies. Despite being blessed w ith a richness of resources and strategic pivot-ness,
the people of M yanm ar face ultra-poverty conditions and m eager economic grow th due
to a corrupted order established under the m ilitary junta. The relative deprivation and
frustrations over human rights violations are exacerbated by a continuous dow nfall o f
the state's political, economic, cultural, and environm ental capacities.
To date M yanm ar has faced continuous political transitions since the period of
high colonialism and then the Japanese occupation follow ed by independence, th e Cold
W ar, and obsoleting pariah state status until recent reform policy initiatives. The
country's status as a pariah state began to be overcom e w hen in late 2000s the
international com m unity welcomed the dem ocratic com m itm ent assured by the
governm ent of M yanm ar. In October 2013, during th e closing of the East Asia Sum m it,
the president of M y a n m a r/ Burma, Thein Sein, accepted th e gavel of ASEAN affirm ing its
positive com m itm ents towards becoming a responsible m em ber of th e global
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com m unity. In N ovem ber 2013, the governm ent o f M yanm ar released 69 political
prisoners and affirm ed th a t a com m ittee is deliberating on granting am nesty to
rem aining prisoners by the end of 2013. It is im portant to rem em ber th a t anti-change
forces always resist reforms. Though the journey of transform ation is long, a sincere job
w ell done is only half done.
To understand the fracturedness o f statehood in M yanm ar and its regional
implications, the study requires looking through historical trends. The historical
episodes explain th a t M yanm ar's colonial and postcolonial political processes resulted in
th e form ation o f a weak union. The union struggled from w ithin because diverse ethnic
groups w ere not form ally constructed together as one nation, but ra th e r sought their
own security and the protection o f individual comm unities from a larger or dom inant
one. Additionally, the decolonization period shows an apparent farew ell to external
powers. In reality external influence rem ained, continuing invisibly in the dom estic
affairs of M yanm ar. The military regime was seen on a num ber of occasions undoing
these external links or creating an image for society of detaching from history rem inders
of any external relations. Changing the name o f Burma to M yanm ar, and Rangoon to
Yangon, are some examples found in recent years.

COLONIZATION TO DECOLONIZATION: END OF EUPHORIA AND BEGINNING OF
INSTABILITY
During the m id-eleventh century, the Pagan Emperor Anawrahta M insaw
established a unified Buddhist em pire by gradually absorbing the peripheral
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principalities o f the Irrawaddy valley, which encompasses M yanm ar's contem porary
m ainland. However, th e Pagan Empire could not entirely incorporate the princely states
of Kachin, Arakanese, and a few others facing external challenges. M any of the
challenges primarily em anated from the Arakanese, Mons, Mongols, Shans, and so
forth. The decline of th e Pagan Empire was initiated due to internal problem s and
centrifugal forces trying to break out, which eventually proved the em pire's incapability
to cope with domestic and external challenges.5
The Pagan Empire established the strong roots o f Buddhism and religious
tolerance in the culture o f M yanm ar. Eventually, this notion of tolerance provided
conditions for external forces to control the region or perm it flexibility for ruling elites
to establish despotic orders.6 The external powers found the domestic socio-political
environm ent m ore conducive to m icro-m anagem ent in th e political system and reaped
the fruits of M yanm ar's geographical "pivot-ness." Ultim ately, by January 1st, 1886, the
once Pagan Empire encompassing the m ajority of Burmans was annexed to British India
as its province. M yanm ar became a British colony and lost its complete sovereignty in
three phases, as a result of three conflicts, the Anglo-Burmese W ar of 1 8 2 4 -1 82 6
(gaining Assam, M anipur, Tenassrim and Arakan); the Second Anglo-Burmese w ar of
1852 (with the annexation of Pegu province, which the British called "low er Burma");
and the Third Anglo-Burmese W a r of 1885 (com plete annexation of th e rem aining upper

5 Michael Aung-Thwin, Pagan : The Origins o f Modern Burma (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press,
1985), 28.
6 Alan W arren, Burma, 1942 : The Road fro m Rangoon to M an d alay (London ; N ew York: Continuum,
2011), 4.
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Burma te rrito ry ).7 There was a fam ous rum or after th e third Anglo-Burmese w a r of 1885
th a t the "Burmese King was not aw are th a t a w ar had been begun until he heard gunfire
just outside his palace closure."8 The annexation o f upper Burma was not a casual
business, as the British enjoyed a very calm situation in th e afterm ath o f the tw o earlier
Anglo-Burmese wars. It was reported th a t a fte r the final conquest o f 1885 British forces
w e re welcomed as "deliverers from tyranny."9 M any w om en were reported to be
harassed, young men executed for their resistance, and o th e r Burmese psychologically
tortured by the photographing of those executed.10 During the colonial interregnum , a
political vacuum em erged resulting in a challenge o f popular legitimacy to colonial rule,
because the British accom m odated Burma as a province o f India and ignored its
historical identity.11 The nature of British unpopularity can be traced through the people
of upper Burma, w ho became rebellious; the guerilla forces targeted British m ilitary
troops and their garrison posts.12 Despite a British reinforcem ent of 4 0 ,0 0 0 troops,
tactics to shoot anyone found possessing arms, and threats to burn th e entire village as
punishment, such actions backfired.13

7 David I. Steinberg, B u rm a /M y a n m a r: W h at Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford ; N ew York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 27; Michael Aung-Thwin and M aitrii Aung-Thwin, A History o f M y a n m a r since
Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformatons (London, UK: Reaktion Books, 2012), 178-88; W illiam J.
Topich and Keith A. Leitich, The History o f M yanm ar, The Greenwood Histories of th e M odern Nations
(Santa Barbara, Calif.: Greenwood, 2013), 44-48.
8 Michael W . Charney, Powerful Learning : Buddhist Literati an d the Throne in Burma's Last Dynasty, 175218 8 5 (Ann Arbor: Centers for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 2006), 256.
9 Thant M yint-U , The M aking o f Modern Burma (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 198.
10 Charney, Powerful Learning: Buddhist Literati and the Throne in Burma's Last Dynasty, 1 7 5 2 -1 8 8 5 ,157.
11 David 1. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in M y a n m a r (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge,
2006), 49.
12 Christina Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilita ry Rule, 2nd ed. (Chiang M ai, Thailand;
London ; New York: Silkworm Books; Zed Books, 2009), 13.
13 M yint-U , The M aking o f Modern Burma, 198; Topich and Leitich, The History o f M yan m ar, 49.
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By 1890 British forces comprised o f m inority ethnic groups and Indian soldiers
subdued the resistance. Over this period o f Anglo-Burm ese wars, colonial rule gradually
altered Burma's political-economic and social system. A fter the second Anglo-Burmese
w ar, colonial rule experienced a sudden rise of a rice exporting economy. In low er
Burma, under British rule, there was a 600% increase in acreage under cultivation.14 A
huge influx of dom estic migration from upper Burma to Lower Burma took place in
order to benefit economic gains. H ow ever, the new settlem ents had to fo llo w colonial
regulations, not the traditional accustomed village style o f headman dealing villages.
British rule appointed its own headm an, called an agent. Under the "colonial village
act," British rule m odified a num ber of traditional practices. Among these changes,
"Shiko," a traditional salutation supposed to be observed fo r sacred Buddha, monks and
entitled elders, was now made m andatory for ordinary Burmese to perform to "British
officers as recognition of submission to British m astery."15 In addition, the colonial
village act also required obeying the appointed political agent; villagers would render
duties as night w atchm en in the assigned areas of village. M oreover, villagers w ere
responsible for providing inter-village transportation, food, and other m aterials on
arrival of British m ilitary or civil officials. Punishm ent of villagers w ith o u t trial was a
normal judicial form at for political agents.16
In response to many exploitative acts, cultural and religious-driven factors
became fundam ental Burmese resentm ents th a t challenged British rule. These

14 Michael W . Charney, A History o f M o d em Burma (Cambridge, U K ; N ew York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 6.
15 A History o f M odern Burma (Cambridge, UK ; N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7.
16 Ibid.
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resentm ents later transform ed into nationalist m ovem ents that created anti-colonial
force tow ards independence of M yanm ar. M a n y Buddhist Burmans referred to th e
colonial period as persistently distorting th e ir cultural and religious identities. The influx
o f immigrants from other British colonial regions, like India and China, gradually
changed the dem ographic structure o f main cities. The consensus o f 1872 shows th a t
m ore than tw o-thirds of Rangoon's population was comprised of Burmese, and by the
1920s the m ajority of residents w ere o f Indian descent. By 1937 out o f 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
residents in Rangoon, only 127,000 residents w ere Burm ese.17 In addition, many
Christian missionaries w ere allowed to convert ethnic minorities at fro n tie r areas to
Christianity and prom ote the positive image o f Europe.
In India, British rule was already w orking on educational reforms to adopt
secular forms of education and encouraged similar patterns in Burma too. Secular
education was either welcom ed or encouraged among the colonial ruling elites to be
trained. The repercussion was a Burmese society culturally, intellectually and politically
divided betw een "British educated colonial elites and Buddhist tra d itio n a lis t^ ]."18
Historian Michael W . Charney (2009) emphasized th e nature of external involvem ents
th a t changed the domestic socio-political and economic dynamics of Burmese society.
He writes th at the colonial authority backed th e "broad intrusion of foreign institutions
and practices th at regulated or interfered w ith rural life to a degree g re ater than any
indigenous, central institution had a tte m p te d in the pre-colonial past."19 Hence,

17 A History o f Modern Burma, 22; Topich and Leitich, The History o f M yanm ar, 52-53.
18 The History o f M yanm ar, 52-53.
19 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, 8.
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M yanm ar in the past and present has persistently experienced foreign interference;
however, the level of interference was higher during colonial times which resulted in the
establishm ent of a m ixture of a m odern-traditional social milieu.
In 1906, Buddhist monks established the Young M en's Buddhist Association
(YMBA), a model copying the Young M en's Christian Association (YMCA). Initially the
objective of YMBA was to address society's religious and social issues; how ever, w ith the
passage of tim e, it transform ed into a political m ovem ent. M any young lawyers,
Buddhist monks, and nationalists transform ed YMBA into a political association called
th e General Council of Burmese Association (GCBA) to prom ote nationalistic
objectives.20 Until the 1930s the dom estic unrest and riots w ere w ell-directed by
Buddhist monks. British officials agreed th a t Buddhist monks were chiefs am ong the
resistance groups.21 M ost Burmans believed th a t British rule not only transform ed their
culture to adjust a newly constructed social milieu but also became disrespectful to
Buddhism. Instances show the blending of English words or practices into Burmese
society started to alter the social structure. Term ing Burma a new British-lndian
province itself constructed a new identity over a historical one.22 M o reo ver, British
officials or soldiers did not take off th e ir shoes w hile entering pagodas, m onasteries, or
other Buddhist sacred places. Buddhist tradition calls for th e respect of places of
worship by entering with bare fe e t.23 In 1916, an active m em ber o f YMBA and young
lawyer U Thein Maung resisted the shoe question in response to the colonial authority's
20 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilita ry Rule, 13.
21 M yint-U , The M aking o f Modern Burma, 205.
22 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M y a n m a r since Ancient Times: Traditions and
Transformatons, 198.
23 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilita ry Rule, 13.
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erected banner stated th a t "No one is p erm itted to w ea r shoes in this Pagoda but
Englishmen and Asiatic Europeans." In resistance M aung placed a banner th a t inscribed
the banning of shoes in pagodas for everyone in o rd e r to replace a banner erected by
th e colonial authroities a t Shwe Sandaw Pagoda in Prom e.24
Two monks, U O ttam a and U Wisara w ho had been exposed to W estern culture
and political norms due to foreign tours, decided to use political platform s to protect
the threatened religious sanctity of Buddhism. Their political maneuvering did not align
w ith colonial rule. They w ere imprisoned fo r anti-colonial speeches and actions. During
im prisonm ent, U Wisara called for a hunger strike against th e colonial regulation th a t
forbade the w earing of monk's robes. His strike lasted for 166 days, w hen he died on
Septem ber 19th, 1929. As a result, a revolutionary m indset started to take shape across
Burmese society, even those "Burmese w ho had not concerned them selves w ith politics
before" stepped into the nationalist struggle against the colonial rule.25 The nationalist's
movem ents accelerated its pace, and British rule experienced its first arm ed rural
rebellion in 1930 under Hsaya (teacher) San. Hsaya San was a traditional-m edical
practitioner and active m em ber of GCBA.26 During the rebellion he disguised him self as
a m onk named U Nyana to escape his arrest. The colonial force suppressed the rebellion
and tried Hsaya San.27 He was sentenced to death, and on Novem ber 28th, 1931, hanged
in Tharrawaddy jail.28 The U Wisara and Hsaya San events w ere significantly symbolic to

24 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, BO.
25 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilita ry Rule, 13.
26 Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, 13.
27 A ndrew Selth, "Myanm ar's Police Forces: Coercion, Continuity and Change," Contem porary Southeast
Asia: A Journal o f International and Strategic Affairs 34, no. 1 (April 2012): 55.
28 Charney, A History o f M odern Burma, 17.
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gather nationalistic fervor, and the events w ere also substantially supported and
published by the Burmese press.
To satisfy the Burmese nationalists, the G overnm ent of Burma Act of 1935
separated Burma from India. It should be noted th a t Burmese nationalists developed a
positive nationalist inspiration from political activities of th e Indian Congress party and
M ahatm a Gandhi; eventually the British realized th e rise o f political protests in Burma
too. It became one of factors th a t lead to the separation o f Burma fro m India.29 The act
came into force in 1937. The G overnor retained executive powers, and the new act
established tw o legislative houses. How ever, the legislatures were subject to veto by the
Governor and Secretary of State.30 In a w ay, Burma was separated fro m India as a
province, and gained a half-autonom y w ith less legislative or governing powers.
Unhappy young nationalists started to look for help from neighboring Asian countries.
W hile 1939 saw the start o f the Second W orld W ar, Dr. Ba M a w (w ho later held
governm ent position during the Japanese occupation) created the Burma Freedom Bloc
Organization (BFBA) under the secretary-ship of Aung San. The objective o f BFBA was to
set a clear tim efram e for independence from British rule, as Britain was engaged in the
Second W orld W ar, but th e proposal for independence was turned d o w n .31
In the following years, Aung San fle w to Japan and recruited his th irty comrades
mainly from Burman ethnic group, which shows a division o f Burmese ethnicities since
th e early days o f independence. These th irty comrades w e re trained under Japanese

29 Steinberg, B u rm a /M y a n m a r: W hat Everyone Needs to Know, 30.
30 Fink, Living Silence in Burma : Surviving under M ilita ry Rule, 15; Charney, A History o f M odern Burma,
41.
31A History o f Modern Burma, 48.
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authorities at Bangkok to learn "com m and, com bat, espionage, guerilla w arfare, and
political tactics."32 It might be th e reason th a t Burmans fe lt segregation from other
ethnic groups as British rule always rem ained doubtful tow ards Burmans and used oth er
ethnicities to m aintain rule.33 Therefore, most of th e nationalists, particularly Burmans,
w ere striving to get m ore representation in the legislature because, by and large,
Burmans believed th a t "British policy to dismiss Burmans from the arm ed forces
(deliberately) segregated the races (see table 5)."34

Table 5: Ethnic Composition of th e Arm ed Forces in Burma, 1931 & 1941
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32 M ary P. Callahan, M aking Enemies : W a r and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, N ew York: Cornell
University Press, 2003), 48.
33 Steinberg, B u rm a /M y a n m a r: W hat Everyone Needs to Know, 29.
34 Callahan, M aking Enem ies: W ar and State Building in Burma, 35.
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The British, who neglected raising a Burmese Arm y and relied heavily on Indian
forces, came to o little too late in 1937 as they rushed to establish a "Burma Com m and,"
which eventually led to the loss of Burma to the Japanese.35 Even a fte r the
establishm ent of the Burma Comm and, th e ethnic disparity was visible and divided th e
country suffering until now. For instance, in th e Battalion o f Burma Rifles to com m and
m ore than 6 ,0 0 0 soldiers, out of tw e n ty -tw o officers and others ranked seven hundred
and fifteen officers belonging to non-Burm an ethnicities or foreigners deliberately
ignoring the 65% of Burmans. This means almost 50% of officers w ere of Karen
ethnicity, 25% Chin and 25% Kachin, w hile only 4 officers w e re of Burman eth n icity.36
Aung San established the Burma Independence A rm y (BIA) under Japanese
training and assistance to liberate it from British rule. In Decem ber 1941, Aung San and
his BIA entered Burma w ith the help of 6 0,0 00 Japanese troops th at helped Japan to
occupy Burma and w rest it from British rule. By 1942 the collapse of th e colonial system
of governance was com plete and was replaced by a BIA adm inistration of young
nationalists under Japanese supervision. Crime rates reached their peak during th e first
half of 1942, as more than 15,000 convicted prisoners w ere released from ja il.37 Over
the years, the law and order situation could not be controlled under BIA, and the brief
euphoria from self-governance faded away under Japanese occupation. BIA engaged in
communal riots as they w ere collecting money and arms to support BIA. U nfortunately,

35 M aking Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 40.
36 Ibid.
37 M aking Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 52.
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"they turned on everyone suspected of British sympathies;" in this regard, people in
Karen suffered the most due to th e ir allegiance to British rule.38
The Japanese banned BIA from addressing law and order situations and later
disbanded BIA soldiers w ere rem obilized as th e Burma Defense Army (BDA) to support
the Japanese campaign in the Second W orld W a r.39 However, the BDA's w a r office
gradually became independent and Aung San m ore in control than th e Japanese, which
played a crucial role later in defeating th e Japanese during anti-Japanese resistance.
Interestingly, w hen many of the BIA officers w ere sent to OTS (Officers Training School)
in Mingaladon, the Japanese instructors had some harsh attitudes tow ards the soldiers
and slapped officers during training.40 These behaviors increased anti-Japanese
sentiments among the cadre of officers a t OTS, which eventually w ere vented during the
w ar against the Japanese occupation along the United Front. In addition, th e people in
Burma noticed th a t the popular Japanese slogan "Asia for Asians" was no m ore honored
in Burma, as it was propagated in China.41 Overall anti-Japanese sentim ent grew w ithin
the military and civilian circles in Burma.
During the last years of the Second W orld W a r betw een 194 3 -1 94 5 , th e British
and U.S. clandestinely armed and trained local guerillas to launch th e attacks against the
Japanese. As in the past, because the fro n tie r areas of northern Burma w ith dense
jungle rem ained problematic, relying on the local population was a good option to fight

38 Tucker, Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 43.
39 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M y a n m a r since Ancient Times: Traditions and
Transformatons, 235.
40 Callahan, M aking Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 63.
41 Donovan W ebster, The Burma R o a d : The Epic Story o f the China-Burma-lndia Theater in W orld W a r li
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 48.
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back. As W inston Churchill rem arked, "the idea o f fighting th e Japanese in th e jungles of
northern Burma [is like] to a man going into the w a te r to fight a shark."42 The United
Front against the Japanese was comprised o f Com m unist Party Cadres, the American
Kachin Rangers, the British Kachin Levies, the Chines, the Socialists, the Indian Arm y, the
British Fourteen Army, British Special Forces, the Anti-Fascist Organization Leaders
(AFO, during post w ar period M ay 1945, the AFO renam ed as Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League (AFPFL)), and young officers in the Tatm adaw (BIA) 43 During the post
independence period, many of these groups w ould later start fighting over political
pow er in a unified state of Burma.
Despite the im portant role of various factions th a t fought against th e Japanese,
th e role of Aung San is crucial. San successfully established a future national arm y for
Burma and also secretly raised anti-Japanese resistance in the shadows o f Japanese rule.
Lt. Gen. W illiam Slim, com m ander of the Fourteenth Army acknowledged the astute
m aneuver by Aung San. During the anti-Japanese campaign, the te rrib le w a r in Burma
caused enormous destruction. M o re than 80% of cities required rebuilding. The horrific
w ar in Burma caused the deaths o f 2 7,0 00 Anglo-Indian soldiers out of 6 06 ,00 0 , while
the death toll reached 73,909 due to wounds, tropical diseases, and lack o f medication.
Japan lost more soldiers; 144,000 w ere dead and 56,000 wounded. It is said that, when
elephants fight, it is grass th at suffers; similarly, the people of Burma w ere inflicted with
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th e greatest rates o f death. Over one million people died due to battles, w ar crimes,
fam ine, and diseases during this w ar period.44
Despite all, the British fought back, getting Burma to preserve and restore its
imperial pow er in east (Asia), and slightly fading over due to the decline of th e British
em pire. Its global retrenchm ent sped up the w ave o f independence and em p o w ered
decolonization m ovem ents, becoming a turning point for th e unification of Burma and
its elevation as a sovereign state in January 1948.45 Before that, in January 1947, Aung
San and the British Prime M inister Clement A ttlee signed th e Attlee-Aung San
Agreem ent in London, which assured the independence o f Burma in a year's tim e . In the
m eantim e, the Karens also aspired to seek independence, w hile the Shans, Kachins, and
Chins whom also w anted to be represented at the A ttlee-Aung San talks w e re not
allowed; therefore the agreem ent was not considered binding for th e m .46 Similarly, it
can be noted th at during the early years of nationalist moves, divided factionalism
existed within the GCBA during 1930s.47 It was obvious to expect the division along
ethnic lines when the entire region was on the course of independence, especially w hen
th e political destiny of each ethnic state was to be determ ined.
In response to grievances by frontier area people, Aung San led a delegation to
m eet representatives of the Shan, Khachin, and Chin groups at Panglong in Shan state
(see the Appendix A for Panglong Agreem ent). The Panglong Agreem ent betw een Shan,
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2011), 456.
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Kachin, and Chin ethnic representatives and the Burmese governm ent, signed on
February 12th, 1947, allowed them to join the union o f Burma. Aung San assured the
representatives a guarantee o f representation, financial aid, and full autonom y under a
transitional governm ent th a t later became a curse fo r not knowing th a t th e ethnicities
w ould be fighting to protect th e ir territories from th e central governm ent.48 For many
nationalists, they believe the Panglong agreem ent helped unify the divided union into a
greater Burma; however, in contrast, many ethnic com m unities on fro n tie r regions
believe the Panglong agreem ent was the beginning of new ethnic troubles in th e new ly
emerging state.
In retrospect, the Attlee-Aung San Agreem ent outlined a road map fo r the
Panglong meeting. According to para 8 (b) of Attlee-Aung San agreem ent, "the leaders
and representatives of the peoples o f the Frontier Areas shall be asked ... to express
th e ir views upon the forms of association w ith the G overnm ent of Burma which they
consider acceptable during the transition period [to independence]."49 The pream ble of
th e Panglong agreem ent also reflects the provision of independence given to Frontier
Areas, as the pream ble notes that: "the members o f the conference, believing th at
freedom will be m ore speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and th e Chins by their
im m ediate co-operation w ith the Interim Burmese Governm ent, have accordingly ...
agreed..."50
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The agreem ent, in return for cooperation to joining the union, guaranteed full
autonom y, as article (V) of the agreem ent ensured the "full autonom y in internal
adm inistration fo r the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle (see the Panglong
A greem ent in appendix)." Shelby Tucker emphasizes and echoes th e similar voice o f
Frontier Areas, w ho believed th a t "they w ere assenting to early independence from
Britain and the perpetuation o f their freedom from British and Burman interference in
their internal affairs; that, w hatever com m itm ent, it was not to perm anent and
irrevocable integration in an independent Union o f Burma ruled by Burmans."51
Interestingly, during the early years of independence, the Union o f Burma faced
great complications because, on the one hand, the original structure of th e Union
allowed Shan and Karenni to secede a fte r 10 years, w hile on the oth er hand, it denied
the same rights to the rest of the contending ethnic groups. M oreover, citizenship rights
to Chinese and Indian and Muslim Rohingya populations w e re denied as non-native
Burmese ethnicities.52 Furtherm ore, 10 years after independence, w hen th e m ilitary
took control as a caretaker it sensed th a t Shan and Kayak ethnicities w ere trying to
secede and break away from the union, which eventually justified the m ilitary coup
against U Nu's governm ent.53 Therefore the Panglong agreem ent's c o m m itm en t to join
the Union vindicated the fractures within the Union. Fracturedness of statehood
ultim ately witnessed a backlash to the dem ocratic process and political developm ent in
the new state.
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A fter clinging to support from Frontier Areas through the Panglong pact, Aung
San became de facto head of tw o dom inant organizations, th e AFPFL political party and
Burma National Army (BNA). The scheduled national elections of April 1947 gave a clear
victory to Aung San's Anti-Fascist party, elected to th e assembly. On June 1947, AFPFL
passed a m ajority resolution to leave th e C om m onw ealth, severing relations w ith th e
British Empire.54 Tw o months im m ediately a fte r th e elections, political rivals
assassinated the th irty -tw o year old Burmese national hero, Aung San, along w ith six
cabinet mem bers, during a m eeting of the executive Council at Secretariat building in
Rangoon. These unwelcom e political episodes gradually plunged the new ly em erging
state into political chaos, though the British, as agreed through Attlee-Aung San
Agreem ent, granted independence to the Union of Burma on January 4 th, 1948. But the
fate o f the Frontier Areas w ithin the Union was not clear, and it was th e beginning o f a
new internal conflict by the newly constructed nation.
Prime M inister U Nu took charge of th e fragile state that hosted diverse groups
of fractured nationhood. Despite being the Prime M inister w ho replaced Aung San after
his assassination, Nu gathered widespread support both in rural and urban corners for
his determ ination to tackle issues of corruption and bad governance. But a persistent
psychological th reat of foreign intervention and domestic unrest, prom pted by m ilitary
institutions, m otivated him to give th e m ilitary a bigger role in politics. For instance,
soon after independence, the Karen-M on State dem anded for more territories in
Tennasserim area, some parts of Irraw addy districts and claimed areas from low er
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Burma. Finally, in 1949 the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) actively
engaged in an arm ed rebellion against the governm ent and took control of most of
Rangoon.55 U Nu's governm ent faced trem endous challenges at m ultiple fronts including
the issues of a w eak federation and the breakout o f civil w a r due to ethnic groups
seeking autonom y or independence along ideological lines.56 Civil w a r was also
aggravated by the arm ed struggle of com m unist party factions. The red flag communist
faction, a splinter o f Communist Party of Burma (CPB) had already launched th e ir an ti
governm ent struggle in March 1946 under th e leadership Thakin Soe. The remaining
CPB became the w hite flag communist party led by Thakin Than Tun and started arm ed
struggle in M arch 1948, leading around 15,000 arm ed fighters declaring them selves the
people's liberation Army of Burma. The CPB leadership and members believed th a t
Burma has becom e a quasi-colonial and quasi-feudalistic society in the post
independence period.57
The role of the CPB cannot be underestim ated in understanding its role in setting
back M yanm ar's nascent dem ocratic regime in the 1950s. The CPB enjoyed strong
support by com m unist China, and w ithout a doubt, the dem ocratization process in
M yanm ar is primarily reliant on Chinese attitudes as w ell.58 Because it has a long history,
China plays the role o f a big brother in trying to m icro-m anage M yanm ar's policies,
denying dem ocratic voices true representation. In the early years o f independence,
despite Burma's w arm relations with China, M a o considered the neutralist policy of
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Burma as pro-W estern. China was not m otivated th a t, in a tim e of polarized worlds, one
can stay neutral. Therefore China's Comm unist Party (CCP) portrayed Aung San's
nationalistic m ovem ent as traitorous and U Nu as a "running dog" of im perialism . The
CCP supported Burma's Communist party as legitim ate representation o f a true
revolutionary army. M ao believed th a t w ith o u t the CPB's revolutionary change, Burma
would remain a sem i-independent country.59

TATM ADAW : IN THE MAKING OF A GARRISON AND PARIAH STATE
The effects of colonial policies of divide and rule could be witnessed in M yanm ar,
which are some o f the fundam ental factors o f fractured statehood. In addition, the
protection of praetorian society by m ilitary junta became another prim e factor th at
further w eakened the state foundations in th e post-colonial period. From 1962 to 2 01 1 ,
the m ilitary or low profile dictators directly or indirectly ruled M yanm ar through tw o
military coups, 1962 and 1 98 8 .60 However, th e m ilitary involvement in politics has a
history prior to independence, as was noted earlier when M yanm ar's m ilitary
organization (Tatm adaw) was established to seek independence. History and the role of
the m ilitary before, during, and a fte r independence became a perfect match for military
elites to retain th e ir influence during post-colonial times.
Once the military form ally stepped in as a self-declared legitim ate actor in
domestic politics and sidelined the dem ocratic forces, the foundation was laid for a
garrison state. According to Harold Lasswell, a garrison state is a "w orld in which the
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specialists on violence are the most pow erful group in society."61 This means the
m ilitary as an institution is specialized in drills th a t function primarily through coercive
applications, repression, and violence.62 Political suppression by any means cannot be
neglected under m ilitary rule; in fact, political repression remains a useful tool to
m aintain the praetorian nature of political o rder by diminishing any possible resistance.
Similarly, since 1962 onwards, civil society in M y an m ar experienced various episodes of
human rights violations, even before (m entioned in the colonial section, the role of BIA
during the Japanese occupation) and a fte r independence, or military connivance
towards violent unrest against m inority groups. In a way, th e military organization had a
positive posture in the eyes of the people, w ho believed in the national sanctity of th e
m ilitary organization because of its founding fa th e r and national hero General Aung San.
Though, a fte r establishing the m ilitary organization, Aung San was assassinated six
months before independence, his leadership succeeded in establishing a unified
nationalist m ovem ent that had later helped liberate the country.
It is im portant to understand the active role of the military in th e politics of
M yanm ar, which provides an intellectual base to analyze th e praetorian structure and
policies im plem ented in M yanm ar. In this regard, Tatm adaw 's (M yanm ar's Arm ed
Forces) role and actions need to be explored to b e tte r understand th e harsh policies
th at M yanm ar has witnessed over th e past five decades. As M yanm ar opens tow ards
the rest of th e world, many political mysteries will be unraveled. Hence, the political
intricacies of M yanm ar can be portrayed through th e fam ous words o f fo rm e r US
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Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, th a t the w orld still is in a phase to distinguish
betw een "known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns" about
M yanm ar's arm ed forces. Andrew Selth explained M yanm ar's case since the first
m ilitary coup of 1962 to recent developm ents. According to Selth, on 1962's coup, much
of the world com m unity is inform ed and aw are about "known knowns," how ever, "the
Tatm adaw 's role since the abortive 1988 pro-dem ocracy uprising is still a large num ber
of "known unknowns." Also, M yanm ar has its share o f mysteries, and its arm ed forces
continue to surprise observers, reflecting the many "unknown unknow ns"."63

a. THE 1962 COUP: A FORMAL STEP TOWARDS THE MAKING OF A GARRISON STATE
The episodes of known and unknown m ilitary ventures in dom estic politics
begins w ith General Ne W in, w ho was earlier involved in suppressing the rebellious
arm ed struggle of KNDO in 1949, the m ilitary intervention th a t helped U Nu avert the
collapse of his elected governm ent.64 In fact, on Septem ber 26th, 1958, U Nu invited
Gen. Ne W in and his m ilitary to form a caretaker setup to resolve th e law and order
situation and return pow er to civilian governm ent. M oreover, the T a tm a d aw proclaimed
its determ ination to overcome the existing corruption w ith police and adm inistrative
structure, elim inate local pocket armies o f upcountry politicians, and lead operational
control.65 Therefore, the m ilitary gained a much higher role in domestic politics;
eventually, the warriors became state-builders not only during the 1950s, but rather
63 Andrew Selth, "Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring M yanm ar's M ilitary Capabilities,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal o f International and Strategic Affairs 31, no. 2 (2009): 273.
64 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M y a n m a r since Ancient Times: Traditions and
Transformatons, 239.
65 Callahan, M aking Enemies : W ar and State Building in Burma, 181.
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justified the continued rule in the following decades.66 Despite U Nu's electoral win in
1961, his regime did not reach the end of his term because his regime was ousted
through a m ilitary coup.
Earlier, many Burmese politicians believed th a t the 1958-1960 caretaker setup of
Gen Ne W in was also an indirect m ilitary coup, but U Nu refused th e popular notion,
until his own elected governm ent was ousted in 1962, and then he acknowledged th a t
he was forced to declare a caretaker set up.67 Ne W in promulgated th a t U Nu's soft
policy towards ethnic-m inorities' demands fo r political reform had th reaten ed the
territorial integrity of the state.68 To control the dam age, Gen. Ne W in arrested political
leaders, dismantled the court system, forcibly retired many civil bureaucrats and
abrogated the constitution, fearing th a t a judicial decree against his coup would
threaten his actions.69 These steps helped the m ilitary under General Ne W in to justify
th e coup of March 2 ,1 9 6 2 as a revolution to save th e country and unify the fractured
nation. Gen Ne W in became chairman of the Revolutionary Council responsible for
administering the political system, w ith the council m em bership being comprised of 17
military officers.70 A num ber of council members, such as Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, San Yu, and
Sein Win, w ere active with Gen. Ne W in during the anti-colonial struggle. Later on many
of them w ere purged because Ne W in was suspicious about them or used the purge as
face saving of bad policies of his regime. The self-propagated, so-called revolution failed,
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and instead made soldiers stronger, who then dom inated domestic politics. The process
of dom ination extended fo r over five decades because of th e am algam ation of th re e
institutions, i.e. "dictatorship, party-state, and defense-state."71
Yoshihiro Nakanishi's (2013) w ork shares a reference to three kinds of
dictatorships: personal, single-party, and m ilitary dictatorships, retaining authoritarian
power on average for ten years, eight years, and th re e years respectively.72 Nakanishi
argues th a t if the average m ortality o f authoritarian rule by military regimes is th re e
years, then the case of M yanm ar is an "outlying observation" in political science, or the
military regime's prolonged endurance was due to an am algam ation o f th e three
institutions m entioned previously.73 Furtherm ore, Nakanishi refers to the survey
research conducted by Barbara Geddes, w ho focused on th e m ortality rate of
authoritarian regimes from 1945-1994.
According to Nakanishi, Geddes' w ork concludes th a t "the proportion of m ilitary
regimes th a t fell during any particular five years betw een 1945 and 1994 was about 50
per cent higher than the proportion of personalist regimes and about four tim es the
proportion of single-party regimes."74 It shows th a t the m ilitary regime in M yanm ar
prolonged its stay in pow er in contrast to th e results shown in that research. It is
significant to m ention th at military dictators alone cannot stay in pow er fo r a long
period, so they cleverly adopt a civilian political garb or establish civilian support to
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prolong their stay. General Ne W in adopted a sim ilar policy, using a civilian posture to
stay in pow er fo r decades until 1988.
W h a t policies helped the m ilitary to strengthen its roots in th e politics of
M yanm ar, and also entrench itself as an economic beneficiary? The policies can be
looked at in tw o phases; first, during his despotic rule from 1962 to 1988, Gen Ne W in
enjoyed absolute authority through his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and
used his own constructed ideology called “Burmese ways to Socialism." The events of
1988 becam e not only the cause of the BSPP's collapse, but also a first step tow ards
dem ocratic transition. The second phase, 1988 to 2010, was another coup replacing Gen
Ne W in, which considered w hether a caretaker setup would handle the adm inistrative
affairs of M yanm ar until a constitutional regime was elected. The caretaker m ilitary
pow er retained rule through the establishm ent of th e State Law and O rder Restoration
Council (SLORC), later becoming the State Peace and Developm ent Council (SPDC).
M oreover, the discussion under the th e m e "unm aking the political econom y of Garrison
state" helps draw attention to the economic benefits the military junta has been
enjoying up until now.
During the first phase from 1962 to 1988, Ne W in avoided or abrogated all th e
policies of U Nu including U Nu's mission of making M yanm ar a pure Buddhist country
strictly following a Buddhist code o f conduct. Ne W in feared that the continuation o f U
Nu's policies could draw some harsh condemnations and actions by the international
com m unity if Christian minorities became subject to discrimination. Ne win had a good
reputation before the 1962 coup because of his active role during th e anti-colonial
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struggle and subjugating th e ethno-nationalist struggles in th e early independence
years. In later years he became a ty ra n t against his own people. It is com m only believed,
and to an extent true, th at "most o f tyrants arise from popular leaders w ho w ere
trusted."75 Similarly, under Gen. Ne W in's rule, M yanm ar was tested by th e limits of
brutality against ethnic groups, a bad perform ing economy, the rise o f a drug economy,
th e rise o f corrupt and chronic authoritarian-political elites, transnational crimes, and
geopolitical challenges.
M any of the issue areas identified above are discussed separately in later
discussions. In many ways, Gen. Ne W in gained his absolute authority through brutal
force and by purging many of the m ilitary and political elites, from w hom he feared any
set back. Popular political parties w ere forced to give up th e ir activities in this regard,
including their assets which w ere seized. M ost political parties including popular AFPFL
and other ethno-based political parties w ere required to follow one state political party
m odeled on Leninist lines, indoctrination social, economic and political policies, nam ed
the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). 76
Ne W in created a news agency to control dom estic media and counter foreign
media criticism and strongly propagate the "Burmese w ay to Socialism" as policy. A
popular belief among the people o f M yanm ar was th a t freedom of expression was more
defended and exercised during 1948 to 1962. However, m any Colonial laws rem ained
intact; even after independence th e Official Secrets Act o f 1923 rem ained in practice,
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which provided th e governm ent a significant am ount of control over inform ation.77
Though a fte r the 1962 coup new laws, such as the Printers and Publishers Act of 1962,
established the Press Scrutiny Board, which enjoyed full authority to censor any m aterial
detrim ental to the socialist system or state ideology.78
University students w ere arrested so as to stop any political resistance
em anating from university campuses. Tragically, university campuses w ere closed fo r
almost fo r tw o years from 1962 to 1964 to subdue any resistance. During these years,
Ne W in's policy legitimized the single party, when he resigned from his m ilitary post in
1972 and was elected through a referendum in 1974. Before the referendum , until
1972, the military ruled th e country directly, while from 1 97 4 onwards the BSPP became
an indirect way by which the m ilitary legalized a means to retain political pow er as a
constitutional dictatorship.79
Ne W in also targeted m ilitary personnel, fro m w hom he fe lt insecure, or made
them scapegoats for his bad governance. Listing a fe w prom inent m ilitary personnel
who lost their positions goes back to 1948, during an internal mutiny w ithin the
Burmese Armed forces in which Karen and Kachin officers w ere forced to rem ove
themselves, and Gen. Ne W in became head of the Tatm adaw . Following th a t in 1961
top ranked m ilitary personal Brig. Gen. M aung M aung was removed due to suspicion of
his ties w ith the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even a fte r the m ilitary coup in 1964
Gen. Ne Win's proclaimed successor Gen Aung Gyi was sacked for his public criticism of
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Gen. Ne W in's economic policies. In later years, Tin Pe was rem oved for believing his
bad economic policies, and Tin Oo rem oved due to a conceived threat to Ne Win's
power. M any of them joined the dem ocratic political struggle against Ne W in and faced
im prisonm ent as well.
Ne Win prolonged his stay in pow er through the inclusion of some civilian or
political personalities on his advisory bodies to justify the referendum s and retain th e
position as head of state. Even in th e BSPP single state party, by and large, the top
portfolios remained in the hands of m ilitary personals. In th e late 1980s his political
opponents succeeded in launching a dem ocratic m ovem ent for political change. In
M arch 1988, a clash broke out betw een a university student group and a local youth
group over preferences of a m odern or traditional music in society at a local teashop.80
The clash gradually gathered a huge mass o f protestors, which eventually was supported
by unhappy monks and a frustrated population against the socio-economic conditions
generated by thirty years policies of the Burmese w ay of socialism.81 Thousands of
protestors came out across the country, Ne Win ordered a crackdown, and as a result
the entire world witnessed the brutality of th e military, w hom killed around three
thousand anti-regime demonstrators 82 Among them dozens of university students w ere
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killed. According to one incident report, alm ost 41 students died due to suffocating in
locked police vans.83
Finally, the popular uprising o f 8888 (Four-Eight Uprising), which was unhappy
w ith the BSPP governm ent, denounced Ne W in's authority and dem anded his
resignation 84 Ne W in agreed to step down and transfer p o w e r to a caretaker setup w ith
a promise to support a m ulti-party system. U nfortunately, he appointed th e most
detested person, U Sein Lwin, as his successor to look after th e political transition. Sein
Lwin was known as the "Butcher of Rangoon" because of his excessive use o f force in
response to demonstrations.85 On S eptem ber 27th, 1988, th e National League for
Democracy (NLD) was established, and Gen Aung Gyi becam e chairman, Gen. Tin Oo
vice chairman, and Aung San Suu Kyi Gen. Secretary to contest dem ocratic elections. By
early 1990, the NLD had reached 2 million mem bers.
The May 2 7 ,1 9 9 0 elections gave a crystal clear victory to th e NLD, sweeping 82
percent of the seats, while the military-backed National U nity Party (NUP) w on only 2%
of seats. The NLD dem anded to provisionally restore the 1947 constitution so the new
governm ent could take charge and w rite a new constitution.86 However, the SLORC
rejected th e idea, and in July 1990 issued a council ruling (SLORC O rder No. 1 /9 0 ) as a
road map towards a future democratic transition. The ruling only authorized th e elected

83 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History o f M y a n m a r since Ancient Times: Traditions and
Transformatons, 256.
84 Vince Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship : Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia (Cambridge ; N ew
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 201-06; Charney, A History o f Modern Burma, 148.
85 Steinberg, B u rm a /M y a n m a r: W h at Everyone Needs to Know, 63.
86 M o rten B. Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma : A Critique o f Western Sanctions Policy
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 130; Derek Tonkin, "The 1990 Elections in M yanm ar:
Broken Promises or a Failure o f Communication?," Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal o f
International and Strategic Affairs 29, no. 1 (2007): 34.

138
representatives to draft a constitution for a future dem ocratic state. W hile the SLORC
retained pow er as the interim pow er to facilitate th e process, it also gave priority and
safeguarded the SLORC's responsibilities tow ards the following three domains:
1.

The three national causes of prevention o f disintegration of the union,
prevention of disintegration of national unity, and perpetuation of
sovereignty;

2.

Prevalence of law and order and regional peace and tranquility, secure
and smooth transport and communications, and easing of people's
need for food, clothes, and shelter; and

3.

Developm ent of all national people in all o f M yanm ar.87

Unfortunately, it turned to be a false promise, and power shifted to a new
military leadership under SLORC, w ho fu rth er ignored the election results and justified
th a t M yanm ar was not ready to be ruled under dem ocratic governance. In 1994 the UN
General Assembly suggested a Tripartite Dialogue betw een the regime and tw o
oppositions including NLD and ethnic minorities, but now, th e military regime remains in
fear of losing pow er and does not w an t to see the em pow ering of ethnic m inorities.88
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b. RISE OF SLORC / SPDC: A BROKEN PROMISE VIA SILENCING DEMOCRACY, UNDOING
COLONIAL PAST AND THE MAKING OF A PARIAH STATE
The Rise of SLORC was a second phase of the direct continuation of m ilitary rule.
It is highlighted above th a t the m ilitary continued to rule in various form s and at various
tim e periods, w hether it was as a caretaker setup in 1958, direct m ilitary coup in 1962,
or self-legitimized adopted and enforced political garb under BSPP in 1974 to 1988, and
even w ithin m ilitary coups against each other. The impact o f the first phase o f m ilitary
rule paved the way in the making of a garrison state, w hile the developm ents in the
second phase o f the 1988-90 coup tried to undo its colonial past through reviving or
reinventing history. By the process of reinventing history th e military establishm ent
thought of gaining legitimacy in order to sustain popular support, in contrast, the
totalitarian actions by the m ilitary created a pariah state, isolating itself from the global
com m unity and facing heavy political and economic sanctions.
The rise of SLORC was a broken promise to the people of M yanm ar. During the
general elections, the people of M yanm ar overwhelm ingly refused to vote fo r a m ilitary
backed political party and preferred instead to support th e NLD. SLORC com pletely
gagged the democratic transition in revenge of its loss in th e elections.
SLORC, which was comprised of 19 m ilitary leaders, made Gen Saw M aung its
new com m ander-in-Chief and chairman. Interestingly, instead of a civilian regime which
could revoke the political arrangem ents o f the BSPP, the military under the platform of
SLORC abolished the 1974 constitution, and BSPP was created under th e m ilitary rule of
Gen Ne W in. One of the reasons was th a t the m ilitary was not in a mood to be fu rth er
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patronized under political guidance, like th e BSPP had done earlier. Despite the
prolonged m ilitary rule, a divided and insecure m ilitary leadership seemed engaged in
an internal coup against senior officers or purging o f potential junior opposing m ilitary
commanders. For instance, the NLD was expecting a possible power transfer to
dem ocratically-elected public representatives, but the hopes of NLD m em bers and
supporters w ere dashed when Gen. Saw M aung was relieved from his position and
retired.
Gen Than Shwe, w ho planned the removal o f Saw Maung, succeeded in
developing a case th a t Saw M aung had dem onstrated some erratic behavior. It is argued
th a t Gen Saw Maung believed th a t the famous Burmese king, Kyanzitta of the Pagan
Dynasty, had returned through reincarnation in his fo rm .89 M oreover, a num ber of Saw
Maung's associates agreed th a t he had become delusional as a result o f the m ilitary
backed political party's loss to the NLD. However, m ilitary doctors believe th a t Saw
M aung had been drugged.90 Finally, after consultation w ith Ne Win Gen, Saw M aung
retired, w hile on M arch 30' 1992 Gen. Than Shwe, the second most senior official after
Saw Maung, became Com m ander-in-Chief and Chairman o f the SLORC. Soon after, Than
Shwe picked Gen Maung Aye as arm y chief w ho later becam e vice-chairman of the
SLORC in 1994. Gen M aung Aye was a hardliner against ethnic minorities, which entailed
negative ramifications for any possible peaceful settlem ent with ethnic conflicts in the
country.

89 Steinberg, B u rm a /M y a n m a r: W hat Everyone Needs to Know, 83.
90 M in, "Looking inside th e Burmese M ilitary," 163.

141
The other case of purging to p ranked m ilitary commanders is im portant to
discuss here. It was Gen Khin Nyunt w ho was among the first members of the SLORC.
Gen Khin Nyunt was one of Ne W in's closest aides. A fter 1992, Nyunt retained the
position of prime minister tasked w ith looking a fte r international dealings and
countering any international pressure through his media w atch. Though Than Shwe
never trusted Khin Nyunt because he was a follow er of Ne W in, simultaneously Gen
M aung Aye was also not on good term s w ith Nyunt. A divide was shown due to a lack of
trust betw een the armed com m and and intelligence com m and of Khin Nyunt. In 2004,
after the death of Ne W in, Than Shwe and M aung Aye purged Khin Nyunt on corruption
charges.91 Khin Nyunt denied the allegations, and he insisted that if he or any of his
subordinates w ere believed to be corrupt, then it would be equally applicable to all
m embers of the SPDC or ministers, because no one was exem pted o f the system and
everyone enjoyed the same benefits. In fact, Than Shwe's involvem ent in corruption
was not a hidden episode too, rather Than Shwe needed an excuse to purge Khin Nyunt.
As an example, Than Shwe, before becoming dictator, and his family w ere not
economically well off. His sister was running a grocery store at Kyaukse (tow n w here his
fam ily lived). Once he became dictator, th e m ilitary seized th e property and bungalows
of affluent people at Kyaukse; later, Shwe gave them to his sister, making her rich
overnight.92
The decision to purge Khin Nyunt was not in favor o f Myanm ar's general interest
for several reasons. Though Khin Nyunt was part o f the m ilitary junta, he understood
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the im portance of international interaction and the role o f international agencies
working fo r the developm ent of M yanm ar. In contrast, Than Shwe and M aung Aye
believed the INGO's w ere "potential foreign spies or neocolonists."93 In addition, Khin
Nyunt was the architect o f the cease-fire agreem ents with ethnic groups, w hile M aung
Aye was a hardliner w ho believed th a t ethnic arm ed forces could be crushed easily w ith
force. In fact, Gen M aung Aye violated on a num ber of occasions the cease-fire
agreem ent.94
The SLORC was facing challenges on m ultiple fronts, for example, dom estic mass
resistance by those w ho voted for the NLD and pressure by the international com m unity
for violating human rights and depriving citizens from basic rights. Than Shwe adopted
some policies to counter the m ounting challenges. First, he ordered the establishm ent
of a political platform like the BSPP so m em bers could contest elections against political
rivals of the dem ocratic alliance. In this regard, a pro-m ilitary political platform was
planned, and Than Shwe oversaw the establishm ent of th e Union Solidarity and
Developm ent Association (USDA), which later w on a controversial election in 2010. In
the m eantim e, the SLORC m orphed into th e SPDC, which w as working on a new
constitution for the country.
Second, Than Shwe took a couple of measures to tackle domestic challenges,
though most w ere of course criminal actions against his ow n people. His policies tried to
divert the attention from domestic challenges, i.e. m ilitary repression, poor economic
perform ance and to cover up w ith these challenges, he started to project a positive
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image of the m ilitary and M yanm ar's history by recalling the bad m em ories of its
colonial past. Than Shwe exemplified the role o f the m ilitary against colonial rule. In
addition, his rule glorified the history o f its kings as great warriors, especially three kings
who unified the state, namely Anaw ratha, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya. Tatm adaw
massively engaged in rebuilding the historic palaces to support their w ords of glorifying
the past and undoing colonial legacies.95 At the capital Naypyidaw, Than Shwe raised
giant statues of Anaw rahta, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya to support his glorification of
the history of M yanm ar and holy w arrio r kings.96
In a process of re-inventing th e past, th e SPDC engaged in some projects th a t
reflected the undoing of colonial initiatives. For instance, the name of th e country
Burma was replaced w ith M yanm ar, Rangoon w ith Yangon, along w ith a list of nam e
changes for cities, rivers, divisions, and states to im itate historical Burmese orthography;
a tangible shift was moving the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw.97 A deliberate
atte m p t was made to link Burma to colonial tim es and delinking it to adhere to
populous support from non-Burmans, yet the spoken usage of Burma was in practice
prior to colonial times. In addition, T atm ad aw w anted to give an impression th a t a
unified Burma now as the Union of M y an m ar was not only for Burmans; rather it was a
consensual political and geographical space fo r all ethnicities.
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Exceptionally, the NLD leadership, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, rejected the
change of the country's name and preferred to keep the older one.98 It arguably may be
because either she w anted the name Burma to continue as it was during its
independence period when her fa th e r was in the lead, or th e notion th a t rejection
m eant not accepting the legitimacy and authority o f the m ilitary to decide a national
m atter on its own. The debate also drew some divide across continents as neighboring
countries, including organizations as the UN and ASEAN, accepted the change, w hile the
United States, Canada, U.K and Australia retained the usage o f the old nam e, and th e
European Union took a m iddle-way solution term ing it "M yanm ar/B urm a." 99
On Novem ber 4, 2005 the change of capital was com pletely a political decision.
Though the name Yangon referred to the revival o f an old name, the decision to relocate
the capital to Naypyidaw, however, was fo r political and strategic reasons. The capital
change not only physically relocated the capital, but also hundreds of civil servants and
infrastructure. Interestingly, the SPDC kept the nam e of th e new capital city secret,
except ordering the relocation to a new place. Once most of the w orkforce had been
transferred to the new city in February 2006, on M arch 26, 2006, th e SPDC announced
the name of the new capital Naypyidaw. Naypyidaw means the site o f the royal country
or royal city.100
The new capital city was located 320 KM north of Yangon, and th e political
reason to shift the capital was previous political protests against m ilitary regimes mainly
98 Lowell Dittm er, "Burma Vs. Myanmar: W hat's in a Name?," in Burma or M y a n m a r? : The Struggle fo r
N ational Identity, ed. Lowell Dittm er (Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: W orld Scientific, 2010), 2.
" Ib id .
100 Daniel Goma, "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind th e Junta's Decision to M o ve th e Burmese
Capital," ibid., 186.
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in Yangon. M oreover, Yangon was becom ing more urbanized and populous, so it would
be hard facing o th e r massive rallies against the military. Ne W in witnessed students
from Rangoon University leading th e protest; therefore, am ong the m ilitary
com m anders was a com mon perception about "Yangon as an enemy." The SPDC even
avoided considering the traditional capital M andalay, which remained th e center of
Burmese culture and religion for centuries. Building a new city and capital was prim arily
to secure their ow n interest against political challenges.101
The second reason for changing th e capital was based on geo-strategic
considerations by the SPDC. The m ilitary com m anders of Tatm adaw fe lt insecure in
Yangon for any possible foreign invasion, keeping in mind th e historical evidence of
British invasions and possible attack on Yangon fo r its closeness to th e shores. Earlier,
a fte r the 1988 dem ocratic protest, a rum or about th e US Navy's Seventh Fleet entering
into M yanm ar's waters led to fears by the Tatm adaw , who thought US forces had come
to rescue the democratic forces.102 This persistent notion o f fear th a t they m ay face
possible attack remained in the back of the mind o f the junta.
Similarly, after 9 /1 1 , when US forces launched attacks against Al-Qaeda
operatives in Afghanistan, Tatm adaw feared M yanm ar could become a possible target
for its bad human rights record and brutal actions against dem ocratic groups.103
Therefore, pushing a new capital city in th e heart o f M yanm ar was a psychological relief
fo r the SPDC. In addition, the junta believed th at in Yangon they w e re always under
101 "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind th e Junta's Decision to Move th e Burmese Capital," in
Burma o r M y a n m a r? : The Struggle fo r N ational Identity, ed. Lowell D ittm er (Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ:
2010), 191.
102 "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind th e Junta's Decision to Move th e Burmese Capital," 192.
103 "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind th e Junta's Decision to Move th e Burmese Capital," 194.
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surveillance by foreign embassies and agencies.104 In recent years classified docum ents
proved fear loomed among the SPDC m em bers of a possible US attack. One account
notes th at Than Shwe had ordered his subordinates to "prepare for th e w orst and hope
for the best;" in th e case of a U.S invasion, th e SPDC was ready to kill all imprisoned NLD
m em bers.105 In tru th , apart from a sense o f psychological insecurity, th e new capital city
was also built to benefit th e junta and their families w ith luxurious life.
Than Shwe used all coercive tactics to bridle any possible th re a t to his m ilitary
rule, and, in fact, m ilitary leaders rem em bered from colonial days w hen Buddhist monks
took the lead in provoking nationalistic fervor. Similarly, Buddhist Sangha once again
became a resistant force against Than Shwe's bad socio-economic policies. The SLORC
decided to bring the Buddhist Sangha's in its control, so it could avert any future
resistance. Until th e late 1980s the Buddhist Sangha's remained autonom ous, and its
members num bered almost 120,000 monks, 180,000 novices and 2 0,0 00 nuns. A
strategy was adopted to register m em bers o f Sangha's and banned any new Buddhist
Sangha organization to operate other than the nine approved by the m ilitary controlled
State Clergy Coordination C om m ittee.106 Earlier, a similar natural step was taken when
Ne W in tried to im plem ent the registration o f monks in the 1960s and faced resistance
from them . He arrested m ore than 90 monks and forcibly executed the orders.107
The other domestic challenge for Than Shwe was popular dem ocratic resistance
from NLD leaders particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, w ho was blatantly criticizing the
104 "Naypyidaw Vs. Yangon: The Reasons Behind th e Junta's Decision to Move th e Burmese Capital," 193.
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dictators over the massacre o f 1988 and deprivation from making a dem ocratic
governm ent. W ith the rise of the SLORC, Aung San Suu Kyi gained a prom inent public
role, and she referenced her father, Aung San, to gain m ore credibility. The SLORC tried
to underm ine the rule and role of her father. Pictures of her father w ere rem oved from
all buildings and a narrative constructed th a t his past political contributions w e re fo r his
own political gains and interests.108 M oreover, Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under house
arrest and hundreds o f supporters w ere tortured.
It was the beginning of the end of a garrison state, becoming instead an
authoritarian-pariah state, which violated international norms, promises, and th e will of
its people. The list of hum anitarian crimes includes countless episodes o f inhum an
tre a tm e n t by Than Shwe's despotic rule. Hundreds of people were killed through
extrajudicial murders, and hundreds o f w om en raped in fro n t of th e ir fam ilies and th eir
husbands. Suspected political opponents and ethnic minorities w ere kidnapped and
th eir m utilated and beheaded bodies dum ped w ith signs o f torture. M any body organs
w ere missing, dem onstrating the height of cruelty during th e torture. Ethnic cleansing
and millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) w ere forced to leave th e ir ancestral
roots and kept on the run in the jungles. From 1992 to 2009 around 2 10 0 political
prisoners rem ained in detention as punishm ent for raising their voices for political
rights.109
The military's governance record remains unpopular not only because it brutally
suppresses its m inority ethnicities, but also violates international norms through th e
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recruitm ent of underage soldiers. M y a n m ar is on to p ranked country in th e w orld in
terms of young children recruited in the m ilitary. M a n y of these young boys are
exploited and used in ethnic combats. According to a recent report published by The
Washington Post, the recruitm ent process has developed into corrupt inform al
enterprises in which businessmen are involved in providing young recruits to the
military. These businessmen receive a sum of $30 and a bag of rice in return for each
young recruit they provide. These poor young boys betw een the ages of 14 to 16 end up
working in m ilitary farms and forced to fight in conflict zones against arm ed rebels.
From the income of poor boys, a m ajor percentage of their salaries is also taken by
corrupt superior m ilitary ranked personnel.110 Due to their poor economic backgrounds,
the recruiters trap the young boys, and then their families never see them fo r long
periods of tim e or hardly know w hy th e ir kids have disappeared.111 These policies are a
glimpse of the heinous actions the m ilitary has been undertaking fo r decades against its
own citizens, and these actions fu rth er isolate M yanm ar from its earlier position as a
non-aligned state to a pariah state, due to ongoing actions th at go against th e standards
of global norms.
The international com m unity imposed economic sanctions against th e m ilitary
rule, which com pletely ignored promises made to its public, continuous hum an rights
violations, and the suppression of elected representatives in the post 1988 elections.
Due to a meager economic perform ance and harsh policies, the public becomes
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frustrated once again and the SPDC brutally crushed the peaceful dem onstrators in
Septem ber 2007, known as the Saffron Revolution. Persistent episodes of despotic
actions against its citizens and m inorities w e re no longer tolerable in the view of the
United Nations. The m ajority of the world com m unity condemned all actions by the
SPDC. Being fu rth er isolated, Than Shwe's annoyed regime blamed W estern countries
fo r sanctions as the cause of unrest instead o f accepting th e undem ocratic steps it had
taken against demonstrators. On O ctober 24, 2007, with th e release o f UN rem arks over
th e hum anitarian crisis, Than Shwe's regim e expelled Charles Petrie; he was head o f the
UNDP and the UN's resident Coordinator in M y a n m ar.112
The international com m unity eased th e sanctions on hum anitarian grounds due
to the annihilation caused by Cyclone Nargis in M ay 2008. Im portantly, Than Shwe and
th e SPDC realized they could not retain pow er based on violence, so a new constitution
in 2008 promised general elections. Again, th e SPDC facilitated a m ilitary-backed Union
Solidarity and Developm ent Party (USDP) and won the elections. Apparently, the 2 01 0
election allowed symbolically a transfer of m ilitary pow er to a so-called dem ocratic
governm ent. However, w ith optimism for th e openness o f a pariah state, th e new
governm ent of President Thein Sein is considered to be m oderate and reform ist, but in
reality the m ilitary retains its share of pow er in the elected parliam ent. The unknow nunknowns about civil-military relations and dem ocratic processes are yet to be explored
in the months and years to come.
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UNVEILING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GARRISON STATE
The British at one tim e referred to Zim babw e as "the jewel o f Africa and the
breadbasket of Africa;" similarly, Burma was known as "the rice bowl o f Asia."113 The
natural resources in M yanm ar have been renow ned since colonial tim es; its current
notable resources include oil, gas, minerals, gems (jade, ruby), tim ber, and teak.
M yanm ar is the largest Southeast Asia oil and gas exporter and the w orld's te n th largest
in terms of natural gas reserves. U nfortunately, this was not the case during the post
independence period; Burma became fam ous as a "beggar w ith a golden bowl" for
being rich in resources but failing to harness th e m .114 M ism anagem ent and rapid
nationalization policies by the m ilitary rulers became the core reasons fo r the country's
fragile social and political economic conditions. However, in recent years, the growing
financial potential of M yanm ar's energy sector could becom e a resource curse, as
rapidly growing economies are scrambling to obtain access to M yanm ar's energy
resources.115
57 percent of M yanm ar's economy is based on agriculture, em ploying over 70
percent of its workforce in the agricultural sector, which makes it an overw helm ingly
agro-based society. Over the years production has shown negative signs o f grow th; for
instance, rice exports fell from 8 70 ,00 0 tons in 1983 to 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 tons in 1 9 8 6 .116 To m eet
the challenges of an economic downfall, though quite late, in 2003 the Burmese
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governm ent form ally announced the liberation of th e rice sector. H ow ever, th e rice
trade was still under indirect state control and was unable to achieve its targ et to revive
its image as the "rice bowl of Asia." Indeed it was the result o f com plete negligence of
th e agriculture sector; the governm ent failed to provide fertilizers to farm ers and
offered no incentives to farm ers, such as agricultural loans and proper irrigation
systems, as m ore than 80 percent of agricultural land lacks an irrigational structure.117
The deficient policies became clear a fte r th e 1962 m ilitary coup. Previously,
M yanm ar benefitted from the Cold W ar's bipolar engagements, owing to its non-aligned
m ovem ent strategy. In a way, M yanm ar succeeded in securing funds and projects both
from the U.S. and the form er Soviet Union. How ever, in the post 1962 m ilitary period,
M yanm ar inclined towards China for economic support as it became isolated from th e
rest of the world due to the aforem entioned anti-dem ocratic steps. For a brief m om ent
during the late 1960s, China and M yanm ar developed some rough diplom atic relations
as a result of anti-Chinese riots, which broke out in June 1967 across M yanm ar. China
blamed the Burmese Governm ent for indirectly supporting the popular uprising th a t
targeted Chinese nationals, which helped the m ilitary rulers support Burmese
nationalism and also successfully divert popular attention from its economic failure
w ithin M yanm ar.118
Starting in 1962, Ne W in adopted a rapid nationalization process and advocated
th e notion of Burmanization. In contrast, Gen. Aung Gyi, w ho was M inister fo r trade and
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industry, was not in favor o f the rapid nationalization of firm s. He was purged in
February 1963 due to the military's internal pow er struggle and lobbying, mainly
because of his disagreements with Ba Nyein and Tin Pe's economic proposals. Tin Pe as
new minister of com m erce was catastrophic at facilitating a rapid nationalization
process and had unfriendly policies towards foreign business nationals. Overall, Ne
W in's nationalizations led to a systemic destruction of the private sector, as an
estim ated 15,000 firms, including heavy industries and banking, w ere nationalized. This
also resulted in the takeover o f foreign businesses, and the exodus of over 2 0 0 ,0 0 0
Indians, largely from the business com m unity.119
The impact was severe. The nationalization process broke the backbone of the
economy, and Ne W in sensed the gradual growing frustration among the people. To
curb economic problems, the m ilitary occasionally abolished banknotes and introduced
new ones to artificially retain its value closer to the US dollar. The popular 1988 protest
th at broke out all over the country, leading to Ne W in's forceful resignation, was
actually a result of economic frustrations, not dem ocratic change. On S eptem ber 5
1987, the governm ent suddenly announced the abolition of the 75-, 35-, and 25- Kyat
banknotes in order to punish merchants for their undue profits and control the
circulating currency in the black m arket. The dem onetization happened before in M ay
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1964 and in N ovem ber 1985 as w ell, but each tim e th e people were given a grace period
to exchange the soon-to-be cancelled currency for other bills.120
By late 1980 Burma faced an acute financial crunch w ith a staggering d eb t of
US$3.5 billion and only US$ 20 to 30 million in currency reserves. The UN Economic and
Social Council stepped in and declared M yanm ar's status as a Least Developed Country
(LDC). The reaction to economic fallout was seen during 1988's massive protest to
demand a fix for the economy. Though Ne W in's brutal retaliation tried to suppress the
protestors, the mass mobilization forced the Burmese governm ent to pass Foreign
Investm ent Law (FLI) in Novem ber 1988, which eventually opened its m arket to outside
investors. Retired Gen Aung Gyi openly criticized the flaws o f Ne W in's socialist policies
under "Burmese W ay to Socialism" as the cause of economic failure.121 If w e com pare
the overall economic perform ance o f M yanm ar, statistics show that the econom y grew
m ore during the period of parliam entary dem ocracy (1948-1962) w ith a rate of 5.3
percent per year, w hile during Ne W in's socialist period (1962-1988) the econom y grew
at a rate o f 3.5 percent a year.122
The post-1988 period was expected to be a phase fo r setting up a dem ocratic
parliam entary system, which could help fix the economic fallouts from m ilitary rule. On
the contrary, the military, under the um brella of the SLORC/ SPDC, took over pow er. The
economy rem ained heavily reliant on aid money, the heroin industry's contribution
towards sustaining the economy, and m ore recently, the revenues from the energy
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sector. SPDC rule in some ways tried to shift th e country's heavy reliance on an illegal
means of economic gains towards opening up the m arket to attract foreign direct
investm ent (FDI), particularly in M yanm ar's rich energy sector. Despite an a tte m p t to
revive economic activities under SPDC during 2 003-2005 through FDI in energy sector,
the sh o rtfall rem ained betw een revenues and governm ent overspending. In addition,
to evaluate the perform ance of the regim e throughout th e military's rule fro m 1962 to
2010 rem ained a daunting challenge because the inform ation made public by regime is
biased, showing a lack of an accountable and transparent system th a t can provide an
independent report. In other words, Burma's m ilitary has not published data on its
overall fiscal position since 1 99 9 /2 0 00 ; it has only published tax data, but no data about
governm ent spending.123 Even when th e re is any data made available to the public, it is
either artificially created to mislead or hides the actual inform ation.
Jared Bissinger (2012) has conducted thorough research on FDIs in M yan m ar
from 1988 to 2011. The statistical explanation of his research expounds th a t during this
period M yanm ar succeeded in attracting US$36 billion in approved investm ents for 445
projects. Out of the US$36 billion, almost US$ 20 billion alone was approved for 25
megaprojects during fiscal year 2010-2011. In comparison, this means prior to 20102011 the total approved FDI since 1988 was US$16 billion and much of this, almost US
$6 billion, was approved for the construction of the Tasang Dam.124 A higher percentage

123 Turnell, "Burma's Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Voracious State," 212.
124 The Tasang Dam almost 300 miles northeast of Rangoon will be first dam on th e Salween River (Largest
dam in M yanm ar and tallest in Southeast Asia) and is planned to be completed by 2020. Thailand's M DX
Group is the m ajor investor of this multi-billion dollar project, which will cost US $6 billion. A fter
completion, 85% o f hydro-electricity is planned to export to Thailand as par initially understanding.
Though planned in 1990s and inaugurated in 2007, the project was delayed for various political reasons.
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of the remaining investm ent was approved for projects during the m id-1990s, including
the first natural gas exploration at th e Yadana gas fields in th e Andaman Sea.125
At the m om ent, most o f the economic gains are projected because of the higher
rate of investm ent in energy sector. Specifically, since early 2000 M y a n m ar has
increased the exploration of oil and gas resources. In fact, in addition to the noted US$
20 billion FDI approved for 2010-2011, betw een 2004 and 2007 M y a n m ar also attracted
a m oderate am ount of FDI (US$ 3.24 billion) for its energy sector. Since 2000, M yanm ar
has signed agreem ents w ith th irteen countries, including Russia, China, India, South
Korea, France, and the U.S.126 M ost of these agreem ents w ere initiated betw een th e
national oil company, M yanm ar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and Total Oil (France),
Unocal (US), PTT Exploration and Production (PTTE, Thailand), Premier Oil (UK), Nippon
Oil (Japan), Petronas (M alaysia), and o th er Chinese and Indian national oil and gas
companies.
Ostensibly, from 1988 to 2011, th e approved FDI and increased rates in trade
show impressive economic gains. But, in actuality, the num ber is low er fo r the 1990s.
Numerous political and economic events contributed towards M yanm ar receiving low
FDI. A fter the events of 1988, it was expected th a t Gen Maung, then chairm an o f the
SLORC, would transfer power to parliam ent. Instead, he was deposed. In the w ake of
the m ilitary retaking power under Than Shwe, foreign investors w ere discouraged. The
SLORC gained some confidence to a ttra ct FDI, but unfortunately 1997's Asian financial

125 Jared Bissinger, "Foreign Investment in M yanm ar: A Resource Boom but a D evelopm ent Bust?,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal o f International and Strategic Affairs 34, no. 1 (April 2012): 27-28.
126 Steinberg and Fan, Modern C hina-M yanm ar Relations : Dilemmas o f M u tu a l Dependence, 167.
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crisis, along with US investm ent sanctions, drastically affected the investm ent plans.
W hen auditing the overall economic perform ance o f M yanm ar, a researcher
usually encounters tw o data sets, one provided by the m ilitary regime and the second
by international financial or research institutions. G reat discrepancies exist in both data.
M ilitary authority under th e SPDC claimed th a t GDP under its rule rem ained in excess of
10 percent a year. In February 2006, M yanm ar's M inister o f National Planning and
Economic Developm ent, Soe Tha, announced th at his country's growth rate for 2005
would be 12.2 per cent. Turnell Sean contradicts th e claim o f above 10 percent for a
decade long period. Sean argues rather th a t, if this was th e case, then M y an m ar should
have been considered the fastest and most consistently growing econom y of the world;
in contrast, it is considered to be a LDC w ith a highly m alfunctioning economic
society.127 Turnell Sean fu rth er presented tw o sets of statistical inform ation for each
year th a t explains the growth rate from 2 00 0 to 2006. As p e r official data provided by
th e SPDC, the grow th rate in the follow ing years are; 1 999(10.9 %), 2000 (13.7 %),
2001(11.3% ), 2002(10.0% ), 2003(10.6% ), 2004(12.0% ), 2005(12.2% ), w hile in contrast,
th e actual growth estim ate suggests th a t the GDP growth in the follow ing years was
2001 (5.3%), 2002(5.3% ), 2 0 0 3 (-2 .0 % ), 2 0 0 4 (-2 .7 % ), 2005(3.7% ), 2006(1.8% ). The data
shows a clear difference betw een official data provided by the SPDC and actual data,
making it an existing inform ation hole p atent in th e country's system.128
Referring to M yanm ar's rich resources and poor economic policies from m ilitary
rule th at closed th e doors of official trade w ith most of th e world raises the question:

127 Turnell, "Myanmar's Economy in 2006," 108.
128 "Myanmar's Economy in 2006," 110-11.
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how did the m ilitary rulers manage to sustain a fragile econom y and its adm inistrative
machinery? On reasonable grounds, it can be argued th a t th e m eager foreign aid and
m inim um rate o f economic growth was indirectly supported through illicit trade and a
narco economy. M ost illicit trade in M yanm ar is concentrated in areas controlled by
arm ed groups, areas th a t are facing a governance vacuum. The vacuum and chaos is
sometimes lucrative for th e "survival o f [a] w eak and unaccountable state may w ell be
enhanced by its ability to capture or profit from illicit econom ies."129 In this regard, the
illicit narco econom y played a crucial role in funding a continuous w a r w ith various
arm ed groups and also supported M yanm ar's economic needs. M yanm ar is the world's
second largest illegal opium producer a fte r Afghanistan. The famous golden triangle
betw een Laos, M yanm ar, and Thailand is the main source o f illegal drug trafficking,
becoming a significant economic activity for the m ilitary in M yanm ar. At the same tim e,
the illicit trade and inform al economies also contributed to the country's social and
economic failu re.130
Shan state, Kachin hill, and W a hills are som e popular areas th a t are involved in
the poppy trade. In 1989 1.6 kg of opium packets w ere sold for 9600 kyats ($ 1 00 0
exchange rate in 1989). Villagers sold opium to Chinese traders, and most of Kachin
opium goes to M yitkiyina and into fu rth er southern areas fo r refinery, as Kachin areas
lack morphine factories or heroin refineries. In fact, Kokang and W a opium goes to Shan
state refineries like Mong Ko, M ong Horn, Nam Kyaun, Kunlong, and Kang M ong, then is

129 Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era o f Softened
Sovereignty, 187.
130 Bradley Babson, "M yanm ar and North Korea: Inform ality in Asia's Pariah States," SAIS Review 21, no. 1
(2001): 90.
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transported to M andalay and Hong Kong. In addition, some of the W a and most of the
Akha and Lahu opium are refined in Shan state sent to Hong Kong and Thailand.131
A similar pattern, as noticed earlier regarding economic growth data, is the little
reliable data th a t exists about the drug production. For instance, th e official Burmese
governm ent's estim ate of 247 tons of drug production in 1989-90 was less than w hat
th e U.S governm ent estim ated o f 2,350 tons for 1 9 9 0 -9 1 .132 As argued previously,
M yanm ar was an inform ation vacuum for decades in which military rule com pletely
isolated and reported fabricated inform ation to hide the tru th . Regarding drug
production, it was obvious th at drug production and trade was a w orldw ide illegal
activity, and m ilitary rule never w anted to reflect an image th a t one of its main
economic resources relied on the drug economy until the late 1990s.
Historical lessons from colonial tim es served M yanm ar's m ilitary rulers
specifically when th e British opium trade was established to meet the financial
difficulties of British rule, which as a result led to th e Opium W ar of 1 8 3 9 -1 84 2 (in which
China had to pay indemnities equal to US $ 21 million and ceded Hong Kong Island as
penalty) and the Arrow W a r of 1 856-1858 (in which the British forced China to legalize
th e opium tra d e ).133 British policies of using opium trade as a lucrative business to
support its foreign expenses w ere historical examples for economic rem edies, in a tim e
when m ilitary rulers were in isolation creating a pariah state promising its people an

131 Ko-Lin Chin, The Golden Triangle : Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2009), 86; Tucker, B u rm a : The Curse o f Independence, 160-61.
132 Ronald D. Renard, The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs an d the M aking o f the Golden Triangle,
Studies on th e Impact o f the Illegal Drug Trade (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3.
133 The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs and the M aking o f th e Golden Triangle, Studies on th e Impact
o f the Illegal Drug Trade (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1996), 18.
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ideal economic and peaceful society under m ilitary rule.
Not only did the m ilitary rely on getting perks and revenues from drug
production and trade, in fact, m any ethnic armed groups relied on opium tra d e to fund
th eir w ar with Tatm adaw . On many occasions Tatm adaw also encouraged its favorable
rebel groups to become part of a counter strategy against rival arm ed groups. Therefore
Tatm adaw supported and encouraged W a rebels, and other armed groups, including
defectors from Communist Party o f Burma (CPB), to produce more opium and ship it to
the North American continent.134
Drug production and its trade was controlled and operated through drug lords,
some o f whom w ere rivals to th e m ilitary and some whom w ere under the protection of
governm ent institutions. Among many drug lords, a few , such as Khun Sa (a CPB leader,
drug lord, w ho fought against th e m ilitary and lost thousands of his m en in fights until
1996, when he surrendered to th e governm ent), W ei Xuegang (in 1998, th e U.S.
Governm ent announced US $2 million on his arrest), and Lo Hsin Han kingpin (who
recently died (2013) as one of biggest business tycoons of th e region) gained high
ranking in the drug and heroin traffic in Southeast Asia.135
The Burmese governm ent shielded these drug lords and facilitated drug m oney
laundering. The money in many ways was channeled to state projects and international

134 The Burmese Connection : Illegal Drugs and the M aking o f the Golden Triangle, 69.
135 Chin, The Golden Triangle : Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade, 89-91.
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dealings. According to M onique Skidmore, MOGE is mainly used for m oney laundering
of revenues earned from the drug tra d e .136 Skidmore fu rth e r explains that:
In a deal signed w ith the French oil Giant Total in 1992, and later joined by
Unocol, MOGE received a paym ent o f US$15 million. Despite the fact th a t MOGE
has no assets besides the lim ited installm ents of its foreign partners and makes
no profit, and th a t the Burmese state never had th e capacity to allocate any
currency credit to MOGE, the Singapore bank accounts of this com pany have
seen the transfer o f hundreds of millions o f US dollars...Funds exceeding
US$60million and originating from Burma's most renowned drug lord, Khun Sa,
w ere channeled through the company. Drug m oney is irrigating every economic
activity in Burma ... and big foreign partners are also seen by the SLORC as big
shields fo r money laundering."137
M yanm ar governm ent officials always denied the fact that th e re was any
governm ent involvem ent in the drug business and claimed to not support any drug
lords. However, popular drug lord Lo Hsin Han, a kingpin, received protection from
Burma's m ilitary for helping them in repelling the CPB during a decisive fight at Kunlong
Bridge, gaining th e trust of the m ilitary. His drug convoys w ere given protection, and the
m ilitary got th e ir share from the partnership too. In 1973 th e Thai police arrested him,
and the U.S. declared a great victory against the drug w ar. The Thai governm ent handed
him over to Burmese authorities; Lo Hsin Han was pardoned, and the M yanm ar
governm ent instead facilitated his narcotics business.138 He became a core security
operator against an arm ed CPB faction, so the m ilitary benefitted in tw o ways, first by
getting money, and second, crushing CPB fighters.

136 M onique Skidmore, Karaoke Fascism : Burma and the Politics o f F ear (Philadelphia: University of
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In response to the illicit trade, th e U.S. rem ained on th e forefront to curb th e
menace of the drug trade through UN agencies vis-a-vis offering M yanm ar direct
assistance. Interestingly, over th e years the persistent political events in M y a n m a r have
also softened U.S behavior towards M yanm ar. Shelby Tucker observed the follow ing
tw o statem ents w ere contradictory and in a w ay tried to exonerate the M yan m ar
m ilitary for not being responsible of any illicit drug trade. For instance, in 1996 President
Bill Clinton vehem ently expressed th a t "the role of drug[s] in Burma's economic and
political life and the regime's refusal to honour its pledge to move to m ultiparty
democracy are really tw o sides of the same coin, for both represents the absence o f the
rule of law ."139 Yet in 1999 the U.S D epartm ent of State's Bureau fo r International
Narcotics reported th a t "there are persistent and reliable reports th a t officials,
particularly corrupt army personnel posted in outlying areas, are either involved in the
drug business or paid to allow the drug business to be conducted by others," which
means some corrupt individuals are involved, w hile the Burmese governm ent is not
involved in the drug tra d e .140
There are several reasons th a t support the idea of th e Burmese governm ent
under the m ilitary rule's being involved into the narco economy. Primarily, the Burmese
governm ent rem ained comprised of m ilitary officers, and th e same m ilitary officers are
responsible for enforcem ent o f anti-drug laws. M ilitary officers get a share in drug
revenue, and more im portantly, revenue is required for th e military institution to fight

139 Burma : The Curse o f Independence, 179.
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its decades long rebel conflict.141 A m ore im portant a rgum ent to evaluate th e Burmese
governm ent's involvem ent can be m ade considering the country's staggering economic
conditions and the governm ent's overspending on modernizing its m ilitary and o th er
expenditures, which certainly needed investm ent. M yanm ar, by and large, used hard
currency earned from the narcotics trade for dom estic and foreign procurem ents. By
the late 1980s, m ore than 90 percent o f M yanm ar's revenue was absorbed by foreign
debt, and it requested the status of LDC, which the UN generously aw arded to protect it
from further worsening its economic conditions. Soon a fte r gaining LDC status, th e IMF
reported that the foreign exchange reserves w ere below US$30 million, which w ere
insufficient to pay for one month's im ports.142
Still under acute economic pressure, the Burmese governm ent planned to spend
extravagantly over the next decade. W ith a planned procurem ent o f "approxim ately
US$2 billion," M yanm ar initially purchased weapons w orth US$ 20 million fro m 1988 to
1997 and only $280 million in 1997. In addition the num ber of military "personnel
increased from 200 ,00 0 in 1988 to 2 70 ,00 0 by 1992 with target of 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 and by 2007
reached 4 00 ,0 0 0 ."143 The defense spending of M yan m ar during fiscal year 199 1 -9 2 was
30.8 percent to 39.9 percent (3.4 percent of GDP) o f the state budget, w hile David
Steinberg has noted th a t it was around 50 percent of the annual budget. Similarly in
1997-98 the governm ent allocated 31.6 percent of annual budget in defense
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spending.144 O ther big spending was recorded during the shift from th e old capital
Yangon to the newly constructed capital Naypyidaw, which absorbed huge investm ents
to plan, develop, and construct an entirely new city as a capital. In addition, in 2006
th e re was a dram atic increase in th e salaries of civil servants and m ilitary officers from
500 percent to 1,200 per cent during a high-inflation econom y.145
Finally, Tatm adaw was also found connected to an incident in which it persuaded
and facilitated local farm ers and even forced laborers "to grow opium instead of rice
and beans and m ilitary guarding th e routes leading to both the family's and th e UWSA's
(United W a State Army) refineries in the Doi Sam Sao, Soi Loilem and Doi M ak-on hills
and Nam Yawn valley."146 Recent revelations from W a governm ent docum ents prove
th a t from 1990 to 1994 the local population was encouraged to cultivate poppy and
become involved in the business o f heroin refineries. The governm ent collected 6
million Yuan (US $ 730,000) tax from these refineries and some total 30 million Yuan (US
$ 3.6 million) during the 1990-94 period. Due to state encouragem ent and th e booming
of the drug industry, the price of opium skyrocketed, a joi or viss147 o f opium priced at
1,000 Yuan ($120) in 1993 soared to 4 ,0 0 0 Yuan (US$ 484) in 1994.148 All these reasons
help develop a strong linkage betw een drug production and trade under the secret
supervision of the Burmese governm ent.
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To curb the challenges of drug trafficking, fro m 1989 to 1992 th e UN took the
lead in form ing a sub-regional arrangem ent betw een China, Thailand, and Burma to
adopt strict measures to curtail the drug trafficking and production. Initially the
discussion was carried out betw een th e United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(UNFDAC) and the Burmese governm ent. Later, from 1992 onward, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDCP) and the three governm ents adopted a sub-regional
strategy, including reducing trafficking in drugs and chemicals, elim inating opium
cultivation at border areas through economic and social reforms, incentives to the local
population, and reducing dem and and consumption of drugs in affected areas.149 To
eradicate opium production, in 2001 veterans of th e Office o f Strategic Services (OSS101), who lived in Burma's Kachin areas during the Second World W a r, launched Project
Old Soldier (POS), a gesture of thanks to the Kachin people fo r their service during th e
w ar. The US congress appropriated funds for the veterans o f OSS-101, w ho volunteered
to train the local population to substitute poppy fo r cash crops, so th e m enace o f poppy
cultivation could be replaced with agro-products and provide a viable economic base for
the local com m unity. Tatm adaw was not com fortable w ith th e project; in fact, a num ber
o f Kachin locals w ho w ere supervising the project w ere killed.150 This entire discussion
dem onstrates how over the decades the Burmese m ilitary's rule over a garrison state
isolated the country from the global com m unity and heavily engaged in illicit political
and economic activities.
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A booming energy sector and th e recent lifting o f US sanctions helped M yan m ar
to concentrate on licit avenues of trade. The SPDC's signal to open up its m arket and
promise to hold elections accelerated trade activities and built some trust w ith foreign
investors. So far tw o countries, China and Thailand, control 75 percent o f M yanm ar's
economy, follow ed by Singapore and India. Fiscal year 2 0 1 3 /2 0 1 4 has reached a record
high total trade volum e of nearly US$ 16 billion. According to official figures, in the first
9 months of the 2013 fiscal year, trade volum e has reached US$ 15.92 billion th a t is US$
3.65 billion more than last year's trade volum e. Overall, M yanm ar is expecting to m eet
its target of US $ 25 billion in FY 2 0 1 3 /1 4 (20% from border trade, w hile 80% from
overseas tra d e ).151
In sum, the history of M yanm ar's political econom y provides evidence of a
w ealthy past and the gloomy phase of ultra-poverty the country has endured under
m ilitary rule since 1962. M ilitary rule initially focused m ore on the exploitation o f tim b er
and teak, with no efforts tow ards its m anagem ent and conservation. U nfortunately, a
great resource was pushed towards decay and rapid deforestation. M any border
communities, like Kachin, lam ent the loss of their resources with no gains, w hile the
m ilitary engaged in misuse of resources and illegal trade. Similarly, th e nationalization
process harmed banking and the mining and energy sector. Despite all, recent economic
gains have shown some promising outcomes. Still, the remnants of the old chronic
political economy is in need of fixing w ithin an institutional fram ew ork, so it can
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contribute effectively towards economic developm ent o f th e entire society as well as its
integration into the region.

SOCIETAL DIVIDES ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DOMAINS: POLICIES OF
ACCOMODATION, ASSIMILATION, OR EXCLUSION
Ethnic Burmans, or Bama, residing mainly on the mainland of th e country,
prim arily dom inate the Union of M yanm ar, while eight m ain other ethnic m inority
groups can be fu rth er divided into 135 sub-groups. The general belief th a t diversity is
strength has proven to be a bad augury for the Union of M yanm ar's nation-building
process since 1948. During independence in 1948, statistical composition records
estim ated Burmans/ Bama at 65-69 %, the Shan at 8.5 to 10 %, Karen 6.2% , Arakanese
4.5 %, M on 2.4 %, Chin 2.2 % Kachin 1.4%, and W a at 1.4%, while th e 1983 consensus
projected the same numbers as recorded in 1 94 8 .152
The ethnic minorities in opposition reject this classification because they believe
it repudiates the existence of many other ethnicities, so categorization on the basis of
ethnic state is not acceptable.153 To note, a num ber of M yanm ar's ethnicities have
trans-border ethnic kinships in neighboring countries, for example, substantial "M o n ,
Karen and Shan communities live in Thailand; Naga and Chin live in India; Kachin
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(Jingpaw) can be found in India (Singpho) and in China (Jingpho)."154These ethnic
groups are also in m inority status in neighboring countries becoming a convenient
source to be exploited by opposing regimes on both sides o f the border for political
gains.
The earlier sections discussed in detail the historical period during and after
colonial tim es, which outlined the military's ventures against its own people in violating
th e ir basic political and human rights. Therefore, since independence, political unrest
has remained a persistent characteristic of M yanm ar's political landscape. M y an m ar has
tw o dimensions of socio-political unrest, first, ethnic m inorities fighting the center
(Naypyidaw) for greater autonom y, and second, Muslim-Buddhist clashes due to
historical grievances.
As noted before, ethnic-m inority grievances started before and a fte r the
Panglong agreem ent. In fact, before the Panglong agreem ent, ethnic leaders from
Kachin, Karen, and Muslims o f Arakan, whom supported th e British w ar against
Japanese occupation during 1942-1945, w ere certain th at "when the w ar ended th e
British would reward th e ir loyalty, granting them independence from Burm a."155 Issues
of ethno-religious strife in M yanm ar have simultaneously accomm odated, assimilated,
and excluded a num ber o f ethnic groups during th e nation building process; similar
patterns remained in practice before the independence o f the country. In the post-
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independence period, M yanm ar failed to develop a pluralistic and inclusive policy
tow ards each single com m unity living in th e country.
The seeds of divide and rule w ere obviously sown during colonial tim es when
British rule facilitated immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and China to take over
office and business jobs. Also, statistical data quoted about colonial tim es indicates
security personnel in higher percentages belonged to m inority ethnic groups. One o f the
reasons for Burman exclusion was British distrust due to th e Burmese resistance. The
Burmans w ere irked for being segregated w hile o th e r ethnicities actively w orked fo r the
British; this made minorities concentrate pow er against th e m ajority.156 Soon after their
independence, the m inority ethnic groups, i.e. Karens, M ons, Kachins, Muslim
M ujahideen from Arkan/Rakhine State and the CPB, lost administrative powers and
started an armed struggle.
The situation becam e worse when the m ilitary regim e under Ne W in adopted
th e policies of Burmanization forcing thousands o f ethnic minorities to flee or being
forcibly expelled.157 Similarly, a fte r Ne W in's resignation, th e brutal era of Gen Than
Shwe during the 1990s focused on reinventing Burman history, and other ethnicities
became victims within their own land. That Tatm adaw under Than Shwe used brutal and
destructive policies against other ethnicities was no surprise. Than Shwe, as noted
earlier, was inspired by reviving the glorious past o f Burman kings. King Bayinnaung was
his main inspiration, among others. King Bayinnaung, w ho ruled five hundred years ago,
engaged in relentless, brutal w ar and destruction to unify th e peripheral areas from
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neighboring powers. Comparing the 5 0 0 year old repressive policies o f King Bayinnaung,
Benedict Rogers has quoted Thant M yint, w ho explains th a t "the Burmese arm y still
sees itself, in [a] way, as fighting the same enem ies and in th e same places, subjugating
th e Shan hills or crushing M on resistance in the South, their soldiers slugging th e ir w ay
through the same thick jungle, preparing to torch a tow n or press-gang villagers. His
(Bayinnaung's) statues are th e re because the ordeal of welding a nation to g e th e r by
force is not just history."158
As a result of harsh state driven policies against ethnic minorities from 1962 until
now, thousands from m inority groups w ere forced to m igrate to neighboring countries
and w ere internally displaced due to fear of execution. 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 ethnic Indians w ere
forced to leave the country under Gen Ne W in's rule in 1964. No com pensation was
given to families w ho had lived in M yanm ar fo r generations when th e y w ere
uprooted.159 Similarly, m ore than 100,000 Burmese-Chinese left Burma under Ne W in's
rule, and in a recent a tte m p t to take control of the Kokang m inority area, T atm ad aw
forced 3 5,000 refugees to flee to China.160 Since 1988 m ilitary actions under Gen Than
Shwe, "refugees belonging to the Karen, the Shan, th e Karenni, the Kachin, th e W ah, the
Rohingyas, and other ethnic groups o f Burma, M on refugees are am ong the m ore than
300.000 people who have fled Burm a."161 a recent report noted the miseries of around
130.000 Karens on the Thai border w here refugees have been in need o f urgent
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humanitarian attention to be accom m odated and reintegrated in society.162 During
these armed struggles thousands of people w ere killed, and a recent estim ation
emphasized th a t around 4 0,0 00 arm ed troops of various ethnic groups replicate a
situation of a "contained balkanization" in Burma, in which armed conflict could resume
at any m om ent.163
W ith th e help of G overnm ent Organized NGO (GONGO), the M y a n m ar Peace
Center moved to broker peace w ith the rebels. In 1989 and the following years, various
ethnic armed groups agreed for a tem porary ceasefire agreem ent betw een the m ilitary
and different ethnic groups. The ceasefire agreem ent allowed the arm ed rebels to keep
their arms and autonom y over th e ir region. It also provided an option fo r those arm ed
groups to facilitate developm ent and economic activity in case of surrendering th e ir
weapons. Despite the ceasefire, so far th e governm ent has failed to reach any political
settlem ent with th e ethnic groups. Arm ed groups also w an ted clarification over the
terms and definitions of a rebel, because there are many ethnicities w ho do not seek
independence, but rather seek a federal system th a t ensures the basic rights of citizens,
the autonom y of the area, and an assurance for th e due ownership rights over natural
resources in th e ir jurisdiction, which are being forcefully depleted under governm ents
supervision.164 A fter all, there is still a lack of trust o f the military.

162 M ark Fenn, "Life Gets Harder on Thai-M yanm ar Border," The D iplom at December 2, 2013.
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A part from ethnic conflicts, episodes o f religious clashes betw een Muslims and
Buddhists have been aggravated since 2012. Alm ost 80 percent of th e population in
M yanm ar follows Buddhism in comparison to 4 percent o f those follow ing Islam. M o st
Muslims are settled in the A rakan/ Rakhine State; how ever, there are small percentages
living in central M yanm ar or parts elsewhere. Two prom inent Muslim ethnic groups are
the Kaman and Rohingyas.165 In N ovem ber 2013, an angry Buddhist m ob attacked a
Muslim village and stabbed a 94-year-old, paralyzed old lady, which saddened many
inside and outside M yanm ar.166
A history of communal clashes existed prior to M yanm ar's existence and even
before colonial rule. However, hatred intensified in the 1920s-1930s, w hen British rule
encouraged immigrants from the sub-continent. Frustrated with low economic
incentives for local Burmans, anti-Indian and anti-M uslim resentm ent existed among
Burmans. This resentm ent was manifested in nationalist policies of th e 1940s and 1960s
which forced Indians to leave. Burmans used term s Kala (from "Kula" in Burmese for
"foreigner" and in hindi/ urdu same "kala" is called for "black").167 Burmans also knew
th at most of the Muslims came from Chittagong to seek w ork and Arakan w om en , w ho

165 Kaman means bow, settled in 1660 along w ith Mugul Prince Shah Shuja, who escaped following defeat
during a pow er struggle and served as special archer's unit to Arakan's king, in past, most of Kaman
remained settled Ramree Island. Rohingya are also known as Rohiga or Roewengya, settld mostly in
Northern Arakan. 1960's the total population of Rohingyas was estim ated 300,000 and mostly Burmese
consider them illegal immigrants, instead call them Bengali and reject to hold th e m w ith th e ir identity.
See Yegar, Between Integration and Secession : The Muslim Communities o f the Southern Philippines,
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later assimilated into the local cultures.168 During th e nationalist struggle against
colonial rule, Buddhist nationalists also spread anti-Indian and anti-M uslim slogans to
encourage foreign immigrants to leave; th e popular slogans strongly propagated th a t
these foreigners are "exploiting our economic resources and seizing our w om en , [and]
w e are in danger of racial extinction." Subsequently, in July 1938, hundreds o f Indians
w e re killed during the riots, which occurred in Yangon.169 In addition, M uslim s from
A rakan/ Rakhine supported British forces, w hile Buddhists supported the Japanese,
which forced Muslims to leave Southern Arakan and to settle in the north, w ith a similar
m ovem ent by the Buddhist population towards th e South. In a way, a divided A ra ka n /
Rakhine was carved in the 1940s.170
Recent observations show th a t the Muslim -Buddhist clashes have acquired a
transnational nature. For exam ple, Buddhists felt angry w h e n the Taliban destroyed th e
Buddha statue in Bhamiyan in Afghanistan, and th e y began to target Muslims in central
M yan m ar.171 Similarly, in response to 2012's Buddhist attacks, in M ay 2013, Indonesian
police foiled a plot by Islamists planning to bomb th e M yanm ar embassy in Jakarta, and
in July 2013, Islamists w ere blamed for bombing Bodh Gaya, one o f th e revered sites of
Buddhism in India.172
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Islamophobia is rapidly growing among Buddhists, w h o believe th a t the M uslim
population is growing fast in contrast to a decline in the population grow th o f Burmans.
A general tendency found among Buddhists is th a t a rapid increase in the M uslim
population would help the Islamic jihadists from surrounding countries to take over
M yanm ar. The Head of the Rakhine State has asked Muslim s to reduce th e ir population
growth by limiting to tw o children. In this regard, Buddhist monks have initiated a
number's campaign called the "969" m ovem ent.173 The 9 6 9 campaign is led by
prom inent Buddhist monks like W irathu and W im ala spreading similar messages as
observed during the 1930s anti-Indian m ovem ent. These claims include the idea o f a
Muslim population's plan to take over the country w ith th e help of jihadi infiltrators,
seeking to get Buddhist w om en through marriage and then converting Buddhist w om en
into Islam. To denounce the plot, the 969 m ovem ent is trying to strengthen Buddhist
identity and practices by asking Burmans for a socio-economic boycott o f Muslims and
by demanding for laws to restrict inter-faith m arriage.174
Growing fear has intensified tensions, and fre q u e n t attacks and counter attacks
have no longer stayed limited towards Rohingyas. O ther Muslim ethnic groups and
mosques are being targeted, and similarly many Buddhists are killed and th e ir places of
worship burnt. In response to these events, and due to growing global pressure,

173 The 969 m ovem ent is started to counter the growing Muslim population in M yanm ar. Muslims use a
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every Buddhist to place this num ber on th eir shops to identify them . The number campaign has severely
affected the business of Muslims and made them feel isolated in th eir own country. The philosophy
behind th e 969 numbers is 9 attributes o f Buddha, 6 attributes to Dham m a means Buddha's teaching and
9 attributes to Buddhist Sangha.
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President Thein Sein on August 17, 2012 established an investigation commission, which
included representatives from all parties. The commission's report includes some
controversial aspects, particularly "the rep o rt [that] included the fact th a t it declined to
use the te rm Rohingya, instead adopting th e governm ent usage Bengali," which denies
Rohingyas to claim their identity and recognition in th e country.175
The prolonged ethno-nationalistic conflicts tem porarily came to a halt w hen the
military regime struck a deal with th e core 17-arm ed groups in 1989. Despite th e
ceasefire agreements, the events of O ctober 2012 show th a t the m ilitary is still actively
fighting the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) m ilitary wing o f the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO), civil unrest betw een Rohingya Muslims and Buddhist in A ra ka n /
Rakhine State is allegedly backed by governm ent forces, and there is ongoing conflict
betw een m inority groups o f the Shan, Lahu, and Karen State with th e governm ent
forces. There are a num ber of criticisms, doubts, and questions which still rem ain
unanswered. The Tatm adaw reacted quickly in response to the Saffron revolution w hen
monks peacefully protested against price hikes and bad economic conditions in 2007,
resulting in the m ilitary using brutal force to suppress protestors. Surprisingly, th e
military did not bother to take any action against those involved in religious riots. In
fact, it creates doubt that eith er religious riots do not directly threaten the m ilitary's
interests, or the m ilitary itself remains silent to derail the nascent dem ocratic transition.
In addition, Nobel Peace Laureate Aung Sang Suu kyi's silence over religious clashes has
raised many questions th a t either she has made a compromise with th e m ilitary to save
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th e democratic transition, or she is seeking a constitutional am endm ent to run for
presidency. According to th e new constitution, the m ilitary still retains 25 percent of
reserved seats in legislation, and her eligibility is linked w ith the m ilitary's consent to
am end the constitution, so she can run for presidential elections.
W ith o u t creating a new political landscape tow ards the inclusive and pluralistic
nature of federative systems of union, it will be hard to foresee a long-term stability. An
unstable M yanm ar will have severe transnational effects, as some glimpses o f the
religious effects noted previously can already be observed.

GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF EAST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
There is no doubt about the significance and geographical pivot-ness of
M yanm ar in the Asian continent, and w ith rising economies such as China and India, the
fu tu re geopolitical impact of M y a n m ar gains a higher profile in global politics. M yanm ar
is on a junction to provide a continental gatew ay fo r China and India due to its location
at a junction th a t provides a land bridge to East, South, Southeast Asia, and an unbridled
coastline along the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. In retrospect, during the
colonial period, M yanm ar was a key geographical unit for British rule to use as a shield
against French colonizers reaching fu rth er tow ards the Indian sub-continent, as the
French w ere enjoying the suzerainty over th e Indo-China area. In addition, M y an m ar
helped allied forces during the Second W orld W ar in defeating the Japanese forces.
Apart from the geopolitical im portance of M yan m ar in contem porary politics, it
is an abandoned country w ith valuable natural resources. M yanm ar is blessed w ith large
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oil and gas resources in the region along w ith gems, teak, and mineral resources.
Regional in flu e n tia l like China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other neighbors,
including Thailand and Bangladesh, are vigilant tow ards th e resources in M yanm ar.
M oreover, most of these countries are engaged in com petition to gain influence over
M yanm ar vis-a-vis each other in order to gain m ore shares in resource exploitation.
The rising economies from Asia specifically India and China, are believed to be
seeking more of their interests in M yanm ar both fo r strategic and econom ic reasons.
China, so far, is enjoying a greater leverage over India for being in b e tte r relations w ith
Naypyidaw since the early days of the independence period, while India is a little
frustrated, but hopeful it will win Naypyidaw's substantive trust and confidence. W h a t
specific geopolitical interests can be traced w hile comparing the historic Chinese and
Indian rivals struggling to counter each other fo r resources in M yanm ar? How is the
geopolitics of M yanm ar becoming a fulcrum betw een the East and South? M ore
im portantly analyzed is w h eth er these external and internal geopolitical m aneuverings
are a cause of domestic instability in M yanm ar. These questions help to understand th a t
even though M yanm ar is in an asymmetrical pow er relation in regards to India, China
and others, it still holds leverage due to its geography and resources. M yanm ar's
m ilitary junta believes that in the contem porary period M yanm ar is "caught in triangular
rivalry betw een China, India and United States."176 Furtherm ore, th e m ilitary leadership
in M yanm ar widely propagates th a t the U.S. is trying to use a "containm ent policy" to
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control China's rise, and in this regard, th e geostrategic location of M y an m ar "is a loop
in th eir containm ent policy."177

a.

BEIJING'S GEO-STRATEGIC BUFFER ZONE
Looking at Beijing's interest in M yanm ar's geopolitical setting takes us back to

1954, the early years o f M yanm ar's independence period w hen the then Chinese
Premier, Chou En Lai, paid his official visit to India and M yanm ar and affirm ed China's
com m itm ent towards the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Both India and
M yanm ar signed these principles, which included the m utual respect of territorial
integrity and sovereignty, policy of non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs,
and projects of m utual benefit so th a t peaceful co-existence could be m aintained.
However, on many occasions, aggression and interventions have proven the
com m itm ents to be unfulfilled.
M yanm ar shares a 1,384 mile long border w ith China's Yunnan province, and an
asymmetrical power relationship has existed betw een the tw o countries for m ore than
five decades. David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan (2012) note that since the beginning of
the Cold W ar, "Beijing has regarded B urm a/ M yanm ar as a geo-strategic buffer zone,
w hether in its confrontation w ith the W est, its rivalries w ith the Soviet Union and
Vietnam , or its Peaceful rise strategy in the post-Cold W a r era."178
It is true th at in the post-Cold W a r epoch China's geopolitical and economic
interests in M yanm ar have been no mystery. M yanm ar has become one of the crucial
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lifelines for China's supremacy in the region and its future economic grow th. In late
2009 the leaders of M yanm ar and China officially reaffirm ed the continuation o f th e ir
"paukphaw (fraternal) friendship," while the m ilitary ju n ta in M yanm ar, taking an
additional step, considered the relationship as th a t of "blood relatives (swem yo
paukphaw) th a t are argued to have existed since 1 9 5 0 ."179 However, the relationship
was never harmonious and w ithout trouble, th e re w ere m oments w hen both countries
w en t to almost zero-level diplomatic ties. For instance, during Gen Ne W in's rule, th e re
was indirect support to popular anti-Chinese uprising in M yanm ar, which actually
diverted the attention from its economic failure w ithin M yanm ar and also to signal
China th at M yanm ar would not be influenced w ith forceful acts.180
In recent years, M yanm ar has significantly reduced its reliance on m ilitary and
economic aid from China, but largely still relies on political and diplom atic protection for
the regime's survival. The ruling military junta understands th at China will not be
com fortable w ith any atte m p t to confine its geopolitical and economic influence in
M yanm ar. China's policy o f peaceful rise and its apparent com m itm ent through a new
foreign policy of non-interference in other's dom estic politics will be a litmus test to see
w hether China allows M yanm ar to act on its own w hile choosing future partners.181 On
the other hand, China's growing energy demand has made it the largest oil im porting
country in the world. To m eet these energy demands, Chinese companies are heavily
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engaged in pipeline and dam construction in M yanm ar to transport oil, gas, and pow er
from the M iddle East and the shores of M yanm ar to Yunnan province.
At the m om ent, 78% of China's electric-pow er needs are m et through coal
burning, w hile China plans to reduce electricity from coal production to 68% by 2 01 0
and to 60% by 2020, which is not y et accomplished.182 Therefore China is keen to look at
hydropow er electricity projects, which are ideal as a renew able energy resource.
Similarly, India is very much keen to harness w ater resources at Chin State. Both India
and China are independently in business to construct dams on rivers closer to th e ir
border areas so electricity can be transm itted to th e ir countries. The investm ent in
hydropow er projects will counter the environm ental challenges posed due to higher
levels of carbon emission in China. Beijing has signed agreements w ith Naypyidaw to
finance seven dams in Kachin State along th e Ayeyarwady, N'M ai Hka, and M ali Hka
Rivers to generate and transm it 13,360-m eg aw att electricity.183
According to the EarthRights International report, th e re are 69 Chinese
corporations actively involved in 90 m ajor projects o f hydropower, mining, oil, and
natural gas explorations.184 Despite the one-sided leverage o f Chinese corporations,
there is a good sign that these projects will attract foreign investm ent in M yanm ar.
During only 2008-2009 around US $856 million, or 87 %, o f foreign investm ent was
directed at the energy sector. China's three major oil corporations are dom inating th e
most of energy exploration projects in M yanm ar. China National Petroleum Corporation
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(CNPC), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have already established a strong presence in
M yanm ar. Having the largest natural gas resources in South-East Asia, M yanm ar faces
o th er neighboring countries in the region as potential contenders in th e exploration and
sharing of energy resources, including India, China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and
Singapore. On many occasions, these contenders are not able to win contracts on th e
basis of m erit; rather, contracts are awarded on th e basis o f political interests. For
exam ple, after the crackdown on Saffron revolution protestors in August 2007, Shwe gas
reserves w ere sold to China's state owned CNPC at a low er price than to other bidders
due to Chinese and Russian diplom atic protection provided at the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) when both vetoed a US led resolution for dem ocratic and
inclusive political culture in M y a n m ar.185 The politically awarded contract to CNPC will
allow the investm ent of 50.9 percent, the cost of tw o pipelines reaching Kunming
(Yunnan) through M andalay and M use (M yanm ar's border area with China). The
approved oil pipeline and gas pipeline will cost US$1.5 billion and US$ 1.04935 billion
respectively.186
On strategic grounds, these pipelines are expected to overcome Beijing's
psychological perception over th e insecurity of the Strait of Malacca called "Malacca
dilem m a." Almost 80% of Chinese oil flows into China through the Strait of Malacca.
Therefore, China is heavily reliant on the U.S. to guarantee th e safe passage of oil
imports as well as overall other types of transits, through th e Strait of Malacca. Beijing
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believes that if any disruption in the flo w of oil w e re to occur it would strangle China's
growing economy. These disruptions are possible scenarios for Beijing due to any crisis
over Taiwan or Beijing's crisis w ith o th er U.S. allies in Asia-Pacific.187 From a historical
point of view, China knows the im portance of M yanm ar, as during th e Second W orld
W a r years of the Sino-Japanese war, Chiang kaishek used Chungking (now known as
Chongqing) as the capital for his legitim ate authority and protection and relied on
M yanm ar to connect to the outside w orld. Once th e Japanese occupied Burma, he had
to rely on airlift provision support of Allied powers, which strangulated the econom y
and transportation leading to failure. W ith the successful completion o f pipelines, China
believes it can m itigate its fear of the Malacca dilem m a and counter India's growing
influence in M yanm ar. Additionally, China will m aintain its "valuable geo-strategic buffer
zone" th at can counter any potential th re a t to Beijing's interest.188

b. DELHI'S "LOOK EAST" VENTURES THROUGH ITS "EXTENDED NEIGHBOR"
Comparing Beijing's interest in M yanm ar, Delhi is not pleased to see its
"extended neighborhood" fu rth er drifting away into a rival's camp. Historically, India
and M yanm ar have experienced ups and downs in the diplomatic, economic, cultural,
and people-people relations. At one tim e, India's liberation leaders w ere greater ideals
to M yanm ar's founding fathers, but the post-independence period under Gen Ne W in's
m ilitary rule changed the scenario, forcing ethnic groups o f Indian origin to leave the
country. India's continued support fo r pro-dem ocratic forces suffered a backlash,
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annoying M yanm ar's dictators and making th em sterner against India. During the Cold
W a r the tw o countries supported the non-aligned m ovem ent (NAM ) until 1979, when
M yanm ar decided to leave NAM as a result of the growing relationship betw een India
and the Soviet Union, and their request for M yan m ar to join the C om m onw ealth of
Nations.
Naypyidaw and Delhi developed a higher level of mistrust w hen India voiced its
support in favor of 1988's pro-dem ocratic protests. In the following years, Delhi
welcom ed democratic groups to India, especially from ethnic minorities th a t w ere not
w ell received by the m ilitary junta in Naypyidaw. Delhi's growing econom y, over
population, and need to fulfill its energy dem ands prom pted India to cautiously
compromise its traditional policies. A new "Look East" policy fram ed to reduce the trust
deficit betw een its neighbors, particularly M yanm ar, w here India not only foresees
economic gains, but also addresses its rapidly rising energy requirem ents to counter
growing Chinese influence.
Historically for Indians, Burma is called "suvarna Bhumi" m eaning the "Golden
Land" in Sanskrit, because, during colonial tim es, Burma became a land of opportunities
fo r m inority Indians to get rich and contribute to th e Indian economy to o .189 The historic
notion of the "Golden Land" faded away during Ne Win's era. Indians in general may not
be enthusiastic about the repeat of political episodes of Gen. Ne W in w ho expelled
thousands o f Indian business com m unity. The Indian governm ent was very critical of
these heavy-handed gestures by M yanm ar's military. Therefore, the Indian governm ent

189 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 297.

183
rem ained one o f the opposing proponents to m ilitary rule in M yanm ar, resulting Delhi
and Naypyidaw both supporting arm ed proxy groups on th e border region against each
other.
Similar to M yanm ar's troubles w ith its ethnic m inorities dom inating border
regions, India's northeast region, bordering M yanm ar, is one of the country's troubled
regions th at encompasses 40 million people, w ith 200 tribal groups in dem arcated areas
in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, M anipur, Meghalaya, M izoram , Nagaland,
Sikkim, and Tripura.190 Anti-India arm ed groups in the Northeast are also engaged in
arms and drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion through using training camps and jungle
bases in the Sagaing division and Kachin areas in M yanm ar. The m ilitary junta in
M yanm ar in fact showed connivance to these activities and used it as bargaining tool to
get military assistance from India to crack down on the arm ed groups. How ever, th e re
was no honest action carried out in reality against groups fighting in India, though th e
Tatm adaw conducted m ilitary operations against M yanm ar's own ethnic m inority
groups in these border regions. Similarly, Indian intelligence agencies helped train
Kachin rebels to create a buffer zone betw een its Northeastern arm ed rebels and
Tatm adaw . O ther than providing a secretive support to arm ed groups, India w idely
supported the pro-democratic groups and highly w elcom ed Kachin and Chin groups in
New Delhi, which further strained relations betw een India and M yanm ar. T atm ad aw
increased its support to anti-India groups like th e People's Liberation Arm y o f M a n ip u r
(PLA) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). In th e late 1980s Tatm adaw 's
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ceasefire agreem ent with ethnic arm ed groups prom pted India to change its policies
tow ards M y an m ar and softened its strict behavior tow ards th e T atm adaw .191
Finally, in 1995, India and M yan m ar agreed to launch joint operation "Golden
Bird" against alleged armed groups on both sides including PLA, ULFA, and the tw o
factions of National Socialist Council o f Nagaland (NACN) in Khaplang (NSCN-K) and
Muivah (NSCN-M) and the Chin National Front (CFN). The unsuccessful plan faded aw ay
as M yanm ar w ithdrew in reaction to India conferring the Nehru Award to prodem ocratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi.192
As noted earlier, India's growing economic activities and dom estic demands
prom pted Indian policy makers to change th e ir traditional policy approaches. It is
p ertinent to observe that India always had a policy o f self-reliance and supporting
domestic output. M arie Lall (2006) notes th a t "India's age-old priority o f swadeshi or
"self-sufficiency" is no longer a feasible goal and regulating relations w ith states w ho
can provide the badly needed gas and oil is seen as central to India's new foreign policy
(particularly "Look East Policy")."193 In this regard, w ith Bangladesh a recalcitrant
partner, India's Look East policy was targeted at opening markets in Southeast Asia and
cooperation w ith M yanm ar was im portant fo r its im plem entation.194 For the
im plem entation of the "Look East" policy, during th e 1990s India came up w ith a new
regional strategic vision towards the east w ith an idea of an "extended neighborhood"
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in Burma. India's new vision prim arily focused on th re e m ain areas: stabilizing India's
troubled northeast region ("Golden Bird O peration 1995"), economic opportunities in
M yanm ar ("Look East Policy of 1991") and counter-balancing the growing Chinese
influence in M yanm ar and the region as a w hole (M ilitary A id).195
Recently, like Beijing, Delhi is investing in a num ber o f mega projects in
M yanm ar. M yanm ar being a geographic pivot, India initiated the Bangladesh-lndiaM yanm ar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) agreem ent in 1997 and
also the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) agreem ent in 2000. A similar initiative by
Beijing, known as China's Kunming Initiative or Bangladesh-China-lndia-M yanm ar (BCIM)
in 1999, provided an avenue for M yanm ar to gradually com e out of isolation as a pariah
state and enjoy the benefits of regional diplom atic ties o th e r than ASEAN.196 The earlier
section of political economy highlighted th e top fo u r countries trading w ith M yanm ar
and showed a recent increase in the high volume o f trade betw een India and M yanm ar,
Among India's many mega projects, prom inent ones include the construction of
highways and oil and gas pipelines connecting M yanm ar w ith India's Northeast region. A
fe w examples: In 2001, Form er Indian Foreign M inister Jaswant Singh inaugurated a 160
KM long road, the India-M yanm ar Friendship road (cost US $2.58 m illion), which
connected the Indian Northeast and M andalay.197 Delhi is also moving forw ard w ith its
$ 40 0 million Kaladan "m ulti-m odal" project; this project w ill link India's M izoram and

195 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 296-99.
196 "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 303.
197 Lall, "Indo-M yanm ar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy," 437; Egreteau, "India's Unquenched
Ambitions in Burma," 303.
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Assam to th e southwestern port of Akyab in M y a n m ar.198 M oreover, during the early
2000s, Indian oil and gas firms, such as Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC),
Gas Authority o f Indian Limited (GAIL), and Essar Oil (a private Indian com pany) w ere
allow ed to exploit natural gas in the Arakan (Rakhine) fields.199
On strategic grounds, Delhi w anted to counter Beijing's growing influence in
M yanm ar. Delhi's bitter experience w ith the 1962 w a r w ith China and recent media
reports propagating the notion of a "rise of China" is obsessing many Indian policy
makers. As China is the main arms supplier to the m ilitary establishm ent of M y a n m ar, a
Chinese arms deal w orth US$ lb illio n and an additional $ 4 0 0 million in 1994 to
m odernize Tatm adaw has raised fears in India. India is also alarmed by suspicions th a t
China is establishing a facility for surveillance and m onitoring purposes at G reat Coco
Island, north of the Andaman archipelago.200 As a response, recently Delhi has been
trying to play catch-up. In N ovem ber 2013, on an official tour, the Indian Arm y chief
General Bikram Singh shared India's plan to provide m ilitary aid, including supply of
m ilitary equipm ent and spare parts, training and border cooperation, w ith President
Thein Sein, Foreign M inister U W unna M aung Lwin, and Com m ander-in-Chief of the
Defense Services, Senior General M in Aung Hlaing. M y an m ar com fortably agreed to
accept the offer and was willing to balance China's rule in M yanm ar through w elcom ing
Indian military trainers for training purposes, as w ell as agreeing to send 100 special

198 Thant M yint-U , Where China M eets India : Burma and the N ew Crossroads o f Asia, 1st American ed.
(N ew York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 318-19.
199 Lall, "Indo-M yanm ar Relations in the Era o f Pipeline Diplomacy," 429.
200 Egreteau, "India's Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 306.
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forces yearly to acquire training at the Indian Army's counter-insurgency and jungle
w arfare school a t Vairengte in M izo ram .201
Despite Delhi being historically at odds w ith Naypyidaw, Delhi is slowly and
steadily progressing tow ards restoring benign relations w ith M yanm ar. Delhi needs to
tackle troubling border issues im m ediately in o rder to gain long term and effective ties
w ith M yanm ar. As discussed earlier, other than arm ed struggles in the northeast, it is
im portant to highlight the geographic reality of India's northeast, which is choked
betw een Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh w ith a narrow link, a "chicken neck,"
connecting it to mainland India. It is a com pletely d iffe re n t case from th a t o f China's
Yunnan province, because India's northeast is a troubled zone and presents
comparatively higher poverty problems. The arm ed groups like ULFA has bases in all
neighboring countries around the region. In 2009 a bomb blast killed m ore than 60
people and injured m ore than 300 in Assam by National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB) due to political and economic grievances.202 India needs to resolve the
grievances of its northeastern region; otherw ise, India's dream s tow ards the east may
face major problems.

c. OTHERS AS LYNCHPIN OF GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM?
O ther than India and China, Japan has been a long tim e silent donor and investor
in M yanm ar. In th a t sense, Japan has developed a soft im age in the minds o f the people

201 Rajat Pandit, "India Steps up M ilitary Aid to M yanm ar to Offset China's Might," The Times o f India
Novem ber 1, 2013.
202 M yint-U , Where China M eets India : Burma and the N ew Crossroads o f Asia, 287-89.
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of M yanm ar. For Japan, th e growing m arket econom y of M yanm ar is an economic
strategic asset in the coming years. Bangladesh and Thailand are also contending
neighbors in term s of gaining a share in energy and econom ic opportunities in
M yanm ar. Despite this, M yanm ar enjoys its largest trading economy w ith Thailand, but
Naypyidaw is always suspicious of Thailand's closeness to th e United States.
Highlighting some significant projects in M yanm ar, Bangladesh has shown its desire to
join the economic revival through the construction of highways. In 2010 Bangladeshi
Prime M inister Sheikh Hasina, during her visit to Kunming (Yunnan), agreed to construct
a railway road connecting Chittagong to Kunming through Ramree (M yanm ar) to
enhance com munication and trade activities.203
Thailand and M yanm ar have planned a mega project to harness M yanm ar's
resources through the establishm ent of an industrial hub a t the Tavoy/ Daw ei area in
th e Tanintharyi Region (form er Tenasserim Division). The initial investm ent is estim ated
at US$8.6 billion with an additional US$58 billion to follow. The industrial project will
develop a deep-sea port, chemical plants, oil refinery, and highways connecting
Thailand, China, Laos, Cambodia, and the rest of Southeast Asia, which w ould eventually
reduce reliance on the usage of the Strait of Malacca. Unfortunately, these projects are
planned at the cost o f environm ental devastation. Thailand plans to shift all industrial
units th at are harmful to this area, meaning in the future M yanm ar will have to bear the
environm ental effects.204 Recently M yanm ar's English newspaper "Eleven" gave
coverage to protestors opposing the industrial projects. According to the new spaper, in

2°3 w h ere China Meets In d ia : Burma and the N ew Crossroads o f Asia, 320.
2°4 w here China Meets India : Burma and the N ew Crossroads o f Asia, 318-19.
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Septem ber 2013, residents of the Dawei area in Tanintharyi Division launched
campaigns against the construction of th e oil refinery and industrial projects th a t cause
environm ental dam age to their area.205
The above discussion highlighting th e com petition over mega projects in
M yanm ar vindicates th e valuable resources and geo-strategic location o f M yanm ar.
These examples support the notion th a t th e re is always a foreign involvem ent due to
attraction to resources and creation of buffer zones for geo-strategic reasons. Similarly,
in the past, it was the British-Japanese colonization and occupation episodes th a t are
vivid examples of direct involvem ent by external powers. W hereas, most recently,
regional powers like China and India are indirectly engaged in expanding th e ir presence
inside M yanm ar. M oreover, the rise of dem ocratic forces in M yanm ar cannot be
ignored, eventually involving W estern forces, especially th e United States, w hen it is in a
process of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region. This external political
engineering helps with the understanding th a t at large the local culture remains a great
tool of exploitation for geopolitical and geo-econom ic reasons.
Since the end o f the Second W orld W ar, th e U.S has been the security guarantor
of its Pacific allies, and rebalancing the rising in flu e n tia l in the region is one U.S strategy
to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the U.S. does not w a n t to push Naypyidaw hard
over human rights violations and dem ocratic forces, as the U.S. tried in th e w ake o f the
1988 protests. The result then was Tatm adaw deciding M yanm ar had to becom e closer
to China. In addition, U.S. investors will not be happy with any forceful a tte m p t by

205 "Residents Protest the Building o f Oil Refinery in Dawei," Eleven September 25, 2013.
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Washington towards Naypyidaw risking th e ir recent investments, so W ashington w ill be
under pressure to deal cautiously w ith Naypyidaw. Additionally, the U.S. is also carefully
observing the diplomatic maneuverings of Naypyidaw in th e region, as Naypyidaw is
active in choosing new partners and assigning projects to countries to m aintain its
historical image of a non-aligned state.
A nuclear M yanm ar and any linkage w ith North Korea will of course be a m a tte r
o f concern for the U.S. and its allies within and outside the region. In th e scenario of
M yanm ar going nuclear, this fractured zone o f Asia-pacific will become one o f th e most
dangerous shatterbelts of the w orld, w here all hostile neighbors are equipped w ith
nuclear weapons. Already China, India, Pakistan and North Korea share borders w ith no
good relations, and if M yanm ar decides to choose th e nuclear camp, it will not be an
ideal situation for global peace, let alone the future stability of the country itself. The
controversial project about M yanm ar's nuclear plan came to light a fte r its defectors
disclosed M yanm ar's nuclear am bition. M any analysts believe it is potentially an
inspiration from North Korea for strategic reasons. It obviously raised concerns of th e
W est and its allies in the region.
According to Alexis Rieffel, "M yanm ar's interest in a nuclear energy program has
been made public, [and] the governm ent has kept secret its plans to build an
underground complex below Naung Laing M ountain (near Pyin Oo Lwin) in northern
M yanm ar w ith possible North Korean help. This site is close to the civilian research
reactor being assembled by Russia. Photographs taken of th e complex betw een 2003
and 2006 are reported to show m ore than 8 00 tunnels ... North Korea is suspected of
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having passed nuclear technology to M y a n m ar."206 The suspected cooperation was
brought to a halt when M yanm ar foiled a North Korean a tte m p t to assassinate South
Korean president Chun Doo-hwan in 1983 during his planned visit to M yanm ar. Kim IISung failed to restore relations w ith M yanm ar, until the historic mass protests o f 1988.
As a result of mass mobilization, the relations seem to have been restored a fte r 1988's
pro-dem ocratic protest, especially w hen W estern diplom atic pressure fo r the tran sfer of
pow er prom pted SPDC (m ilitary junta) to join its old rogue block. Finally, in 2000,
M yanm ar's military regime made public its plans to purchase a small reactor from
Russia.207
Seeing a possible nuclear proliferation in the region, in 2003 the then chairm an
of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee, Richard G.

Lugar,showed concern over

M yanm ar's nuclear ambitions and referred to it as a "source of instability throughout
South and Southeast Asia."208 In 2007 M yanm ar agreed to term s w ith Russia to
construct a nuclear reactor. The deal was actually discussed in 200, and stalled during
2002 due to M yanm ar's inability to make an advance paym ent. How ever, the boom ing
energy industry is helping M yanm ar to accumulate its foreign reserves. As per th e initial
plan, the reactor will generate 10-m egaw atts of power. The cost o f th e project was not
disclosed; how ever, according to Russian hints, it will be around US$500 m illion.209 Due
to the recent rise of energy sector investments, M yanm ar has apparently been silent on
nuclear reactors for energy purposes; how ever, its th reat perceptions cannot be ruled

206 Rieffel, M yanm ar/B urm a : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 143.
207 M yanm ar/B urm a : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 183-87.
208 M yanm ar/B urm a : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 188.
209 Turnell, "Burma’s Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Voracious State," 226.
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out. If the promised reform policies fail and M y a n m ar decides to return to its earlier
status, the U.S. and its allies will need to retain b e tte r working relations w ith Tatm ad aw
until responsible civilian pow er takes the charge.
Overall, th e geostrategic and geo-economic avenues have becom e favorable to
M yanm ar. M yanm ar needs to propose friendly economic policies and move forw ard
towards a democratic transition and economic developm ent of the entire country
w ithout being limited to a few groups and excluding the rest. In this regard, U.S. policy
makers also understand th a t regional economic interdependence has strengthened th e
relations of China with other Asian countries; so, it is unlikely that th e U.S. will block the
Strait of Malacca. However, a reasonable assumption is the fear th at if dem ocratic
forces are quelled or human rights violations persist in M yanm ar, it m ay potentially
threaten all the mega projects.210 The security of pipelines and roads are a serious
m atter as most o f these linkages are passing through ethnic minority areas, which are
under the control of ethnic militias. It is a serious issue for China too, as the oil and gas
pipelines of the Shwe Gas project will pass through 22 tow ns along 980 KMs (officially
771-793 KMs) of M yanm ar. For the protection of th e pipelines, forty-four infantry and
light infantry battalions are stationed, which dem onstrates th a t w ith o u t resolving issues
w ith ethnic minorities the security of these pipelines are at high risk.211 The construction
of new roads and railroads across M yanm ar by India and China is itself the creation o f a
new Silk Road in the tw enty-first century. Though M y a n m ar connects tw o big world
economies directly or indirectly to the rest of the w orld, critically M yan m ar would be

210 Steinberg and Fan, Modern C hina-M yanm ar Relations : Dilemmas o f M u tu al Dependence, 170-80.
211 M odern China-M yanm ar Relations : Dilemmas o f M u tu al Dependence, 178.
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accomplishing this task through odd connections through "vast hinterlands of India and
China, much less visible to the outside, poor and w ith a spine of violent conflict running
right through."212 W ith o u t resolving its domestic problems w ith ethnic m inorities,
mainly political and economic grievances, sooner or later th e turmoil may turn
M yanm ar into a quagm ire for the rest of the country and affect the economic
opportunities o f entire region.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Suppressing its own people w ho rose up to seek th e ir basic rights, M y a n m ar has
experienced one of the most brutal m ilitary regimes in recent history. U nfortunately
historical and societal divides have given the m ilitary regim e leverage to play with
emotions and nationalistic fervors on those dividing lines. For a stable M yanm ar, th e
country needs to establish a federal arm y recruiting from all ethnic groups, not
discriminating against others by recruiting only Burmans. In addition, M yanm ar, a
geographical pivot state balancing betw een China and India, two im portant rising
regional powers, has its own geopolitical and economic challenges, w hile the entire
Southeast Asian region has been undergoing a process of transform ation for th e last
tw o decades.
During the political and economic transform ations, the military regimes in
M yanm ar consolidated the roots of a praetorian society. However it grappled w ith
diverse political developm ents of regimes in its neighboring countries. For instance,

212 M yint-U, W here China M eets India : Burma and the N ew Crossroads o f Asia, 292.
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Vietnam and Laos became rapidly growing m arket oriented party-states, th e Philippines
and Indonesia experienced the transitions o f post-developm ental dictatorship
democracies, Thailand became dem ocratized but w ith an unstable democracy w ith a
political monarchy, and Singapore and Malaysia enjoyed successful economic ventures
under com petitive authoritarian states. M eanw h ile, Burma became economically
stagnant seeking political direction under a m ilitary regim e.213 The m ilitary regime
continued its rule for five decades, and finally in 2010, the military agreed to transfer
pow er to a so-called democratically elected regime.
The 2010 elections apparently provided a ray of hope towards a dem ocratic
transition and the establishm ent of rule of law th at can respect the egalitarian rights of
every m em ber of M yanm ar through inclusive policies tow ards political settlem ents.
During Novem ber 2013, on her visit to Australia, Aung San Suu Kyi said, "W e are just
starting out on the road to democracy. W e are not there yet, as some people seem to
assume ... w ithout am endm ents to the constitution, w e can never become a truly
democratic society."214 Along w ith the political transitions, the economic revival is seen
as a sign of relief fo r M yanm ar's impoverished people a fte r decades of ultra-poor
conditions due to its isolationists and bad economic policies by the m ilitary regime. The
new projects about the economic, political, and social initiatives in Burma is expanding
in the landscape of M yanm ar, including the social "space, legal and political protections
and opportunities fo r the poor, uneducated, unhealthy, malnourished, and

213 Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution : The State and M ilita ry in Burma, 1 962-1988, 4.
214 "Joint Press Conference with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; Visit to Australia," (Canberra N ovem ber 28,
2013).
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disenfranchised citizenry... [BUT]... th e re is no full consensus, much insider and outsider
opinion prioritizes creating contending pow er centers able to challenge th e status of the
m ilitary machine as the essential political actors."215 The reason for this is th e status o f
th e m ilitary machine a crucial actor; most inform ation has to be channelized through
th e regime under the influence of the m ilitary, and outside M yanm ar, opinions are
skeptical about the legality of any positive initiatives. M oreover, most countries',
especially China and India, are solely concerned about the security of th e ir investm ents
in M yanm ar. If M yanm ar fails to reach a political s ettlem e n t with ethnic groups, th en it
may have negative repercussions on the mega projects started recently, and there will
be no security guarantee for safe passage through economic corridors in th e troubled
zones.
At the m om ent, th e entire world is predicting the prospects and challenges on
the basis o f known-knowns about M yanm ar, yet, th e re is an information black hole, so
the unknown-unknowns need m ore tim e and patience so th e intentions of th e regime
and the outcomes of current ventures can be evaluated. M yanm ar's existing fragile and
w eak diplom atic links, lack of stability, and inability to be properly integrated into th e
regional and global stage is damaging to the aspirational growth of Asian countries, and
its impacts will be negative to the rest of the world.

215 Ian Holliday, Burma R edux: Global Justice and the Quest fo r Political Reform in M y a n m a r (N ew York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 168.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY II - PAKISTAN: FROM NATION-BUILDING TO A HODGEPODGE OF CIVILMILITARY RULE

Our Beloved country (Pakistan) is facing severe challenges o f pow er o u ta g e /
Load shedding, rising cost (inflation), M ountain of Debts, unem ploym ent,
Chaotic economic situation, despondency among youth, extrem ism and unrest,
rising poverty, fractured governm ent institutions, widespread corruption, and
Pakistan's w eak global image ... these are like a dense jungle of problem s ... fo r
his new governm ent.
Prime M inister Nawaz Sharif1
Pakistan is the pivot of th e world ... the frontiers on which the fu tu re position of
the world revolves.
Founder and First G overnor-General of Pakistan, M . A. Jinnah2
Pakistan is an enormous country; it is strategically an im portant country not just
for the United States but also for th e W orld. It's a country, whose people has an
enormous potential, but it is also right now a country that w ithin it has
extremists elements... (The United States) engaged aggressively w ith Pakistani
governm ent to com m unicate th a t w e (U.S) w ant nothing m ore than a stable,
prosperous, peaceful Pakistan... (And) w ork with th e Pakistani governm ent in
order to eradicate this extrem ism th a t w e consider a cancer w ithin the country
th a t can potentially engulf the country."
President Barack O b am a3

INTRODUCTION
A historic m om ent in the political history of Pakistan, May 11, 2013, saw for the
first tim e a successful democratic transition of pow er from one dem ocratically elected
governm ent to another. Despite the positive indicators o f th e dem ocratization process,
1 During the maiden speech at parliament after electing third tim e Prim e Minister o f Pakistan in June 5th,
2013.
2 During conversation with American w artim e correspondent M argaret Bourke-W hite in Septem ber 1947.
3 During official visit to India, and responding to a question asking, "W hy has th e U.S reluctant to label
Pakistan as a terrorist state?" In Novem ber 2010.
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Pakistan is still referred to as a deep state or security state, where its m ilitary is believed
to be the most pow erful institution th a t sways political processes, as opposed to other
political institutions4 The political leadership is branded as incom petent, corrupt, and on
many occasions a shadow o f doubt has been cast on the loyalty of politicians to their
country. Thus the politicians have rem ained less fortunate in Pakistan's political
landscape, w hile the tw o colonial inherited institutions, th e civil bureaucracy and th e
m ilitary, have taken charge of and penetrated deeply into th e political system .5 The
domestic pow er struggles for political authority and bargaining betw een political and
m ilitary elites affected the establishm ent of any proper political and social order. On
many occasions the country's constitution, which is believed to be the suprem e law, has
been abrogated via frequent coups. Every coup or m ilitary intervention was legitimized
as in the greater interest o f the nation-state. The effects o f power com petition betw een
the political institutions led the "Pakistani masses in a state o f semi-literacy, making
them prone to adopt a religiously based culture of resentm ent while depriving th e m of
the theoretical and practical tools [of inclusive or participatory politics] th a t would allow
th em to challenge the existing social ord er."6 Today, Pakistan is not in an ideal situation
in term s of its social cohesion as a nation com pared to its early days o f nationhood,
w hen it em barked on a journey of nation and state-building in the 1940s.

4 Shuja Nawaz, "Army and Politics," in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (N ew York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 79; Veena Kukreja, Contem porary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts
and Crises (New D e lh i; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003), 45.
5 Tariq AN, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death o f a State, US ed. (London & New York: Verso Editions / NLB
1983), 197.
6 Frederic Grare, "Rethinking W estern Strategies tow ard Pakistan: An Action Agenda fo r th e United States
and Europe," (Washington, D.C Carnegie Endowm ent fo r International Peace, 2007), 8.
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The deeply polarized nation-state requires a com plete overhaul. Over the last six
decades the domestic and regional pow er politics have drastically affected th e entire
Pakistani nation, which is extrem ely polarized and fractured betw een the pro-liberal and
anti-liberal camps under the colorful shades of revolutionaries, seculars, m oderates, the
religious, fundam entalists, ethno-nationalists, and so forth. Subsequently a huge portion
o f the bewildered population seems to be sandwiched betw een the contending poles.7
This dangerous scale of polarization can be depicted in the perspective th a t fo r many
M alala Yousafzai (a girl w ho was shot by Taliban fo r prom oting and defending w om en's
right to education) and Salman Taseer (killed for supporting the am en d m en t of
Blasphemy law) are heroes, w hile fo r fundam entalists they are agents o f the W est. In
fact, Islamists in the country see Osama Bin Laden and M um taz Qadri (personal police
guard and killer of Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer) as th e ir heroes. M o reo ver, the
state narrative of dealing w ith terrorism and extrem ism is lately based on th e idea of a
"good" and "bad" Taliban, or extrem ism itself creating a divide in society.
Polarization has gradually created great confusion and controversy am ong the
citizens; if asked to define Pakistan's identity, it is quite easy to get m ultiple
interpretations and definitions. It is true to accept th a t identity is shaped by narrative,
and depends on th e state's policies th a t have m olded its identity during the nationbuilding process. Benedict Anderson writes th a t nations are "imagined com m unities,"
and with the passage of tim e, there is a persistent change process in social

7 Akbar Ahmed, "W hy Jinnah Matters?," in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. M aleeha Lodhi (N ew
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 21.
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consciousness, th erefo re, "identity ... cannot be rem em bered, [and] m ust be narrated."8
In Pakistan's contexts, the identity of the nation is visible in various contending form s.
Pakistani journalist Ahm ed Rashid has sm artly sketched th e various images o f Pakistan's
identity through various viewpoints, as he w rites that:
"the m ilitary defines Pakistani national identity defensively, in term s o f the
country's vulnerability, as a national security state, w ith a perm an en t mistrust of
India. The politicians in pow er have never seriously tried to challenge this
isolating self-definition by offering alternative policies, such as prom oting good
neighborliness, ending support for Islamic extrem ism , fostering economic
developm ent, and providing education. The Pakistani Taliban, fo r th e ir part,
would define Pakistan in religious term s: they call fo r the establishm ent o f a
state based on Sharia or Islamic law and fo r a caliphate."9
The deep polarization of society has evolved around the "holy battles" betw een
secular or liberals and orthodox religious or anti-liberal groups; and in m any ways these
societal drifts towards extrem ism are coxed by state policies countering regional
security challenges, pending unresolved political disputes and political interests. Over
th e years, due to regional geopolitical m aneuvering, there are occasions w h e re policies
directly and indirectly support certain divisive groups, which has from tim e to tim e
fu rth er w idened the fissures of fragm entation in th e societal structure w ith
overwhelm ingly mind-numbing ramifications for th e political developm ent o f the
nation-state.10 Diverse opinions and opposition exist in every political society, but the
lack of tolerance and em pathy to accom m odate m inorities and the denial to accept each
other's rational viewpoints is a troubling factor in Pakistan's evolving political culture.

8 Anderson, Im agined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism , 204.
9 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the B rin k: The Future o f America, Pakistan, and A fghanistan (N ew York:
Viking, 2012), 25.
10 Farzana Shaikh, M aking Sense o f Pakistan (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 83.
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Looking at the journey o f nation-building in Pakistan, a British Pakistani w riter,
Tariq Ali in his book Can Pakistan Survive? explains th a t the sequential political
developm ent involved the "triune influence o f m ilitary dictatorships, failed populism
and rural conservatism on the political developm ent has reduced the country to a state
of perm anent crisis."11 However, in response to the prevailing alarming situations,
Anatol Lieven calls Pakistan a tough country which has shown resilience against all the
"divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, o ften savagely
oppressive towards the poor and w om en, and hom e to extrem ely dangerous forms of
extrem ism and terrorism and y et it moves and is in many ways surprisingly tough and
resilient as a state and a society."12
The holistic image of the country projects th a t Pakistan's w eak but self-centered
political elites are continuously confusing the entire nation, but the m ajority o f citizens
are seeking the proper direction th at th e country's founders envisioned (see the
Appendix B for a glimpse o f M r. Jinnah's vision). The entire nation is com pletely
confused over its core interests and national agendas. W hile the situation on the ground
is complex, the Pakistani people anticipate some bold and careful decisions to reorient
state narratives towards the forgotten ideals of the nation's founding fa th e r M r. Jinnah,
who outlined the ideals during his historic speech delivered to the constituent Assembly
of Pakistan on August 11, 1 9 4 7 .13

11 Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death o f a State, 163.
12 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 1st ed. (N ew York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 4.
13 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan : Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2001), 5-6; Shaikh, M aking Sense o f Pakistan, 68.
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Due to geo-strategic and geopolitical reasons, mainly an Indian-centric
existential fear, Pakistani political leadership im m ediately decided to becom e a W estern
ally so it could benefit from its bipolar politics fo r its own safety in th e region.
Conversely, at the domestic level, nation-building was based frequently on religious
ideals th at possibly eschewed any secessionist or irredentist struggle. The decades long
m ilitary rule signified a higher role o f religion in political life, which helped m ilitary rulers
fram e a "policy of tripod," m eaning decision-making and outcomes centered around
th ree priorities: religious nationalism, Indian centric foreign policy, and an alliance w ith
th e W est.14 The notion of religious nationalism gathered m ore space in civic and political
public spheres. The implicit policies o f facilitating non-state actors, especially during the
Cold W ar, resulted in the indoctrination of ideas like Gazwa-e-hindi (Battle o f India)
establishing the caliphate in greater Khorasan, fu rth er cementing a confrontational
ideology in the minds of conservatives. The past policies o f supporting and facilitating
radical groups created a social space th a t entertained and em pow ered extrem ely
hardline religious leadership.15 These trends tend to develop a confrontational m indset
towards political and economic m odernization, which unfortunately hollows the
foundations of the state w ithin. Som etimes the economic sanctions also isolate it from
th e rest of the world. However, the notion of isolation breaks away due to Pakistan's
geographical pivot, such positioning always keeping it as one of the most im portan t
units in the geo-strategic structure o f world politics.

14 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and M ilitary (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow m ent for
International Peace 2005), 15.
15 Ibid.
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The policies of m anipulating religious nationalism seems to negate M r. Jinnah's
first presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 1 1 ,1 9 4 7 . In
his address Jinnah clarified that Pakistan was created as a country for Muslims, w ho
w ere politically marginalized. Keeping in mind the past m em ory of m arginalization, the
role of religion in the governance of the state should be evaded in newly form ed
Pakistan, he declared, and the governance structure should be relegated to th e private
dom ain.16 As in his August 1 1 ,1 9 4 7 speech, Jinnah fundam entally outlined th e following
principles as the basis for a political culture for the new ly established country (see th e
entire speech in appendix B):
"You are free; you are free to go to your tem ples, you are free to go to your
mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may
belong to any religion or caste or creed th a t has nothing to do w ith th e business
o f the State... W e are starting in th e days w h e re th e re is no discrim ination, no
distinction betw een one com m unity and another, no discrimination betw een
one caste or creed and another. W e are starting w ith this fundam ental principle
th a t we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State... Now I think w e should
keep th at in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course o f tim e
Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims w ould cease to be Muslim s, not in
th e religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in
th e political sense as citizens of th e State."17
The fundam ental guiding principles w ere im portant for Jinnah, because Jinnah
did not w an t to see other religious m inorities suffer or feel inferior, as Muslims had
during the early colonial era. In this regard, an effective political order needed to be
reoriented through a careful look at historical decisions. A fter all, reorientation is a

16 M agnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding (N ew
York: Public Affairs, 2013), 23-24.
17 Malik, Pakistan : Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities, 6.
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challenging course of action to alter an established political culture, but th e current
times demand an effort be m ade to achieve the goal.
In the process of reorientating the state, Pakistani policy makers need to be
prudent in observing the crucial period o f 2 0 1 3 -2 01 4 . The reason it is a crucial phase of
the tw e n ty first century is because it will be a defining m om ent for Pakistan itself, the
region, and the entire world to set an agenda for th e rest o f the century. The phase is
specifically significant for Pakistan because the state is in a process of political transition.
This transition helps with the m aturing o f the political system with dem ocratic ideals,
though the state struggles to put its political order on track. Additionally, Pakistan has a
key role in the "global w ar on Terror," which has entered an im portant and conclusive
stage of the w ar in Afghanistan. W hile presenting Pakistan's National Internal Security
Policy (NISP) 2013-2018, the Interior M inister of Pakistan, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan
categorically m entioned the "existential th re a t to the integrity and sovereignty o f the
state" is looming due to terrorism .18 The cost of the recent high m agnitude of terro rist
activities is high; cost can be witnessed through the loss o f control o f te rrito ry to foreign
terrorists, w ho established their authority on ungoverned spaces w ithin Pakistan's
territorial jurisdiction and challenged th e w rit of th e state. Economically terrorism has
cost $78 billion, and more im portantly, civilian casualties have crossed the figure of
48,994, including 5,272 security personnel, from 2001 to Novem ber 2 0 1 3 .19
If the existential th reat becomes acute, then it will certainly prom pt the
international com m unity to be vigilant about Pakistan's nuclear assets, and the

18 Ismail Khan, "Pakistan Most Terror-Hit Nation," Dawn 02-23-2014, para. 2.
19 "Pakistan M ost Terror-Hit Nation," Dawn 02 -2 3 -20 1 4 , para. 8.
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transnational effects across the region and the w hole w orld. At the m om ent, the
safeguard of nuclear weapons is protected under a strict comm and and control system,
which satisfies international agencies. How ever, Pakistan's nuclear program was put and
remains under an international w atch list since the Pakistani governm ent was alerted
over A. Q. Khan's clandestine transfer of nuclear technology, a discovery which led to
international observers and analysts to liken it to "a nuclear W a lM a rt."20
Secondly, this phase of history is im portant for the region because Pakistan's tw o
im portant neighbors, Afghanistan and India, will elect new governm ents. Therefore, the
newly elected regimes in the region such as in Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan will
be seeking to achieve favorable win-sets to preserve their political, geo-strategic, and
economic interests. Also, the waves of instability across th e Middle East are alarm ing
and pose transnational challenges fo r Pakistan and its neighboring countries, forcing
them to tackle complex issues on m ultiple fronts. Finally, Pakistan is located at a
junction of the region which is unique as it converges South Asia, East Asia, Central Asia,
and W est Asia, providing a suitable base fo r potential global economic activities, i.e. the
rise of Chinese and Indian economic m arkets and their regional influence. At the same
tim e, the entire convergence zone is dangerously fractured from w ithin, as it hosts three
of the world's nuclear powers, China, India and Pakistan. The powers are also the
world's top three arms importers, and they are hostile to each other and represent a

20 Christopher Clary, "Dr. Khan's Nuclear W alm art," (The Acronym Institute for Disarm am ent Diplomacy,
2004), para. 2.
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bitter history of past wars and continuous border skirmishes.21 Preserving peace and
stability and carrying out smooth political economic activities in the region is in the
g reater interest of the entire w orld.
The agenda of this chapter is to identify the core problems th a t Pakistan has
witnessed during its journey of nation and state-building processes. W h a t are the
factors th at facilitated in weakening state institutions, ineffectiveness, and
unaccountable state-society relations, which subsequently underm ined the rule o f law?
The discussion focuses on historical and contem porary analysis of fo u r broader areas to
explain the driving factors, i.e. security, political-economic, social, and geopolitical
dimensions, to understand the evolution of violence, corruption, hum an rights abuse,
and geo-strategic troubles in Pakistan.

DECOLONIZATION: A M O M E N T OF EUPHORIA AND DYSPHORIA
The decline of the British Empire resulted in a speedy decolonization process
across the world. The anti-colonial and independence m ovem ent in th e Indian sub
continent resulted in the creation of tw o states on the basis of the tw o-nation th e o ry .22
The notion of the tw o-nation theory advocated tw o separate states on th e basis of
religion, i.e. Hindu m ajority areas w ere to form India, w hile Muslim m ajority areas w ere
to become Pakistan.23 The state's form ation process was shaped by an act o f a surgical
partition of the Indian sub-continent in August 1947. A population of 42 million lived in

21 Siemon T. W ezem an and Pieter D. W ezem an, "Trends in International Arms Transfer 2013,"
(Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2014), 1.
22 M aleeha Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 10.
23 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 14.
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East Pakistan, w hile 33 million resided in W est Pakistan, based on th e ir religious
identity. Interestingly, India was located in betw een and divided both eastern and
w estern wings with a territory stretched over 1,000 miles.24 Partition resulted in one of
the largest human mobilizations in the history; m ore than one million people died, and
ten million migrated as refugees. In fact, decolonization was a m om ent th a t brought an
end to the British Empire, but left a legacy of hatred and violence in the region th at
continues to this day.25 Bruce Riedel, Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project,
notes that "India and Pakistan w ere born w ith a wound, and the w ound has not healed
in the decades since; instead it has become more infected, giving rise to te rro r and
violence."26
As an outcom e of the tw o-nation theory, Pakistan became th e first country to be
created in the name o f religious ideology, later followed by Israel's creation on
ideological grounds in 1948. Form er President of Pakistan and military dictator Gen. Zia
ul Haq compared Pakistan with Israel during an interview in The Economist in 1981,
categorically pointing out th at religion's role is pivotal in the existence of Pakistan. He
affirm ed if one were to "take Islam out o f Pakistan and m ake it a secular state; it would
collapse."27 Thirty years after his interview , the situation now is m ore complex, highly
intolerant, and violent. Over th e years, it has resulted in producing intolerance and

24 Bruce 0 . Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, Brookings
Focus Books (2013), 47; Lieven, Pakistan : A H ard Country, 10; Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and
Authoritarianism in South Asia : A Com parative and Historical Perspective, Contemporary South Asia
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18.
25 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 48.
26 Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink an d Back, 47.
27 Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion : Pakistan as a Political Idea (USA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 4.
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disseminating hatred towards oriented ideals, in th e nam e o f religion, tow ards
opponents for political gains by specific classes and fo r strategic reasons.
During the early days o f Pakistan's independence, th e developing nation
struggled to construct a national identity on ideological grounds. The founding political
leadership "aspire(d) to W estern constitutionalism" which to the leaders seemed likely
to address various issues o f national identities and th e territorial legitim acy of the state
in becoming acceptable to all ethnic groups.28 Aspiration towards W estern
constitutionalism can be traced to Jinnah's vision fo r the new ly born nation-state. Jinnah
trusted th at democratic ideals would be suitable fo r the constitution of th e country, as
fo r him, the Pakistani "soil is perfectly fertile fo r dem ocracy" for its political
orientations.29 Jinnah did not realize, however, th a t in the future many of the colonial
legacies would ham per the dem ocratic orientation o f the country by strengthening its
praetorian structure.
The m om ents of euphoria over independence faded away quickly w ith both
domestic and external factors, as Pakistan scrambled with a number of socio-economic
and geopolitical challenges. From its inception, these challenges caused Pakistan's
fledgling political institutions to be established on w eak and fragile foundations. M ainly
on political grounds, the newly born nation-state was "lacking both a w ell-defined basis
of nationhood and a sufficient adm inistrative structure."30 On the economic front, th e
poor economic conditions did not promise to support the state's financial needs. A fter

28 Shaikh, Making Sense o f Pakistan, 1.
29 Haqqani, M agnificent Delusions : Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding,

21 .
30 "History Repeats Itself in Pakistan," Journal o f Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006): 115.
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independence, th e exchequer o f Pakistan was em pty; the lack of funds to pay em ployee
wages and salaries was a hard situation for the new ly born country.
Ian Talbot w rites th at one of the reasons fo r Pakistan's economic challenges was
the delay in receiving the share of assets from divided India. As per the partition plan,
Pakistan was entitled to receive 17.5 per cent of th e assets, including a share of th e Rs.
550 million cash balance, w hile India was willing to share a smaller percent to w h a t was
agreed in principle. An agreem ent was reached in Decem ber 1947 to share the cash
balance. As India was already in shock to see a divided land, and due to th e geopolitical
conflict over Kashmir fu rth er cem enting a higher level of distrust, India m oved to
withhold the transfer o f the agreed cash balance, though th e am ount was released at
later stages.31 However, the year's earlier unresolved political and geographic issues
over Kashmir w ith India on its Eastern frontiers, and at the same tim e, Afghanistan's
question over the Durand Line on its W estern Frontiers, became a security challenge for
years to come. Afghanistan's alignm ent w ith India quickly prom pted the Pakistani
security establishm ent and political elites to align w ith China for regional balancing,
while opting towards the W est fo r technological, m ilitary, and economic assistance.32 In
order to counter tw o fronts, one at its eastern and the o th e r on its w estern border, a
policy to support non-state actors as proxies became active in order to fulfill the political
and security agendas in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In recent decades this policy has

31 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, Expanded and updated ed. (N ew York, NY: Palgrave Macm illan,
2005), 98; Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South A s ia : A Comparative and Historical Perspective,
22.

32 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and M ilitary, 15.
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backfired, and the non-state actors are now transform ed into an anti-state force fighting
against the Pakistani people and state institutions.
Another tragedy of the new ly born nation was the early death o f th e founder of
the nation-state, M r. Jinnah (m ainly known as Q uaid-i-Azam , meaning "great leader") in
1948. After his death, political events gradually receded fro m the dream s built for the
country's future to be a m odern Islamic state th a t proclaim ed pluralistic dem ocratic
norms through inclusiveness and the assimilation o f every individual w ho lived in th e
country.33 In fact, state policies becam e more em phatic on promoting orthodox Islamic
ideals as the unifying force for the nation and to d e te r th e nationalistic issue of Bengalis
in Eastern Pakistan, and Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in W est Pakistan, which had
already opened a num ber of dom estic fronts for Pakistan to tackle. These issues
gradually provided appealing circumstances for the m ilitary elites to take over power,
w hom had already established praetorian roots in the sub-continent under colonial rule.
Another setback to Pakistan's fledging dem ocratic institutions was the
assassination of its first Prime M inister M r. Liaquat Ali Khan (also known as Quaid-iM ilat, meaning "leader of the nation") during a public speech in 1951. Police personnel
on duty soon killed the assassin, and the reason behind th e assassination was buried,
along with the PM's corpse, as a mystery. A fter his assassination, the civil bureaucrats
took com plete command of governance, and later m ilitary coups com pletely sidelined
the political leadership.34

33 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : A t the Crosscurrent o f History (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 53.
34 Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death o f a State, 43.
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The hodgepodge of civil-m ilitary leadership constructed a new state narrative
portraying Pakistan, which affirm ed it was created in the nam e of Islam, should stand
with the principles of religion. Over tim e, the "political com m itm ent to an ideological
state gradually evolved into a strategic com m itm ent," which turned into a symbiotic
relation betw een m ilitary and religious elites endorsing each other's acts.35 Systematic
processes attem pted at various stages may explain th e "attem pts at Islamizing the state,
at Islamizing the law, at Islamizing political life, at Islamizing the economic and banking
system, at Islamizing Knowledge;" how ever, the degree of success fo r each a tte m p t
varies depending on the type of regim e in Pakistan.36 A fter the events o f 1971's w ar,
Pakistani state officials gave a serious look at recasting th e state's history.37 History
books and texts for schools and academic purposes w ere designed in a w ay th a t could
support religion as a basis for Pakistan and its way o f life.38 Since the late 1970s the re
designed history books have included a subject called social studies; th e subject has
become m andatory and has been taught from prim ary schools to professional degree
programs in universities, so future generations are em bedded with the constructed
narratives. It is im portant to note th a t the Pakistan history and social studies books
describe th a t the independence struggle was not linked w ith British colonial tim es and
an undivided India, but rather date back to 712 AD w hen M oham m ad Bin Qasim, at the

35 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and M ilitary, 3.
36 M arc Gaborieau, "Religion in the Pakistani Polity," in Pakistan: The Contours o f S tate an d Society, ed.
Soofia M um taz, Jean-Luc Racine, and Imran Ali (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44.
37 Ayesha ialal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," International Journal o f M iddle East
Studies 27, no. 1 (1995): 74.
38 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle with M ilita n t Islam (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007), 19.
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behest of Um ayyad Caliphate, came from Baghdad and attacked Sindh (now part of
Pakistan) to fre e some imprisoned Arab traders.39
The history of romanticism continues and includes th e Mughal period of rule, the
w ar of liberation of 1857 against British rule, and surprisingly the roles o f M ehm ud
Gaznawi (w ho ruled in 10th century over most o f Afghanistan, some parts of Iran and
today's Pakistan) and Ahmed Shah Abdali (fath er o f m odern day Afghanistan) are also
included in the spreading or preaching o f Islam th a t eventually provided the basis fo r
Pakistan. The historiography process through textbook curriculum includes chapters on
Muslim rulers from the past to balance th e religious rulers w ith authoritarian leadership.
Through narratives, creating a nexus betw een religion and authoritarian rule provided
an opportunity to use religion as a justifying factor th at endorses rulers or th e ir political
actions; the ruling elites knew th a t Muslims becom e submissive w hen religious
discourse is em ployed. Additionally, in recent tim es blasphemy laws have been used for
political or personal reasons. Historian Ayesha Jalal quotes from one of Dogar's history
books th at shows how historical narratives w ere fram ed to declare m ilitary rulers as
true leaders following religious guidance and dem ocratically elected Prime M inister
Bhutto as a dictator; the Dogar's book referred th e dem ocratic regime of Bhutto as a
"...cruel regime ... a worst dictatorship of a staunch C om m unist... Bhutto, a drunkard,
characterless and an un-lslam ic-minded man, was totally inclined to-w ards the
unnatural and anti-lslamic principles of Communism and Socialism. (W hile), the Islamic
regime of Zia, (is) the blessed advent o f the M a rtia l Law regime of Pakistan under th e

39 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and M ilitary, 40.
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blessed leadership of... General M uham m ad Zia-ul-Huq, an Islamic-minded man, came
on the blessed day of July 6 ,1 9 7 7 ."40
The re-w riting of history also rebranded national heroes. In recent decades, M r.
Jinnah was portrayed as a staunch religious personality seeking a theocratic state.
Looking at Jinnah's words, it is clear he did not im ply the creation o f a theocratic state.
As M r. Jinnah says, "M ake no mistake. Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it.
Islam demands from us th e tolerance of other creeds and w e welcome in closest
association w ith us all those w ho of w h atever creed, are themselves willing and ready to
play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan."41 In fact, Mr. Jinnah adm itted th a t
following core ethics of religion based on equality, inclusiveness, tolerance, and justice
should be prevalent for all citizens w ithout any discrimination. For Jinnah, there w ere
socio-economic and political priorities at the top of the list during Pakistan's struggle for
nationhood. W hile addressing a gathering in Delhi in 1946, he asserted, "W h a t are w e
fighting for? W h at are we aiming at? It is not a theocracy nor a theocratic state. Religion
is there and religion is dear to us. All the w orldly goods are nothing to us w hen we
talking of religion: but there are other things which are very vital - our social, our
economic life."42 In contrast, lawmakers ignored the road m ap defined by Jinnah,
especially in the 1980s, a tim e when Jihadis poured into th e region from various parts of
th e Muslim world to fight against Soviets, help the ruling elites to re-construct

40 Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," 82.
41 "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," 81.
42 Om ar Asghar Khan, "Political and Economic Aspects o f Islamization," in Islam, Politics, an d the State :
The Pakistan Experience, ed. M oham m ad Asghar Khan (Totowa, N.J., USA: Zed Books, 1985), 144.
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narratives based on hagiographic and hyperbolic orientations put fo rw ard as ideal, and
romanticized the nation about Islam's glorious pasts and adventures.
In a sense, Pakistan ignored th e rich cultural diversity and history of
heterogeneous comm unities dwelling on its soil for thousands of years in order to
support the legitimacy of m em bership based on an idea o f belonging to a religious
ideology.43 Implicit state policies to hom ogenize its heterogeneous com m unities did not
w ork well; in fact, w hen diverse identities w ere ignored or forced to mold into a new
identity, issues of polarization surfaced. Pakistani Historian Mubarak AM says, "history
should not be influenced by religious beliefs since history has no religion. Pakistan came
into being in 1947, but our history existed before this which cannot be d e lete d ."44
In today's Pakistan, w hat is witnessed and observed is that it is high tim e to reset
the political input and output procedures in th e political system th a t allows the state
narratives to evolve around value-consensus not by artificially fram ed or externally
engineered for the benefit of any specific domestic group, class, institution, or external
actor. Pakistan's fo rm er Ambassador to the United States Ms. Maliha Lodhi w rites th a t
Pakistani policy is "devaluing (the actual) history fo r political and ideological reasons,
Pakistan has found it difficult to project a national identity th a t can strike a sym pathetic
chord with its heterogeneous people...(Therefore, today) Pakistan is trying to define the
inner and outer contours o f its national identity."45

43 Devji, Muslim Zion : Pakistan as a Political Idea, 9.
44 "The Ideology of Thought Control in Pakistan," Dawn August 1, 2011, 8.
45 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 11.
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Since the birth of Pakistan as a nation-state to the present, the paranoia of an
existential th re a t has been deeply em bedded in th e mindset of policy m akers. In some
ways it could be true when one genuinely looks into earlier episodes o f its post
independence period, i.e. Afghanistan's denial to adm it Pakistan's UN m em bership and
the conflict over Kashmir. But a fte r th e Cold W ar, Pakistani policy makers should have
come out of this paranoia.46 Now the changing tendency is to believe th a t th e global
power's agenda is to disarm Pakistan's nuclear strength (as it is the only M uslim nuclear
pow er) and dictate the term s of rule. Therefore, th e dilem m a of Pakistan's policy
makers is th a t they are largely occupied w ith the Cold W a r politics trends of "ideological
divide and enduring friendships or enm ities ... (and) the m ajor powers (m ainly pointed
towards India) of the world are out to destablise, if not destroy, Pakistan."47
Ms. Maliha Lodhi believes th a t it is im portant to understand five factors in order
to know the history of political developm ents in Pakistan. These are, a) "the pow er
asym metry betw een political and non-political or unelected institutions, b) A fe u d a ldom inated political order and culture th a t fosters clientelist politics, c) Reliance on an
oligarchic elite th at has growth based on borrowings and bailouts to address the
country's chronic financial crises and its resistance to taxing itself and its netw ork of
supporters, d) The intersection betw een efforts to leverage geography in pursuit of
national security goals and the role of outside powers, e) The persistence of centrifugal

46 Haqqani, M agnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History o f Misunderstanding,
23.
47 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas," The Express Tribune March 9, 2014, para. 1.
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forces and bitter ideological controversies over th e role of Islam in the state and
society."48
A fter 67 years of independence, th e challenges are much higher in all dom ains
w hether it is political, social, economic or environm ental. O ther than political and
economic arenas, in the social dom ain Pakistan is among th e top risk societies which are
dangerous to journalists, present deadly attacks against minorities, hum an right abuses,
m alnutrition, higher infant m ortality rates, hosting and possible spreading polio virus (as
in Syria the polio cases detected believed to be cam e from Pakistan49) and deadly
attacks on polio workers, lack of proper health and educational facilities which fu rth e r
traps the country's fragile political economic situation. The energy short fall has already
ham pered industrial output, w hile ineffective governance has significantly nurtured the
centrifugal actors or forces of fragm entation w ithin the state in the form o f non-state
actors. Despite th e fears o f the burdens of its past, th e country has great potential and
resilience to revive due to its young and growing skilled hum an resources, natural
resources, as a geographic pivot on both economic and geopolitical grounds, but w ith a
big if, meaning th a t the political leadership must reset its policies and strategies,
diverting from traditional defense-oriented policies and fra m e a balanced policy for
symmetrical grow th of the state's pillars i.e. parliam ent, judiciary, executive branches,
and the emerging role of media in a vibrant, civil society.

48 Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 52.
49 Stephanie Nebehay, "Polio Virus Strain in Syria Confirmed as Being from Pakistan," Reuters N ovem ber
11, 2013.
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EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE: THE MAKING OF THE SECURITY STATE
Since the first day Pakistan was created, its journey o f nation building was not an
easy task. To resolve the political, economic, and security challenges, th e civil and
military bureaucracy supported the popularization of th e idea o f having a strong
national army th a t would keep the country moving ahead as a savior. Strengthening and
investing on defense was justified w ith th e assumptions of an Eastern border th re a t
from India as a top national security th re a t and th e Durand line issue w ith Afghanistan.50
In this regard, Pakistan's engagem ent in Kashmir w ith

India and in response to

"Afghanistan's persistent interference in (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan by
supporting liberation m ovem ents"51 provided a legitim ate reason for the

m ilitary

establishment to strengthen its roots in the political decision-making process. Especially
in the last thirty years th e m ilitary leadership supported the narratives o f the Afghan
Jihad during the Cold W a r against the USSR, eventually culminating in dom estic and
regional violence.

In continuity,

Pakistani strategists

heavily relied

on the

same

strategies of relying "non-state actors to advance its fictional strategic interests has
come full circle."52
W hile Pakistan is geographically a pivot and a m ilitarily nuclear pow er w ith one
of the largest standing armies, it is also ranked among th e most fragile and w eak states
in the world. Today, Pakistan's tribal belt is considered th e "epicenter of terrorism " and
ungoverned space, which has mostly cost Pakistan a t all fronts. And the global

50 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 99.
51 Julian Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and th e Sources o f the Pakistan-Afghan
Confrontation," Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 17, no. 1 (2011): 43.
52 Talat Masood, "Pakistan's Drift Towards Isolation," The Express Tribune February 4th, 2014, para. 11.

217
com m unity is on alert about any mishap in the region which could badly affect global
stability.53 By and large, Pakistan's India centric policy, countering ethno-nationalist
struggles, coupled w ith a num ber of political events (nam ely the Afghan W a r of 1979,
and th e Iranian revolution of 1979) occurred in th e neighborhood and intensified the
level of violence in the country. Therefore, the evolution o f violence in Pakistan exists in
d ifferent forms; the violence exists on ethno-nationalistic grounds, sectarian and
religious grounds, and for geo-strategic reasons.
To understand the evolution of violence, it is significant to study th e causes and
effects of violence in the country. One o f the m ajor causes in making Pakistan a security
or police state to deal w ith is the fear against India. Subduing nationalist trends through
the use of force, using religious sentiments to diffuse nationalist tendencies,
undermining progressive movements, and nurture of extrem e ideologies due to
geopolitical reasons results in the em ergence of various m ilitant outfits posing an
existential th re a t to Pakistan. Should recasting nationalist tendencies will reset the
balance or repeat the history and allow irredentists to becom e active again? A rational
approach to understanding Pakistan's praetorian society is an im portant factor, because
out o f 67 years of history, the military ruled for m ore than half of Pakistan's history,
while civil bureaucrats only ruled a little more than one decade. M o reo ver, supporting
non-state actors for use as proxies remains a core feature in the entire region, be it the
case of Kashmir, Afghanistan, or Baluchistan. Therefore, th e politics of South Asia is
based on reactionary politics, first, by creating self-anxiety against each o th e r and

53 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1 9 4 7 -2 0 1 1 (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 422.

218
consequently establishing a niche betw een governm ents and non-state actors to
achieve objectives based on the self-created anxieties.
The post 9 /1 1 era has changed the dynamics of proxy w arfare in general, which
is trying to move away from th e state's traditional policies o f supporting th e non-state
actors for strategic reasons. Despite a global shift in policy, the rem nants of proxy
w arfare continue in various conflicts affecting th e zones of fragile states like
Afghanistan, Syria, and many African states which become fertile fields o f proxy w arfare.
Therefore, it is unfortunately not easy fo r many Third W orld states to exonerate
themselves from web-traps w oven for proxy w arfare.
In order to reduce the severe effects o f security challenges, Pakistan needs to
prioritize its domestic and foreign policies so its negative image can be countered, and
the role o f the state can be regarded notably in regional and global contexts. Pakistani
political and defense analyst Hasan Askari Rizvi suggests th a t Pakistan needs first to
focus on its "internal political stability and cohesion, and economic resilience (which
will) increase the capacity of a state to counter external pressures and increase its
foreign policy options."54 An increase in state capacity will encourage g reater economic
integration th a t will potentially help Pakistan to defuse its diplomatic rows and pave the
way tow ards effective regional and global integration.
Ahmed Rashid points out th at there are four reasons which actually prevented
the stabilization and social cohesion of Pakistan as a nation-state. First, Pakistan is still
struggling to outline the proper definition as a nation, so there is a lack o f clarity over
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national identity. Second, there is a distinct divide over its security paradigm betw een
the military's India centric policy and the political leadership's alternative outlook fo r
restoring neighborly ties. Third, th e abnorm ality of th e state's continued support of non
state actors or Jihadi groups, which is now psychologically affecting m ilitary personal,
and many of these groups have becom e anti-state guerilla factions. Finally, th e inability
to accom m odate ethnic groups into a political balance and access to a fair share of
resources among provinces ham pers a social and political cohesion am ong its
nationals.55
W ith the prevalence of th e above-m entioned factors, the future image of th e
entire region depicts a soaring level of violence. At the very least, to avert internal
security threats, Pakistan essentially needs to fram e "visionary and integrated policies"
th at will help in "harmonizing external and internal policies."56 W hile adm itting the
national, regional, and global transform ations and political transitions, Pakistan's
Adviser to Prime M inister on Foreign Affairs and National Security M r. Sartaj Aziz
emphasized a new policy outlook at the National Assembly o f Pakistan, which will be a
comprehensive national security policy through integrating internal security, defense
security, and foreign policy with available economic resources. According to these new
policies, M r. Aziz assured the parliam ent th at the new governm ent is putting sincere
efforts into the design and im plem entation of a policy on "Internal security and policy of
non-interference; economic developm ent through trade and not aid; fully benefiting
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from geographical location; and prom oting Pakistan's image by strengthening
democracy and economic institutions in the country."57 The proposed policy is setting its
agenda on the basis of neutrality, however, it needs to see th e interest of traditional
stakeholders; a clash o f interest w ith stakeholders will potentially ham per any proposed
collective wisdom. As in th e past, many such proposals failed due to m ilitary adventures
in the region (e.g. the Kargil conflict in 1999), m ilitary doctrines (e.g. Cold Start (Indian);
A zm -e-N au-lll (Pakistani)), or terrorist attacks (e.g. the M um bai attack allegedly
involving the support of Pakistan) causing severe setbacks to political developm ents and
lingering mistrust against each other.

PRAETORIANISM: THE WEAKENING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND STATE
CAPACITY
The role of the m ilitary in Pakistani politics is central and retains a "quasi
monopoly," being significantly influential in dom estic politics vis-a-vis policy
form ulation.58 The origin o f Pakistan's m ilitary can be traced back to before the creation
of the country w hen it was form ally established as the British-lndian colonial arm y.
However, in the post-independence period, the evolution o f the m ilitary strengthened
its capabilities and established itself as a disciplined institution following the patterns of
colonial legacies inherited by the British military, but also deepened its settings into the
politics of the country, which led to frequent m ilitary coups and prolonged m ilitary rule
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over the country. The frequent interventions continued to be legitimized in the interest
o f national security, and the m ilitary projected its actions "as an ultim ate a r b itr a to r ...
and eventual savior of the nation-state."59 The ram ifications of military interventions
and m ilitary rule, on the one hand, established a benign praetorian political system
favoring th e m ilitary elites; on the other hand, political institutions o th er than the
m ilitary became ineffective. In general, praetorian societies primarily underm ine
democracy, equity, and economic grow th, and th e ir long-term effects suffer th e political
com m unities and dem ocratic institutions o f the state.60
Praetorianism in Pakistan's political system evolved through a num ber o f factors
which included institutional legacies inherited from colonial times, and dom estic and
regional factors th a t also provided opportunities fo r civil bureaucrats and m ilitary elites
to institutionalize central authority in the political system. The institutionalized
fram ew ork affirm ed the notion of the military's "right to intervene" in dom estic politics,
remaining visible in various formats, i.e. as an arbitrator, paternal, or guardian's role to
fix political troubles.61 It is hardly surprising th a t th e continued role o f the m ilitary and
bureaucracy to act as guardian or arbitrator in politics is due to practices from colonial
traditions. The colonial forces w ere not subservient to the elected representatives o f the
sub-continent, but rather directly subordinated to the governor-general. M ilitary elites
were in the executive hierarchy of legislative process, in which the m ilitary had a m ore
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prom inent role in the sub-continent than w h a t was practiced in England.62 The similar
patterns o f m ilitary engagem ent in decision-making and political involvem ent continue
a fte r the decolonization as well; even after independence in 1947 the British generals
and officers retained m ilitary com mand until 1951.
Obviously, after th e partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, both India and
Pakistan prim arily relied on colonial state m ethods, strictly following bureaucratic
control and centralization.63 For instance, th e colonial Governm ent o f India Act of 1935
was adopted (until the Objective Resolution o f 1949 was passed) and provided a
concrete base (known as steel fram e) for bureaucratic authority during British rule. The
same act was inherited and adopted by both sides. South Asia historian Ayesha Jalal
identifies the problem , noting th a t soon a fte r the birth of th e new independent states,
th ere was a need of a "massive reorganization of th e administrative apparatus o f th e
colonial state to guarantee the supremacy o f elected institutions" instead of providing a
popular legitimacy "on the grounds of pragmatism and the need to m aintain some sort
o f adm inistrative continuity to cope w ith the massive dislocations and law and order
problems th a t followed in the w ake of partition."64
At the tim e of partition, Pakistan was too w eak and faced strategic and
institutional challenges. The notion of oneness of nation was already challenged on
m ultiple fronts through sub-nationalist m ovem ents. To tackle the strategic challenges,
mainly from India over Kashmir and Afghanistan over the Durand line, most o f the
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budget was invested in defense. To train a professional arm y, Pakistan em ployed almost
500 British officers due to a shortfall of qualified Pakistan m ilitary officials.65 As Pakistan
already inherited one-third of the British Indian arm y, meaning 30 percent o f the arm y,
4 0 percent of its navy, 20 percent o f the air force, while only 17 percent o f revenue,
such a huge m ilitary and less economic provisions burdened the country.66 Due to th e
lack of resources and institutional strengthening, the Pakistani state avoided crucial
areas of investm ent, like health and education, instead preferring to shield the safety
and security of the state in suspicion of any possible hostility from much bigger and
stronger neighbors.67 The state-building process fundam entally focused on defense
capabilities, w hile political and apolitical state building capacities rem ained ignored; this
gradually became visible in the form of asym m etrical pow er relations betw een state
institutions.
In 1948 Pakistan is estim ated to have allocated 75% o f its budget on defense,
which underm ined other im portant sectors to provide basic social and political goods.68
Despite a w eak m ilitary and dilapidated economic base, India and Pakistan w en t to w ar
soon after their birth in 1948 over Kashmir, resulting in th e division of Kashmir th at
endures to this day.69 Pakistan's apparent decision to go to w ar w ith the help of tribal
militias was in reaction to India's decision to retain Hyderabad and Junagadh because
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Pakistan anticipated getting these tw o princely states in th e view o f th e June 1947
partition plan. Pakistan's m ilitary repeated similar tactics o f 1948 to get Kashmir in th e
1965 w ar and in the 1999 Kargil conflict, but th e outcom e further increased distrust
betw een th e tw o states.
Interestingly, when the Indo-Pak conflicts over Kashmir of 1948 and 1999 [other
than the tw o wars of 1965 (over Kashmir) and 1971 (over Bangladesh), because the
m ilitary was already ruling during these years], are com pared, it can be noted th a t each
w ere on an occasion when a civilian governm ent was in place. After an unsuccessful
outcome, the m ilitary leadership and its cadre had grievances against the political
leadership for being lenient and giving up on the wars, which the m ilitary always
believed to be going in th e ir favor. The grievances by the military on both occasions
w ere follow ed by m ilitary coup attem pts, w ith the first case being unsuccessful, w hen
"M ajor-G eneral Akbar Khan, chief o f the general staff and coordinator o f th e Kashmir
campaign, unsuccessfully plotted the first m ilitary coup in 1951, citing as his main
m otive the mishandling of the Kashmir issue by civilians."70 While in 1999 Gen.
M usharraf was successful in overthrowing PM Nawaz Sharif over a plane scandal,
however, the m ilitary cadre was unhappy w ith PM Nawaz Sharif's decision to back up
from Kargil heights, as the military command's belief it had a better control and position
in the large area.71
Another im portant feature to bear in mind is how military interventions during
post-colonial societies are linked to racial divides. It is im portant because m ilitary
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institutions are m ore influential in Third W orld societies, and "ethnic composition plays
a m ajor role in th e country's politics," especially in regards to politics o f ethnicities and
pow er relations betw een a center and its provinces.72 During the British colonial period,
colonial authorities raised local armies and picked soldiers from selected ethnic groups;
as in Burm a/ M yanm ar, Burmans w ere ignored, and in Nepal the British enlisted
Gurkhas as a m artial race of the subcontinent to support its fight. Similarly in the Indian
sub-continent w hen the British w ere planning on dismantling the "Bengal Arm y a fte r
1857's mutiny" or because of rebellions against British rule, colonial British rulers
prudently recruited Pashtun and Punjabi Muslims (from today's Pakistan), Punjabi Sikhs
(from today's India) into the m ilitary as ethnic m artial races, while o th er Muslim
populations or ethnicities w ere ignored.73 A fter th e creation of Pakistan, the m ilitary
trends continued the colonial legacy and in general ignored other ethnicities, w hile
India, through a policy procedure, gradually controlled the disproportion of ethnic
influence of Sikhs over its military. In Pakistan's case, since most of th e inherited m ilitary
personnel belonged to W estern Pakistan, and the center remained in the hands of
W estern Pakistan, in th at scenario, East Pakistan becom e a peripheral unit.
Recent statistics still show th a t the demographic representation in the m ilitary
continued as inherited from colonial settings. According to military analyst Ayesha
Siddiqa, 75 percent of military personnel are recruited from three to four districts of
Punjab, called "Salt Range," 20 per cent from th re e to four districts of Khyber
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Pakhtunkhwa, w hile 5 per cent from rem aining tw o provinces, Sindh and Baluchistan.74
To furth er break down the composition, a recent statistical data set indicates th a t 67
per cent of the officer corps and 43 percent o f the soldiery in the arm y is composed of
Punjabis; around 25 percent of the officer corps and 22 percent of th e soldiery in the
arm y is Pashtun, w hile the remaining percentage is divided among o th e r ethnic
groups.75 In fact, the Cold W ar period also facilitated the colonial legacies of picking
allies based on "racialist concepts," with Pakistan becoming "America's most allied ally"
for joining hands w ith NATO partners South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO in
1954) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO in 1955) to help the W est by providing
bases in South Asia against the Soviet Union.76 The U.S adm inistration under President
Eisenhower assumed Pakistanis w ere Ghurkas w ho fought fo r the British colonial arm y
and hoped Pakistanis would help in the fight against Communism.77 This becam e a
reality in the 1980s, and eventually the world witnessed th e demise of the Soviet Union.
The first decade o f Pakistan's history was crucial as it actually m olded the shape
of political dynamics w ith the early death of its founding father, and the disintegration
of political parties allowing bureaucrats to rule the country for 11 years. This was
followed by military rule in 1958, which continued until th e debacle of East Pakistan in
1971 which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh as a new nation-state. The creation of
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Bangladesh initiated serious debates about th e perform ance of the m ilitary, the role of
political leadership, and m ore im portantly, flum m oxed the entire nation w ith questions
regarding the validity of its ideology. Religious ideology remained the essential facto r in
unifying the heterogeneous com m unities during the struggle for independence.78 One
aspect of the argum ent debate, talked about the failure of th e tw o-nation theory, which
undermines the role o f religion in retaining th e national cohesion. The counter
argum ent still proves th at Bangladesh did not decide to re-join India, as half o f the
Bengal ethnic Hindu m ajority still lives in India and India was a winning party th at
supported the people of East Pakistan's independence, but rather th a t M uslim Bengalis
preferred to have an independent country on the basis of a religious divide. In response
to the loss of the w ar and 9 0,0 00 m ilitary personnel held as prisoners o f w a r (PoW ), the
Pakistani m ilitary was forced to give up pow er and provide a chance fo r Z. A. Bhutto's
dem ocratic governm ent to control th e system.
Referring back to 1958's m artial law governm ent and military rule, Gen. Ayub
Khan promised the nation an im m ediate dem ocratic election. Interestingly, later on
Gen. Zia ul Haq in the late 1970s and Gen. M usharraf in the late 1990s follow ed the
same pattern as their predecessor did regarding im m ediate and transparent dem ocratic
elections. Promises and pledges are always w ithered away shortly a fte r coming into
power, and each one's rule was prolonged fo r almost a decade. As in m ost Third W orld
states, the waves o f dem ocratization w ere taking place, and by contrast "Pakistan's
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democracy died" soon a fte r authoritarian regimes replaced the dem ocratic order.79
W ith the gradual influence over domestic and foreign policies, the role o f the
m ilitary also becomes effective in proposing and fram ing foreign policy. The m ilitary's
superiority complexity over political elites believed th at it has a b etter assessment of
national, regional, and global th re a t perceptions. Therefore, the fact th a t most m ilitary
rulers enjoyed strong and positive strategic relations w ith th e U.S., and the U.S. heavily
supported the m ilitarization of Pakistan's arm y both through training and equipping
w ith m odern w eaponry dem onstrates how dem ocratic institutions w ere given less
attention. Intriguingly the global and regional geopolitical scenarios co-incidentally
became significant during the tim e of m ilitary rule, which already focused and projected
the geopolitical im portance of Pakistan, and helped Pakistan become a beneficiary of
th e Cold W ar rivalry betw een th e U.S. and the Soviet Union.80 The geopolitical situation
prom pted U.S. policy makers to pour economic and m ilitary aid into Pakistan. For
exam ple, during Gen. Ayub's rule (1 9 58 -1 9 69 ), the U.S. relied on Pakistan to curtail the
expansion of communism; the policy rem ained for Gen. Ayub's successor, Gen.
M uham m ad Yahya Khan (1 9 69 -1 9 71 ). During Gen. Zia ul Haq's period (1 9 77 -1 9 88 ),
Pakistan became a frontline state in fighting against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. Finally Gen. Pervez M usharraf's period (1999-2008) once again made
Pakistan a frontline state; this tim e in the global W a r on T error (W oT).
During the Cold W ar, Pakistan com fortably becam e the "West's eastern anchor
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in an Asian alliance structure."81 To cem ent th e long term strategic interests, in early
1950 Gen. Ayub Khan, as Pakistan's arm y com m ander during his visit to the U.S.,
requested m ilitary assistance through Assistant Secretary o f State Henry Byroade,
declaring, "I didn't come here to look at barracks. O ur arm y can be your arm y if you
w an t us. But let's m ake a decision."82 Pakistan was desperate to strengthen its m ilitary
capabilities because geographical and existential fears and insecurities hovered
continuously in the minds of Pakistan's m ilitary and political elites. Pakistan w on the
support of the United States' political and m ilitary leadership as it perceived India being
inclined tow ards the Soviet block and Pakistan as an ally ready to allow use of its m ilitary
bases against communism. Though Pakistan's political elites and m ilitary leadership did
not make the sharing of Badaber airbase (near Peshawar) public.
The airbase became an issue when th e Soviet Union shot down a U2 surveillance
plane in 1960, making it the center o f public attention and international politics.83
Similar to its earlier period of m ilitary cooperation, in the post 9 /1 1 period Gen.
Musharraf's rule also provided the m ilitary bases fo r operational m atters, w hile in public
it was told th a t Pakistani forces would not provide any base except in logistical support
in the global w ar on te rro r as an ally. How ever, w ith the passage of tim e and unpopular
drone attacks, political pressure built to seek answers about the provision of m ilitary
bases and any agreem ents regarding drone attacks betw een the U.S. and Pakistan. The
military rem ained in denial until U.S. Navy Seals hunted dow n Osama Bin Laden (OBL) in
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Pakistan in 2011, and afte r the NATO airstrikes killed 25 Pakistani m ilitary personnel at
Salala in Novem ber 2011, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. In protest o f Salala
incident, Pakistan asked th e U.S. to vacate Shamsi Airfield, also known as Bhandari
Airstrip located in Baluchistan (actually leased to th e UAE, after 9 /1 1 the US took charge
of Shamsi through a sub-lease, obviously w ith the consent o f Pakistan).84 In addition,
Gen. M usharraf m entioned after his re tirem e n t th a t there was an agreem ent betw een
the U.S. and Pakistan for limited drone strikes, and Shamsi airfield was one o f the
facilities in the region used for drone operations.85
The vicissitudes of the U.S. and Pakistan's alliance is based on a happy and
unhappy marriage relationship, which are reflected in various diplomatic highs and lows
and strategic ties. Such highs can be seen w hen on the diplomatic fro n t Pakistan played
a crucial role in bringing the U.S. and China closer, and President Nixon m entioned in his
m em oir after the trip to the region th a t he found India's leader Nehru "the least friendly
leader," and showed his com m itm ent to extend greater support tow ards Pakistan.86 A
low is considered, however, when Pakistan faced severe economic sanctions in response
to its nuclear program in the 1990s under civilian rule.87 An all-tim e low was witnessed
after the Salala incident in Novem ber 2011. In protest Pakistan blocked NATO supply
lines into Afghanistan th a t cost millions of dollars to the U.S. as it forced an extrem ely
expensive reliance on supply routes via Afghanistan's north and by air. The Salala
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incident was proceeded by tw o earlier events, i.e. in January 2011, the arrest of CIA
contractor Raymond Allen Davis in Lahore, and in M a y 2011, the U.S. Navy Seals'
Operation Geronim o to hunt down Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, events which
already indicated the emerging diplom atic gaps b etw een th e two states.88
Unlike Gen. Ayub's m ilitary regime, the post-1977 m artial law period led by Gen.
Zia ul Haq is known as the Islamization of Pakistan. Gen. Ayub's period is largely
considered Pakistan's pro-m odernization phase w ith a lesser tendency to find a relation
betw een the military and th e mosque.89 How ever, Gen. Ayub did facilitate tem porarily
th e use of religion for his electoral gains. Though th e tem porary support by religious
groups cannot be singled out, it eventually strengthened th e roots fo r religious
ideologues and the decay of a democratic future. The full-fledged support and
imposition of an orthodox Islam as a political ideology under Gen. Zia's period (19771988) became an ideal match for clerics and Islamists to deeply penetrate society's
social structure as well as the state's institutions.
At the same tim e, during the late 1970s the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the
W estern Allies and states from M iddle East sent 3 5,0 00 holy warriors th a t fu rth e r
supported Gen. Zia's enthusiastic Islamic ideology o f violent jihad narratives.90 In
m ilitary and economic aspects Pakistan tem porarily benefitted from the bipolar conflict,
but in the long run, its socio-political conditions suffered. M s. Maleeha Lodhi explicitly
draws th e troubles inherited by Pakistan fo r its supporting o f jihad in Afghanistan and
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Islamizing Pakistani society. Ms. Lodhi w rites jihad ideology from Zia's tim e brought
problems to Pakistan, which included the "induction o f Islamic militancy, proliferation of
weapons, spread of narcotics, exponential grow th o f madrasahs, growing violence and a
large Afghan refugee population (three million during the w a r time and around tw o
million today)... resulting Pakistan's own instability."91
Gen. Zia highly encouraged the reshaping of th e state's law, educational system,
and way of life according to conservative religious thoughts and imposition o f Sharia as
th e rule of law for Pakistan. Ostensibly Gen. Zia, like his predecessors, promised to
support an inclusive political system, but in reality his "single-minded c o m m itm en t to
anti-liberal, anti-dem ocratic, anti-m inorities and anti-w om en agenda" was seeking a
political and social order in which "adm inistration, judiciary, banking, trade, education,
agriculture, industry and foreign affairs are regulated in accordance w ith Islamic
principles," consequently creating the monopoly of "an Islamic garrison in Pakistan."92
Contrary to Zia's ideals, the actual teachings of religion demands inclusive, dem ocratic,
and equal rights for all w ithout any discrimination.
Zahid Hussain explains th at in Zia's period, the Islamization of state and society
occurred at tw o levels: a) "Changes w ere instituted in the legal system; b) Islamization
was prom oted through print media, radio, television and mosques."93 Religion was
strictly indoctrinated in civil services, the arm ed forces, and the educational system .94 As
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an instance to vindicate th e argum ent, the introduction of Hudood Ordinance in legal
affair th a t was prom ulgated in 1979 is a vivid exam ple. The Hudood Ordinance outlined
and defined the punishments for any im m oral or unethical acts through traditional
Islamic ways. Harsher punishments included death by stoning for adultery, 100 lashes
for fornication, 100 lashes for false accusation for adultery, 80 lashes fo r drinking
alcohol, am putation or cutting off the right hand fo r theft, whipping (ta'zir) and death
for derogatory remarks against the Prophet.95 W ith the inclusion o f a blasphemy law in
1982 prohibiting anyone from using derogatory remarks against the Prophet, initially
the maximum punishm ent was life im prisonm ent; an am endm ent to the blasphemy law
in 1986 maximized the punishm ent to th e death penalty fo r any derogatory stance.96
Society became m ore hostile than before, and blasphemy laws became a political and
revenge tool on many accounts.
To im plem ent these laws religious clerics (ulem a) w e re required to sit on the
Shariat Benches of the High Courts, which w ere established in 1981. How ever, in 1986, a
full-fledged Federal Shariat Court replaced the Shariat Benches.97 The outcom e of
promoting and infiltrating a religiously oriented political ideology threatens the
cohesiveness of the state by creating divides betw een those who follow the ideology
and those w ho do not. Over the period o f tim e, once society is radicalized, then it
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anticipates sharing pow er with th e center and aggressively demands and paints the
entire society w ith a single color, which eventually underm ines the diversity o f opinion
and diversification of society. As it happened in Afghanistan, when the religious regim e
led by the Taliban systematically destroyed Afghan society's rich culture, societal
structure, and pre-lslamic heritage.98 Similarly, a fte r 9 /1 1 , the Pakistani governm ent and
its civil society faced challenges from various contending Islamist ideologies, and state
institutions are still grappling w ith these ideational threats; these ideological bases are
the creation o f its own past and facilitated by geopolitical events o f the Cold W ar.
Gen. Pervez Musharraf's period (1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 8 ) is the latest m ilitary rule in the
political history of Pakistan. Gen. M usharraf rem oved the democratically elected Prime
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in a m ilitary coup on O ctober 1 2 ,1 9 9 9 . Unlike earlier m ilitary
rule, M usharraf did not declare martial law or appoint him self as chief m artial law
adm inistrator, but rather an "emergency" was imposed and Musharraf picked a
corporate title called "chief executive" (later becoming president of the country), w ith
powers equivalent to th a t of prime m inister.99
By the tim e Gen. M usharraf took power, Pakistan was suffering under economic
sanctions due to its M ay 1998 nuclear tests conducted in response to India's nuclear
explosions. In addition, the Kargil conflict o f 1999 brought a negative image to Pakistan
on a global level. Finally, the overthrow ing of a dem ocratic governm ent was also view ed
negatively as another derailed chance at a dem ocratization process. In fact, the UN
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Secretary General censured the m ilitary act of removing Sharif, and the International
M onetary Fund (IM F) decided to suspend its loans until democracy was restored.100
M usharraf announced his seven point agenda in a tim e of national despondency and
assured the people th a t it would help Pakistan to stabilize by: 1) "rebuilding national
confidence and m orale, 2) strengthening the federation w ith the rem oval o f inter
provincial disharmony, 3) revival of th e econom y and restoration of th e investors'
confidence, 4) ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice, 5) depoliticization
of state institutions, 6) devolution of pow er to th e grassroots level, and 7) ensuring swift
and across the board accountability."101 The actualization o f the wish list was not easy
for a military ruler to achieve in smooth order w hile the country's diplom atic and
economic standing was in a dilapidated condition. As noted previously, Pakistan always
benefited from geopolitical conflicts, and once again the traum atic events o f 9 /1 1
changed the entire script of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures on Pakistan.
Pakistan once again became a frontline state, this tim e in th e global w a r on te rro r. U.S.
President George W . Bush quickly helped Pakistan by easing off its sanctions in response
to Gen. Musharraf's com m itm ent to become a pivotal partner in the w a r in Afghanistan.
Through M usharraf's rule the U.S. provided m ore than $10 billion to Pakistan.
During most of this period M usharraf rem ained focused on th e w ar on te rro r in
Afghanistan, w ith a vague strategy about how to deal w ith the war, th e gradual "spread
of radicalization, intensification of violence and the furth er undermining of a febrile
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econom y."102 Like Gen. Ayub, M usharraf is also considered a pro-m odernization
personality. Keeping in mind the changing global patterns o f globalization, M usharraf
opted to re-shape Pakistan's image w ith his famous slogan "enlightened m oderation," in
which he was determ ined to "repair Pakistan's image as a beacon of m oderate Islam;"
he remained unsuccessful due to Pakistan's deep rooted Kashmir policy and support for
jihadi factions w ho fought against Soviets in Afghanistan, Indians in Kashmir, and even
the broader scale notion o f a caliphate deep into central Asia.103 Unlike his m ilitary
predecessors, M usharraf unprecedentedly opened the m edia, which becam e one o f the
most powerful institutions allowed to express public and political opinions. In addition,
his reforms in higher education w ere revolutionary, a needed credit to M usharraf fo r his
governm ent's outstanding investments. How ever, during th e last years o f his rule, his
decision to ban the media and his coup against the judiciary provided an opportu nity for
his political opposition to mobilize a political struggle and force him to resign as a head
of state in early 2008.
Looking into the impact of praetorianism in the Pakistani political system, as
m entioned above, a num ber of analysts argued th a t the role of the m ilitary in the
colonial Indian sub-continent was given a high portfolio. Therefore, it is not surprising to
see a continuation of the military's arbitrary role in a post-colonial setting. How ever, in
Pakistan's case, the role of the m ilitary can be view ed in tw o different periods, a) 19471971, b) 1977-2008. The first period of m ilitary interventions is considered to be like
engaging the m ilitary in politics through an arbitrary role and is focused m ore on
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budgetary dem ands to strengthen th e m ilitary's capabilities. Budgetary dem ands are
always m ore appealing to m ilitary strategists, w hom believe Pakistan was in need of
securing its threatened borders to its east, as India opposed the recognition o f Kashmir
and the w est, w here Afghanistan supported an irredentist struggle against Pakistan.104
The second period of the military's role in politics was a systematic institutionalization
of the m ilitary in domestic politics. The institutionalization o f strategic thinking in
domestic polity helped the military not only to deal with th e long te rm lim itations of
m ilitary interventions but to identify its political w ay-out. M oreover, m ilitary personnel
successfully stepped into corporate industry too.
According to M azhar Aziz, in the post-1977 period th e "institutionalization of
military control, form ally through introducing constitutional provisions, penetrating the
public sector by appointing serving and retired m ilitary officers, and by occupying the
economic space through its business activity, has made it increasingly difficult fo r the
political elite to roll back its influence."105 As an exam ple, during Gen. Zia's period o f rule
(1 977-1988) tw o im portant steps em pow ered his authority and penetration into th e
civil-bureaucracy to safeguard the interests o f the military. First, Gen. Zia am ended the
country's constitution and included article 5 8 (B) 2 through 8th am endm ent in 1985.
Article 58 (B) 2 vested the president with pow er th a t allowed him to dismiss the national
and provincial assemblies, and dissolve the parliam ent.
Interestingly, due to emerging differences, his own selected prim e m inister
M uham m ad Khan Junejo, became th e first victim w ho was removed through the use of
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58 (B) 2 powers. Later, the same article was invoked to dismiss all of the elected
regimes. In addition, Gen Zia's plan to fu rth e r e m p o w er his authority was to establish
th e National Security Council, although it did not come to fruition, w hile during
M usharraf's m ilitary rule M usharraf succeeded in institutionalizing the suprem acy of the
m ilitary through his "Legal Framework O rder (LFO)" which am ended th e constitution
and allowed the m ilitary to look after the country's affairs through the establishm ent of
th e National Security Council (NSC) in April 2 0 0 4 .106 A lready enjoying the powers of 58
(B) 2, the establishment of the NSC strengthened M usharraf's authority and fu rth er
cem ented his rule through institutionalization.
At the grassroots level, M usharraf introduced m onitoring cells th a t w ere
supposedly m eant to keep an eye on corruption in public offices, which in fact
em pow ered deputed m ilitary officers over public offices. In his rule, M usharraf regime
by 2004 there w ere about 150 serving and retired m ilitary officers "heading the
governm ent's major corporations, holding ministries, controlling education, leading
police, subjecting Musharraf's opponents to accountability, running foreign missions,
managing cricket, and so forth" this num ber is in addition to the regular 10% quota for
military in civil services.107 In addition, a frequent posting of military personnel in th e
civil-bureaucracy was also noticed on a higher scale, which was rolled back in Gen.
Kiyani's tenure as the new m ilitary Chief. Gen. Kiyani spent his tim e strengthening the
image of the military in the public eye. The m ilitary had been significantly criticized
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during M u s h a rra f s last years o f rule. M usharraf's actions against the media and
judiciary w ere widely criticized, directly affecting the m ilitary's public posture.
A fter President Musharraf's resignation in 2008, th e PPP led a coalition
governm ent under the rule of President Zardari to once again amended the constitution
and relieved the powers o f president, w ho will not be able to use 58 (B) 2 th a t has
derailed the dem ocratization processes. Prime M inister Naw az Sharif, elected in 2013,
passed a m otion to change the structure of th e NSC. PM Sharif's governm ent believed
th a t since Pakistan has a parliam entary system, the NSC should be headed by th e PM,
not the president. Therefore, the new am endm ents em pow ered the PM as head of the
NSC and included m ore civilian representatives in the council to create an equilibrium .
A second im portant initiative was the creation of a quota o f reserved seats for
military officers in the civil service or bureaucracy. It is im portant to re m em b e r th a t the
military's political weakness is its technical inability and skills to govern th e political
community; additionally, the lack of legitimacy always challenges the m ilitary rule.
Although th e military enjoys legitimacy for its interventions in most Third W orld
societies but cannot prolong its rule, a professional m ilitary is trained for a d iffe re n t
domain than retaining pow er in the political sphere.108 The colonial legacy of a quota for
military personal continued in Pakistani polity. The first President of th e country, M r.
Iskander M irza, also became a bureaucrat through his m ilitary service career. The civilbureaucracy is referred to as a steel fram e in Pakistan's polity, having significant control
over the planning and execution of national policies. The induction o f m ilitary officers
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through a quota helps m ilitary officers understand th e political culture of society. It
further provides an insight into political life and civic culture th at helps m ilitary
bureaucrats create a nexus betw een the m ilitary and society. In this way, m ilitary rulers
tried to fill the vacuum of political leadership through the establishm ent o f roots w ithin
the institutions and derive support from the public.
Finally, in recent years, it has been greatly debated th a t military coups and
interventions into politics are a response by a m ilitary "defending its corporate and
status and privileges."109 First of all, it needs to be acknowledged th a t economic
opportunity costs provide a w indow of opportunity fo r m ilitary rulers to prove their
interventions as pro-developm ent, as the Turkey and Egypt military tried to prove.
Following th e pattern, Pakistan's m ilitary rulers engaged in developm ent activities.
Instead of showing any keen interest in political m obilization or participation, they
invested in the industrial sector as a b etter payoff fo r country. This was in a w ay a
positive sign, though at th e same tim e m ilitary elites involved into economic
activities.110 During his era in Pakistan, Gen. Ayub focused more on developm ent
projects, eventually bringing the m ilitary into the corporate sector. For instance, public
institutions, nam ely the Frontier W orks Organization (FW O), the National Logistic Cell
(NLC), and the Special Communication Organization (SCO) are linked under th e military's
supervision; these institutions are the largest of th e ir nature to deliver services for
construction, transportation, and com m unication services respectively in Pakistan.111
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The m ilitary's other economic institutions, categorized as subsidiary
organizations, like the Fauji Foundation (FF - Arm y), Army W elfare Trust (AW T - Arm y),
Shaheen Foundation (AF - Air Force), and Bahria Foundation, (BF - Naval) provide
em ploym ent and w elfare services to ex-servicemen and also provide em p lo ym en t
opportunities to civilians w ho work at the industrial units. Under these subsidiary
organizations, industrial investment in oil and gas, cem ent industry, pharmaceuticals,
sugar mill, fertilizer mill, banking, insurance, housing schemes, overseas em plo ym ent,
and so forth are industries run under retired m ilitary personnel.112 Some of the
industrial units are the largest handlers of th e ir kind in the country and enjoy a g reater
share in economic activities across th e country.
Apart from domestic resource extraction, th e U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia have
remained the main donors to Pakistan and its m ilitary. Ishtiaq Ahmed em phasized th a t
"Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as long as the donors are willing
to provide it w ith the required resources and it can convince or coerce its population
th at the struggle fo r survival necessitates prioritisation o f th e allocation o f scarce
resources to security."113 On these grounds, it is obvious th a t the praetorian roots in
Pakistan's political system have settled firm ly. Despite th e global political awakening,
th e geopolitical competitions and unresolved political disputes in the region will provide
an advantage to Pakistan's m ilitary in retaining its traditional influence over national
security, foreign policy, and obviously the safeguarding of its economic interests and
privileges.
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DYNASTIC POLITICS: A COMPROMISED DEMOCRACY OR POLITICAL CORRUPTION?
Democracy is widely accepted as a suitable and popular form of governance
throughout th e w orld. Democracy on a broader scale shares some com m on norms, i.e.
pluralistic tendencies based on inclusiveness, political trust, accountability, and will of
the m ajority in the political system. Despite knowing the pros about dem ocratic political
systems, Third W orld countries are still troubled w ith issues of frequent m ilitary
interventions, single party authoritarian rule, absolute monarchy, to talitarian regimes,
rule by one fam ily, rule by tribal lords or feudal lords, or in anarchic conditions, and rule
by warlords. Interestingly, in most o f cases these undem ocratic structures prom ote
dynastic politics. According to Farrukh Saleem dynastic politics is a "succession o f rulers
from the same fam ily or line," dom inating th e quasi-democratic form s o f governm ents
and weakening the dem ocratization process through compromises w ith undem ocratic
forces.114 The fragile and w eak status of the Pakistani state is a suitable exam ple of
compromised democracy in which a nexus betw een civil-military elites engages in
entertaining its own interests.
Looking back into Pakistan's history, th e past script and political episodes reflect
th a t the dem ocratic initiatives have been given little chance to perform . Although on a
fe w occasions democracy was provided some space to flourish, it ended up as a political
transition in domestic politics th a t was used as a bargaining chip or compromise
betw een the troika, i.e. political elites, bureaucrats, and th e military. The m ajor dilem m a
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with Pakistan's political elite is its roots in th e feudal class, or the fam ily fie fd o m .115 This
feudalism is blamed for equally affecting the political m aturity of institutions and
delinking the state from society for personal gain, th e same reason w hy m any analysts
criticize non-dem ocratic forces. Farruk Saleem highlights th e correlation betw een
dynastic politics and societal backwardness and political parochialism. Saleem argues
th at out of 1.7 billion poor, why is it th a t 51 percent o f w orld's population lives in South
Asia? He links the answer to dynastic politics or feudal structures th a t d eliberately kept
societies highly illiterate, poor and depen dent on these fam ily lineages, so th a t
influential families retained their authority. W ith reference to continued argum ent,
Larkana in Sindh is a vivid example, which produced tw o o f Pakistan's most popular
prim e ministers, but illiteracy and ultra-poverty rates are high, while people still pledge
allegiance to the same family authority, dem onstrating th e political parochialism and
dependency of a controlled society.116
Historically, political pow er in Pakistan is derived from the biradari system
(brotherhood, kinship group, clan) under the supervision o f feudal landlords, which
facilitated the dynastic politics. The biradari system is highly influential in Punjab, and it
plays a pivotal role in the electoral process.117 For exam ple, out of 342 seats fo r the
National Assembly (272 General Seats, 60 reserved for w om en, 10 for m inorities),
Punjab has 183 seats, making it alone eligible to form a national governm ent from only
one province. The feudal elites use biradari for political mobilization during political
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campaigns, and its influence spills over into urban politics as well. Therefore th e social
order influenced under landlords (biradari system) in Southern Punjab, W ad ero (title for
feudal) in Sindh, Sardar (title for tribal leader) in Baluchsitan, Malik (title fo r Pashtun
tribal leader) in KPK or Tribal Areas, have shaped th e pow er dynamics both at a
provincial and national level. Interestingly, many o f th e new ly emerged feudal fam ilies
in northern Punjab have no landowning background, how ever, some turn ed feudal due
to an increase in urban property ownership or successful corruption through state
services.118
During the colonial era, pow er was considered a symbol of pride, and mostly the
landlords, civil servants or m ilitary elites enjoyed power, which furth er continued in the
post-colonial setting. As noted, pow er corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Over the years, the political oligarchy corrupted the pow er and resource sharing in
Pakistan. According to a Pakistani political scientist Dr. M oham m ad W aseem , "the
pervasive nature of corruption in th at country (Pakistan) can only be understood
through a structural analysis of the legal, adm inistrative and judicial fram ew o rk o f th e
state as it was inherited from colonial India and subsequently preserved and sustained
by the ruling elite after independence."119 Ian Talbot's w ork highlighted th re e m ajor
criticisms towards feudalism: 1) "The bulk of the agricultural population has rem ained
effectively depoliticized; 2) the perpetuation of feudal pow er relations has contributed
to Pakistan's distinctive political culture of violence and intolerance; and 3) the parochial
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and personalist character of Pakistan's political parties w ith th e ir rapid changing
loyalties is rooted in this predom inance o f landlords."120
W ith the influence of dynastic politics, political leadership is draw n from the
feudal families and national politics stays around personality-based politics, which
creates a leadership vacuum to thrive at the grassroots level. Most influential political
fam ilies are th e Bhutto fam ily from Sindh and the Sharif fam ily from Punjab; both enjoy
pow er and are likely to continue th e ir influence in th e future politics o f th e country.
O ther influential families such as Gilanis, Khars, Dreshaks, Qureshis, Tam ans, Khosas,
Mazaris, Legharis, Mehars, Bijraniss, Rinds, Raisanis, Jhakaranis, M akhdum s o f Hala,
Shahs of Nawabpur, the Khan of kalabagh's fam ily, etc. continue to retain th e ir dynastic
political pow er over their respective jurisdictions and constituencies.121
In Pakistan's early years a num ber of initiatives w ere designed to carry out land
reforms, which w ere thought to be able to restructure the social divide and political
gaps w ithin society. Prominent land reform initiatives of Z. A. Bhutto promised people
th a t he would abolish feudalism, since his political slogan was based on Islamic socialism
(food, shelter, cloth). Despite Bhutto's promise and comprehensive land reform plan
(150 acre for irrigated land and 300 fo r non-irrigated land was set as a m axim um limit),
a com paratively b etter reform offer than Gen. Ayub's reform plan (m axim um possession
of 500 acre for irrigated and 1000 for non-irrigated land), Bhutto him self was a
landow ner.122 Therefore, anticipating effective outcomes was in vain. In short, most of
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the parliam entary or dem ocratic regimes in Pakistan are directly or indirectly influenced
through feudal structures. Pakistan Peoples Party (Bhutto) retains a stronghold in rural
Sind and Southern Punjab, w hile Pakistan M uslim League (Nawaz) retains influence over
mercantilist and biradari system. M aleeha Lodhi w rites th a t in the Pakistani polity feudal
influence is a fault line, which needs to be addressed. She explains th a t th e re is a
"Clientelist politics" betw een feudal lords and their subjects, in which th e "governance
is em bedded in the notion of rewarding their clients rather than electorate. Their
preoccupation w ith rulership rather than public service is in keeping w ith the
patrim onial structures of traditional society."123
The patterns o f politics in Pakistan's urban-rural settings have only e m pow ered
the influential, feudal families. In return, these oligarchic groups com prom ised th e
sanctity o f citizens' votes in lieu of political and economic corruption. Political
corruption not only hollowed out the foundations o f true democracy and civilian rule,
but also kept the doors open for m ilitary interventions and valid reasons against
"corruption and bad governance heaped on Pakistan's popular politicians."124 A general
tendency among the masses is to view their political elites as the most corrupt and less
sincere w ith people and providing them political goods.
There is a deep nexus betw een corruption and th e compromising o f dem ocracy
th at helps political elites, military rulers, and civil-bureaucrats to create a w in-set, so
each party can be com fortable w ithout interfering into others' m atters. H ow ever, the
dilem m a is th at political elites are more divisive in their ranks than the m ilitary or
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bureaucrats, and th e ir divisive opinion and opposition creates political space for the
m ilitary to play a role as guardians to intervene. U nfortunately, the tw o tenures of P.M.
Benazir Bhutto and P.M . Nawaz Sharif in 1980s and 1990s, respectively, w ere spent
engaging over corruption charges through the establishm ent of accountability
mechanisms against rival political parties and w orkers, w hile both w ere rem oved from
pow er on corruption and bad governance charges.
The Bhuttos (branded to be secular) and the Sharifs (branded to be sympathizers
to right wing parties) are today's tw o ruling fam ilies, and th e re is a chance th a t th e
fam ily dynasty trend likely to continue. Like the Bhuttos and Sharifs' roles in national
leadership, fam ily dynasty is not a unique case in provincial set ups too. The personalitybased polities are popular in the rest o f Pakistan's provinces. In reference to th e o th er
provinces, the Bugtis, Maris, Mengals etc. dom inate in Baluchistan; and the late Bacha
Khan's fam ily in KPK are some of the most vivid examples o f family rule in the respective
provinces. M eanw h ile, both the Bhutto and Sharif families have sealed a historical
rivalry. In 1972, then Prem ier Z.A. Bhutto's nationalization process had affected the
fam ily business of the Sharifs, and the Sharifs w ere disgruntled about the loss o f th e ir
industry. Once Gen. Zia came to pow er in th e late 1970s, he picked Bhutto's opposition
members in his cabinet in order to diffuse any political pressure from the public. A t the
same tim e the Sharifs regained their business Ittefaq industries. The revenue fro m the
Sharifs' fam ily business is m ore than $400 million. On returning to Pakistan in the 1980s,
Benazir Bhutto, who was unhappy w ith the m ilitary because her fa th e r was executed
under m ilitary rule, felt the Sharifs one of the close-linked parties to the m ilitary.
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Therefore, both Bhuttos and Sharifs rem ained opposed, w hile compromising the
dem ocratic transition w ith non-dem ocratic forces.
During the early rule of Nawaz Sharif, the governm ent alleged th a t in th e past
Benazir Bhutto's regime was involved in massive corruption activities including hiring
thousands of party workers on state positions w ith o u t m e rit and misusing state
resources. M ost of the allegations to Benazir w ere pointed towards her husband, M r.
Asif Ali Zardari (w ho later became President of Pakistan a fte r her assassination in late
2008). M r. Zardari was alleged to have received a percentage through kickback during
the deals of foreign and domestic contracts; w hile he used "front men (the m oney) w en t
to the Bhutto-Zardari com bine."125
During Bhutto's first term as prem ier, her husband M r. Zardari, "acquired a
succession of nicknames: M r. 5 Percent, M r. 10 Percent, M r. 20 Percent, M r. 30 Percent,
and finally, in Bhutto's second term when he was appointed minister of investments,
M r. 100 Percent."126 The investigators estim ated to "trace more than $ 10 0 million to
Benazir's secret accounts in foreign banks."127 In addition to facing opposition from
political opponents and corruption charges, the m ilitary also considered Ms. Bhutto a
th re a t to strategic assets who doubted her plans w ere to rollback Pakistan's nuclear
plan for economic bargains. W ith the fear of losing the nuclear program along
corruption charges, Benazir Bhutto's governm ent was toppled, and fo rm er intelligence
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chief, Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani adm itted in Pakistan Suprem e Court about the bribing of
political and religious parties in opposition against M s. B hutto.128
Similar to Ms. Bhutto's rem oval, M r. Sharif was also removed fro m his
premiership in the same patterns. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan justified his action to
dissolve S harifs governm ent on the basis th a t corruption charges cost Pakistan $20
billion; he also accused M r. Sharifs governm ent of extra-judicial killings, victim ization of
opposition, and so fo rth .129 Raymond W . Baker has thoroughly shared th e statistical
data on corruption charges and off-shore investm ents of both Bhutto-Zardari and
S harifs families. As a glimpse at the alleged accusations on prem ier S harifs earlier
term s, Baker m entioned contracts w ith Daewoo (a South Korean com pany). According
to Baker:
"M r. Sharif authorized im portation of 50,000 vehicles duty free, reportedly
costing the governm ent $ 70 0 million in lost customs duties. Banks w ere forced
to make loans for vehicle purchases to w ould-be taxi cab drivers upon receipt of
a 10 percent deposit. Borrowers got their "Naw az Sharif cabs," and some 60
percent of them prom ptly defaulted. This le ft the banks with $500 million or so
in unpaid loans. Vehicle dealers reportedly made a killing and expressed their
appreciation in expected ways. Under Sharif, unpaid bank loans and massive tax
evasion rem ained the favorite ways to get rich. Upon his loss o f pow er the
usurping governm ent published a list of 322 of the largest loan defaulters,
representing almost $3 billion out of $4 billion ow ed to banks. Sharif and his
fam ily w ere tagged for $60 million. The Ittefaq Group w ent bankrupt in 1993
when Sharif lost his prem iership th e first tim e . By then only th re e units in the
group w ere operational, and loan defaults o f the remaining companies totaled
some 5.7 billion rupees, m ore than $100 m illion."130
During both civil and m ilitary rule, the ruling elites w ere quick in establishing
accountability intuitions, e.g. in S harifs tim e the Ehtesab (Accountability) bureau, and in
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Musharraf's period the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). But these bureaus w ere
used for political scoring and victimizing th e opposition and governm ent opponents. In
the early years of Musharraf's rule, he used NAB fo r all those who w ere involved in
corruption, but dropped all corruption cases against political absconders w ho w ere
living in self-exile and w ho returned hom e on the basis of a controversial ordinance
decreed on Novem ber 2007 called the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The
NRO dropped all the cases betw een January 1 ,1 9 8 6 and October 1 2 ,1 9 9 9 . This
controversial ordinance, in a sense, indem nified th e corruption in the country, and
provided a source of strength to anyone w h o continued to violate th e rule of law.
President M usharraf thought the NRO w ould help him retain another tenure as
president, but he miscalculated and was forced to resign in 2008. In th e post-M usharraf
period, the PPP once again was given a chance to rule the country as a dem ocratic
regime. As President Zardari came to pow er, he gathered sympathy on the basis o f his
wife Ms. Bhutto's assassination. The PPP governm ent under Zardari's rule was the first
tim e any dem ocratic governm ent in the history o f Pakistan successfully com pleted its
term and transferred power to another dem ocratic regim e through elections in 2013.
The track record of corruption rem ained th e same during this period (20082013), as a num ber of recent instances suggested th at th e scale of corruption and
money laundering in billions was higher. During this period, on a num ber of occasions,
the PPP-led governm ent and its coalition political parties (Pakistan Muslim LeagueQuaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) in Punjab, Awam i National Party (ANP) in KPK, and M u ttah id a
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Qaumi M o v e m en t (M Q M ) in Karachi) w ere charged w ith corruption charges fo r being
involved directly or indirectly in some o f the m ajor state-ow ned corporations.
In 2010, the Federal M inister fo r Religious Affairs, Hamid Saeed Kazmi (m em ber
of th e PPP) was charged in the Hajj (Pilgrimage) Scam. During the annual Hajj
(Pilgrimage) th e governm ent charged each pilgrim about Rs. 230 ,00 0 ($ 2 ,7 0 0 ) for
providing transport and accom m odation in Saudi Arabia, earning Rs. 5.8 billion in
revenue, but was blamed for providing poor lodging. The m isappropriation of funds
forced the minister to resign.131 M oreover, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) also
accused M r. Abdul Qadir Gilani, son o f then Pakistani PM, Yousuf Raza Gilani, of
receiving Rs. 20 million as kickbacks in th e Hajj Scam. According to the Asia Times, the
previous PPP governm ent was plagued w ith corruption charges. A nother son by Former
PM Gilani, M r. Ali Musa Gilani, was charged in a drug scam during his father's rule. The
Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) accused Musa Gilani o f being involved in a Rs. 8 billion ($8
million) drug scam (Ephedrine (poor m an’s cocaine) is used in m anufacturing medicines
to tre a t common cold, flu, and asthm a) rewarding a contract to tw o local
pharm aceutical companies through th e PM secretariat and form er PM's son.132
In 2011, the PML (Q)'s top leadership known as th e Chaudhry Brothers
(landowners from Punjab), Moonis Elahi was accused of looting Rs. 2 20 million in the
National Insurance Company Limited (NILC) corruption scandal.133 A nother case of the
PML (Q)'s Chaudhry Brothers w ere also tried in court over Rs. 44 billion corruption

131 Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Pakistan Hajj Scam Inquiry: Top Official Kept on Remand," BBC Novem ber 20th,

2010 .
132 syed Fazl-e-Haider, "Gilani Son Named in Drug Scam," Asia Times April 12, 2012.
133 "Chaudhrys Panic after Nile Scam: Pml-N," The News January 29th, 2011.
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charges in Employees Old Age Benefit Institution's (EOBI) scandal.134 Railways M inister
Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (m em ber of the ANP, a coalition party to the PPP govt.) and
railway officials w ere accused of a m ulti-billion dollar scrap scandal. The accused
officials valued Rs. 300 to 600 million for 3 9,0 00 m etric tons o f scrap, which was actually
valued at m ore than Rs. 3 billion.135 Similarly, the m inister fo r ports and shipping, Babar
Ghauri (an M Q M m em ber) is accused of overlooking the loss of 19,000 NATO containers
from Karachi port during M r. Ghauri's ministerial tenure. According to th e Director
General of the Sindh Rangers (a param ilitary force), these containers w ere carrying
arms, which could be used in destabilizing and creating volatile conditions in Karachi, as
it is the main port used for supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan.136
Political corruption has continuously existed in Pakistan; however, the political
elites have devised more subtle ways to avoid corruption charges by engaging in
legitimized corruption. The general public believes th at political decisions to devalue the
country's currency always benefits the political elites, w hose bank accounts are in
foreign banks or holding foreign currency, and w ith o u t any corruption involved like
kickbacks, the currency depreciation preserves th e ir profits. M oreover, a fte r coming to
power in 2008, the PPP governm ent initiated a poverty reduction program m e through
an act of parliam ent to help the poor by providing m onetary benefits. Nam ed a fte r Ms.
Bhutto, the program m e was called the Benazir Income Support Program me (BISP). Yet,
the BISP turned out to be a legitim ate corruption scheme. As the program m e itself
134 Arif Rana, "Eobi Scandal: Ex-Minister Implicated in Rs.44 Billion Scam," The Express Tribune O ctober 28,
2013.
135 Asad Kharal, "Embezzlement: Bilour Named in Multi-Billion Railways Scrap Scandal," ibid. M arch 7,

2012 .
136 "Missing Nato Containers: Mqm 's Ghauri Seeks to Become Party in Case," Dawn Septem ber 10, 2013.
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gained wide popularity domestically and internationally fo r its pro-poor policies, under
th e garb of legitim acy and popularity, funds w ere given to political elites mainly
associated w ith th e ruling party or coalition to distribute to th e ir constituencies and
workers so future votes could be secured.137
Due to th e m ism anagem ent o f funds and corruption, the new BISP officials
under the Nawaz governm ent have requested NAB officials to conduct serious inquiries
into fraudulent activities. According to NAB, the BISP has spent Rs. 165 billion, of which
15 percent came through donors and interest based loans, and almost 85 percent
directly from th e governm ent exchequer.138 An instance of m ism anagem ent shows th at
the previous officials under PPP governm ent during 2 0 0 8 -2 01 3 spent m ore than Rs. 3
billion on media campaigns, and the contracts aw arded to th e advertising com pany
lacked any form al procedure.139
Pakistani masses are in a gradual process of understanding the factors and actors
behind such political deprivation. The public understands th a t fam ily dynasties and
feudal lords are "pretentious, self-interested, unprincipled, reactionary snobs w h o
constitute a m ajor obstacle to social and dem ocratic developm ent."140 The hodgepodge
of civil-military compromises and pow er struggle has transform ed Pakistan into an
"hourglass society," which means the "state and the public are m utually related through

137 Pamela Constable, Playing with Fire : Pakistan a t W ar w ith Itself, 1st ed. (N ew York: Random House,
2011), 269.
138 Khawar Ghumman, "Corruption Cases in Bisp to Be Probed," D aw n Jan. 12th, 2014.
138 Ibid.
140 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 248.
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a m inimum o f institutional links, and people are generally disengaged from politics
except for the occasional exercise of their right to v o te ."141
Political Scientist Aqil Shah has mixed feelings about the dem ocratic viability and
future of Pakistan, and he writes th a t "democracy in Pakistan is likely to rem ain stillborn
unless the officer corps' praetorian norms and prerogatives undergo erosion and th e
m ilitary is brought under firm dem ocratic-civilian control. The growing internal th re a t
from terrorism, and the sense of public insecurity th a t it generates, do not augur w ell
for democratic civil-m ilitary relations. For now, Pakistan's "resurrected civil society" will
likely to come forw ard and ensure th a t the m ilitary has no real occasion openly to
underm ine or overthrow an elected governm ent."142 Ian Talbot has nicely concluded the
political system and dynamics of Pakistan's quasi-democracy in the follow ing statem ent:
"The political system and its practitioners in the 1990s appeared as
ineffectual and bankrupt as their counterparts in the first troubled decade of
independence. In both eras, politicians raised charges of corruption against th eir
opponents while at the same tim e using patronage to secure pow er. The only
difference is th at w ith the passage o f tim e both the resources available for
corruption and the media's ability to uncover it have dramatically increased.
Now, as during the 1950s, the disorderly struggle between opposition and
governm ent encourages m ilitary intervention in th e political process. This very
authoritarianism has in the past perpetuated the weakly institutionalized
personalist politics which have becom e Pakistan's hallm ark."143
The 2013 general elections w ere historic in many other ways besides being a
historic transfer of pow er from one civilian regime to other. They w ere significant also
because Pakistani society witnessed the rise of a new democratic party, the Pakistan
Tehreek-i-lnsaf (PTI led by a fo rm e r Cricket star, Imran Khan), which challenged th e

141 Waseem, Dem ocratization in Pakistan : A Study o f the 2002 Elections, 63.
142 Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," 24.
143 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 369.
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status quo o f the traditional dom ination by tw o parties i.e. th e PPP and PML (N). By and
large, the educated youth joined PTI to bring change to the country. Following this
trend, many influential political leaders, including som e w ith powerful feudal
backgrounds, quit th e old parties and joined PTI. In a way, it is like old w ine in new
bottles, but the overall trend is positive and will eventually filte r the political deadw ood
burdening the system. Remarkably, this positive tren d can also be linked w ith provincial
election results of 2013, in which Dr. Abdul M alik Baluch (a middle class and self-m ade
politician) of the National Party (NP) changed the status quo of consecutive rule by tribal
leaders. Similar trends can som ehow be attributed to PTI form ing a governm ent in KPK.
In contrast the remaining tw o provinces, which hold a m ajority of the seats of
representation in parliam ent and regional settings, retained the old political patterns.
The other features of the 2013 political change w ere the strengthening of the
media and judiciary as im portant pillars of the state. Even before the 2013 elections, the
rise of free media and the restoration of an independent judiciary is believed to have set
in motion trends of accountability in Pakistan's political system. Both m edia and
judiciary already played a crucial role in President M usharraf's forceful resignation,
which may not have been anticipated a decade earlier. In addition, it is the first tim e in
Pakistan's history th a t a m ilitary chief is facing a trial for treason for suspending the
constitution during the imposition o f a state of em ergency under m ilitary rule. His
political opponents struggled to indict him in four cases, th e first a high treason case
under "article 6 o f constitution."144 Former President M usharraf was indicted by a court

144 Article 6 of Pakistan's Constitution: High Treason
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th a t accused him of abrogating and suspending the constitution through the imposition
of an emergency and detaining superior court judges in Novem ber 2007; he was also
indicted for unconstitutionally and unlawfully am ending the constitution soon after
imposing a state o f emergency. Second, he was indicted in th e assassination case of
form er prem ier Benazir Bhutto, third for the killing of Baluch nationalist leader Naw ab
Akber Bugti and fourth, for the Lai Masjid (Red M osque) operation; all are possible
attem pts from his political opponents to place him on trial. M usharraf is d efian t w ith
the term high treason, as he responded in court a fte r charges were leveled th a t
"W hatever I did, I did for the country and its people. I am sad that I am being called a
traitor," and in fact, for m ilitary elites are also upsetting to witness th e politicized
charges for a m ilitary chief who served the state fo r 45 years.145 M usharraf believes it is
a political victimization and questions, w hy not put on trial all judges and politicians w ho
endorsed his rule and enjoyed its perks? W hile witnessing a historical precedent being
set against a fo rm er military chief, there is a higher possibility that th e m ilitary is set to
intervene to avoid any furth er judicial trial of the form er military chief in various courts
of the country.

(1) Any person w ho abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance, or attem pts or conspires to
abrogate or subvert or suspend or hold in abeyance, th e Constitution by use o f force or show o f force or
by any other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.
(2) Any person aiding or abetting [or collaborating] th e acts m entioned in clause (1) shall likewise be guilty
of high treason.
(2A) An act of high treason mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) shall not be validated by any court
including the Supreme Court and a High Court.
(3) [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] shall by law provide fo r the punishment of persons found guilty of high
treason.
145 Peer M uham m ad, "Treason Charges Indicted," The Express Tribune April, 1 2014.
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Along w ith the judiciary, the media's role was significantly realized, and yet at
the same tim e, Pakistan is considered a dangerous country fo r journalists, having been
victims of targeted killings, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks. Until last year, Pakistan
retained th e top rank as th e most dangerous country for journalists, being surpassed
due to the higher intensity of fighting in Syria. However, th e situation still shows a
positive trend in term s of the media gaining g reater freedom of expression and speech
and establishing checks and balances, but th e re are many occasions which dem and
enforcem ent of media ethics as w ell so th a t the m edia does not becom e a party or
manipulator. To strengthen democracy all pillars o f the state have to support each other
in order to bridle the traditional oligarchy and fam ily fiefdoms.

SOCIETAL VIOLENCE: ETHNO-RELIGIOUS TERRORISM AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT
Pakistani society is facing m ultiple aspects o f violence. The nature o f violence
varies at different levels, which range from traditional violation of hum an rights on one
side of th e spectrum, to extrem e violent ethno-religious insurgencies at the other end,
which threatens the Pakistani social fabric and state security. In recent years Pakistani
society has held a track record in protecting human rights, women's rights, th e provision
of education, proper healthcare and sanitation, religious freedom , freedom of speech
and expression.
During the last decade, persistent violence has been at the epicenter o f socio
political life. Pakistani lawmakers adm it th e acute intensity of the violent insurgency
that is gripping th e whole of Pakistani society poses a grave threat. As m entioned
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previously, Pakistan's Interior M inister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan notified th e National
Assembly about the real existential th re a t from ongoing severe terrorist activities. The
rapidly deteriorating law and order situation and hum an insecurity challenge the
meaning and duties of a nation-state in which loyal citizens seek returns for th e ir
allegiance, tied to social bonds and the contract betw een state and society. The m u lti
layered violence and te rro r activities across th e country are the end product o f the
evolution o f violence in Pakistan, primarily started in the early years o f independence
th a t gradually intensified. Over the years, Pakistan has becom e a security state wrestling
w ith pre-existing and self-created security issues, which became a reasonable
justification fo r the m ilitary to interfere in dom estic security threats w ith its highly
transnational roots and engagements.
The roots of Pakistan's traditional violence in society and evolving episodes o f
terrorism are the outcome, or fallout, of national, regional, and global agendas. In other
words, three factors contributed in the evolutionary process of Pakistani violence,
namely evolving radicalization, unjust intra-provincial, political-economic policies;
regional unresolved political disputes; and th e global geopolitical struggle during the
Cold W ar. The latter tw o factors are discussed later on in th e section on geopolitics.
The m ulti-layered violence and terrorist activities are linked to various factors
and ambitions. Unfortunately the Pakistani geographical space has becom e a useful
shelter for various foreign and domestic m ilitant and mafia groups, and each m ilitant
group has its own agenda. James Piazza explains th a t fragile and risky societies have a
higher probability of "experience terrorist attacks, have th e ir citizens join in and
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perpetrate terrorist acts, and see their territory used as bases from which to launch
attacks abroad. This pattern occurs because failed and failing states are easier for
terrorist m ovem ents to penetrate, recruit from , and operate w ithin."146
There are m ore than 40 m ilitant groups operating in various parts o f Pakistan,
some threaten and directly denounce the state's legitimacy and its constitution, some
threaten society, and some threaten the integrity o f the state. The th re a t to state
authority em anates from religious ideological groups, whose ambitions are not only in
seeing Pakistan as a theocratic state, but also seek to spread transnational influence.
M ajor groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliations w ith Al-Q aeda, and
Islamic M ovem ent of Uzbekistan, etc. are vivid examples here. The th re a t to society is
linked to all politically m otivated or sectarian based groups threatening dom estic peace
and stability, e.g Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Sunni - LeJ) and an off-shoot of a banned Sunni
organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), whose prim ary targets are Shia com m unity,
while Sipah-e-M uham m ad (SMP), a banned Shia m ilitant organization, counters th e rival
Sunni groups. The threat to state integrity is always generated from nationalists'
movements; i.e. the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) poses the same th re a t as the
creation of Bangladesh in 1971 th a t was through nationalistic struggle.
To understand the core reasons why religious groups became such pow erful
entities and established ungoverned spaces, particularly in the Federally Adm inistered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Afghan-Pakistan border region, it is necessary to revisit
some of the earlier discussion on radicalization, or Islamization processes.

146 Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 471.
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In Pakistan's early years its political elites seems com fortable to allow the benign
conditions fo r religious groups to flourish, so the usage of religion can help to
homogenize or prom ote the "ethnification" o f diverse ethnic groups. The
homogenization policies became divisive factors instead. W hen Prime M inister Liaquat
Ali Khan rectified the Objective Resolution in 1949, it endorsed state sovereignty vested
in God's authority. According to Ishtiaq Ahm ed, the ulema / religious clerics interpreted
th e reference of sovereignty under the Objective Resolution as endorsing Sharia law as
th e law of land, w hile P.M. Liaquat Ali Khan "did not mean a theocracy or a rejection of
democracy and m inority rights; rather, democracy and m inority rights w ere to be
sublimated in accordance with Islamic percepts."147 On the other hand, a num ber of
political analysts believe th at the notion of religion was used deliberately and cautiously
as per the nature o f the audience. Hussain Haqqani writes "when Liaquat Ali Khan
addressed "W estern audience ... his Islamic rhetoric was diluted by couching it in
cultural term s", and domestically he continued to use the term Islamic ideology
providing a legitim ate base for religious groups to assert the role o f religion in
determ ining state policies and actions.148
Using religion benefited the political elites in enforcing and legitim izing their
powers. Rulers such as Gen. Ayub, Prem ier Z. A. Bhutto, and Gen. M usharraf, w hom
w ere believed to be pro-developm ent and m odernization rulers, also had adopted
Islamization policies, while projecting slogans like "Pakistan Islam ka Qila hai (Pakistan is

147 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1 9 4 7 -2 0 1 1 ,106.
148 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and M ilitary, 32.
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a fortress of Islam)" and gaining political benefits.149 Earlier, when Ms. Fatima Jinnah
contested elections against Gen. Ayub in 1965, Gen. Ayub relied on religious backing
and sought out clerics to support and prom ulgate Fatwas (religious decree) against
w om en's eligibility to run for office through religious interpretation.150 During Gen. Zia's
rule in the 1980s his governm ent was highly m otivated in seeking an "Islamic
renaissance," which turned out to be a perfect condition for the U.S. to take advantage
of strategically against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, though the im pact was
disastrous fo r Pakistan's economic, political, and institutional fu tu re.151 The US backed
anti-Soviet w ar in Afghanistan and Gen. Zia's Islamic renaissance becam e a perfect
marriage, it allowed Gen. Zia's regime to patronize the political, ethnic, and sectarian
groups to counter his political oppositions th a t gradually widened the fissures of social
cohesiveness of society. Subsequently, Pakistani society witnessed the mushroom ing of
Madrasahs, sparking sectarian strife, an influx of foreign fighters and th e ir perm anent
settlem ent in Pakistan's tribal areas (also disrupting tribal life), and an exodus o f th ree
million Afghan refugees th a t disrupted the local economy along w ith spreading drug and
Kalashnikov culture.
Although after 9 /1 1 the waves of violence soared with insurgencies, suicide
attacks and terrorist activities, it should be noted th at the religious indoctrination
process was started much earlier, and the seeds of militancy were already sowed. Since
2001, waves of terrorism have killed m ore than 50,000 Pakistanis (See the table 6 for

149 Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2 0 1 1 , 323.
150 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 55.
151 Ziring, Pakistan : A t the Crosscurrent o f History, 218; Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 48.

details), w hile the intensity of violence has increased every passing year. By and large
the deaths w ere due to an increase in suicide attacks, in which terrorists targeted
governm ent installations, places o f worship, schools, and W estern NGOs. W hen asked
w here terrorism 's epicenter in Pakistan lies, general public opinion affirm s th a t the
tribal region near the Afghan-Pakistan border is th e nexus of extremism and militancy.
However, terrorist networks have lately been penetrating into urban settings like
growing influence in biggest city Karachi. Pakistan is regularly being asked through
diplomatic channels to "do m ore" in the tribal areas, but th e re is not much willingness
to understand the tribal structure and its dynamics. It is th e tribal areas th a t have
suffered the most, and outsiders are forcefully terrorizing th e locals and occupying
these lands.
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Table 6: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014
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It is recognized that as radicalization increased, acts o f terrorism, intolerance and
violence in Pakistan evolved concurrently. How ever, w hy the state could not succeed in
controlling or tackling the root causes of terrorism must also be analyzed. One of th e
mostly overlooked prim e factors is th e institutional vacuum in certain areas, which
provides an atm osphere for militants to flourish. The convergence of charged
radicalized groups in areas of ineffective and decapitated political institutions em pow ers
these outfits. For instance, Pakistan retained post-colonial laws, such as th e Frontier
Crimes Regulations (FCR), considered draconian laws, which em pow ered one
governm ent representative to imprison or punish a person w ithout tria l.152 The FCR
remains in effect in fifteen designated tribal areas, including the FATA region. In th e
vicinity of FATA, some tribal zones are ruled through the Provincial Adm inistered Tribal
Areas (PATA) system im plem ented in M alakand. The Peshawar high court in 1994
repealed PATA, but its jurisdiction did not extend to FATA. As a result o f this judicial
vacuum, a local religious leader, Sufi M uham m ad, launched Tehrik-e-N ifaz-e-Shariat-eM uham m adi (TNSM) demanding Sharia law and courts fo r Malakand, which gradually
spilled over into tribal areas and oth er parts of the country.153 Despite the fact th a t FCR
is a draconian law, it perform ed a role of justice and established order w ith o u t leaving
any political vacuum.
Today, FATA is considered one of the most dangerous zones in the w orld,
term ing it an ungoverned space and safe haven fo r global terrorists. The general
tendency shows th a t "all m ajor terrorist plots are now being hatched in Pakistan's tribal

152 Fair, "Addressing Fundamental Challenges," 92.
153 Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 59.
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b e lt."154 W hy is it th a t the tribal areas of Pakistan became an epicenter o f global
terrorist networks? First, th e continuous religious penetration for the last th re e decades
fo r geopolitical reasons helped to consolidate various m ilitant groups to establish th e ir
bases there; second, these external groups gradually dismantled the traditional pow er
structure and created a political vacuum. M ilita n t outfits quickly filled this political
vacuum w ith their own legal standpoint in reference to Sharia law, regularly conducting
targeted attacks w ithin and beyond Pakistan's frontiers. Interestingly, various criminal
networks, drug traffickers, and mafia groups with th e ir extended financial interests
joined militants in order to perm eate the radicalization in o th e r parts of the country,
resulting in "the Islamization of criminal activity and criminalization o f segments of
Islamism in Pakistan."155
The tribal areas are historically famous for being difficult to ta m e or subjugate by
force, as earlier in history great powers like im perial Britain and Russia suffered too.
M ost of the population in the tribal areas are ethnically Pashtun, w hile the tribal
Pashtun society is referred to as segm ented by m any authors, meaning it is "a subtype
o f w hat are technically known as acephelous or headless societies."156 The tribal belt is
internally organized through diverse stratification. The tribal elders (M aliks), w ho serve
as administrators under a tribal chief (or Khan), control th e tribal system. "The elders
represents lineage-base authority vest in the Jirga (council o f elders), and expressed

154 M oeed Yusuf, "A Society on the Precipice? Examining th e Prospects o f Youth Radicalization in
Pakistan," in Reaping the Dividend Overcoming Pakistan's Demographic Challenges, ed. Michael Kugelman
and Robert M . Hathaway (Washington, D.C: W o od ro w Wilson International Center, 2011), 94.
155 Shaikh, M aking Sense o f Pakistan, 173.
156 Ty L. Groh, "A Fortress w ithout Walls: Alternative Governance Structures on th e Afghan-Pakistan
Frontiers," in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era o f Softened Sovereignty, ed.
Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 97.
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through Puktunwali or Pashtunwali (tribe's code or th e way o f the Pashtuns)" and follow
"term s of the charter or Nikkat.157 The first and forem ost aspect of Pashtunwali is about
th e honor (or Nang), meaning a tribe takes it as a prim e honor to observe the tribal
codes.158 The im portant tenets of Pashtunwali are hospitality to a traveller, guest, or
stranger through th e offering of food and shelter (known as melmastia or
m ehrm apalineh), risking life and property to provide shelter and protection to any
person, friend or enemy, w ho desires sanctuary (know as nanaw atai), defending
belongings, with property as pride (ghayrat), deference and respect (know n as ehteram )
to elders (called masharan), and deterrence through revenge or retaliation (known as
badal), along w ith the traditional institution of the Jirga.159 O ther codes, like
tarboorw ali, settls rivalries betw een male cousins and marriages b e tw ee n cousins,
which shapes and preserves pow er, w ealth, and authority within fam ilies and protects
lineages.160
British colonial rule understood the im portance o f Pashtunwali for tribal peoples;
considerately, the British introduced FCR, preserving the tribe's code, but also adding an
influential pillar called th e "political agent," the sole authority representing the colonial
rule. A fter the creation o f Pakistan, a third pillar also em erged, i.e. the role of the

157 Akbar S. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone : H ow America's W ar on Terror Became a Global W a r on
Tribal Islam (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 2013), 49.
158 Groh, "A Fortress w ithout Walls: A lternative Governance Structures on the Afghan-Pakistan Frontiers,"
98.
159 Hilary Synnott, Transforming Pakistan : Ways out o f Instability, Adelphi, (Abingdon: Routledge fo r the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 107-08; M oham m ad Taqi, "The Federally Abandoned
Tribal Areas," Daily Times March 27, 2014; Groh, "A Fortress w ith o u t Walls: A lternative Governance
Structures on the Afghan-Pakistan Frontiers," 98-99.
160 Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone : H ow America's W a r on Terror Became a Global W a r on Tribal
Islam, 50.
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religious cleric and mosque. Pakistan, in fact, did less to integrate the tribal society into
its mainstream political structure, but let it continue through colonial patterns, which
helped Pakistan prevent the em ergence o f a de facto Pashtunistan w ith the help of
Afghanistan. Therefore, since 1947, there w ere three sources of authority in th e tribal
structure: the first pillar being th e tribal elders, or M alik, th e second pillar w ith the
religious leader, or M ullah, who has a lesser role in political decisions or in a traditional
Jirga, but plays a pacifying role and diffuses violence, and th e third pillar introduced
through colonial settings the political agent, representing th e central governm ent w ith
more authoritative powers.
W ith the influx of foreign fighters in the tribal area during the 1980s, the
demographic structure gradually changed and even em pow ered and transform ed locals
into m ilitant groups. These groups then started to challenge the traditional authorities
of Jirga comprised of tribal elders. In fact, the Taliban killed most of the influential tribal
elders, which replaced the tribal leadership w ith hardcore fundam entalists. Interestingly
foreign fighters, especially the Al-Qaeda leadership, cleverly blended some tribal codes,
like the nanawatai (seeking sanctuary) and using badal (revenge or retaliation) to
achieve its own agenda. Over the years, Al-Qaeda tacitly adopted the "tribal codes
called for revenge" into their interpretation of religion.161 Such effects can be observed
w ith the term s like shura (religious term for consulting or advisory body) replacing Jirga
for meetings in tribal areas held by m ilitant leaders. Subsequently, foreign and dom estic
militants poured into tribal areas for training and execution of terrorist plans. The
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Taliban shura established its own courts, denying th e legitimacy of Pakistani courts, law,
and its constitution. The hardline religious schools in many parts of the country w ere
used to recruit potential fighters and volunteers and to collect donations. To finance th e
insurgency and terrorist activities, "the m ilitant groups have managed to generate a
self-sustaining m odel th at involves patronage from foreign groups like Al Qaeda,
domestic and foreign charitable contributions diverted for th e ir use, forced
contributions, ransoms, shares in th e narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan, thefts in
Pakistani cities."162
Facing rising militancy and sectarian violence, Pakistan lacked laws or policies
capable of trialing militants. The other tactical problem w ith military operations was
th at Pakistan's m ilitary was by and large trained fo r conventional w arfare against India
on its eastern front. Thus, responding to guerilla w arfare was a great challenge, which is
why a higher num ber of causalities was initially inflicted w hen M usharraf form ally
launched operations in th e tribal areas to hunt Al-Qaeda and other foreign m ilitants.
Currently Pakistan has 150,000 troops deployed in tribal areas out o f the 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 strong
army on its w estern border.163 Over the past 13 years the new battle zone provided
training and preparedness for m ilitary personnel to fight a guerilla campaign.
The im pact of rising militancy in the tribal areas has affected th e local population
more than any once. The tribal areas became a launch pad for terrorists' attacks inside
and outside of Pakistan. To tackle the militants, th e local population becam e victims and
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targets for allowing th e ir territory to be used by militants. W ith o u t proper security
provided by the state, it is difficult fo r locals to stand against militants. In fact, local
tribes are unhappy w ith militants, w ho have brought great suffering to them and th e ir
families. The local population is sandwiched betw een m ilitary operations from Pakistan,
terrorists' threats within th e tribal areas, and CIA drone strikes.
The drone strikes have succeeded in elim inating high value targets since 2004,
but at the same tim e became highly unpopular (also known as Angel o f Death among
local population - see the data about Drone strikes in table 7). There is great confusion
over the accuracy of the data on th e num ber of civilians and militants killed during
drone strikes. In 2013, w hen Interior M inister Chaudhry Nisar briefed senators about
th e statistics, the opposition parties boycotted the senate session and w alked out in
protest over the presentation, claiming th e data was wrong, and dem anded th a t the
minister correct the data, while calling it a "pack o f lies."164 According to the Interior
M inister "no civilians w ere killed in 235 drone strikes in 2 0 1 2 and 84 attacks in 2013,"
while he agreed that the highest num ber o f drone strikes w ere 115 in 2010, in which
751 terrorists w ere killed w hile 2 civilians w ere killed.165 M ilitants and th e ir political
sympathizers used the images o f civilian casualties to gain sympathy and seek legitimacy
from the population. U.S.-based scholar and w rite r Akber Ahmed, w ho was a fo rm er
political agent in the tribal areas and a retired Pakistani bureaucrat, explains in his
recent book th a t "the tribal population is traum atized n o t only by American missiles
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(drones) but also by national arm y attacks, suicide bombers, and tribal w arfare, forcing
millions to flee their homes to seek shelter elsew here and live in destitute conditions as
hapless refugees."166

Table 7: Drone Strikes in Pakistan
Num berof
Strikes

Ifear

SEF1

2004-2009

51

410 - 595

167 - 335

2009

52

4 6 5 -7 4 4

# 0 -2 1 0

2010

128

751 -1 ,1 0 9

2011

75

363 -6 6 6

2012

50

199 - 4 1 0

102 - 120

ISr
175 - 227

84 - 1 9 6

1 9 -2 0

3 5 1 -4 2 8

2

6 -1 1 .

1 5 8 -2 3 6

1 -2

1 0 0 -2 1 2

13 - 63

27
# 8 -1 5 4
0 -4
0 -1
2013
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013, UK.
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W ith the th re a t of terrorism , Pakistan has suffered greatly due to the lack of
social cohesion. The issue of non-cohesiveness is due to th e underm ining of the diversity
of opinion, belief, and existence. In general, it is noted th a t diversity is a source of
strength, but unfortunately Pakistan is divided along ethnic, racial, and sectarian lines,
which constantly weaken its statehood. People are persecuted for th e ir affiliation w ith
minority sects and religious beliefs. According to th e Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies
(PIPS), sectarian violence caused the death of 687 people in 2013, which was a 22
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percent increase in the num ber of sectarian causalities reported in 2 0 1 2 .167 The PIPS
report predicted th a t trends of sectarian and racial violence will continue at a high ratio.
From January to M arch 2014, 70 people w ere killed and 92 w e re injured in 26 sectarian
related incidents reported by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). One o f the reasons
for the chaotic situation is th e internal displacem ent of people due to m ilitary
operations and th e fight against militants. In 2009 alone, 3 million people w ere
internally displaced due to m ilitary operation and fight w ith TTP. Large num bers of
displaced groups moved to larger cities, w ith the change in dem ographic settings
creating further tensions in various parts of country.
Besides sectarian divides, the other m ajor issue th a t weakens Pakistan is the
distrust over resource distribution and political economic com petition at the intra
provincial level, i.e. betw een Sindhis and Muhajirs (Urdu speaking groups) in Sindh,
betw een Baluch and Pathans in Baluchistan, w ith Hindko speaking Hazara people
seeking a new province in KPK, and the Saraiki belt in Punjab's demands for a new
province in South Punjab leading to grievances w ithin provinces, all of which continue to
challenge and ham per building a national id en tity.168
Among all the provinces Baluchistan presents a serious challenge, as some of its
ethno-nationalist groups, such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the
Baluchistan Republican Arm y (BRA), are fighting fo r independence. The Baluch tribes'
grievances are rooted in political economic complaints over the distribution of resources
and demand for political autonom y. During Z.A. Bhutto's rule the m ilitary conducted
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operations against these groups in the 1970s. Since th e 1970s, nationalist m ovem ents
had been suppressed, but in early 2000, Baluch leader Naw ab Akkber Khan Bugti re
launched his political protest. This political protest was fu rth e r supported by an incident
in which an Army officer was blamed for raping a fem ale doctor posted in Baluchistan.
Nawab Bugti dem anded justice for violating tribal codes. Naw ab Bugti and his fellow
tribesm en took the arms as resistance. M usharraf issued th e ultim atum to Bugti th a t
"Don't push us. It is not th e 70's (referring to earlier m ilitary operation against
nationalist insurgency in 1970), when you can hit and run, and hide in the m ountains.
This tim e, you w o n 't even know w hat hit yo u ."169 In 2006, Nawab Bugti was killed in his
mountain hideout. Baluch nationalists believe he was killed in a m ilitary operatio n, w hile
military leadership denies it. M ilitary reports claimed that local police forces, w ith the
help o f m ilitary elite forces the Special Services Group (SSG or Commandos), w e n t into
the hills in order to arrest Nawab Bugti, but he detonated th e cave w ith explosives
killing himself and scores o f elite m ilitary personnel.
In the afterm ath of Nawab Bugti's death, th e nationalist groups, w hose demands
were fo r greater autonom y of the province and a g reater share in resources, joined the
Baluch groups whom w ere seeking full independence of Baluchistan. U nfortunately, due
to anger over the m ilitary, BLA members began targeted killings, kidnappings, and th e
torturing of settlers (mainly from Punjab). At the same tim e , Baluch intellectuals,
lawyers, doctors, and journalists also w en t missing and w e re found dead, th e ir bodies
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dum ped in various locations, believed to be victims o f extra-judicial killings.170 Baluch
liberation parties blamed Pakistani intelligence agencies, w hile Pakistan blames India for
funding Baluch insurgents, who are believed to be hiding in Afghanistan.
The issues o f missing persons are gaining attention in Pakistan, and m any
groups, including nationalist, religious, and civil society organizations are dem anding
legal action from th e Supreme Court. So far, the blam e has been leveled against
intelligence and law enforcem ent agencies for the kidnapping of alleged terrorists.
There is a widely held perception among all ranks o f law enforcem ent agencies th a t
th ere is no proper legislation regarding the trial of terrorists or militants. Previously a
num ber of terrorist suspects w ere presented in courts, but a lack of proper laws and
unwillingness of eyewitnesses to appear in court, fearing death threats from m ilitants,
has led to the release of many high value terrorists. Believing the same will occur w ith
o ther prisoners, law enforcem ent agencies refrain from keeping any such persons in
custody.
Afterw ards, in late 2013, due to m ounting pressure from th e Suprem e Court of
Pakistan, some missing persons appeared in court. The Court desired to see and hear
about many other suspected missing persons. Upon failing to m eet the dem ands o f the
court in March 2014, the court was assured to file a First Inform ation Report (FIR)
against serving arm y officials. Interestingly, at the same tim e, the governm ent
presented a controversial ordinance called "Protection o f Pakistan Ordinance (PPO)" in
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parliam ent fo r its endorsem ent.171 The governm ent has justified th a t th e proposed
ordinance will help to fill a legal vacuum, which has allowed militants and mafia
m embers to be released w ithout trial and roam freely. The PPO was already approved
by the President, M r. M am noon Hussain in O ctober 2013.The opposition parties and
even PML (N) coalition parties, like Jamiat Ulem a-e-lslam and the Fazal ur Rehman
group (JUI - F), have resisted the move, stating it will allow further extra-judicial killings
and also allow arresting people w ith o u t w arra n ts .172 Despite the resistance from
political parties and a walk out from a National Assembly session, the m ajority of
parliamentarians belonging to PML (N) passed the PPO in April 2014. Opposition parties
are determ ined to challenge the PPO through the legal system. The ordinance may
provide an escape or indemnity to persons, w ho are being accused of being involved in
missing person cases.
To conclude, the Pakistani political elites, lawmakers, and civil society candidly
agreed th a t the m ultiple types of violence in society have threatened its statehood. For
the existence and survival of statehood, all th e responsible stakeholders need to fram e
short term and long-term policies and mechanisms to elim inate the th re a t o f terrorism .
In 2013, the All Parties Conference (APC) decided to give peace a chance by
reaching out to militants and attem pting to dialogue. The dialogue process was halted
as a result of a U.S. drone strike th a t killed Pakistani Taliban chief Hakimullah M ehsud in
Novem ber 2013. The peace talks resumed in the tribal areas with an agreed cease-fire.
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Initially, tw o demands by the Taliban w e re the release of th e ir comrades and fam ily
m em bers and a dem and of a peace zone in South W aziristan173 in th e tribal areas, so
th a t the m obility of Taliban m embers could be assured w ith o u t the th re a t of being
targeted. The dem and for establishing a peace zone means relinquishing the established
authority of the state in the area and allowing non-state actors to form a state w ithin a
state. It is unlikely th at Pakistan will grant the dem and for a peace zone, as the m ilitary
lost a great num ber of its soldiers in its campaign to clear th e area.
For many political elites like the PTI leadership, the peace talks are th e only
solution for stability, but they need to be rem inded that th e re were six agreem ents
established earlier betw een various m ilitant factions and Pakistan, and these past
agreem ents did not assure a long-term peace. Peace talks are a useful strategy to
contain the level of violence but are not an end point. As long as m ilitants receive
foreign and domestic funding directed at radicalization and access to te rro r breeding
units in radicalized madrassahs, short-term peace talks are not effective. For exam ple, in
2011 a U.S. diplomatic cable reported th a t Saudi and UAE financing o f $ 10 0 million
towards religious seminaries in Southern Punjab was approaching poor and m ultiple
children families and providing free education, food, and shelter. Once these
organizations seemed confident in the willingness of parents to send th e ir sons, issues,
and the importance of M artyrdom in religion w ere also discussed, and in th e case of

173 South Waziristan form erly in the hands of Taliban, during a m ajor military operation in 200 9
codenamed Rah-e-Nijat routed out th e Taliban from the area
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m artyrdom o f a son, the fam ily w ould receive a rem uneration of Rs. 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 ($ 6 ,5 0 0
according to the 2011 exchange ra te ).174
In this regard, the governm ent should seriously consider its educational system.
The country is producing th re e social classes, nam ely a class of private schools (an upper
middle class), public schools (m iddle or low er middle class), and religious schools or
Madrassahs (enrolling poor with no incentives, no provisions, and no access to m odern
day schools), which creates a social divide. Therefore, understanding th e im portance of
education is an integral part of a state's internal security and stability, requiring it to
revisit school syllabi or curriculums, and the entire educational system. The extrem ists
seek to dem oralize those w ho wish to attend schools and lure those w ho are out of
school or destitute and desperate. By 2011, m ore than 6 million children betw een the
ages of 5 and 9 w ere out of school due to poverty.175
Investm ent in education is th e most im portant factor for Pakistan's grow th,
prosperity, viable change, and political stability. On the importance o f education, the
youngest nom inee for the Nobel Peace Price, M alala Yousafzai (who was shot by th e
Taliban for seeking and prom oting girls education) expressed her views at th e United
Nations and challenged th at "let us pick up our books and our pens, they are our most
powerful weapons. One child, one teacher, one book, one pen can change th e w o rld ."176
W ith the exception of a fe w madrassahs, which have proper dom estic and
*
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and crowded. During his governm ent, M usharraf tried to bring all madrassahs under
governm ent control through registration and offered incentives, but this policy program
failed due to the influence of clerics fearing they would lose their sources of influence
and power over villages and economic privileges. In addition, Madrassahs are becoming
enterprises generating economic gains through the collection of donations in the nam e
of religion. The new PML (N) governm ent has shown interest and c o m m itm en t to enroll
2 2,000 religious madrassahs under governm ent control.177 Reforming the educational
sector and bringing madrassahs into the m ainstream public educational system will pay
long-term benefits to Pakistani society.
Arrested extremists and Taliban fighters have been indoctrinated; th erefo re, deradicalization programs are essential. Pakistan's military, a fte r some successful
operations in some parts o f the tribal areas, have established "de-radicalization
em ancipation programs (DREP)" also known as "Rehab". Hundreds o f m ilitants under
the DREP program's rehabilitation process are re-educated as responsible people w ith
civic consciousness, who undergo educational, moral, vocational, and psychological
training to stay away from extrem ist elem ents, and also to accept th e ir social
responsibilities and not misuse religion for harm ful acts.
A fter 13 years of fighting against militancy and terrorism, in early 2014, the
Nawaz governm ent finally agreed to push fo r a legal structure (PPO) and proper internal
security policy (NISP) to deal with issues o f violence and terrorism . The PPO has yet to
be approved by parliam ent, which is considered controversial by opposition parties, so a
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perm anent law still needs to go through some refinem ent. However the NISP outlined
th e causes and ways to deal w ith te rro r-re la te d activities including "organized anti-state
actors; their use of religious ideology to garner local support and recruit from amongst
th e poor and vulnerable; use of mosques and madressahs to nurture hate-based
narratives; external patronage and funding fo r terror; inadequate capacity and
inefficient perform ance of law -enforcem ent agencies; an intelligence black hole due to
lack of coordination; dysfunctional governance and criminal justice systems th a t neither
incentivise citizens nor deter crim e."178 The im provem ent NISP requires is to fu rth er
categorize the levels and types of terrorist activities or organizations engaged in
Pakistan because some have transnational roots, some regional, and some are sub
national ethnic based terrorist or rebel groups. To im p lem en t the NISP, the governm ent
reactivated and revamped th e earlier established National Counter Terrorism A uthority
(NACTA). NACTA's job is to coordinate betw een national intelligence networks and law
enforcem ent agencies, so as to im prove efficiency. In addition, to support NACTA, th e
Counter Terrorism Rapid Deploym ent Force (CTRDP) will ensure a quick and effective
response to any unexpected events. Still, Pakistan relies heavily on police forces in cities.
Though the Frontier Constabulary (FC), or militia scouts are employed because o f th e ir
law enforcem ent agency's b etter rapport w ith the local population, they unfortunately
are less trained and incapable of dealing w ith militants. The proper training and
equipping of these units is far m ore im portant than asking military or para-m ilitary
forces to intervene all the tim e.
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W ith the successful im plem entation of proper anti-terror laws, Pakistan can
improve dom estic stability and project a positive image abroad. According to Hasan
Askari, "Pakistan's negative image abroad cannot be countered unless the governm ent
controls religious and cultural extrem ism , and elim inates terrorism . The rhetoric of
Pakistan being the victim o f terrorism gives only one side o f the truth. The o th e r side is
th at Pakistan is also a source of transnational terrorism . Furtherm ore, the terrorist
groups in Pakistan are indigenous and will not give up violence until the Pakistan
governm ent adopts a tough policy to elim inate th e m ."179 The Pakistani nation has paid a
high cost of w ar against terror; any delay in the proper form ulation o f law and policies
and th e ir im plem entation will bleed the nation and society, risking highly its existence as
a nation.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FRONTLINE STATE
Pakistan has remained a pivotal and "frontline state" since th e Cold W ar,
especially during the 1980s and the post 9 /1 1 period.180 On both occasions the flo w o f
foreign aid was high and stimulated economic grow th in som e sectors o f the economy.
However, the core concentration of aid was focused on th e defense sector. In Pakistan,
most o f the economic troubles originate from th re e factors: a) a dom inating feudal
order, b) high defense expenditure, and c) debt burden.181 Over the last decade, the
burden on the economy has also been aggravated by the rise in terrorism and domestic
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security issues and freq u en t natural calamities. Overall, th e economic o u tp u t of recen t
years shows a gloomy outlook. The core troubling aspect o f Pakistan's econom y is its
small tax base. The tax collection system is in disarray, as th e richer, ruling elites avoid
paying taxes, as w ell as small and m edium class business elites, with only salaried
employees sustaining th e tax base through salary deductions.
Political elites take advantage of th e dom estic extraction of resources by direct
and indirect taxation levied on the middle class, and also extract foreign resources in the
name of foreign aid. Following these patterns, the tax evasion syndrome is deeply
em bedded in the domestic system. For exam ple, due to th e economic hardship of
minimal foreign reserves during his rule in th e 1990s, P.M Nawaz Sharif allow ed tax
evaders and corrupt elites to "w hiten [the] ill-gotten income with no taxation and no
fear of detection" for foreign currency deposits (FCDs).182 Therefore, th e system lacked
a proper tax collection mechanism, which resulted in huge deficits betw een spending on
public goods and revenues.
Pakistan's 45 percent workforce is em ployed in the agricultural sector, and th e
lack of landownership and skewed distribution of resources have resulted in higher
poverty in rural areas.183 Those w ho own th e land are feudal and w ealthy politicians,
w ho mostly enjoy the exem ption o f direct taxes on agricultural land or incom e, because
landowners argue th at they are already paying implicit taxes through concessions to
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support the governm ent's price system.184 The dilem m a o f Pakistan's political economic
system is th a t individuals gain w ealth, but collectively the state lacks th e resources,
eventually widening the rich and poor gap.
A historical overview of Pakistan's political economic performance and economic
outlook in term s o f grow th or stagnation can be divided into four to five phases. These
phases also show particular distinctions because o f dem ocratic and undem ocratic
periods o f rule. M a tth e w McCartney's w ork, focusing betw een 1951 and 2009,
categorized the growth of the economy into five episodes: 1) episodes o f grow th
1 95 1 /5 2 - 1 9 5 8 /5 9 (civil-bureaucratic rule) 2) episodes o f growth 1 9 6 0 /6 1 - 1 9 7 0 /7 1
(m ilitary rule) 3) episodes of stagnation, 1 9 7 0 /7 1 - 1 9 9 1 /9 2 (military rule) 4) episodes of
stagnation 1 9 9 2 / 93 - 2 0 0 2 /0 3 (dem ocratic rule) 5) episode of growth 2 0 0 3 / 04 2 0 0 8 /0 9 (m ilitary rule).185 Additionally, th e post 2 00 9 phase of democratic rule is
considered a period of stagnation in term s of economic grow th.
Along the general trends based on th e grow th or stagnation o f Pakistan's
economy, each historical phase of political economic performance is unique. Each of
these unique trends can be characterized as: the fla t fifties, 1947 to 1958; th e golden
sixties (Gen. Ayub Khan's period), 1958 to 1969; th e socialist seventies (P .M . Z.A.
Bhutto), 1971 to 1977; th e revivalist eighties (Gen. Zia ul Haq), 1977 to 1988; the
muddling nineties (civilian rule of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's era), 1988 to 1999;
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and the reform ing hundreds (Gen. M usharraf), 1999 to 2 0 0 7 .186 It is n o tew o rth y th a t
each phase of governance set differen t economic trends, which was eith er com pletely
changed by the following regime, or faced challenges due to earlier policies. Ayub's
period is recognized in many ways as a golden period, though his policies benefited the
ruling elites - known as the tw e n ty -tw o ruling families. Soon after m ilitary rule ended,
Bhutto nationalized the system th a t drastically affected fu tu re economic trends. This
setback due to the nationalization process took years to rebuild Pakistan's econo m y.187
Instead of improving economic trends, Pakistan's volatile and unpredictable
domestic political scenario has severely affected the economy. Ishrat Hussain explains
the correlation betw een the domestic political conditions and Pakistan's economic
perform ance, as he writes:
"Pakistan, transitions from one political regime to another have been quite
difficult, causing uncertainty and short-term reductions in the speed o f economic
growth. The transfer of pow er from the m ilitary to civilian regimes in 1 9 7 1 ,1 9 8 8
and 2008 w ere marked w ith m acroeconomic instability, a slow down in
economic activities, rising unem ploym ent and inflation and th e adoption o f a
wait-and-see attitude by investors. But economic recovery has also been
resilient; short-term losses caused by political volatility have not been large
enough to offset the positive long-term secular economic m o vem en t."188
At the end of the day, Pakistan's journey as a nation-state thus far has been
marked by poor governance and bad economic output, w hich further poses challenges
to the larger economic sphere, i.e. "macroeconom ic instability, high inflation, poor
public services, criminal neglect of the social sectors, widespread corruption, crippling
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pow er outages, growing unem ploym ent, deepening poverty and a deteriorating debt
profile."189 M oreover, the current economic challenges em anate and are interlinked
w ith problems of terrorism , illegal trade, drug trafficking, IDPs and Afghan refugees, and
many unheeded social problems th a t have deteriorated th e security situation, deterring
local and foreign investors.
Pakistan's fight against terrorism since 2001 to FY 2012-13 has cost it $98
billion.190 However, on diplom atic and economic term s, th e early years of th e w a r on
te rro r w ere favorable to Pakistan as it was under th e shadow of economic sanctions,
and its foreign reserves w ere around $1 billion.191 Pakistan's decision to support the
U.S.-led W a r on te rro r helped increase its foreign reserves to $ 4 billion w ith the flow of
foreign capital under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) and strong rem ittances.192 Up
until now, Pakistan's economy has highly relied on CSF and foreign rem ittances. The
recent date shows th a t during the first half of FY 2014, Pakistan received a higher
am ount of foreign remittances in th e am ount of $7.9 billion, 9.4 percent higher than the
previous year.193 Overall, since 2002, Pakistan has received an average o f $825 million
from the United States for economic assistance, and during the last 4 years, Pakistani
expatriates have sent nearly $ 1 billion every month in rem ittances.194
W ith a full-scale m ilitary engagem ent in the tribal areas and o th er insurgency-hit
areas, Pakistan's economy has been severely affected with imbalances betw een
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revenues and its expenditures. In addition, the financial crisis of 200 7 -0 8 and increasing
oil prices dealt a blow to Pakistan's economy. To survive in th e face o f economic
difficulties, Pakistan convened a conference called Friends o f Democratic Pakistan
(FDOP), which was launched on Septem ber 26, 2008. FDOP includes Australia, Canada,
China, Denmark, France, Germ any, Italy, Japan, Norway, th e Netherlands, the Republic
o f Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, th e UAE, UK, USA, and the
Asian Developm ent Bank. This conference's aim was to gain some economic support
through donor countries and to prom ote a greater dem and fo r Pakistani goods in the
international m arket. The economic burden fu rth e r increased when floods in Pakistan
hit more than 14 million people in 2010. It destroyed infrastructure th a t forced internal
displacement, destroyed cash.crops, livestock, and above all, led to th e loss o f a great
num ber of human lives. The W orld Bank promised a $ 900 million loan fo r recovery from
this natural calamity. In February 2012, th e W TO also approved a pending bill th a t
would give Pakistan a tw o-year w aiver on 75 Pakistani products in the European m arket.
The allowed items, mainly textiles, would am ount to 900 million euros in im port value
and accounts for 27 % of EU imports from Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan had already
suffered the effects of a traum atic and massive earthquake to its northern regions,
particularly Kashmir, in 2005. The effects o f the 2 0 1 0 flood, however, w ere fa r harsher
than the earthquake on the Pakistani economy.
Pakistan's history reflects th a t regional geopolitical odds have tem porarily
benefited Pakistan, but in the long run Pakistani society has to bear the burden
entrusted upon them due to m ism anagem ent and the w rong policies of its political-
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oligarchy. Example of regional odds includes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
which caused th e exodus of millions of Afghans into Pakistan affecting Pakistan's socio
economic and political dynamics. Today, there are officially more than 1 million, w hile
unofficially 3 million Afghans integrated into Pakistani society. The new Afghan
generation born in Pakistan has developed deeper roots in Pakistan. Until now Pakistan
has reported th a t it has spent $200 billion on Afghan refugees since 1 9 7 9 .195 On the
request of international agencies, Pakistan has extended th e stay of officially registered
Afghans until 2015. The added foreign dem ographic is upsetting the dom estic system,
ultim ately affecting economic trends, and burdening the entire society.
Pakistan is facing trem endous challenges from its ow n demographic issues due
to rising poverty and an increasing labor force. The fragile economic conditions m ake it
difficult to accomm odate the labor force, which keeps a high number o f youths
unem ployed. By the year 2012-13, m ore than 3.5 million people are estim ated to be
unem ployed.196 According to the International M o netary Fund (IMF), w ith a low er GDP
growth rate in 2014, Pakistan's unem ploym ent rate will continue to grow in the coming
years. The unem ploym ent rate in 2013 was 6.7 percent, and it is forecasted to be 6.9
and 7.2 in 2014 and 2015 respectively.197 Past governm ents initiated a num ber of
poverty reduction programs through economic activities, i.e. the Social Action
Programme (SAP) in the 1990s which failed due to w eak governance problems; the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in the 2000s adopted through social
195 "Burdened Economy: Pakistan Has Spent $200b on Afghan Refugees," The Express Tribune O ctober 26,
2013.
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M onetary Fund, April 2014), 67.
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mobilization under the Rural Support Program N etw ork (PRSN); and BISP in late 2000s
(discussed earlier in the previous section).198 W ith o u t investment in hum an capital to
prepare skilled labor, economic sustainability, and a reduction in poverty, the large
population will continue to suffer.
W hy should the Pakistani governm ent w orry about ram pant unem ploym ent?
The answer is th at a high ratio o f Pakistan's population is young, and gradually a greater
num ber of youths are joining th e ranks o f the unem ployed. Out of Pakistan's
approxim ately 180 million people, 59 percent means 101.95 million people are below
th e age of 24. The num ber becomes approxim ately 116 million people, if one includes
the age group below age 2 9.199 To delve into past terrorist and criminal activities during
the last 10 years in Pakistan, most of the perpetrators are below the age of 3 0 .200 By and
large, Third W orld countries have a higher percent o f youth population. 6 0 percent of
Egypt's population, like Pakistan's, is under the age of 30, w hile 74 percent o f Yem en's
population is likewise below age 30; both countries are facing massive political
unrest.201 Economic demands, especially unem ploym ent, are propelling frustrated
youths in Third W orld countries to com e out into th e streets and protest, or in many
cases engage in illegal trade, drug trafficking, and terrorism . As an exam ple, Karachi,
Pakistan's economic hub, contributes m ore than 42 percent of Pakistan's GDP. For the
last couple of years, Karachi has been plagued w ith ethnic, religious, and political
violence and sectarian crises. GEO News, a private TV netw ork, unearthed th e realities
198 "Human Developm ent in South Asia 2006 ", 122-25.
199 Yusuf, "A Society on th e Precipice? Examining th e Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan," 77.
200 "A Society on the Precipice? Examining th e Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan," 96.
201 Patrick Kingsley, "Does a Growing Global Youth Population Fuel Political Unrest?," The Guardian March
19, 2014.
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of black m arket and illegal economic activities in Karachi. According to the GEO News
docum entary, it cost the people of Karachi around $ 8.5 million per day fo r extortion,
kidnap ransoms, loot, plunder and street crim e.202 A m ore fearful scenario is predicted,
when M r. A ltaf Hussain, the head of Karachi's largest political party M u tta h id a Q uam i
M ovem ent (M Q M ), categorically m entioned th at the flow o f terrorists in Karachi is
going to make Karachi a global center for terrorism . Recently, Karachi and m ajor cities in
Pakistan have become a source of economic activities for terrorists. Karachi particularly
faces a pow er struggle betw een radical groups th a t seek to dom inate the city.
Frustrated and unem ployed youth are easily entrapped fo r criminal activities in such
instances.
The new governm ent o f P.M. Sharif has taken some initiatives to tackle
economic problems. To address unem ploym ent, P.M. Sharif has initiated the Youth
Business Loan Scheme w ith the allocation of Rs. 3.7 billion; the scheme will provide
100.000 youth loans every year. The industrial sector has not been efficient lately, losing
productivity due to a shortage of energy supplies. Currently Pakistan is dealing w ith a
7.000 M W shortfall despite the fact th at it contains the w orld's third largest coal
reserves and utilizes less than 1 percent towards energy generation. On th e o th er hand,
the acute problem w ith pow er supply is the electricity th e ft and line losses. In M arch
2013 then State M inister for W a te r and Power, Tasnim Qureshi, inform ed th e senate
th at over th e last five years Pakistan had lost Rs. 59 billion (US $ 590 million) and Rs. 90
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billion (US $ 900 million) respectively on account o f th e ft and line losses.203 Lacking
proper m anagem ent and mechanisms to control huge losses is further corrupting th e
system. In order to m eet the dem ands of energy shortfalls, like the previous PPP
governm ent (2008-13), the current governm ent of PML (N) has shown a willingness to
tem porarily rely on rental pow er plants (RPP). In th e past, however, such RPP projects
w ere highly plagued by nationw ide scandals with th e involvem ent o f political authorities
in corruption and kickbacks during th e RPP deals th a t resulted in not m eeting the target.
Finally, it is obvious th at Pakistan has paid a high cost for fighting th e w a r against
terrorism ; the direct and indirect costs have deterred investors. Exclusively, Pakistan has
relied on foreign capital to pay its bills and debts. Reliance on foreign aid pam pered the
political elites, w ho artificially fix th e economic crises, but in a longer period the real
problem resurfaces. Pakistani policy makers could not succeed in harnessing the
resources and opportunities for economic developm ent. The first step to begin is to
neutralize the militancy and insurgency in th e country; doing so will boost the
confidence of local and foreign investors. Higher economic investm ent leads to higher
economic activity and benefits a larger portion of th e population.

203 "Pakistan Lost Rs90 Billion in Electricity Theft, Line Losses," The News 2013.
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GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF CENTRAL, EAST, WEST, AND SOUTH ASIA
Pakistan's geographic location is unique for economic, geopolitical, and geo
strategic reasons; it is a convergence point and provides a gateway to Central Asia, East
Asia, W est Asia, and South Asia. This convergence point is one of the fundam ental
factors th a t make Pakistan a pivot state. The geographic features qualify Pakistan as
high value for possessing natural resources, like its coal deposits at Thar, Sindh; coppergold deposits in Chagai, Baluchistan; iron ore deposits in Deddar, Baluchistan, natural
gas in Baluchistan, etc. Geopolitically, Pakistan is the most suitable economic corridor
for trade and transit activities connecting th e sub-regions o f Asia w ith the rest of the
world. As the geostrategic role of Pakistan rem ained im portant throughout th e Cold
W a r and in the post-Cold W a r so has its geographic position.
Pakistan is a neighbor to the im portant rising economies of India and China,
which are experiencing an unprecedented increase in the domestic dem and fo r energy
consumption and the need for a m ore stable region, so th a t a smooth economic rise can
be achieved and sustained in the long run. As discussed in M yanm ar's chapter, China
and India's energy thirst is leading th em to seek new fields and routes fo r energy
pipelines. In regional context, India basically depends on oil and coal-based fuel
supplies; almost 50 percent o f India's pow er generation comes from coal-based fuel, 32
percent from oil, and the rest of its energy production from natural gas, hydro, and
nuclear programs. In 2006, India's total domestic demand fo r natural gas was 43 billion
cubic meters and it soared to 110 billion cubic m eters by 2010. India has been keen to
m aterialize tw o im portant gas pipeline projects, which are designed to pass through
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Pakistan. These are th e Iran-Pakistan-lndia gas pipeline (IPI) and Turkm enistanAfghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI). The violence in Afghanistan and insurgencies in
Baluchistan and KPK provinces o f Pakistan has stalled these projects.204
China's economic interest is very much linked to th e geopolitical im portance and
stability of Pakistan. Beijing and Islamabad have been in close friendly relations since the
1960s, and as a gesture of friendship, the mega project in th e 1970s was the
construction of th e Karakoram Highway (KKH) passing through Gilgit-Baltistan (GB),
which connects the tw o countries. China has always adm itted the diplom atic affinity
betw een Beijing and Islamabad. To explain the friendly relation betw een Beijing and
Islamabad, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Luo Zhaohui, in 2009, said:
"Pakistan was one of th e first countries to recognize New China. Ever since our
diplom atic relations began in M ay 1951, w e have enjoyed m utual understanding,
respect, trust, and support and our friendship and cooperation have flourished.
W e are truly good neighbors, close friends, trusted partners, and dear brothers.
W hen China was in difficulty caused by the W estern blockades in the 1950s and
60s, it was Pakistan which opened an air corridor linking China w ith the outside
world. In the 1970s it was Pakistan, which served as a bridge for the
norm alization of China-U.S. relations."205
The expanding Chinese interests in Central Asia, South Asia, the M iddle East, and
Africa will keep China highly dependent on Pakistan. Both Beijing and Islamabad have
reaffirm ed their friendly relations calling it "higher than the Mountains and D eeper than
the Oceans."206 Pakistan already handed over the most strategically located deep-sea
port of Gwadar in Baluchistan to Chinese authority, who are looking a fte r operational
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matters. Gwadar, which is close to the Straits of Hormuz, is expected to be a gam e
changer in term s of trade and transit in years to come th a t potentially will link China and
landlocked Central Asia to the rest of th e w o rld .207
Similarly, the U.S. strategy proposed under fo rm er U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton of undertaking the "New Silk Road Initiative," connecting Afghanistan and
Central Asia w ith the global m arket to ease the sources of unrest and economic
challenges, has a great potential link to th e port of G w adar.208 The objective of the U.S.
strategy for connecting Afghanistan and landlocked Central Asia is due to a "missing link
for the M odern Silk Road (MSR-1), a unified Eurasian continental trade and transport
system th a t would enhance the prosperity and security for all involved."209
Apparently the individual agenda points of both the U.S. and China on Silk Road
projects are plans to establish the sources o f communications for th e isolated and
landlocked states in the region. But, at the same tim e, the U.S. policy o f rebalancing
towards Asia, and China's M aritim e Silk Route (MSR-2), potentially projects a com peting
feature in the Asian continent. China's MSR-2 provides a w indow o f opportu nity to
"improve China's geo-strategic position in th e w orld", but is linked w ith domestic
stability in the region and its relations w ith other contending powers in the region210
This is not to forget that in the Central and South Asian context Afghanistan is
historically considered a buffer state betw een powers, and its recent extension to some
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parts of Pakistan also shows symptoms o f buffering to a m a jo r power, though w ithin the
region all of th e m em ber states are balanced against each other. Therefore, any futu re
clash of interest in the region will sooner or later becom e a direct or indirect foothold
for a pow er clash.
W ith reference to Afghanistan as a historical buffer zone, and in th e w ake o f the
w ithdraw al of International Forces from Afghanistan in 2 0 1 4 , Anatol Lieven em phasized
th at "long after W estern Forces have left Afghanistan, Pakistan's survival will rem ain a
vital W estern and Chinese interest. This should encourage cooperation b e tw ee n Beijing
and Washington to ensure Pakistan's survival. By contrast, a Sino-US struggle for control
over Pakistan should be avoided at all costs, as this would add enormously to Pakistan's
destabilization."211
Presumably, China will gradually connect "the string of pearls" around th e Indian
Ocean, creating a sense of fear and insecurity for India. Despite China's assurances, India
is engaged in its own counter balancing o f China in the region.212 Fearing China's
growing m aritim e pow er through Gwadar, India is funding the Zaranj-Delaram highway
connecting Afghanistan, Central Asian republics, and Iran's Chabahar port, so the
highway and port can help reducing dependency on Pakistan.213 Yet India's investm ent
will grant it leverage on the countries it is investing in "developing a com peting port at
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C h a b a h a r... is not as w ell situated as Gw adar for th e continental trade" and transit in
fu tu re .214
Chinese to Pakistani geographic assets suddenly becom e easier to get hold as a
result of Pakistan's deteriorating diplom atic relations w ith th e U.S. significantly over the
hunt of Osama bin Laden and the Salala incident on the Afghan border. Pakistan's
growing perception of the U.S. is closer to its traditional rival India, which fu rth er
m otivates Pakistan to strengthen its strategic relations w ith China.215 In this regard, a
recent agreem ent betw een P.M. Sharif's governm ent and Beijing will start a mega
railway project connecting Gwadar to China's easternm ost province of Xinjiang, proving
th e fast growing interdependency betw een both countries.216 China's interest of
economic expansionism and Pakistan's response to create a corridor through its
te rrito ry seeks to overcom e Pakistan's prolonged economic vulnerabilities and shows
th e intensity of m utual-and-asym m etrical interdependency. Beijing has pledged to
invest $50 billion in various projects in Pakistan.217 M ost of these projects are building
and upgrading highways, infrastructure developm ent, fiber-optic cabling, and in the
energy (mainly hydro and nuclear) sector.
Pakistan has also adopted the slogan and insists on reviving the Silk Road for
trade and transit activities. W hile speaking to Asian leaders during the annual Boao
Forum for Asia 2014 at South China's Hainan province, P .M . Sharif emphasized the
revival of New Silk Road. M r. Sharif noted th at th e steps taken betw een Beijing and
214 Kuchins, Sanderson, and Gordon, "The Northern Distribution N etw ork and th e M odern Silk Road:
Planning for Afghanistan's Future," 15.
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Islamabad to establish the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor is actually th e southern
extension o f the N ew Silk Road.218 He fu rth er stated th at "[Pakistan's] geography links
China and th e New Silk Road to the w arm w aters o f the Arabian Sea and the Persian
Gulf. This is the linear dimension of our relevance w ith the Silk Road", and "Pakistan is at
th e confluence of China, the Eurasian land-bridge and the M iddle East w hich enables it
to be the route to a three-pronged economic corridor b etw een China, Central Asia and
th e M iddle East."219
The truth in economic benefits and leverages through the creation o f the
economic corridor is crucial for Pakistan, and the potential benefits are viable too.
However, these economic opportunities are highly linked w ith resolving dom estic
security and political issues on the one hand, w hile addressing regional geopolitical
dynamics on the other, requiring subtle approaches to avoid any im pedim ents to th e
dream projects. On a domestic scale, the security related issues have already been
discussed in earlier sections. However, tw o im portant instances are significant for
Pakistan to address the future viability of creating an economic corridor. First, since
1947, GB (a 72,971 sq. km or 28,174 sq. m ile gatew ay or border zone o f South Asia, East
Asia and Central Asia located on extrem e northern parts o f Pakistan) is a constitutionally
deprived region of the country w ith no rights to participate in national elections or have
representation in parliam ent and senate, w hile GB allows th e KKH to pass through its
territory. The fate of GB is linked to the Kashmir dispute. If Pakistani lawm akers
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continue to ignore addressing the issues o f political deprivation of this region, then it
will gradually evolve into a pow er vacuum and threaten Pakistan's greater interest in
th e region and beyond. A fter all, India claims GB as an integral part of g reater Jammu
and Kashmir. India's bid to get GB means cutting o ff China from Pakistan and gaining
direct access to Central Asia's oil fields and markets. H ow ever, the situation on the
ground is not in India's favor, as locals are highly integrated into the Pakistani system
and structure, but political grievances and deprivation are basic sources for political
movements.
The second domestic instance is th e political settlem ent of grievances o f ethnic
Baluchs, who are seeking greater autonom y over th e resources they possess (ethnonationalist unrest is discussed in early sections). 80 percent of Pakistan's natural
resources are located in Baluchistan, and m ore im portantly the port of G w adar exists in
Baluchistan as w ell. A dom inating perception among Baluch ethnic groups is th at
national policy is facilitating the non-local im m igrant w ork force from o th er parts o f the
country, especially from Punjab. This changes the demographic ratio on th e ground, and
in fear of losing in the population ratio, a num ber o f nationalist rebel groups are
targeting non-local works and settlers. Therefore, focusing on political grievances of
both GB and Baluchistan needs to be a priority because fo r an economic corridor to exist
and be successful, both GB and Baluchistan will play simultaneously the role of entrance
and exit for trade and transit activities in the region.
Another coming geopolitical anarchy betw een Pakistan and its neighbors will be
its disputes over w ater, which is severe and given less attention. To elaborate, the issue

of Kashmir prim arily has been argued around the notion o f "integral part" claims on
both sides in India and Pakistan. For decades, the political solution to Kashmir has
rem ained unresolved. Similarly, to counter Pakistan's claim over Kashmir, India
supported Afghanistan's claim over the Durand line issue, which eventually m ade them
natural allies. Interestingly, to counter India, in 1963 Pakistan gave up its claim to over
2,050 sq. miles of border area to China and agreed to accept china's offer to w ith d ra w
for only 750 sq. mile of land, helping Pakistan and China to become allies and balancing
India in the region. The issue of Kashmir w ill become serious not for dem ographic
affinity or claims, but rather both Delhi and Islamabad now weigh the im portance of
Kashmir on the value of w ater resources. As a m a tte r of fact, Pakistan is a low er
riparian, as Pakistan's four main rivers in Punjab other than the Indus river originate in
Indian administered Indus Basin.
The rapidly growing population, agricultural, and energy demands have speed up
the construction of mega dams on both sides. Pakistan has shown serious concern over
construction of dams on Pakistan's allocated w ater resources, which may cause
shortfalls to its agricultural sector and possible flooding during monsoon season.
Similarly, on the W estern front of the country, Pakistan is an upper riparian for
Afghanistan's Kunar River, which eventually merges into th e Kabul River, and re-enters
Pakistan, making Kabul an upper riparian. Kabul has shown its concern to Pakistan fo r a
number of dam projects th at may affect its w ater resources, though th e re is no w a te r
treaty signed betw een Afghanistan and Pakistan, whereas in the case o f India, both
countries already signed an Indus w a te r treaty under the auspices of th e W orld Bank in
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the 1960. Despite the tre a ty and growing India's domestic demand, India has already
started construction of num ber of dams. Pakistan has shown its worrisom e and reached
Perm anent Court of Arbitration over India's construction o f Baglihar dam and
Kishanganga hydroelectric plant on River Chenab and the Jhelum River. Under Indus
W a te r Treaty three W estern rivers o f Indus system nam ely th e Indus River, the Jhelum
River and the Chenab rivers w ere exclusively allotted to Pakistan, w hile th e three
Eastern Rivers o f Indus system, the Sutlej, th e Beas, and th e Ravi w ere exclusively
entitled for India. There is a high chance th a t if all parties do not pay attention to th e
w ater factor, and fail to conclude some term s, then the e n tire region can be engulfed in
high scale conflict over this resource.
The complex regional geopolitical dynamics of South Asia have evolved through
weak links th at have badly affected the political developm ent of the entire region.
Mainly, the geopolitics of South Asia has been centered on th e geographical disputes
within the "Pakistan-China-lndia triangle."220 The politics o f triangular relations are quite
common in the case of South Asia in its extension to relationships w ith neighboring
countries in the M iddle East and East Asia, e.g. during the Cold W ar triangular relations
betw een "China-Pakistan-U.S. vs USSR-Afghanistan-lndia" remained focal points.221
Stepping out of triangular premises, on a greater scale Afghanistan and Pakistan have
become the nexus points betw een tw o "shatterbelts [of th e world], the South East Asia
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and the Middle East."222 On some occasions, the South Asian region is also considered to
be a shatterbelt, but m ore often it plays th e role of fulcrum betw een tw o crush zones. In
reality, South Asia "is internally fragm ented, wracked by internal rebellions and tension
betw een states," with a m oderate scale foreign involvem ent existing to qualify it as a
shatterbelt.223lndia's resistance, how ever, to allowing any foreign interference is the
core factor th at excludes the South Asian region from being considered a sh atte rb elt.224
Exclusion from being considered a shatterbelt does not imply th a t South Asia is
not a violent region. Pakistan has lost m ore than 5 0,000 people just in th e last decade;
India has lost more than 22,000 soldiers over the course o f a num ber of border
skirmishes and domestic security challenges. Today M aoist rebels are considered the
most high profile th reat to India's security than any other entity. Bangladesh is in
trouble with restoring relations w ith India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka experienced a bloody
insurgency, Nepal is trying to shift its traditional pro-Indian policy to balance with
Chinese ties, and Afghanistan continues to suffer as a failed state due to m ore than
three decades of war. W hile the world has entered into th e tw enty-first century w ith
new aims and ambitions, most Third W orld countries have yet to cross this threshold,
carrying unresolved disputes of the past th at ham per political developm ent.
According to the latest report published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2 009-2013 the world's to p three arms im porters w ere
India, China, and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have their arms imports increased by 111
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percent and 119 percent as compared to imports during 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 8 .225 According to the
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), although Pakistan has already
surpassed India in keeping a higher num ber o f nuclear weapons due to fear o f India's
conventional strength over its own, lately Pakistan has been engaged in developing
short-range tactical nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, Pakistani strategists
believe this developm ent creates a d eterren t against any conventional w a r or is capable
of inflicting heavy losses in case of an attack.226 W ith a highly a fractured region and low
level of m utual trust, the potential for w ar betw een India and Pakistan, and o f any
nuclear w ar betw een the tw o w ould, according to th e Nobel Peace Prize-winning
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear W a r and Physicians fo r Social
Responsibility, cause the deaths of 2 billion people, ending civilization, and causing
fam ine in th e entire region.227
Despite Pakistani political elite's choice of the United States as a security
guarantor soon afte r its independence and the recipient of economic and m ilitary aid
since 1951, Pakistan could not strengthen its dem ocratic institutions. According to data
compiled by the Center for Global Developm ent, from 1951 to 2011, the United States
provided $67 billion in aid to Pakistan. Although the flow o f aid fluctuates, it rem ained
higher in tim es of U.S. geopolitical interest in the region. Throughout this entire period,
Pakistan has relied on external support, especially against India, and "m ost o f Pakistanis
believe th a t Americans are not aware of India's longstanding hegemonic goals and the
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dangers to Pakistani and U.S. interests th a t they entail."228 In recent years, th e United
States has increased its diplom atic and economic ties w ith India and o th e r Asian
countries, in reference to a general belief about the tw enty-first Century as an Asian
Century. Pakistani strategists w orry about U.S. inclinations towards India and approving
a civil nuclear deal w ith India. Pakistan is seeking a similar deal on the transfer of
nuclear technology for peaceful usage. Pakistan noticed th a t U.S. apprehensions about
nuclearization w ere not focused on disarm am ent, but nuclear terrorism .229 Keeping in
mind security concerns and issues of nuclear terrorism , Pakistan under a new
governm ent presented once m ore its case to acquire a nuclear deal fo r peaceful usage
at the third National Security Sum m it (NSS) in the Hague in March 2014. The Pakistani
premier assured attendees about th e security of its program under five pillars: "a) a
strong command and control system led by the National Command Authority; b) an
integrated intelligence system; c) a rigorous regulatory regime; and d) a comprehensive
export control regime; and active international cooperation."230 Overall, Pakistan
received positive appreciation for its nuclear arsenal's safety measures, but U.S.
lawmakers shifted the focus o f institutional building and aid support tow ards education,
health, and civil-society in Pakistan. In fact, the Kerry-Lugar bill pledged $7.5 billion split
over 5 years in a program supporting socio-economic domains and o th er possible
avenues to support energy issues instead o f agreeing to a civil-nuclear program.

228 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the U nited States : Riding
the Roller Coaster (Washington, DC: United States institute o f Peace, 2011), 17.
229 Shamshad Ahmad, "A 'Cloaked' Nuclear Security Process," The Express Tribune March 28, 2014.
230 "Hague Summit: Nawaz Makes Case for Civil Nuclear Energy," ibid. March 25, 2014.
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American lawmakers are cautious about transferring nuclear technology,
especially in the case o f an unstable situation w here nuclear technology can be leaked
to any rogue forces, which could be highly detrim ental to regional and global peace.
Recently, there was controversy w hen media reports surfaced regarding Saudi Arabia's
likely demand for Pakistani nukes if Iran goes nuclear.231 Pakistan denied such
revelations. However, another controversy is still unfolding about Saudis seeking
Pakistani arms (m ainly anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets) and human resources to
support Islamists and rebels against Bashar al-Assad's regim e in Syria.232 Pakistani
officials have denied any weapons to be sent to rebels, but agreed th a t it has been
selling weapons to different countries including in M iddle East way before Syrian civil
w ar started. The Saudis have pondered their discomfort over the U.S.'s reconciliation
policy with Iran and Syria due to th e ir ideological differences and decided to reach out
to other possible options and actors to carry on its own policy against th e Assad regime
and indirectly against Iran.
In early 2014, frequent visits by high officials from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have
already grabbed attention in Pakistan. To great surprise, Pakistan's Finance M inister
announced th a t Saudi Arabia has donated $1.5 billion and another $ 1.5 billion will be
gifted at a later stage.233 Analysts and opposition leaders are doubtful about Pakistan's
M iddle East policy, and a num ber of predictions suggest th a t the $1.5 billion gift is
paym ent for arms against Assad and other demands. The Nawaz governm ent has denied

231 "Saudi Nuclear Weapons ’on Order1from Pakistan," BBC N ovem ber 6, 2013.
232 "Saudis 'Seek Pakistani Arms for Syrian Rebels'," Dawn February 24, 2014.
233 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The M iddle East Puzzle," The Express Tribune March 24, 2014.
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these speculations and assured th a t Pakistan m aintains balanced relations w ith all
M iddle Eastern states. However, if Pakistan becomes a "partisan in intra-Arab conflicts,"
then all hostile neighbors, including Iran, Afghanistan and India, will pose m ultiple scale
security challenges to Pakistan.234 As a result, it will be the beginning of an other w ave of
extra-regional geopolitical proxy conflict based on ethnic and sectarian violence
affecting the entire society.
Despite the row over a num ber of security issues, both Washington and
Islamabad know the value of each side. Pakistan still depends on m ilitary and economic
aid from the U.S. to com plete other mega projects and certainly needs investm ents
from the W orld Bank and IMF. W ith o u t U.S. support it will be hard to obtain loans and
aid. Reciprocally, the U.S. understands the im portance of Pakistan in th e region,
especially when the U.S. is preparing to conclude its offensive mission in Afghanistan,
which is considered to be one o f th e largest mobilizations o f war m achinery since the
Second W orld W a r. In th a t sense, W estern Allies are anticipating Pakistani support in
the w ithdrawal and com m itm ent for restoring peace in th e region once international
troops have departed. Therefore, Pakistan needs to deal w ith its security issues and
stabilize its domestic challenges so it can help to respond effectively to geopolitical and
geo-strategic challenges.

234 "Pakistan’s Policy Tilt in the M iddle East," The Express Tribune February 23, 2014.
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CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Over the past 67 years, Pakistan has been ruled under a political oligarchy
through dynastic fam ily, civil bureaucracy, and m ilitary rule. The political oligarchy
adopted the colonial structures of pow er and retained pow er for a long span of tim e.
M ost im portantly, Pakistani political elites have utilized th e ir geographic status as a
frontline state over and over again, and the benefits rem ain distributed am ong the
members of the oligarchy.235 The m ilitary enjoys authority as a guardian of th e entire
nation and system, but seems hesitant to relinquish this role. In the same w ay the
inherited British colonial "steel fram e," i.e. th e bureaucracy, "still carry the burden of
maintaining a colonial bureaucracy th a t is crippling the nation down to its core, [so
th ere is a need to] decolonise [Pakistani] bureaucracy from the colonial m indset, and
make it perform ance based and accountable."236 Ironically, the dynastic fam ily, feudal
structure, and political elites or rulers remaining in "pow er have always been obsessed
by self-interest rather than national interest," and th e rest o f nation is being fooled with
the notion th a t waiting for God's miracle will bring justice and fix the system .237
Pakistani society is politically tam ed into a subjective-parochial political culture and has
impacted the overall social cohesion of the state.
W e a k socio-political cohesion has gradually hollow ed out Pakistan's political
culture's foundations. Mainly, political elites have allow ed subjective parochial political
system functions through centralized and controlled political systems, w hile th e overall
235 Grare, "Rethinking W estern Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda fo r th e United States and
Europe," 43.
236 Hussain Nadim, "Decolonising Our Civil Services," The Express Tribune April 4, 2014.
237 Christina Lamb, W aiting fo r Allah : Pakistan's Struggle fo r Democracy (New Delhi; New York: Viking,
1991), 295.
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system lacks the social cohesion in society.238 The resulting higher level o f corruption
provides room fo r dictators to intervene and stay in pow er for a longer period, which
keeps the institutions weak, and repatrim onialization in th e system. Times have
changed; the population nowadays is becoming m ore inform ed and "the resilience o f a
population is frustrated w ith corruption and civil disorder, and determ ined to do
something about it," so a viable political o rder needs to be established.239 O therw ise, if
th e state is not cured, then as usual one will see th e vicious circle repeating: the
"political condition of w eak states often propel the m ilitary into governm ent as the only
organization possessing th e pow er and/ or the national legitimacy to hold th e state
together," and dem ocratic institutions will gradually face a political decay.240
Pakistan has been tem porarily benefiting from all o f these odd events by taking
advantage of its status as a frontline state, but these benefits did not last long enough.
The consequences of becoming a frontline state, particularly with the use o f religious
ideologies, have backfired for Pakistan. Pakistani law m akers now understand the limits
o f religious ideology as it failed to preserve unity in 1971.241 The viability of Pakistan's
stability demands policies th at respect and protect diversity and the opinions of others.
By doing so, Pakistan can be in a position to overcome the issues o f a w eak and feeble
civil society.

238 Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An Agenda f o r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era,
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241 Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of th e Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation,"
46.
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Pakistan is entangled w ith m ultiple challenges em anating from security, political,
economic, and social realms. But Pakistani society is so resilient that it has th e capacity
to emerge again as a stable and responsible state. Seth Kaplan writes th a t although
Pakistan is facing conditions of state fragility, "dealing w ith Pakistan is not a hopeless
option. Pakistan has a significance experience w ith com petitive elections, a court system
and legal profession th at prize their independence, a reasonably free and critical m edia,
and a strong opposition."242 The capacity and capability o f a stable Pakistan depends on
a political order th a t respects the rule of law, treats every m em ber o f the state on equal
term s, finds a balance betw een its defense and non-defense spending, and restores
friendly ties w ith neighbors, the path tow ards stability and prosperity. W ith a successful
leap, both the citizens of Pakistan and the global com m unity will respect the positive
image, credibility, and legitimacy of Pakistan.

242 Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States : A N ew Paradigm fo r Development, 159.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Around the world today, we still see children suffering from hunger and disease.
W e still see run-dow n schools. W e still see young people w ithout prospects for the
future. Around the world today, men and w om en are still imprisoned fo r th e ir political
beliefs, and are still persecuted for w h a t they look like, and how they worship, and w ho
they love.
President, Barack O b am a1
Democracy is the Best Revenge.
Benazir Bhutto2
W e cannot m ake the world safe for democracy w ith o u t first making the world
safe for diversity.
The Aga Khan3

INTRODUCTION
W hy study fragile or w eak pivot states? Does the study of fragility m a tte r in a
highly interdependent world when extra-territoriality or deterritoriality enable
individuals, groups, firms, and organizations to carry overlapping loyalties beyond th e
state of origin? First of all, the notion of state fragility resonates w ith the global fear
about transnational effects on global peace and stability. Cracks in th e state system
perm eate w ith a higher frequency o f insecurity. Now, these cracks are em anating from
state fragility, referring to those states w ith poor perform ance in term s of an

1 Remarks by President Obama at M em orial Service fo r Former South African President Nelson Mandela,
December 10, 2013.
2 Declan Walsh, "M y M o th er Said Democracy Is Best Revenge - Bhutto Son," Guardian Decem ber 30th,
2007.
3 The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, quotes the Aga Khan, w hile welcoming His Highness the
Aga Khan at Canada's Parliament, February 27, 2014.
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inefficiency to provide political goods to citizens, unsatisfactory economic output,
domestic instability, and socio-political insecurities which threaten state and regional
harm ony. As described in chapter tw o, Robert Rotberg (2004) argued th a t as these
insecurities challenge the "legitimacy and creditability of state," the value o f the social
bond betw een citizens and the state gradually fades.
The coming security and hum anitarian challenges are alerted by statistical data,
which most likely em anate from fragile societies and their growing instabilities: as
highlighted, 2.5 billion poor live in w eak societies, and the majority live in zones of
conflict.4 According to a W orld Bank estim ate, approxim ately 1.5 billion people live in
fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS). By 2015 the FCS will host 32 percent of
world's poor, and this num ber will reach 4 0 percent by 2030. The W orld Bank report
suggests th at such fragile conditions due to w eak institutions, poor governance,
political, and social instability are often accompanied by continuous endem ic violence,
which eventually impedes developm ental agendas in these fragile parts o f the w orld.
The track record on human rights is highly w orrying in FCS, and most o f these countries
are in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These regions are lagging behind th e M illennium
Developm ent Goals (MDGs). M ost of the conflict-affected fragile societies in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America are spending an average US $22 billion a year on arms, and most of
the small arms are accessible to violent groups endangering the peace in th e ir
respective regions. Appropriating the same am ount tow ards some of th e MDGs w ill help
the states achieve some targets, such as universal prim ary education and th e reduction

4 Sachs, The End o f P overty: Economic Possibilities fo r Our Time; Collier, The Bottom Billion : W hy the
Poorest Countries Are Failing and W hat Can Be Done A bout It.
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of infant and m aternal m ortality, estim ated at US $ 10 billion and US $12 billion
respectively.5 The resolution of health and educational problems can overcom e most
political and security issues. As an instance, Boko Haram , a Nigerian radical terrorist
group, is actively fighting the pursuit of education. The Boko Haram insists th a t western
education is illegal, and a similar pattern persists in Pakistan in which some target
schools and resist the developm ent o f a knowledge-based and responsible society. This
notion infers that the higher ignorance, th e higher th e chance of clash; in contrast, th e
higher the knowledge base, the m ore society can pave the w ay for a m ore civilized
orientation th a t reduces any expectation o f clash.
M ost prom inent explanations rely on domestic factors as the root cause of
fragility; how ever, looking beyond domestic reasoning, this study adds one external
dimension to the study of state fragility. Therefore, at the domestic or endogenous
scale, the evidences show th at th e weakness of the state arises from political, security,
economic, and social domains. All of these domains are interdependent, m eaning th a t
failure in one aspect can cause the failure of all. In most o f th e cases of state fragility
identified in the case studies, w eak and fragile states "display a paradox: th e y are at
once strong in the category of despotic pow er, but w eak in infrastructural po w er."6 The
literature and case studies em ulate the existence o f a political vacuum, political
oligarchy, and kleptocracy, which becom e prom inent factors of the ineffectiveness of
institutions and governance. The exogenous factors are linked with geopolitics, which

5 Hillier and W ood, "Shattered Lives: The Case fo r Tough international Arms Control," 4.
6 K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State o f W a r (Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 104.
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cause a burden on the state due to its position and resources. The addition o f the
geopolitical factor expounds upon an enduring and valid discussion; w h e th e r during
colonial times or in the post-colonial era, these geographical pivots have rem ained
zones of im portance for regional and m ajor powers.
The "birth o f [the] paradigm " of state fragility or failure surfaced a fte r the end of
th e Cold W ar, highlighted the "risks [that] w ere posed by th e fragility of state structures
and recom m ended profound shifts" in security and foreign policies. The paradigm
mainly suggested m ilitary interventions in w eak states, considering th em to be
"factories of volatility," th e interventions w hittled down th e intensities of "chaos,
violence, and grievances."7 Global interventions based on lack of com m itm ent,
geopolitical interests, and s h o rtte rm policies retained the worsening conditions o f state
fragility, and in m any situations like Iraq, conditions become highly volatile. Similar
patterns are yet to seen in a num ber of fragile states, i.e. Nigeria, Sudan, Yem en, and
many other geographical pivots, which are highly volatile islands o f chaos th a t need
m ore than externally engineered interventions. For instance, in the post 9 /1 1 period,
international forces in Afghanistan and the U.S. intervention in Iraq focused on "state
building and counterinsurgency (COIN)" agendas, presuming they could help overcom e
fragile statehood conditions and curtail the m agnitude of violence. Over the years,
however, the notion of state-building in these w ea k states has received less a tte n tio n ,
w ith the focus remaining on dealing with COIN o p tio n s .8

7 Michael J. Mazarr, "The Rise and Fall o f th e Failed-State Paradigm," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (Jan/Feb
2014).
8 Ibid.
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The problem of dealing and ignoring issues o f state fragility in a num ber o f
violent situations was the lack o f understanding of th e actual root causes of fragility and
weakness; even if the causes w ere tracked, they w ould be compromised fo r security
reasons in battling against insurgents and terrorists. Therefore, in recent decades, the
hype about threats posed by w eak states took flight very quickly, but simultaneously
lost m om entum . It is not unique to observe the high am ount of attention given to
terrorism instead of state-building, because the contem porary threat paradigm
em anates from transnational terrorist activities instead o f any fear of a state attacking
another state. Though traditional security th re a t perceptions retain th e ir weightage,
scenarios like Russia's move into Georgia and Ukraine validate the conventional
explanations about security threats.
This research doubts and questions the idea about th e rise and fall o f the
paradigm of state fragility w ithin the scope of the last tw o decades, because the history
of w eak and strong societies existed before. There is always an asym metrical pow er
relationship betw een the w eak and the strong, and states th a t seek m axim um gain
through dealing w ith each other via buffering, balancing, and bandwagoning. It appears
th a t fragility and weakness are not new sources o f threats or problems both on the
conceptual and contextual scale. In fact, traditional concepts such as small states, small
powers, and w eak societies w ere replaced with th e contem porary usage of concepts like
w eak, fragile, failing, quasi-state, failed, and collapsed state. In general, both historical
and contem porary narratives still seek to fix the dom estic issues of th e state and its
institutional weaknesses. M ost im portantly, the core difference betw een then and now
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is the compression o f tim e and space, resulting in th e height of a security th re a t, which
may not be possible to perceive in early years at the same scale. In reference to Jared
Diamond's argum ent, cited in chapter II, th a t in the contem porary tim e period the world
cannot stay safe witnessing societies collapse in isolation, th e ripple effects of collapse
are m ore severe today than ever. For exam ple, as discussed in chapter IV, India and
Pakistan fought several wars in the past, which had less of an impact on regional and
global peace. But now the scenario has changed, and a full scale nuclear w ar betw een
these tw o countries will cause the deaths of or affect nearly 2 billion people, w ipe an
entire civilization off the region, and trap millions into hunger and struggles w ith
displacement, a hum anitarian situation beyond one's imagination. O verall, th e severity
of the problem is higher, which prom pts a serious exam ination of how to fix such fragile
states.

TW O CASE STUDIES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter is focused on the com parative analysis o f the tw o case studies,
M yanm ar and Pakistan. The analysis seeks an answer derived from contributions from
earlier chapters on conceptual fram ew ork and evidence. Earlier chapters thoroughly
investigated an answer to the research question, "under w h a t conditions do w eak states
continuously fail to perform?" They also expand th e debate into an issue o f fixing
fragility and posit th a t traditional fixation is linked w ith different form s o f interventions.
Therefore, should it be accepted th at interventions are the only solution to deal w ith
the continuous fragile conditions of these tw o cases, or should weak states m ake it their
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own responsibility to tackle problems o f stability and viability of their loose statehoods?
The explanation is drawn over tw o hypothetical statem ents m entioned earlier; 1) The
absence of an effective political order (institutional ineffectiveness and bad governance)
causes a gradual decay of state structure, 2) The burden of geography and geopolitics is
more likely to affect state fragility. W ithin the param eters o f these hypothetical
statements, the previous chapters discussed thoroughly how the core factors of fragility,
colonial legacies, the effects of corruption on governance, and geopolitical
maneuverings, gradually dwindle statehood.
A positive indicator of th e contem porary, complex, and interdep endent w orld is
the decline of inter-state wars, but at the same tim e, the propensity o f conflicts is rising
at the intra-state level. Domestic conflicts in affected societies are contagious; as one
can see from the ramifications o f the Syrian civil w ar th a t has multifold contagious
affects involving the entire region. The seeds of similar intra-state conflicts exist in most
w eak and fragile states, just w aiting for fertile situations fo r reaction. For exam ple, since
independence, the security apparatuses in Pakistan and M yanm ar have been
continuously engaged in fighting against insurgents, rebel nationalist groups, and lately
th e intensity has increased to the extent th at a political will is needed to resolve the
problem for the betterm en t of both societies.
Keeping in mind the violent situation in both countries, the overall trends of
state performance in M yanm ar and Pakistan are not positive. According to th e Failed
State Index, in 2009 M yanm ar and Pakistan w ere ranked at num ber 10 and 13
respectively. Myanm ar's com m itm ent to democracy and path to openness substantially
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changed th e situation. Similarly in Pakistan, though th e security situation is still at risk,
political transitions are promising. Compared to 2009, the latest Failed State index o f
2013 ranked M yanm ar and Pakistan 13th and 26th respectively.9 The trend suggests a
slow and steady recovery, as the dem ocratic transitions in tw o countries are promising
features th a t eventually overcome m ajor domestic challenges and strengthen
institutions. Still, th e rankings remain in the high-risk category of fragility.

HYPOTHESIS I: THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORDER (INSTITUTIONAL
INEFFECTIVENESS AND BAD GOVERNANCE) CAUSES A GRADUAL DECAY OF STATE
STRUCTURE
In the rapid decolonization process during th e 1950s and 1960s, th e phenom ena
of political order remained a focal point fo r a num ber of political scientists, including
Samuel Huntington, whose work on Political O rder in Changing Societies outlined
challenges and opportunities for newly independent states. Huntington argued th a t
newly independent countries confuse the m odernization process as a w ay ou t fo r th e ir
fragile statehood, rather he emphasized th e pursuit of political developm ent ultim ately
helping those w eak states in their nation-building processes. But w h at is observed in
many w eak states, for example M yanm ar, Nigeria, and Pakistan th at soon after
independence they either quickly started to seek economic gains due to an im m ed iate
economic crunch and paid less attention to the political developm ent o f th e ir
institutions, or the institutional legacies established during th e colonial tim es continued

9 "The Failed States Index," (2013).
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to rule the complex and heterogeneous political communities. Jeffrey Herbst called the
decolonization process granting sovereignty to many decolonizing states "little m ore
than legal fiction."10 Herbst's idea in many ways reverberates with th e idea o f Gerald B.
Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992), w ho argued th a t ill-planned and quick
decolonization th a t do not prepare the newly establishing states for th e ir future
responsibilities cause state failure, Guinea fo r example.
These arguments seem appealing; alm ost all newly decolonized states struggled
w ith political, economic and societal challenges. As discussed in chapter IV, soon after
independence Pakistan suffered economically, as it lacked funds to pay th e salaries of
state servants. Contrary to Herbst's idea about sovereignty as legal fiction, W illiam
Zartm an (1995) argues th a t the legality of the sovereign state is in fact granted and
assured by the international com m unity, so it should not be fictitious; rather, the
problem of weakness and state fragility com pletely depends on the weakness and
perform ance o f state institutions. Similarly noted before, Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson (2012) built their argum ent around the im portance of institutions, as they
negate the notion th at culture, history, and geography cause nations to fail; it is
institutions.11
Acemoglu and Robinson's argum ent has partial strength, but as this study shows,
geography cannot be ignored. Culture m atters too: for instance, in the context of the
Indian sub-continent, we can evaluate the role of culture allowing political participation
and democratic transitions in post-colonial tim e. Three political parties w ere established

10 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 118.
11 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations F a il: The Origins o f Power, Prosperity and Poverty.
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during British Colonial tim e, nam ely the Indian National Congress (1885), All India
Muslim League (1906), and Young M en's Buddhist Association (1906), and all three
parties led nationalist political struggles against colonialism and created three
independent countries, India, Pakistan, and Burma (now M yanm ar). Is th e re any
individual, sociocultural influence on these organizations th a t at a later stage inflicted
any cultural norm on the political processes in the countries and th e ir respective
political systems? Michael Ignatieff agreed th a t m ultiple reasons cause state fragility
instead of only a single factor causing decay. As Ignatieff w rites about state fragility,
"som etim es the cause is th e colonial legacy; sometimes it is m aladm inistration by an
indigenous elite; sometimes, failure is a legacy first of interference by outside powers,
and then a b a n d o n m e n t... and most im portant, many failed or failing states are poor
and have suffered from th e steadily m ore adverse term s o f trade in a globalized
econom y."12
Deliberating on the institutional dimension, Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson's argum ent about the im portance of "inclusive institutions" fo r th e viability of
society is convincing, if focused on domestic factors of fragility and the w eakening of
political order. Douglass North explains institutions as they "are the rules o f th e gam e in
a society or, more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape hum an
interaction."13 Pointed out in chapter II, th e re are three sets of institutions significantly
im portant to enforce the political order, i.e. the state, the rule of law, and an
accountable governm ent (democracy). The enforcem ent o f order has rem ained

12 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 118.
13 North, Institutions, institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 3.
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ineffective in both M yanm ar and Pakistan, because institutions rem ained unstable, and
on a num ber of accounts, states become "predatory" against their own citizens w ith
lesser accountability on actions they have taken.
The first core factor in th e weakness of fragile states is the idea of colonial
legacies th a t accounted for the asymm etrical growth of institutions, in which
authoritarian regimes eventually becom e pow erful and state institutions becom e
w eaker. The colonial legacy not only allowed authoritarian powers to rule, but
com pletely underm ined the heterogeneity and diversity o f society. Similar patterns
w ere adopted in post-colonial tim es, w hen state m achinery forcefully engaged in
"hom ogenization" and "ethnification" processes w ithout offering agreeable bargains to
pluralistic communities. The artificial process o f ethnification is being resisted in w eak
states th at have internal violence. For exam ple, the Kachins are fighting against the
Burmese arm y believing they only represent ethnic Burmans, who tried to occupy th e ir
land and resources; this case is not different from how Baloch nationalist groups feel
about Pakistan's m ilitary for its m ajor population ratio draw n from ethnic Punjabis.
Harris Mylonas emphasized th a t the process of homogenization is a w ay of excluding
non-core groups or re-orienting a new identity. Still, it is im portant to rem em ber th a t
the ethnic groups are always conscious o f their national and ethnic differences, and in
m odern tim es, consciousness is supported by the idea of self-determ ination. Therefore,
based on the state's policies o f assimilation, the accommodation and elim ination of
non-core ethnic groups has caused great uproar in many accounts o f w eak states.
Fearing problems with heterogeneity, the state engages in forceful hom ogenization, in
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which non-core groups seek th e popular, political incentive of self-determ ination. As
violence grows, the non-core or m inority groups start seeking support from various
external forces, and the provision of "safe havens" is the m ain "good" th a t one state can
provide against the rival. Similarly th e enem y state looks fo r similar groups unhappy
w ith the state, so it can utilize them in reciprocity (a tit-fo r-ta t policy) fo r w h a t rival state
is doing against it.14 In an instance in the case studies, M yanm ar blames India for
supporting Kachin rebels, and India blames M yanm ar over its shelter and support for
rebels from India's northeast province; in a similar situation, Pakistan and India blam e
each other for supporting insurgent groups in India's adm inistered Kashmir and
Pakistan's Baluchistan regions respectively.
Therefore, in the "paradox o f Decolonization, (for in s tan ce )... heterogeneous
political heritage was brushed aside in the rush by nationalists to seize the reins of
power of th e nation-states as defined politically and geographically" by the colonial
rulers.15 Particularly, Nigeria, which has m ore than 250 ethnic groups, these groups
w ere forced to join state as a process of colonization and decolonization outcomes.
Their diverse and past history is ignored, which allowed a num ber of centrifugal forces
to join anti-state and terrorist groups. As one of the country's richest in energy
resources, and w ith the highest fertility rate, Nigeria faces huge internal security threats
w ith transnational linkages betw een terrorist networks.
A nother similar account is the Asian context, w here in the case of M yanm ar, a
total of eight m ajor ethnic m inority groups and 135 sub-groups under the um brella of

14 Mylonas, The Politics o f N ation-B uilding: M aking Co-Nationals, Refugees, and M inorities, 35-36.
15 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 120.
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core ethnic groups, w ere forced to join the union during th e British period, and w ere
later trapped into internal w ar betw een th e center and periphery. In many accounts,
w eak and fragile states learned to dom inate small or non-core groups as ethnic
minorities. As highlighted, in M yanm ar the Burman m ajority (composition 70%)
dom inates other non-Burman ethnic groups, and in Pakistan, the province o f Punjab
dom inates over other provinces based on its high ethnic and political dom ination. Barry
Buzan (2007) has referred to these societies as "im perial states," in fed erative structure,
in which one ethnic group dom inates the o th er and continues to keep internal
fragm entation and pow er struggles among diverse ethnic groups; this consequently
weakens the social cohesion of the nation-building process.
Francis Fukuyama described the tw o ways th a t contribute to the political decay
of a political system; 1) ineffectiveness of institutions, and 2) Repatrim onalization.
About institutions, Fukuyama w rites th a t "institutions w ouldn't be institutions th a t is,
stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior - if th e y w ere not fu rth er reinforced by
strong social norms, rituals, and other kinds o f psychological investments in them ...in
case of disjunction (in investment process) cause political decay or
deinstitutionalization."16 The second form of political decay, in which ruling elites allow
favoring family, and friends to retain pow er through lineages, which "constantly put the
pressure to repatrim onialize the system."17 Here, Pakistan's model is a most suitable
scenario; its many institutions rem ain dysfunctional with dynastic politics em bedded in
the repatrim onialization of political culture.

16 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 452.
17 The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to th e French Revolution, 453.
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If looking at conditions for w hy political institutions are weak in fragile states, the
literature and evidence suggest th a t one reason is th e prolonged rule of authoritarian
rule establishing praetorian hierarchical structures th a t gradually cause th e decay of
political institutions. As aforem entioned, the paradox of w eak states is th a t th e y are
powerful in the category o f despotic pow er and its coercive capabilities, w hile w eak in a
non-coercive state capacity. In M yanm ar and Pakistan, the vacuum o f political
leadership (at the landscape of the political process) allowed military regimes to fill the
gap. For instance, in 1947, a fe w m onths before the independence of M yanm ar, national
hero Aung San was assassinated; com parably Pakistan's founding fath er, w ho wished to
see a dem ocratic Pakistan w ith equal rights fo r all th e citizens, died soon a fte r its
independence. These events plunged the new ly independent countries into political
chaos, providing m ilitary elites the opportunity to take political charge.
The patterns of m ilitary interventions are com mon across all the fragile states,
w hen they witnessed political chaos soon a fte r th e ir freedom and engaged in political
strife. The earlier postcolonial glimpse of Nigeria shares the common faith th a t m ilitary
intervention occurred in less than a decade o f independence and continued its influence
until 1998. Should it be assumed th a t the colonial rulers trusted the m ilitary elites to
retain social cohesion through the use of force, instead of allowing an evolutionary
process via democratic transitions? Since 2001 in Afghanistan, the international
com m unity has allocated a huge am ount of investm ent in resetting th e fragm ented
societal cohesiveness. A fter a decade of political and economic m anagem ent, the
international community is charging Afghans to take care o f their fu tu re — m ainly the
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country's newly raised 350,000 security personnel. The com parative im balance betw een
strong Afghan security and weak governm ent institutions suggests th a t the fu tu re th reat
is not from terrorist or internal political divides but from a "coming m ilitary coup" based
on belief, as in post-colonial times, th a t the m ilitarily must intervene to save the
dem ocracy.18 The case of a military coup in Afghanistan against the historic dem ocratic
transitions right now developing will prove the traditional trends of th e past, w hen most
newly independent weak states faced m ilitary interventions. These interventions
gradually hollowed the effectiveness of th e institutions.
Ironically, the m ilitary elites always legitim ize their domestic political ventures.
Now legitimacy at large does not mean the "civil society's acceptance o f the m ilitary's
role, but to the mechanism through which m ilitary justifies its political influence."19 For
exam ple, Former Pakistan Army Com m ander Gen. Khalid M ahm ud A rif argues th a t th e
Army's take-over o f dem ocratically-elected governm ents is in a way to avoid political
instability. Gen. Arif emphasized th a t Pakistan inherited political instability as part and
parcel since independence. It is because Pakistan com pletely lacked the proper
structure of a state; the flow of millions of Muslim refugees from India; the early death
of founding father (a leadership vacuum); nascent political system and internal disorder
fu rth er w eakened the system; and inexperienced, inefficient, or not properly trained
politicians caused the derailm ent o f dem ocratic system in country.20 Despite the fact
th a t the m ilitary always institutionally seeks justification fo r its interventions as an

18 Paul D. M iller, "Afghanistan’s Coming Coup? The M ilitary Isn’t Too W eak - It’s Too Strong," Foreign
Affairs (April 2, 2014).
19 Siddiqa-Agha, M ilita ry In c .: Inside Pakistan's M ilita ry Economy, 36.
20 Malik, Pakistan : Founder's Aspirations an d Today's Realities, 19.
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appropriate step to tackle existing problems o f political developm ent, it is significantly
im portant to understand th a t "political disorder as a cause o f the m ilitary's
intervention" as w ell.21
The duplicity in words and actions of praetorian guards have gradually lost th e
confidence of people's opinions about any promises made regarding dem ocratic
transitions or handing over power to civilian regimes. M eaning, by and large, m ilitary
interventions have promised im m ediate free and fair elections and a transfer power.
But, in contrast, once m ilitary elites com e to power, either they forget the promise or
enjoy political power, showing less inclination to handover th e power. In 1958 Gen.
Ayub Khan's m artial law in Pakistan and in 1962 Gen. Ne W in's m ilitary rule in M yan m ar
promised elections, as similarly their m ilitary predecessors follow ed th e patterns of
offering electoral pledges, but when it came to the elections, either th e elections w ere
rigged or did not oblige w ith results. In fact, during the electoral campaigns, the m ilitary
elites themselves became candidates to contest elections, as in 1960's Gen. Ayub
contest against Ms. Fatima Jinnah (sister o f Pakistan's founding father); and in th e case
of M yanm ar military-backed retired generals contents against Aung San Suu Kyi
(daughter of national hero and founding fath er) a fte r the revolution of 8888.
In both instances, in M yanm ar and Pakistan, the state machinery was utilized to
underm ine the populous support for civilians. For exam ple, in Pakistan, clerics w ere
asked to prom ulgate religious decrees (Fatw a) against the eligibility of the fem ale
contestant (Ms. Jinnah). These actions w ere planned to subside her popularity and avoid

21 Aziz, M ilita ry Control in Pakistan : The Parallel State, 59.
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any support she could have gained, as her blood relation to the country's founding
fa th e r M r. Jinnah. Likewise, in M yanm ar, Aung San Suu Kyi gained popular support and
used her fath er Aung San for m ore credibility. The m ilitary rule under the SLORC tried to
underm ine the rule or posture of her father. Pictures of her father w ere rem oved from
all buildings and a narrative was constructed th a t his past political contributions w ere
for the gain o f his ow n political interests.
Fearing the rise of dem ocratic voices, m ilitary regimes always avoid free and fair
elections and prefer controlled referendum s and legal approval from suprem e courts.
To avoid populous resistance, m ilitary regimes in M y an m ar and Pakistan moved th e ir
capitals from urban and populous centers to new ly built capitals close to m ilitary
headquarters. Pakistan shifted its capital from Karachi to Islamabad, and M yanm ar
shifted from Yangon to Naypyidaw. The official explanation argues th a t it was in the
strategic interests for the transfer of capitals.
Another interesting com m onality betw een M y an m ar and Pakistan is the state's
role in reorienting the state's narrative based on identity and ideology. As pointed out
and discussed in detail as evidence in chapters III and IV, m ilitary rulers in M yanm ar
started to revive glory of past fam ous kings and erected th e ir statues at various public
places. A parallel instance was m entioned before th at the Pakistani ruling elites,
especially during the 1980s, re-invented past religious glory introducing Arab, Central
Asian, and other Muslim warriors into the educational curriculum. They believed these
actions would allow them to gain popularity among the people, but in Pakistan's case,
many of the policies backfired and redirected public a support for religious narratives
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based on reviving orthodox thoughts on establishing caliphate. Today, many
conservative groups nurture these principles and em bedded with these ideas as a core
agenda to establish global caliphate. Results of these actions have flared up com m unal
and sectarian violence against minorities in M yanm ar and Pakistan.
The m ilitary elites in M yanm ar and Pakistan believe th a t it is th e ir responsibility
to protect the integrity o f the state, so it has the legitim ate right to decide which
domestic actor is m ore reliable. To protect the national interest, it is observed th a t
m ilitary regimes have supported stateless actors, as Tatm adaw is allegedly involved in
supporting drug lords, w hom in return supported th e econom y of M y an m ar during the
times of sanctions, supported financing energy ventures, and also helped M yanm ar's
security forces to fight against domestic ethnic rebels. The case of Tatm adaw is not
different; if com pared to Pakistan's geopolitical role in the first Afghan w ar in 1979
supporting Islamist Jihadist to fight against Soviets. Later th e same jihadists perceived as
a useful tool to seek its "strategic mirage" or so-called strategic depth and countering
irredentists in KPK and Baluchistan. To clarify, the nationalist groups fighting against the
center in M yanm ar and Pakistan are for political rights and over resource distribution;
while, in contrast, the stateless geostrategic assets of the past have developed an
ideological m otive seeking its im plem entation as th e rule o f law, like Taliban and
likeminded factions in Pakistan are asking fo r the imposition of Sharia law and challenge
the legal validity o f constitution o f Pakistan through their w ay of religious perspectives.
However, the problem becomes severe w hen states craft laws th a t are used on
political grounds against minorities. As, under the m ilitary regime in the 1980s evolved
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Pakistan's blasphemy law th at awarded th e m axim um death penalty. The law has
recently become a main tool to targ et m inorities or individuals with d ifferen t views on
various social and political issues. Alarmingly, the level of intolerance has grow n, and
even lawyers and judges now fear dealing w ith legal petitions that are linked w ith
blasphemy related m atters. Scores o f judges and lawyers are killed e.g. in 1996, Justice
Arif Bhatti (killed in Lahore, after clearing a case on blasphemy) and m any w ho have
tackled the cases simply left the country: such as, fo r exam ple, Justice Pervez AM Shah,
who issued a death sentence on M u m taz Qadari a security official w ho killed Governor
Salman Taseer fo r his views to am end th e law .22
It proves all three sets of institutions, the state, the rule of law, and an
unaccountable governm ent is on loose practice, which does not allow an enforcing
political order to retain a social cohesion in the state. In M yanm ar, the m ilitary has been
ruling since the early 1960s: the recent dem ocratic transition is a sham, and is, in fact,
an arm ored democracy run by retired m ilitary officials. In th e case of Pakistan, th e
political system has established a "com prom ised dem ocracy" betw een m ilitary and
civilian political elites. M ilitary rulers promised to fix socio-economic and political
problems, while alleging th a t these problem s are th e outcom e of inefficient political
elites and their chronic corruption. W hen the pledges are not fulfilled, it is because
military elites themselves found governing through the same political elites, as th e
military has never been strong enough to endure its political rule w ith o u t endorsem ent
from quasi-parliaments (and referendum s) and judiciary. Ultim ately parliam ent is drawn

22 Babar Sattar, "Judiciary and Tolerance," Dawn April 21, 2014.
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from the same feudal or traditional political elites, w hom have been blamed for
repeated involvem ent in political corruption.23 The recurrence of similar patterns,
involving the repatrim onialization o f the system, allows th e corrupt political elites to
enjoy pow er through lineages or dynastic politics.
In M yanm ar's case, the current ruling party is actually a king's party, and the
opposition party is on a compromising stage because Aung San Suu Kyi seeks
am endm ents in the constitution allowing her to run for head of governm ent in next
elections, as her deceased husband's foreign nationality disqualifies her. She also seems
compromising over the military's w eight in the assembly. In addition, many fo rm e r
m ilitary elites, w ho w ere purged during th e pow er struggle within th e m ilitary brass are
still in leadership problems with Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, M yanm ar's case is still an
unknown situation with many political mysteries.
Constitutionally or theoretically Pakistan's military, compared to M yanm ar's, is
accountable to the Prime Minister's office, but the "adm inistrative control o f the arm ed
forces and general military planning are areas w here the arm ed forces do not allow any
interference."24 In 1999, when then Prime M inister Nawaz Sharif planned m ilitary
downsizing and reduced the military's influence in politics, he was sacked. Similarly, in
2008, the governm ent of Pakistan's People Party (PPP) tried to shift th e control of InterServices Intelligence (ISI) under the ministry o f interior; this turned out be a bad plan, as
PPP governm ent back tracked from their decision within 24 hours. They decided to

23 Lieven, Pakistan : A Hard Country, 24.
24 Aziz, M ilitary Control in Pakistan : The Parallel S tate, 52.
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continue the old structure, in which theoretically ISI will re p o rt to Prime Minister's
office.25
The problem o f domestic politics is not only with m ilitary intervention, but th e
competing dynastic politics and rival feudal families dom inate the national political
parties. Therefore, they allow the m ilitary elites to form alliances w ith th em from tim e
to tim e. By doing so, the political decaying o f institutions and repatrim onializing of the
political system goes hand in hand. The dilem m a o f Pakistan's politics is th a t m ilitary
interventions are successful because oppositional political parties support th e loss o f
the ruling political party, and "a large politicized citizens are not offended by the
governm ent's demise, if not positively delighted w ith its o verth ro w ."26 For instance,
when Gen. M usharraf removed Nawaz Sharif, a num ber o f Pakistan's political parties
rem ained quiet and com fortable. No one resisted th e undemocratic step taken by th e
military, and even the late Benazir Bhutto rather blamed "Sharif of antagonizing and
provoking the m ilitary against his own governm ent."27 Unless there is a thorough shift in
political processes in these fragile states, institutions will have to rely on compromises
and pow er struggles betw een groups. Until then th e leadership and political vacuum will
continue to benefit and sustain the traditional status quo.
As noted in chapter II, with reference to Samuel Huntington's (1968) work,
mentions th at praetorianism has historical roots in various form s i.e. oligarchical to
radical praetorianism. Historical oligarchical praetorianism had decapitated th e state

25 Jones, Pakistan : Eye o f the Storm, 247.
26 Eric Nordlinger in Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque an d M ilitary, 129.
27 Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, 265.
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and created an institutional vacuum, so societies highly remained oligarchic and feudal.
Huntington fu rth er argued that th e oligarchical praetorianism evolved into radical
praetorianism, which dom inates social forces and destroys the indigenous political
institutions.28 To balance and m itigate th e direct role of th e military in dom estic politics,
Huntington's other (1957) classic w ork on the Soldier and the State: The Theory and
Politics o f Civil-M ilitary Relations, tried to deal w ith questions regarding civilian control
of the m ilitary. Huntington argued th a t th e professionalization of th e m ilitary is
necessary and the neutrality of the m ilitary in politics is much needed to ensure civil
control of the military. The military's focus on external borders will also keep them away
from domestic politics, so civil leadership can engage in evolving the social cohesion.
This process will require "equilibrium," if not, the m ilitary will always find ways to
intervene.29
Despite the fear th a t the m ilitary establishments in M yanm ar and Pakistan are
likely to continue their influence on domestic politics, the military elites understand the
dynamics of the contem porary political landscape is changing. M yanm ar's constitution,
w ritten under military rule, still provides 25 percent of weightage fo r the m ilitary in
parliam ent, which eventually retain its influence. In the case of Pakistan, th e m ilitary has
a compromising structural adjustm ent w ith political elites w ho manage the pow er like a
musical chair game. A gradual awakening o f political consciousness is in progress, which
is ultim ately the challenge of the traditional repressive systems and subjective parochial
political culture. As Christian Denvorpt agreed, traditionally the "closed, unresponsive,

28 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198-99.
29 The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations, 94.
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paranoia inducing governm ents run by a few individuals (i.e., autocracies) w ere the ...
systems believed to use repression in an e ffo rt to protect leaders as w ell as elites w ho
w e re otherwise incapable o f staying in pow er, (but now) political leaders carefully weigh
th e costs and benefits of coercive action," as the rapidly growing media and judicial
watchdogs have prom pted to reduce th e frequent usage o f coercive measures, though
not com pletely controlled y e t.30
Finally, the political decay of institutions can be controlled and m ended if
inclusive and accountable political systems are put emplace to make sure th e rule o f law
is im plem ented and respected at all levels. In doing so, chronic problems o f corruption
and internal violence are curtailed, and the m aturity of the political system w ill build a
favorable and guaranteed investm ent environm ent as well.

HYPOTHESIS II: THE BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS IS MORE LIKELY TO
EFFECT STATE FRAGILITY
Geography is an im portant variable th a t persistently engages th e statesm en's
perceptions originating from tangible and intangible sources of pow er and security
concerns. The literature on w eak and fragile states has generally ignored th e geographic
factor th at becomes a burden on statehood. As discussed in earlier chapters human
societies have clashed for geographical gains, w h ether th e ir struggle rem ained focused
on the hegemon's engagements into "the periphery of the earth" (Hans J. M orgenthau);
or for the "heartland-dom inated land power" (Halford Mackinder); or to gain control

30 Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," 4.
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over "m aritim e-oriented Rimland" (Nicholas John Spykman). Many o f these struggles
have become a cause of "state death." The colonial rulers conquered and caused a
num ber of small and medium states to die, and later colonial powers combined these
small entities into single nation-states during the decolonization process. Tanisha Fazal
(2007) has argued th at state death has declined a fte r 1945 because there are now fe w
opportunities o f direct conquest fo r land, or hardly any colonization process is in place
th a t could directly occupy a territory. In the post-1945 period, however, th e re is "an
increase in interventions to replace regimes and leaders w hen conquest is prohibited,
and also an increase in the num ber of state collapses as leaders exploit state resources
knowing th a t they face little or no risk o f conquest."31
W h a t does theory tell? A point noted earlier was th a t weak and fragile states as
rational actors weigh the cost and benefit through their asymmetrical pow er
relationship w ith the stronger one. States tend to balance against th e im m ediate
proxim ate threat, because "if states bandwagon w ith proximate powers, spheres of
influence come into being; if they balance, a checkerboard system of alliance arises."32
W h a t we see in many parts of the Third W orld is most states having disputes and
conflicts w ith their im m ediate neighbors. They are persistently engaged in balancing
each other, w hile preferring to provide a buffer zone or bandwagon w ith an external
player. For instance, Afghanistan and Pakistan tried to balance against each other,
similar to India and Pakistan, or India and China, and so fo rth , but at the same tim e

31 Fazal, State Death : The Politics and Geography o f Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, 8.
32 Grygiel, G reat Powers and Geopolitical Change, 17.
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Afghanistan and India aligned w ith the fo rm e r Soviet Union, while Pakistan aligned w ith
United States, buffering their territories against im m ediate neighbors.
A nother im portant dimension of geographical significance is geopolitics. If the
state is on the crossroads of a m ajor pow er's interest, it is hard to escape or change
reality until the state itself is internally stable and understands how to utilize its
geographical im portance as a strength. Jakub Grygiel explains that "states cannot alter
geopolitics to match their interests, or at best they are very limited in th e ir capacity to
do so. A change in geopolitics involves a change in routes or in the location of resources,
and a state cannot single-handedly effect such a change."33 Strategist A. T. M ahan's
emphasis on controlling sea-lanes can project the superiority of states' pow er, but it
should not underm ine the value of historical land routes. For instance, the traditional
silk route helped connect East Asia to Europe. In later years, the oil and gas pipeline and
railways became changing patterns of connection. M oreover, the new ways of air routes
provided a possible w ay to reach geographic points but rem ained an expensive option.
Geopolitics takes tim e to change, and it changes along the alterations introduced
through establishing new routes. For exam ple, Panama and the Suez Canal com pletely
changed the geopolitical importance of the surrounding a rea .34
It is pertinent to clarify th at m any political elites in w eak and fragile states are in
search of excuses and strategic scapegoats, so they can blam e others or external forces
to cover up their own domestic mistakes. According to Holsti, strategic scapegoating
generally invokes an "irrational hatred against others" and it involves "carefully

33 G reat Powers and Geopolitical Change, 25.
34 Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 28-29.
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calculated strategies by political leaders ... to distract th e ir publics from gross
m ism anagem ent at home by point to the [Others] as the source of th e ir problem ."35 By
finding strategic scapegoats, political elites try their best to preserve "the state, and
guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil w ar is to ... find a com mon enem y
w hom (the subjects) can m ake common cause."36 This study has avoided those
instances, which may show th a t the idea of using geography is to find a strategic
scapegoat. In fact, the study based on "weak pivot states" justifies the geopolitical
significance of the cases, which engage m ajor powers in th e region. In the cases of
M yanm ar and Pakistan, both countries reside on a "crush zone" or Cold W a r
"shatterbelt," which indirectly engaged the tw o super-powers during the Cold W a r. Still,
today the high fragm entation and increasing level o f violence exists in the region.
W hy is geography an im portant variable? Stew art Patrick concludes his book
W eak Links, Fragile States, Global Threat, an d International Security, w hile answering
the question, "Which w eak states m atter?" He answered th a t those w eak and fragile
states are most worrisom e, "in term s o f th e ir recent connection to transnational
terrorism , W M D proliferation, transnational crime, energy insecurity, an infectious
disease."37 Ironically Patrick narrows down his fears of state fragility: out o f fifty-six
w eak and fragile states, only a handful of th em are said to cause real problems.
W h eth er these problems are related to the opium trade in Afghanistan (Golden
Crescent) and Burma (Golden Triangle); proliferation issues in North Korea and Pakistan;

35 Ole R. Holsti, To See Ourselves as Others See U s : H ow Publics Abroad View the U nited States a fte r 9 /1 1
(Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 2008), 186.
36 Quoting French Philosopher Jean Bodin in ibid.
37 Patrick, W eak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 245.
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of global energy supply, w ith only 7 percent coming from these weak states;
transnational terrorist related threats from Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and
Yemen with lesser scale support to terrorist from Iraq, Bangladesh, M ali, and
M auritania. Patrick's explanation o f considering a fe w and handful of w eak and fragile
states could have m ore of an impact am ong a large group o f weak states, which
implicitly links the argum ent with the approach on geopolitics. As Patrick agrees to
notify a few names like instability in Iraq, Nigeria, Angola, Uzbekistan, and Turkm enistan
can disrupt energy supply and price control, which vindicates the im portance of
geographical pivots, though the author has not explicitly m ade the argum ent in
reference of geographical pivot-ness.38
Looking at the cases, both M y an m ar and Pakistan are geopolitical linchpin states
due to their geopolitical and geostrategic premises in Asia. Zbigniew Brzezinski's
emphasis on the new "global Balkans," fo rm er U.S. President G.W. Bush's initiative on
the "greater M iddle East" and fo rm e r Sectary of State Hillary Clinton's inclusion of the
Indian sub-continent in the definition of "Asia-Pacific," tim e and again show th a t the
selected cases M yanm ar and Pakistan reside on in drawing geographic pivots.39 Both are
im m ediate neighbors to regional powers India and China, which are also highly
dependent on the greater stability of and positive relations w ith M yanm ar and Pakistan.
Conversely M yanm ar and Pakistan's balanced and friendly policies tow ards India and
China help stabilize their political, security, and economic challenges.

38 W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 245-46.
39 Brzezinski, Second Chance : Three Presidents and the Crisis o f Am erican Superpower, 154; M arina
O ttaw ay and Thomas Carothers, "The G reater M iddle East Initiative: O ff to a False Start," (Carnegie
Endowm ent for International Peace, March 2004), 2; Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," 57.
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Overall, it is w idely argued th a t th e tw e n ty -firs t century is th e Asian Century
during which the economic shift tow ards Asia will allow Asian in flu e n tia l to gain
leverage and balance the other regional pow er centers o f th e world. Despite such talks,
there are many Asian countries th a t struggle with core economic and political
challenges. In addition, domestic challenges are supplem ented with interstate
geographical disputes, internal security issues in th e e n tire ty of Asia; for exam ple,
geographical disputes betw een China, Japan, Vietnam , Philippines, and o th e r
neighboring countries have always caused an optim um o f distrust betw een regional
m embers. As China seeks to gain a leadership role in its N e a r Seas (Yellow Sea, East
China Sea, and South China Sea), th e U.S. is rebalancing in Asia to keep its post w ar
leadership in the region.
W hile the Chinese policy o f encircling the entire region through strings o f pearls
persists for economic reasons, simultaneously the U.S and its allies have initiated a
tw elve nation regional trade pact called th e Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). China
considers the TPP a U.S. strategy of containm ent tow ards China; however, th e U.S. and
its allies will seek to establish a m aritim e code and trade alliance to bridle any
geostrategic assertiveness em anating from China. M o re specifically, China claims its
sovereign rights over Senkaku Islands, w hile Japan disputes it, under article 5 o f the
U.S.-Japan M utual Security Treaty; any fu tu re clash betw een Japan and China w ill be
directly or indirectly bound and will engage U.S. involvem ent in the region. In April 2014,
during President Obama's tour of the Asian region, he reaffirmed the long-term security
guarantee of its allies and affirm ed th at "America is and always will be a Pacific nation,"
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and th e United States will continue to hold the leading role.40 Similar to th e Pacific
region, geopolitical and security challenges have expanded elsewhere, including South
Asia, the M iddle East, and Central Asia. Severe problems in one state or region will
affect all. Therefore, fixing the problems of w eaker m em bers of Asia and finding
peaceful solutions for unresolved geopolitical disputes assures a brighter future for the
Asian Century.
Economic prospects through M y a n m ar and Pakistan are promising, if the tw o
countries are provided w ith, or em erged as, an economic and energy corridor to th e ir
powerful economic neighbors and the entire region. As discussed in chapters III and IV,
China has invested billions of US dollars on projects, and at the m om ent Chinese
companies have been supervising m ore contracts. 80 percent of China's oil flows
through Strait of Malacca, and 60 percent of China's energy supply comes from the
M iddle East. As mentioned earlier, establishing new routes, also changing the
geopolitics, similarly to China's plan to becom e less dependent of Strait o f Malacca
through establishing new ports and oil and gas pipeline through M y a n m ar and Pakistan,
will make it less dependent on routes th a t are under U.S. regulation or supervision.
Tracking the changing dynamics in the region dem onstrates how th e U.S. and India have
developed greater economic and diplom atic ties. For China, growing U.S. ties w ith India
is less worrying factor, "so long as th e ir [the Chinese] trading routes rem ain opened and

40 "Q&A: Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun Interviews President Obam a," Washington Post April 23, 2014.
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th e ir identity respected — including a territorial integrity about which they are likely to
rem ain most intransigent."41
On the ground, both M yanm ar and Pakistan have a long history o f fighting w ith
ethno-nationalists groups and recently religious groups as w ell; China is carefully dealing
w ith the growing insurgency in Xinxiang and lately a suicidal attack in Yunnan province.
China is not feared about balancing arch-rivals in th e region only but is seriously
concerned about pivotal neighbors like M yanm ar and Pakistan; should any "go astray or
fall apart in a radical surge of Islamic fervor or in th e counterrevolutionary takeo ver of a
nationalist arm y," it will shatter China's dream s of becoming a rising pow er.42
Democracies, such as the U.S. and India, have also shifted th e ir policies towards
M yanm ar; they have realized th at in the past supporting openly dem ocratic forces
prom pted the m ilitary regime drifting tow ards China, North Korea, and even tow ards
Russia w ith nuclear ambitions. Keeping th e tone low, the new policies tried to w ork
along the m ilitary backed Thein Sein's Union Solidarity and Developm ent Party (USDP),
w ho came into pow er a fte r 2010's election. India's "Look East policy" is trying to
counter China through investm ent in the energy and com m unication sectors and offers
defense equipm ent along w ith training facilities. New Delhi believes th a t Beijing's
"effort to establish an economic and political presence in M yanm ar's and Pakistan's
Indian Ocean ports are strategic ambitions of China to encircle India."43 India is
observing the growing influence of China around its w aters, as Beijing is engaged in

41 Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the W est," 42.
42 A W orld R ecast: An American M o m en t in a Post-Western Order, 75.
43 B rz e z in s k i, Strategic Vision : America and the Crisis o f Global Power, 1 6 3 -6 4 .
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helping to build or upgrade a num ber of ports around India: in Kyaupyu, Burma;
Chittagong, Bangladesh; Ham bantota, Sri Lanka; and G w adar, Pakistan, and
interestingly, most of these are not free from violent troublesom e activities.44
Compared to M yanm ar, Pakistan has becom e m ore violent in recent years, as
Baluch nationalists fight over economic and political grievances, and Pashtun's suffer in
FATA with the flow o f various radical and terrorist netw orks occupying th e ir areas.
Following recent elections, new governm ents in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan should
seize this opportunity to take a fresh start; otherwise: staying in the past will m aintain
th e burden of history and geography fo r the entire region. There are many o th e r serious
issues th at need attention, especially the acute problem o f the scarcity o f w a te r a
potential source of full-scale conflict. Pakistan has already gone to international
arbitrary courts over India's construction of the Baglihar dam and Kishanganga electricpow er plant on Chenab and Jhelum River. The flow of the rivers makes India an upper
riparian, but w ater o f these tw o rivers are exclusively allotted to Pakistan through Indus
W a te r Treaty on 1960. In addition, prolonging the Kashmir dispute and playing the
blame game over proxy support to rebels and insurgents on both sides have w idened
the trust gap. The result was Pakistan's elected cabinet deciding to aw ard India with
MFN status, but a lack of trust w ithheld it.
Finally, the first case M yanm ar is trying to em ploy a policy of not becoming
dependent on one state, so it is carefully picking and selecting partners as everyone is
putting their bid. M yanm ar is welcom ing FDI, projects, and developm ent. However, its

44 Kaplan, The Revenge o f G eography; W h at the M a p Tells Us A bout Coming Conflicts and the Battle
against Fate, 250.
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harsh stance tow ards ethnic minorities and Rohingya is deplorable. Internally
M yanm ar's geographical units are for the tim e being quiet due to a te m p o ra ry ceasefire.
The sooner the fight starts, the m ore foreign investors feel insecure, similar to w h a t is
happened to Pakistan since 2005, w here th e height of te rro r and suicide attacks badly
affected the economy.
The second case Pakistan can benefit from its resources and provide an
economic corridor to the region, but it must put its house in order. Changing dynamics
in the M iddle East are scary too. As the intensity o f sectarian fighting is gaining
m om entum , Pakistan can play a geostrategic role, betw een Saudi Arabia and Iran, as
Pakistan did betw een Washington and Beijing during the Cold War. If these issues are
not resolved, Pakistan will be badly affected, not through transnational affects, but from
within its own sectarian groups.

IS CONTINUOUS STATE FRAGILITY MENDABLE?
Fixing fragile states requires a serious strategy. The socio-economic, political,
and security conditions are more deplorable for those w ho live in violent situations than
those w ho fear the intensity of threat. The spillover effects are worrisome fo r regional
countries and beyond, but hum anitarian conditions are m ore threatened by th e affected
population. The perform ance of w eak states has been poor since the decolonization
period and should be considered a structural problem . If so, then Samuel Huntington's
w ork strongly advocated a path of political developm ent, w hile ignoring the
m odernization process.
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Assessing Huntington's argum ent w ith reference to contem porary tim es shows
th a t economic developm ent and m odernization are essential features enhancing and
strengthening political and adm inistrative capacities of state. Francis Fukuyama suggests
th a t political developm ent takes the lead in stabilizing institutions, i.e. state building,
rule of law, and democratic accountability enforce th e political order. How ever,
Fukuyama fu rth er argues th a t "beyond the establishm ent o f a state th a t provide for
basic order, greater administrative capacity is also strongly correlated w ith econom ic
grow th."45 Fukuyama links higher scale corruption in institutions to low salaries and
incentives in poor and w eak states.
How to fix the problem? James Piazza has synthesized recom m endations of
earlier works on state fragility, as th e earlier contributions suggest various options
"favor of robust m ulti- or unilateral intervention to prevent state failure and proscribe a
range of policy courses, such as: building stable dem ocratic institutions, increasing
economic assistance, m ultilateral m ilitary intervention."46 These options are valid, but
the geopolitical troubles and unresolved regional political disputes still risk peace and
stability.
First o f all, the duty of the state is to provide political goods to the population,
which includes security and the freedom of expression of its citizens. The state is
responsible for maintaining order and the supremacy of th e law; if it fails, th e integrity
of nation-hood is in question. In a num ber o f cases like East Timor, Sudan, Rwanda, and
many others, poor performing states have experienced foreign interventions and

45 Fukuyama, The Origins o f Political O rd e r: From Prehuman Times to th e French Revolution, 469.
45 Piazza, "Incubators o f Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 470.
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peacekeeping forces to safeguard th e human rights abuse on hum anitarian grounds.
Now, every w eak or low perform ing state does not necessarily require peacekeeping
forces or interventions. In many cases, interventions are also resisted based on issues of
sovereignty; article 2 (7) of United Nations (UN ) Charter avoids intervention in the
domestic affairs o f any state. How ever, the UN has made interventions w hen
responding to hum anitarian crises such as mass scale genocide, fam ine situations, and
natural disasters.
Francis Fukuyama and many others have suggested th a t if th e re is a large-scale
hum anitarian crisis and human rights violations persist, then the international
com m unity has "not just the right but the obligation to intervene."47 In Pakistan, w hen a
massive earthquake hit in 2005 and disastrous floods ravaged the hum an settlem ents
and destroyed the crops in 2010, Pakistan allow ed th e flow o f foreign aid and
hum anitarian interventions to help w ith rescue operations, rehabilitation processes, and
capacity building of affected populations. In contrast, we have cases like in M yan m ar,
w here according to the UN, thousands of Rohingya people are suffering from
m alnutrition and health problems, and hundreds o f thousands of refugees belonging to
Karen, the Shan, the Karenni, the Kachin, the W ah, the M o n , the Rohingya groups are
displaced due to internal war. They are seeking hum anitarian interventions, which the
state does not allow due to its own security reasons. Therefore, interventions have their
own limitations.

47 Fukuyama, State-Building : Governance and W orld Order in the 21st Century, 97; Ignatieff, "Intervention
and State Failure," 119.

340

Foreign aid has been the main tool o f providing assistance and helping w eak and
fragile states sustain their institutional capacities. Some authors suggest th a t foreign aid
is ineffective, w hile other believe foreign aid is helpful if allocated in th e right direction
and the right place. Um ar W ahedi and M arina Rabinowitz argued th a t "foreign aid is
ineffective with respect to economic perform ance... (Because) economically w eak states
m ay strongly fail to enhance private economic activity through the provision of good
institutions."48 The work o f Umar W ahedi and M arina Rabinowitz has analyzed under
w h at conditions foreign aid becomes ineffective: first, those "countries th a t are prone
to insurgencies and have conditions such as the presence o f rough terrain which allows
insurgents to form their m ovem ent w ith o u t being destroyed at an early stage," and
second, "when there is an inequitable distribution o f resources or th e control of local
assets w ithout participation of benefit;" e.g. the author refers to the Chinese
construction of deep-sea port at Gwadar, which will becom e a dispute betw een
Islamabad and Baluch nationalists over the issue o f the inequitable distribution of
revenue and resources 49 A problem of a similar nature is gradually arising in the Dawei
area of the Tanintharyi Region (form er Tenasserim Division) in M yanm ar, w here
Thailand is building a huge industrial hub, a deep-sea port to connect Thailand, China,
Laos, and Cambodia with the rest of the region. Local resistance has already started not
for resource distribution, but mainly environm ental damages for the area.

48 Ayesha W ahedi and Marina Arbetm an, "Will Foreign Aid Help Curb Terrorism in Pakistan?," in The
Performance o f Nations, ed. Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 197.
49 "Will Foreign Aid Help Curb Terrorism in Pakistan?," in The Performance o f Nations, ed. Jacek Kugler
and Ronald L. Tammen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), 198.
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Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone suggest th a t foreign aid is helpful if the
program supports the dem ocratization process in w eak societies. Suvan and Tirone
argued and analyzed th at foreign aid investm ent in dem ocratic programs have
experienced less chance o f internal violence or civil w ar th e n those th a t did not receive
th e aid for democracy. The spending on democracy prom otion program under the U.S.
Agency for International Developm ent (USAID) has climbed from $121 million to $722
million per year during 1990 to 2 0 0 3 ."50 Suvan and Tirone share the exam ple of 1999,
when the USAID played a key role during the political transition in Indonesia, in which
th e pow er shifted from Suharto's regime to democracy. USAID ensured the
im plem entation of dem ocratic reforms, th e decentralization of power, protection o f
minorities, and the accountability o f political systems at th e grassroots level, which
helped to avert any backlash in the pow er transition.51 However, w ith Pakistan one o f
largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid, then w hy is th e situation still volatile? Which o f
Um ar W ahedi and Marina Rabinowitz's tw o explanations should apply in a Pakistani
context? The problem w ith Pakistan's case is th at th e foreign aid is mostly spent in th e
defense sector, not the civilian. If there is a plan to spend th e aid in civil society projects,
th e political elites extract foreign aid as a resource fo r personal gains.
Facilitating democratic transitions in weak and fragile states will be a suitable
stride towards the political m aturity of a system. Instead o f interventions to contain
contagious effects, ideally the global com m unity should step forward and facilitate th e

50 Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone, "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does
Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," American Journal o f Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 234.
51 "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?,"
American Journal o f Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 235.
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process. It is argued, "the successor to a doctrine o f containm ent must be a strategy of
enlargem ent— enlargem ent of the world's free com m unity o f market dem ocracies."52
Indonesia has experienced a prolonged dictatorship under Suharto, but soon an
Indonesian transition determ ined to adopt dem ocratic values and m arket econom y will
positively change Indonesia's course of action. Since the transition has begun in 1999,
Indonesia has leaped from its then position o f the world's tw en ty seventh largest to
today's sixteenth largest economy, and in the coming decade, Indonesia is expected to
surpass leading economies like Germ any and the UK.53 It shows that the dem ocratic
"formula of th a t linked democracy w ith peace, and peace w ith prosperity, appeared to
w ork well enough" as the rest of the world feels politically conscious th a t dem ocratic
values are the most reliable w ay out of the clutches of authoritarian rule and poor
perform ing economies.54
It is im portant to facilitate the growing political consciousness of w eak and
fragile societies so a long term bond can grow out of it and evolve a m utual trust
towards the facilitator, rather than as a perceived as intervention. Analyzing th e im pact
of successful transitions in w eak societies, Larry Diamond explains th a t "Im proving
governance effects directly the strengthening state capacity; liberalizing and
rationalizing economic structures; securing social and political order w hile m aintaining
basic freedom ; improving horizontal accountability and controlling corruption."55

52 Justin Logan and Preble Christopher, "Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing
Nation-Building Office," in Policy Analysis (CATO Institute, 2006), 2.
53 Abdul-Latif Halimi, "The Regional Implications of Indonesia's Rise," The Diplomat April 10, 2014.
54 Serfaty, A W orld Recast: An American M o m e n t in a Post-Western Order, 14.
55 Larry Jay Diamond, Consolidating the Third W ave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997), xxiii.

343

Diamond informs th a t most Third W orld states practice "delegative democracies,"
meaning they lack "horizontal accountability and provides benign condition for
corruption. Absence of accountability in a state engages in power struggle betw een
institutions and flares up other social and ethnic issues. Effective pluralistic dem ocratic
political culture assures the protection of individual's rights, respecting and ensuring
rule of law, safe guarding the citizen's interest, assimilating marginalized groups, and
institutionalizing the horizontal accountability of different branches of officeholders to
one another (check and balances), and abolishing th e reserved and self-legitim ized
domains of pow er exercised by either m ilitary or o th er social and political forces th a t
has no problem of encountering the accountability to the electorate."56
The argum ent th a t successful dem ocratic transitions in weak states brings
domestic peace and stability should be analyzed w ith the idea of w h e th e r democracy
precedes stability or if first stability is necessary to initiate democratic initiatives. To
respond to the argum ent, the general tendency is to believe that dem ocracies do not
fight against democracies, which vindicates the idea that democratic institutions help
stabilize society and enhance levels of cooperation with o th e r democracies in the region
and beyond the region. During the period of decolonization, most w eak and fragile
states w ere polarized due to a bipolar w orld, and most of th e newly independent states
faced military interventions and dictatorships. The great powers m aintained the status
quo and continued to support undem ocratic regimes, until recently w hen th e politically
awakened world challenged the status quo in some parts o f the Third W orld. A nother

56 Ib id .
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explanation informs th a t the growing "dem ographic insecurities," due to "youth bulge,"
will severely provoke political unrests in risky societies. This means th a t the countries
w ith current turm oil have a population w ith m ore than sixty percent below 2 4 years of
age. The recent study shows th at out of 7.2 billion o f the world's population, 44 percent
is below 24 years o f age and 26 percent is below 14 years o f age; interestingly, 82
percent of this youth live in weak and fragile states specifically in sub-Saharan Africa and
Asia.57 The unsatisfied youth are dem anding change from leadership; th erefo re
investm ent in education fo r democracy will payoff well; otherwise, ongoing political
unrests and growing unem ploym ent could be a m ore serious issue. For exam ple, Egypt,
whose population includes 60 percent below 30 years of age, has in recent years
gathered hundreds of thousands against 30 years o f dictatorial rule; these political
transitions are serious in s nature and should be dealt accordingly.58 O ther alarm ing
instances include the forcing of young children to w ork as soldiers in conflicts in Africa
and Asia; according to an estim ate out of 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 children soldiers, M yanm ar's m ilitary
regime is believed to recruit highest number: 7 0,0 00 boys serve in th e m ilitary and are
lured through economic incentive and forced to join m ilitary.59
An a tte m p t to traditionally support dictatorial rule through interventions will
cause more trouble to the interest o f great powers and th e region itself and will allow
th e "rise of illiberal democracy" w ith w eak institutions and poor governance structures.
Foreign aid programs, like the Kerry-Lugar Bill, primarily focus on civil society programs
37 "Is Youth Bulge a "Magic Indicator" for th e Failed States Index?," Wilson Center,
http://w w w .new securitybeat.org/2013/10/youth-bulge-m agic-indicator-failed-statesindex/#.U0W CIfldV8E.
58 Kingsley, "Does a Growing Global Youth Population Fuel Political Unrest?."
59 Hillier and W ood, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control," 48.
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such as health and education which preferably become fruitful decisions for prom oting
global norms of inclusive democracy. Before coming to the office of President, Obam a
had established his "Soft Security Agenda" to avoid w ar or conflict-oriented
peacemaking and nation-building processes. Then Senator Obama believed th a t bases
of Soft Security Agenda would facilitate to "serve our (US) long-term security interests
then we will have to go beyond a m ore prudent use of m ilitary force. W e will have to
align our policies to help reduce the spheres of insecurity, poverty, and violence around
the world, and give more people a stake in the global order th a t has served us so
w ell."60

CONCLUSION
For centuries, politics has been in transition, but in recent decades, th e pace of
transition has been accelerated. During these transitions political societies are
continuously witnessing th e birth, grow th, peak, senescence, and decay of societies,
either due to God-made or m an-m ade reasons. The difference betw een earlier epochs
of transitions and today's political activities reside in a bit o f different settings of tim e.
For instance, compared to the past, today's societies cannot ignore a state decaying in
isolation. The scale of the ramifications is much higher than ever before.
To answer the research question of this project, literature on a conceptual
fram ew ork helped to understand th e role, duties, and responsibilities o f states in the
contem porary tim e period. The hypothetical discussions based on endogenous and

60 Michael O'Hanlon, "Obama's W eak and Failing States Agenda," The Washington Q uarterly 35, no. 4
( 2012 ):

68 .
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exogenous factors allowed the address o f challenges and conditionalities of
contem porary weak, but pivot states in term s of state fragility. The discussions draw
some conclusions through seeking explanations regarding going back to th e colonial
episodes of w eak states to contem porary era challenges.
First, most of today's w eak and fragile states are grappling w ith the num ber of
domestic and regional issues that are actually remnants o f being colonial past. The
form ation of nations and then states through surgical processes in various parts o f the
Third W orld im m ediately became a source of conflicts. T here are th re e im portant areas
th a t cause w eak and fragile states to suffer: 1) ethnic compositions w ere done on th e
basis of geopolitical interests, which forcefully divided or included independent states
into a bigger dominion, e.g. in Nigeria, M yanm ar, Pakistan, and a num ber of other cases
faced the challenges of irredentist struggles based on ethno-nationalism . Therefore,
authors such as Jeffery Herbst te rm the creation o f such states as nothing m ore than a
legal fiction th at challenged the vertical authority and legitimacy of statehood most of
the tim e 2) the geographical disputes continued, as colonial rulers allow ed th e newly
independent states to decide on such claims with th e ir neighbors; this gave birth to
conflicts in the region over resources and land, e.g. the Kashmir dispute lingers for
decades and became more complex and dangerous due to th e nuclearization of the
region. 3) The continuation of colonial legacies or institutions that enabled authoritarian
regimes and dynastic politics to take over the political process further w eakening th e
institutions and accountable systems of governance.
Second, feeble socio-economic conditions due to bad governance and wrong
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policies turned into a poverty trap for the population. For instance, the Buddhist
Socialism in M yanm ar under Gen. Ne W in in 1960s and Islamic Socialism in Pakistan
introduced under Prime M inister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1970s rapidly nationalized the
institutions and industries in the tw o countries th a t forced foreign and domestic
investors to suffer at their peaks, w hile the decision w eaved the poverty w eb for th e ir
own people. The downfall of economic transitions can be m easured through falling
economic output, as a result of early years' nationalization processes th a t eventually
turned M yanm ar's status as "the rice bowl of Asia" to a "beggar w ith a golden bow l."
Likewise, Pakistan's golden days of economic progress stumbled into m urky economic
days.
Third, during the Cold W a r period many w eak states w ere governed by dictators,
and for geostrategic reasons and positions of states at the crossroads of m ajor powers'
interests, the global powers maintained the status quo through allowing dictators to
rule these countries. This resulted over the period of tim e in the support of
undemocratic forces to strengthen the roots of praetorianism and led to an
asymmetrical grow th of institutions th a t lacked checks and balances.
The consequences of the above-m entioned developm ents are prevailing
frustrations and political deprivations in w eak states reflected through the
unprecedented rise of violence, widening rich and poor gap, corruption, lack of proper
justice, and absence of punitive measures for criminals encouraging crime and violence,
high m ortality rates, spreading epidem ic diseases, human rights violations, and growing
intolerance against non-core groups. In order to reduce th e intensity o f threats and
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violence, the study recommends creating spheres o f socializations at intra-state and
interstate levels.
At the intra-state level, spheres of socialization allow the dem ocratization
process at the grassroots level, which will help to ow n the system and develop
synchronization betw een domestic values and global norms o f democracy. In this
regard, if external support takes th e role of facilitation to advocate education for
democracy, it will become a beacon of equality and inclusiveness fo r all the citizens. The
role of facilitator is a proactive approach to dealing with issues of fragility, instead of
waiting fo r the w orst scenario and becoming interventionist to address th e problem .
Facilitation can improve a positive relation on the basis o f mutual respect, w hile in
opposite scenarios the adversaries always w ait to exploit th e situation. Here th e natural
calamities are exceptions, which anticipates hum anitarian interventions as a last m inute
call from nature.
Successful transitions eventually support a political culture th a t cultivates
tolerance, political trust, and a willingness to compromise on diverse opinions. These
processes of political developm ent support the enhancem ent of capacities o f state, its
institution, and the entire political system. As Larry Diamond has nicely portrayed the
effectiveness of th e social contract betw een a participatory citizen and state in following
lin e s ,:
....the "citizens of new democracies form judgm ents about th e ir political systems
based not only on w h a t they deliver economically, b u t also on the degree to
which they deliver valued political goods: freedom , order, a rule of law,
accountability, representativeness, and overall e ffic a c y ... citizens expect th eir
democracies to govern dem ocratically, in com pliance with th e constitution and
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the laws, and to govern efficaciously, in term s o f choosing and im plem enting
policies th a t address the most im portant problems th e society confronts."61
At the interstate level, the spheres o f socialization allow the w eak states,
especially the pivot states, to integrate themselves into the m arket econom y, facilitate
economic interdependency through transparency, and integrate into sub-regional,
regional, and then the global level to tackle the burden of geography, which can become
opportunity. Both cases, M yanm ar and Pakistan are right now at th e crossroads of a
m ajor power shift. New economic corridors are going to shift geopolitical dynamics, and
accordingly pow er politics will shift as well. Both states success in creating spheres of
socialization w ith a greater integration will be beneficial; becoming partisan or choosy
may cause fragility to continue.
Finally, th e study finds room for fu rth e r research in the analysis o f th e conditions
of state fragility in the future. W h a t we see in most of the w eak and fragile states is a
struggling w ith th e fundam entals o f a nation-state, like issues of identity, nationbuilding, and state-building. Looking ahead at years to com e, one may affirm a unique
junction point o f human history: First, m ore than fifty percent of world's pollution will
start to leave urban areas; this will change the traditional supply and dem and balance,
core and periphery debate, and raise issues and norms for cosmopolitan systems of
states and societies. Second, growing environm ental challenges and th e scarcity of
resources are turning into potential threats, mostly looming in w eak societies. Last but
not least, the emerging issues of demographic insecurities as briefly highlighted dem and
more research and additions to th e literature.

61 Diamond, Consolidating the Third W ave Democracies, xxiv.
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APPENDIX B: M r. JINNAH'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
OF PAKISTAN AUGUST 11, 1947

M r. President, Ladies and Gentlem en!
I cordially thank you, w ith the utm ost sincerity, fo r th e honour you have
conferred upon me - th e greatest honour th a t is possible to confer - by electing me as
your first President. I also thank those leaders w ho have spoken in appreciation o f my
services and th e ir personal references to me. I sincerely hope that w ith your support
and your co-operation w e shall make this Constituent Assembly an exam ple to the
world. The Constituent Assembly has got tw o main functions to perform . The first is the
very onerous and responsible task of fram ing the future constitution of Pakistan and the
second of functioning as a full and com plete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature
of Pakistan. W e have to do the best w e can in adopting a provisional constitution for the
Federal Legislature of Pakistan. You know really th a t not only we ourselves are
wondering but, I think, the w hole world is w ondering at this unprecedented cyclonic
revolution which has brought about the clan of creating and establishing tw o
independent sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent. As it is, it has been
unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history o f the w orld. This m ighty sub
continent w ith all kinds of inhabitants has been brought under a plan which is titanic,
unknown, unparalleled. And w h a t is very im portant w ith regards to it is th a t w e have
achieved it peacefully and by means o f an evolution o f the greatest possible character.
Dealing w ith our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any w ellconsidered pronouncem ent at this m om ent, but I shall say a few things as they occur to
me. The first and the forem ost thing th a t I would like to emphasize is this: rem em ber
that you are now a sovereign legislative body and you have got all th e powers. It,
therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your
decisions. The first observation th a t I would like to make is this: You will no doubt agree
w ith me th a t the first duty of a governm ent is to m aintain law and order, so th a t th e life,
property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by th e State.
The second thing that occurs to m e is this: One of th e biggest curses from which
India is suffering - 1do not say th at other countries are free from it, but, I think our
condition is much worse - is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. W e must put
th at down w ith an iron hand and I hope th a t you will take adequate measures as soon
as it is possible for this Assembly to do so.
Black-marketing is another curse. W ell, I know th a t black-m arketeers are
frequently caught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or som etim es fines only
are imposed. Now you have to tackle this m onster, which today is a colossal crime
against society, in our distressed conditions, w hen w e constantly face shortage o f food
and other essential commodities of life. A citizen w ho does black-marketing commits, I
think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous o f crimes. These blackmarketeers are really knowing, intelligent and ordinarily responsible people, and when
they indulge in black-marketing, I think they ought to be very severely punished,
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because th e entire system of control and regulation of foodstuffs and essential
commodities, and cause wholesale starvation and w an t and even death.
The next thing th a t strikes m e is this: Here again it is a legacy which has been
passed on to us. Along w ith many other things, good and bad, has arrived this great evil,
the evil of nepotism and jobbery. I w an t to m ake it quite clear that I shall never tolerate
any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any any influence directly of indirectly brought to bear
upon me. W henever I will find th a t such a practice is in vogue or is continuing anyw here,
low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it.
I know th e re are people w ho do not quite agree w ith the division of India and
the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now th a t it
has been accepted, it is th e duty of everyone of us to loyally abide by it and honourably
act according to the agreem ent which is now final and binding on all. But you must
rem em ber, as I have said, th at this mighty revolution th a t has taken place is
unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling th a t exists betw een th e tw o
communities w herever one com m unity is in m ajority and th e other is in m inority. But
th e question is, w h eth er it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than w h a t has
been done, A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there
are sections of people w ho may not agree w ith it, w h o m ay not like it, but in my
judgem ent there was no other solution and I am sure fu tu re history will record is verdict
in favour of it. And w hat is more, it will be proved by actual experience as w e go on th at
was the only solution of India's constitutional problem . Any idea o f a united India could
never have worked and in my judgem ent it would have led us to terrific disaster. M aybe
th a t view is correct; maybe it is not; th at remains to be seen. All the same, in this
division it was impossible to avoid the question of m inorities being in one Dom inion or
th e other. Now th a t was unavoidable. There is no other solution. N ow w h a t shall w e do?
Now, if w e w an t to make this great State o f Pakistan happy and prosperous, w e should
wholly and solely concentrate on the w ell-being of the people, and especially o f the
masses and the poor. If you will w ork in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying th e
hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and w ork to g e th e r in a spirit
th a t everyone of you, no m atter to w hat com m unity he belongs, no m a tte r w h at
relations he had w ith you in the past, no m a tte r w h a t is his colour, caste or creed, is
first, second and last a citizen of this State w ith equal rights, privileges, and obligations,
there will be on end to the progress you will make.
I cannot emphasize it too much. W e should begin to work in th a t spirit and in
course of tim e all these angularities of the m ajority and m inority com m unities, the
Hindu com m unity and the Muslim com m unity, because even as regards Muslim s you
have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have
Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed if
you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the w ay of India to attain the
freedom and independence and but for this w e would have been free people long long
ago. No pow er can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 4 0 0 million souls in
subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody
could have continued its hold on you for any length of tim e, but for this. Therefore, w e
must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your tem ples, you are
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free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State o f Pakistan.
You may belong to any religion or caste or creed th a t has nothing to do w ith the
business of the State. As you know, history shows th a t in England, conditions, some tim e
ago, w ere much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and
the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now th e re are some States in existence
w here there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class.
Thank God, w e are not starting in those days. W e are starting in the days w h e re th ere is
no discrimination, no distinction betw een one com m unity and another, no
discrimination betw een one caste or creed and another. W e are starting w ith this
fundam ental principle th at w e are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people
o f England in course of tim e had to face th e realities of the situation and had to
discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon th e m by the governm ent of their
country and they w e n t through th a t fire step by step. Today, you m ight say w ith justice
th at Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; w h a t exists now is th a t every man is
a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members o f the Nation.
Now I think w e should keep th a t in front of us as our ideal and you will find th a t
in course of tim e Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because th a t is th e personal faith of each individual,
but in the political sense as citizens of the State.
W ell, gentlem en, I do not wish to take up any m ore of your tim e and thank you
again for the honour you have done to me. I shall always be guided by th e principles of
justice and fairplay w ithout any, as is put in the political language, prejudice or ill-will, in
other words, partiality or favouritism. M y guiding principle will be justice and com plete
im partiality, and I am sure th at w ith your support and co-operation, I can look forw ard
to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations o f the w orld.
Source: Columbia University W eb site:
h ttp://w w w .colum bia.edu/itc/m ealac/pritch ett/O O islam links/txt jinnah assembly 1947
.html. Feb 11th, 2014.

388
VITA
Tasawar ul-Rahim Baig
Graduate Program in International Studies
BAL 7045
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 2 3 5 2 9-00 8 6

Academic Qualification:
•

PhD studies at the Graduate Program in International Studies, Old Dominion
University, Norfolk, VA during 2 009-2014.

•

M.A. from the Center for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University,
Sweden during 2006-2008.

•

M.A. from the D epartm ent o f International Relations, University o f Karachi,
Pakistan during 2002-2003.

•

B.A. (Honours) from the D epartm ent of International Relations, University of
Karachi, Pakistan during 1999-2001.

Professional Experience:
•

Full tim e faculty m em ber at D epartm ent of International Relations, Karakoram
International University, Gilgit Pakistan since 2003.

Awards & Honors:
•

W on Fulbright Scholarship (2009-2014) to pursue PhD in International Studies in
USA.

•

Best University Teacher Award received on 26th January 2008. The Aw ard was
conferred by Dr. Atta ur Rehman, Chairman Higher Education Commission,
Pakistan at HEC, Islamabad.

